STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY



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By

KRISHNACHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA

Vol. I

Edited By

GOPINATH BHATTACHARYYA

Presidency College, Calcutta

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

These 'Studies in Philosophy' represent all the published and only a few of the unpublished philosophical writings of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya. There remains over an immense mass of manuscripts which will, perhaps, remain unpublished for all time to come.

The present volumes comprise the following tracts:—

Vol. I

No.	Title	
1.	Studies in Vedāntism	(Published in 1907)
2.	Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā	(„ 1925)
3.	The Advaita and its spiritual significance	(„ 1936)
4.	Studies in Sāṁkhya Philosophy	(Unpublished)
5.	Studies in Yoga Philosophy	(")
6.	The Jaina theory of Anekānta	(Published in 1925)
7.	The Concept of Rasa	(Unpublished)

Vol. II

No.	Title	
1.	The Subject as Freedom	(Published in 1930)
2.	The Concept of Philosophy	(„ 1936)
3.	The Concept of the Absolute and its alternative forms	(„ 1934)
4.	Studies in Kant	(Unpublished)
5.	Some aspects of negation	(Published in 1914)
6.	The place of the indefinite in Logic	(„ 1916)
7.	Definition of 'Relation' as a category of existence	(Unpublished)
8.	Fact and thought of fact	(Published in 1931)
9.	Knowledge and Truth	(„ 1928)
10.	Correction of error as a logical process	(„ 1931)
11.	The false and the subjective	(„ 1932)
12.	The objective interpretation of percept and image	(„ 1936)
13.	The Concept of Value	(„ 1934)
14.	The reality of the future	(Unpublished)

Each of the above tracts is preceded by an Analysis. The first one was made by the author himself and the others have been done by the editor. Of the foot notes, those marked in numerals are by the editor.

In presenting these studies the editor is happy to offer his most grateful thanks to the enterprising publisher, Sree Sushil Kumar Basu, the proprietor of Messrs. Progressive Publishers. It was he who very generously volunteered to undertake the publication of the book and see it through the press.

My warm thanks are also due to Professor G. R. Malkani, the Director of the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner (Bombay) for his ready permission to reprint 'The Subject as Freedom' which was originally published by the Institute; to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and Messrs. George Allen & Union Ltd. for their kind permission to reprint from their 'Contemporary Indian Philosophy' the essay 'The Concept of Philosophy'; and to the R. K. Mission for their permission to reprint 'The Advaita and its spiritual significance' which first appeared in their 'Cultural heritage of India'. The editor is also obliged to a pupil of his and to his daughter for their assistance in preparing the copy for the press.

It is very much regretted that a number of typographical errors have crept in in spite of earnest endeavours to avoid them. In the 'Errata' at the end of the volume, only the major errors have been listed and corrected.

THE EDITOR

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ABBREVIATIONS

BV = Bhoja-Vṛtti
SK = Sāṁkhya-Kārikā
SPB = Sāṁkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣyam
SS = Sāṁkhya-Sūtram
STK = Sāṁkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī
TV = Tattva-Vaiśāradī
YB = Yoga-Bhāṣyam
YV = Yoga-Vārtikam

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION TO VOL. I

Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya was born in a Brāhmaṇa family of Serampur (Bengal) on the 12th of May, 1875. The grandfather, Umākānta Tarkālaṅkāra was a Sanskrit scholar trained in the indigenous seminaries of learning. The father Kedarnath had not much of academic education and was employed in a mercantile house at Calcutta. He was a man of slender means with a numerous family to maintain and was hardly in a position to bear the educational expenses of his children. Krishnachandra was sent to the local school at the usual age and after passing the Entrance Examination of the Calcutta University in 1891, he entered the Presidency College at Calcutta. He graduated with triple Honours in 1896 and was awarded the P. R. S. of the University in 1901. The academic record during the school and college periods was uniformly brilliant.

Krishnachandra joined the Education Department of the Government of Bengal as a Lecturer in Philosophy in 1898, and after serving with great distinction as a teacher of Philosophy in almost all the Government Colleges in Bengal, he retired from service as the Officiating Principal of Hughly College in 1930. He joined the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner (Bombay) as its Director and remained there from 1933 to 1935. He also acted as the George V Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at the Calcutta University from 1935 to 1937.

Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya was warm and generous in his temperament but was rather shy and was almost 'afraid' of publicity. He was nevertheless a man of very strong principles and also of strong likes and dislikes. He had great independence of spirit and he never submitted to official bullying. He was a genial personality and those who came in close contact with him were profoundly attracted towards him. He was an admirer of classical Indian music and study of good literature was one of his recreations for a long time. He spoke moderately but always impressively and had a keen sense of humour. His relations to his students were extremely cordial and many of them almost adore his memory. He was of a medium build, had a fairly strong constitution and was a man of active habits for the greater part of his life. In his later years, however, when he was

afflicted with asthma, he developed complete sedentariness. He was generally abstemious in his habits. His private life was one of austere purity and he was a conspicuous example of the Hindu ideal of plain-living and high thinking. He died on the 11th of December, 1949.

Krishnachandra was deeply interested in current Indian affairs and though his office debarred him from taking an active part in politics, he was ever since the Swadeshi Movement an ardent champion of extreme nationalism. In socio-religious matters, he was a conservative Hindu, both in his habits and in his outlook. He had unmixed contempt for the exponents of 'liberal' Hinduism and he looked upon the so-called 'social reform' movements in Hindu society as unmitigated evils. He was a firm believer in the Hindu code of values and was a bitter opponent of all who maligned it.

Krishnachandra possessed a profoundly original mind. He had an acute analytic intellect combined with imagination and insight of a very high order. Though he was widely read in Indian and Western philosophies, classical German philosophy and Advaita Vedānta were the two forces that exercised a major influence on his intellectual development. He had great intellectual energy and almost upto the end of his life he used to revel in sustained philosophical discussions. He wrote extensively. But his writings present a striking contrast to his oral disquisitions. When he spoke, even his serious discourses were used to be interspersed with quips and sallies; they were remarkable for their lucidity and thoroughness and he would develop his points without any reserve. But when he wrote, he often became almost a different man. He seemed to lose his expansiveness, became reserved and instead of lucidity he tried almost to be aphoristic in his expression. Far from developing a point he was content just to set down a cryptic thesis leaving the bewildered reader to elucidate for himself as best as he could. Though he wrote vastly, he published little. And this was due to the fact that he would complete very few of his writings. The present editor has with him an immense mass of unpublished documents containing reflections, studies, fragments, notes etc. on a large variety of subjects and at different stages of completion.

The philosophical writings of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya are mainly of two kinds: (a) constructive interpretation of other

systems and (b) construction of a new system of his own. The two are not indeed unconnected; but in giving an account of his philosophical contributions, it seems desirable to keep the two apart. The author's philosophical position will be analysed in some detail in the Introduction to Vol. II which will contain all the basic writings in which his philosophy has been formulated. In the present Introduction, an attempt will be made to bring out the distinctive features of the interpretational writings which form the contents of the first volume.

In his 'Studies in Vedāntism' the author suggests that his method is one of constructive interpretation and disclaims that it is an 'exposition' in the ordinary sense of the term. A perusal of the contents of the present volume will go to show that this method is also the one which the author has employed par excellence in all his studies in Indian philosophy. The method has also been described as 'speculative'. But the author has not anywhere indicated its precise nature. From a consideration of his actual procedure it would appear that by 'constructive interpretation' the author means much more of construction than of interpretation, and the method in substance amounts to speculative re-construction based on a few pivotal tenets rather than an objective exposition based on a detailed study of the more important texts of the particular school of philosophy that is claimed to be interpreted. The method is apparently a risky one and may easily be taken to be a fanciful reading of one's own thought into others' thinking. The author was quite conscious of this risk, but then he was of the opinion that it could be eliminated if the construction were not repelled by the letter or spirit of the system to be interpreted; or, in other words, if it could be made to fit without any disharmony into the general frame-work of that system. And this is exactly what the author used to claim for his interpretational writings. It is to be noted, again, that the constructive effort is prominent more specially in connection with those doctrines which are prima facie the most removed from the common consciousness. The major task of this kind of interpretation was, in the author's view, to render esoteric doctrines intelligible in terms of the contents of common consciousness.

Much of what the author has here said of Vedānta, Sāṁkhya and Yoga is not to be found in the extant original literature on these subjects. It is an extension or a development in

new directions of some fundamental tenets of the several schools. It is development not in the sense of necessary amplification of what is potential therein: it is rather the discovery of new potentialities and is in that sense a genuine addition to the existing corpus of the philosophy of the relevant schools. The extension, again, is always the result of the application of certain principles which constitute the fundamentals of the author's own philosophy. It would be unfair to suggest that this is nothing but subjectivism in the sphere of interpretation. For, the so-called 'objective' interpretation is as much 'subjective' in this sense as 'constructive' interpretation. The mind that interprets is not a tabula rasa; neither is it just a calculating machine or an electronic brain. The interpreter is a thinking being and as such he will have to interpret with a mind having a system of beliefs and from a stand-point which he happens to occupy at the time of his interpretative activity. Subjectivism in this sense is inevitable in all human thinking. It is not any blemish either unless, indeed, the belief-system is proved to be unfounded or the perspective distorted, or, again, unless its application turns out to be wrong or illegitimate.

It is to be expected that in such an interpretation as the present one, there would be improvisations and deviations from the standard interpretations holding the field. In the first tract on Vedānta, viz., 'Studies in Vedāntism' some of the innovations are as follows:—(a) the conception of 'levels of consciousness'; (b) the conception of dream-experience as constituting a new 'dimension' of existence; (c) the exhibition, on the strength of conscious dream, self-conscious dream and dreamless sleep respectively, of 'the objective possibility of perception without sensation, of the self-conscious knowledge of all space as one object and of all time as one unfolded panorama, and of the self swooning into the realisation of noumena'; (d) the re-interpretation of the conceptions of adhyātma, adhibhūta etc.; (e) the re-interpretation of the concept of devatā as the absolute unity of subject and object; (f) the interpretation of the concept of loka as the absolute intuition-medium for this unity; (g) the re-interpretation of the concepts of parā-prakṛti, śakti and aparā-prakṛti; (h) the ethico-theological elucidation of the concept of jīvan-mukti; and (i) the interpretation of some cosmogonic myths.

In the second tract, viz., 'Śaṅkara's doctrine of māyā', the writer has tried to understand the doctrine of acosmism from the common phenomenon of illusion. The improvisations relate to the concept of māyā. The interpretation of the phrase 'sad-asat-vilakṣaṇa' is, no doubt, more in accordance with the detractors of the concept of māyā, but it is remarkable that the author has tried to make the concept of 'neither sat nor asat' intelligible from an analysis of the different aspects of the experience of illusion. The second innovation concerns the analysis of the three stages in the phenomenon of correction of perceptual error, correlating them to the three aspects of māyā as vāstavī, anirvācyā and tucchā and connecting them with the different aspects of creative and destructive activities of the Lord.

In the third tract, viz., 'The Advaita and its spiritual significance', an attempt has been made to elucidate the doctrine of the illusoriness of individuality from the ethical experience of repentance. It is to be remarked here that the author has not generally tried to establish the Vedāntic doctrines with the help of arguments. He has rather sought to understand them with the aid of the contents of common consciousness.

In the Sāṁkhya and Yoga studies, the innovations are as follows:—(a) the conception of 'reflection as a kind of introspective insight to unravel the nature of the Sāṁkhya tattvas and also as a freeing process from aviveka; (b) the distinction drawn between the causal and the non-causal manifestations of prakṛti and some of its evolutes; (c) the theory of the phenomenality of the world of experience in regard to its character and not being; (d) the re-interpretation of the concept of bhāva as the referential function of the mind; (e) the interpretation of the concepts of buddhi, ahaṁkāra and tanmātra as self-knowing, self-willing and self-feeling respectively; (f) the interpretation of the tanmātras as at once mind-stuff and the matrix of the bhūtas; (g) the characterisation of Sāṁkhya as a religion of 'spiritual naturalness'; (h) the distinction drawn between causality in the phenomenal world and causality in the world of tattvas; (i) the conception of qualitative combination in Sāṁkhya; (j) the theory of anticipatory response of buddhi and the lower tattvas; (k) the theory of the guṇas as the absolutes of the three modes of feeling

which are to be understood in terms of freedom; (l) the conception of ākāśa as the functional form of prakṛti distinguished from *ākāśa as bhūta; (m) the re-interpretation of the conceptions of time and causality in Sāmkhya and Yoga;* (n) the enumeration of as many as *thirty* major points of difference between the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga schools.

In the tract on 'Anekānta', the author tries to show that neither the category of 'identity' nor that of 'difference' can be regarded as fundamental in philosophy, that the alternation of identity and difference is a more satisfactory conception than either pure identity or pure difference, and that a new interpretation of the Jaina theory of anekānta is possible in the light of the concept of alternation.

In 'The concept of Rasa' an attempt has been made to assign the exact 'level of consciousness' on which aesthetic experience stands; and according to the author's analysis, artistic enjoyment stands on a par with 'duplicated sympathy' which is on a level higher than that of common sympathy which, in its turn, is higher in level than the ordinary experience of joy. The writer also seeks to give a new account of the genesis of bībhatsa-rasa.

The above will give an idea of the wide range of improvisations which the author has presented in these Studies. It is for the competent reader to judge whether they are legitimate or not. But to come to a right decision on the point, it is necessary to have a fair acquaintance with the writer's own philosophy which, however, is not reported in the present volume and which the editor hopes to analyse in some detail in his Introduction to Volume II.

STUDIES IN VEDĀNTISM

INTRODUCTION

The following studies in Vedāntism are not so much expositions of the traditional Vedānta as problematic constructions on Vedāntic lines intended to bring out the relations of the system to modern philosophical systems. The work of construction has, however, been subordinated to the work of interpretation. A wide latitude of interpretation has been claimed throughout.

The studies follow the traditional authorities, the Upaniṣads, the Brahma-sūtras, and Bhagavad-gītā, and confine themselves to the monistic interpretations of Śaṅkara. They draw on treatises like Pañcadaśī, Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī, etc., propounding what may be called the later Vedānta, for such definite views as may be regarded to be legitimate systematisations of the earlier but looser Vedānta. No attempt has been made here to trace the historical evolution of the Vedāntic school.

The historical study of a school of thought must have methods and aims different from those of a philosophical study, though the studies are mutually supplementary. The philosophical study should come first in the order of time; the historical study of an ancient system of philosophy, to be of any use at all, must be preceded by an earnest study of the philosophy, in the expositions traditionally accepted as authoritative. The correctness of these expositions—at any rate, the perspective—may be impugned afterwards by historic research. But the historian here cannot begin his work at all unless he can live in sympathy into the details of an apparently outworn creed and recognise the *truth* in the first imperfect adumbrations of it. The attitude of the mere narrator has, in the case of the historian of philosophy, to be exchanged as far as possible, for that of the sympathetic interpreter. There is the danger, no doubt, of too easily reading one's philosophic creed into the history, but the opposite danger is more serious still. It is the danger of taking the philosophic type studied as a historic curiosity rather than a recipe for the human soul, and of seeking to explain the curiosity by natural *causes* instead of seriously examining its merits as philosophy. This unfortunately is sometimes the defect of Western expositions of Eastern philosophy and religion,

It springs from a tacit conviction, which, to say the least, bespeaks a lack of historic sense, that the common-sense evolved at the present day is absolutely infallible; though if the history of philosophy were rightly studied, it would show that many of the modern speculative *discoveries* are but reaffirmations of old truths, and that the present-day common-sense itself is a complex structure in which are imbedded types of thought which are ordinarily taken to be completely outworn and superseded. We have heard of Indian pessimism and fatalism disposed of by a sapient reference to the climatic and political conditions of the country; and the very name of philosophy has sometimes been denied to Indian speculation on the ground, apparently established historically, that the Oriental intellect is not sufficient dry and has not masculine virility enough to rise to anything higher than grotesque imaginative cosmogonies. When history thus sits in judgment on philosophy, an Indian student of Vedānta may well be excused if to him a reproduction of the philosophy, such as may bring it into contact with modern problems, appears far more important than any mere historical dissertation.

A fair instance of how principles of historical research are sometimes allowed to prejudice a right appreciation of philosophy is afforded by Dr. Thibaut's otherwise valuable introduction to his translation of the Vedānta-sūtras, with Śaṅkara's commentary (Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxxiv). Referring to the attempts of Śaṅkara and other scholiasts to evolve a complete philosophic system from the Upaniṣads, he says: "On later generations, to which the whole body of texts came down as revealed truth, there devolved the inevitable task of establishing systems on which no exception could be taken to any of the texts; but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible one, i.e., one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and honestly, there really is no reason to deny" (p. cvi). The texts "do not allow themselves to be systematised because they were never meant to form a system" (p. cxiv). "......But the task of systematising once given, we are quite ready to admit that Śaṅkara's system is the best that can be devised" (p. cxxii). The contention here apparently is that the task is *not* given, except to one who believes the texts to embody revealed truth.

Now, what precisely is the task to which Śaṅkara has addressed himself? It is not that of the critical historian, it is the

task of piecing together the several texts into a philosophical system, of developing a hypothesis on a necessary basis which will cover all the texts. But it may be asked, why should it be assumed that all the texts should find place in a necessary system? May not some of them embody false speculations altogether? Here, then, we have to consider the special nature of the Upaniṣad texts. They may or may not have been revealed; but as they are, they are presented not as mere guesses from the outside to explain the facts of the Universe, nor even as leisurely philosophisings conducted on a necessary basis, but as embodying mystic intuitions, often the products of what has been called the mythologic imagination which *sees* philosophy in poetic symbols. There are sometimes attempts at reasoning, too, but then by themselves they are hardly logically convincing, having not unoften an almost infantine naiveté about them. Now, the question here is, what should be our attitude towards these texts which, apparently at any rate, embody intuitions? So long as no obvious mark of spuriousness is discovered, they are to be regarded as genuine, though even a genuine intuition may be false in its content. The falsity, however, is not to be judged apriori but only after a strenuous endeavour to reproduce, if possible, the intuitions through such means as may have been laid down, in the śāstras, or, what we understand better, after an attempt to systematise all the texts into a well-rounded philosophy. The latter is the task which Śaṅkara and other commentators have set themselves to accomplish. Hence admitting that the texts were never meant to be strung together into a system, it can still be held that the task of systematising is inevitably given to every student of the Upaniṣads.

Dr. Thibaut does not appear to have sufficiently distinguished the role of the philosophic systematiser from that of the critical or historical scholar when he lays down the caution that "we must refrain from using unhesitatingly and without careful consideration of the merits of each individual case, the teachings direct or inferred, of any passage to the end of determining the drift of the teaching of other passages". A commentator is certainly open to severe censure when he asserts that a text bears a certain *meaning* which it cannot bear in a particular context. But when he simply means that the truth embodied in a particular text is inadequately expressed and should be developed or rendered more explicit in the light of other texts, or when he in-

terprets a mythologic metaphor differently in different passages under the conviction that it is a natural symbol of many correspondent truths of different potencies or grades, he is to be deemed as perfectly within his rights as a philosophic interpreter and systematiser. A philosophic commentator, especially on unsystematised texts embodying speculative truths, has a far wider latitude than a literary commentator. Exegetical interpretation here inevitably shades off into philosophic construction; and this need not involve any intellectual dishonesty. We may readily admit that "what he (the commentator) from his advanced standpoint looks upon as an inferior kind of cognition" was not "viewed in the same way by the authors of the Upaniṣads", but that may have been because the teacher of the inferior wisdom had not in view the antithesis between it and the superior wisdom. Śāṇḍilya, the teacher of the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, may not have "looked upon it as anything else but a statement of the highest truth accessible to man". but that is no reason why Śaṅkara may not look upon it as the inferior wisdom. It would appear, too, as though the distinction between the higher and the lower wisdom was taken by Dr. Thibaut and some others to be wider than what Śaṅkara himself intended; to Śaṅkara, the Saguṇa (determinate)-Brahman and the Nirguṇa (indeterminate)-Brahman were not so much distinct gods as the contrasted aspects of the same reality.

A misconception of the latitude allowed to philosophic systematisation may be traced in Dr. Thibaut's remarks on Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā. He tries to demonstrate that Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā is nowhere to be found in the Upaniṣads except probably in an undeveloped form in a few doubtful passages, and contends that the doctrine should not, therefore, be read into other passages which are intelligible without it. Let it be granted for the present that the demonstration is satisfactory. Later on he admits that the doctrine of "the final absolute identification of the individual self with the universal self is indicated in terms of unmistakable plain-ness" (p. cxxii) in the Upaniṣads. Now if the point were discussed as one of philosophy rather than of historical scholarship, it would not be difficult to perceive that the doctrine of Māyā is a necessary corollary of this doctrine of the individual being Brahman in Mokṣa (absolute liberation): for it is only in this identification that he realises that individuality

was an illusion and that the distinction of subject, object, etc., possible only through this individuality, was an illusion too.

In a reproduction of Vedāntism such as we have proposed, no attempt need be made to distinguish the points common to the Indian systems from those which are specifically Vedāntic. Special care, however, should be taken to develop from first principles such Vedāntic positions as being distinctively Indian present a marked contrast to European habits of thought. There are sundry deep-seated differences between Eastern and Western speculation. To European common-sense, certain forms of Indian speculation may appear absurd or puerile at the best; while now and then there are presented heights and depths of thought which take away and stifle one's breath, and which an all too comfortable rationalism designates hyper-subtle and mystical. An attempt should be made to show that in some cases at least the contradiction to European common-sense or scientific thought is only apparent, and that the Indian position, properly understood, whether true or false, is a development of thought in an unsuspected direction, though by no means incompatible with Western thought; while in certain other cases where there is real contradiction to European common sense, an analysis of this apparently absolute standard may, peradventure, yield dissolving views in which the Eastern thought is found to alternate with its Western counterpart with the naiveté of a summer dream. As to what is vaguely called the mysticism of Vedānta a clearing-up should be attempted in a more than ordinarily strenuous spirit of rationalism. Only it should content itself with a problematic indication of the direction in which the dark truths lie without pretending to furnish omniscient *explanations*.

The attitude to be borne towards the present subject should be neither that of the apologist nor that of the academic compiler but that of the interpreter which involves, to a certain extent, that of the constructor, too. It is too late in the day to *defend* a system like the Vedānta with a theologian's animus; it is hardly necessary, except probably to silence a class of persons whose ignorance of the system is matched only by their zeal in combating it. And it is, to say the least, unwise, even for one who has implicit faith in the system, for, to drag it into the theological arena is to effectually scare away all open-minded men from it and relegate it for good to the limbo of oblivion. The Vedāntic

propagandist cannot do better than appeal through a literature wholly expository, without a word of dogmatic lecturing in it, which will invite readers—it may be, a select class of them—to contemplate with something of an aesthetic sympathy an ancient *life-ideal animating an organised body of ancient thought, just to quicken, it may be for a moment,* the consciousness, always very torpid, that the dominating ideal of the day is only one among many possibles; and then if Vedānta has any real vitality in it, it will set them thinking till it leads to a real division of the spirit. A true philosophic system is not to be looked upon as a soulless jointing of hypotheses; it is a living fabric which, with all its endeavour to be objective, must have a well-marked individuality. Hence it is not to be regarded as the special property of academic philosophy-mongers, to be hacked up by them into technical *views*, but is to be regarded as a form of life and is to be treated as a theme of literature of infinite interest to humanity.

ANALYSIS

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CHAPTER I

AN APPROACH THROUGH PSYCHOLOGY

1. The psychology of waking, dream, and dreamless sleep constitutes the pivot of the Vedāntic system and of certain other systems like the Yoga, which may be regarded as ancillary to it. It is to be regarded as a clear addition to ordinary psychology, the importance of which is not a whit exaggerated if it is claimed that it recognises a new dimension of existence altogether. Its importance will be appreciated by connecting it with kindred Western speculations on the one hand, and with Vedāntic speculations in Metaphysics on the other.

2. What would be the empirical account of a dream? Physiological speculation on the point has hardly anything to offer except certain platitudes which do not touch the speciality of the phenomenon; and so the psychological exlpanation alone is worth referring to here. When a man goes to sleep, images are roused in his mind, sometimes by sensory presentations, but most often with apparent spontaneity, although even in such cases the absence of an ideal suggestion, *continuous with a sensory presentation*, cannot be absolutely proved. In waking perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations, the ideational elements are generally copies of previous percepts (sometimes involving new construction also); but these do not appear at random, being attracted into definite grooves of suggestion by the presentative elements and by attention as determined by practical interests. In dreams, too, we have copies of waking percepts, but imaginative construction is here far freer, there being normally no restrictive and directive action of sensation on the one hand, and of connective attention on the other. Many events and combinations of events which would be at once deemed to be impossible waking life would not be questioned at all in a dream. In waking life, many associations or constructions are ruled out, prevented from even appearing in consciousness, by certain beliefs determined by our practical necessities. Even sensations and percepts are occasionally so ruled out. At the same time, in waking life, there are different degrees of seriousness or concentration of attention on what directly subserves life; there are stages of listlessness, play, aesthetic and philo-

sophic consciousness. So long, however, as the consciousness of a body is there we cannot 'become a living soul'; the body always demands a measure of attention, while outer stimuli are continually stirring it up and starting ever-renewed trains of associations. In dreams, the distractions of this 'heavy' body are reduced to a minimum, sometimes disappearing altogether; the necessity of practical life is not so tyrannic, and hence there is unrestrained credulity. But why should there be a belief at all? Objectification carries a naive belief with it, unless it is definitely contradicted by some other belief. The idea of the object is not known to be a *mere* idea, unless contradicted by some perception or by a more vivid or coherent idea.

3. We may conceive a stage of dream proper—there being transitional stages between waking and dreaming—where there are no sensations and the consciousness of the body is at a minimum. Here the object-consciousness must be purer than in the waking stage, i.e., freer from reference to body; the self, too, is not mere idea of body but is the seer of ideas cf. Dṛṣṭer draṣṭā or seer of seeing). So in a dream, things appear to come in and go out without startling or surprising us: they are recognised as matters of course. Space and time tend to lose their reference to the body, and so violations of continuity occasion no surprise at all. There is no tyrannic continuous memory, no rigid demand for uniformity, no compunction for not being in a line with truth—a glorious life of thoughtless thoughtfulness.

4. Does this account of a dream justify us in taking it to belong to a *new dimension* of psychical existence? The continuous gradations from waking consciousness to dream proper need not preclude us from admitting such a new dimension. Dreams may be described as perceptions without sensation. Is there any difference in kind between perception with sensation and perception without sensation? The question would roughly resolve itself into the old question about the existence of a qualitative difference between impression and idea. The differentiae of impression and idea that are ordinarily proposed are not really satisfactory. As to the criterion of vividness, it is altogether adventitious to knowledge as knowledge; besides, ideas appear less vivid than sensations only when they coexist, and that, too, not in all cases. The criterion of being affected by movement is unsatisfactory, for in dreams where we have admittedly nothing but ideas, objects

are affected by our dream-movements; here, too, the test is useful only when impression and idea coexist. As to the other criterion, inner coherence, it may be pointed out that the incoherence of a dream is not felt as such within the dream: besides, sensations as sensations have no coherence, and we may have incoherent perceptions riding roughshod over all our expectations. There is nothing left but the felt abruptness or *given*-ness (independence of self would be going too far, as self-consciousness may not have been developed) of the impression, as distinct from the freedom, the play-like easy, unquestioning movement of attention in ideas and dreams. In framing to ourselves a difficult combination of ideas, in introspection, in the effort to recollect, a resistance no doubt is offered by percepts or habits of thought generated by sense-experience; but as the self prevails against it, the ideal functioning is felt to be free, the easiest to the self.

5. This shows that sensation and idea are not co-ordinate in reality[1], and to overlook this is a fundamental vice of Empirical Psychology. The idea may unconsciously animate the sensation (perception is a 'presentative-representative' cognition); but this unconscious working is absolutely different from its conscious existence. The conscious idea, while recognising itself to have been operative in the percept, absolutely disown its unconscious sensuous character; e.g., when an illusion is corrected by careful observation, the idea simulating a percept is known to be a *mere* idea, but the illusory percept vanishes altogether without caring to court a comparison with the true percept. Thus we have three distinct mental states throwing light on one another; (1) perception in which idea unconsciously works, (2) such perception coexisting with a conscious idea, where the idea is regarded as inferior in reality to the percept, and (3) the pure idea, hardly ever realised in waking consciousness (except probably in the fluid transparency of the poet's intuition, in spontaneous clairvoyance, or in the settled vision of the Yogin), to which the waking world would appear unsubstantial. The last state is one to which all have not access, and would be disbelieved altogether, were it not for the fact that we have a daily illustration of its *possibility* in our dreams. In dreams, the ideas do not consciously remember the corresponding waking percepts; they are at once percepts.

1 Because the one is free while the other is constrained or given.

6. Not that dream is truer than waking percept. Each is true within itself; but while 'the former is daily sublated, the latter is sublated only under exceptional circumstances' (Śaṅkara). The truth of this or that waking percept may sometimes be denied in a dream as it may be denied in waking life itself; but dreams do not deny the truth of waking life as a whole, for they never doubt their own waking character. Waking, however, always denies the truth of dreams.

7. We have already, however, found reason to believe that the dream-world is wider in *possibility* than the waking world. The dependence of waking perception on sensation shows its limitation. Sensation, far from being the final standard of truth, is by itself the farthest from the truth [2]; belief is easiest in self-consciousness. Internal perception is prior to external, logically if not chronologically. The sensation is felt to give us reality, only because the idea unconsciously animates it. The element of representation in perception is the element of interpretation or knowledge. But then it must be borne in mind that this unconscious working of the idea is known only when we have come to be reflective or self-conscious. Even then the sense-conditioned consciousness informed with the idea is felt to be higher in point of truth than the mere idea set over against it. But that is because practical attention or the self is not yet dissociated from the body; anything not directly ministering to the life of the body is taken to be unreal. With the development of the mind, the self and its interests come to be more and more dissociated from the body—we come to infer and deliberate and have abstract interests; still, except in very rare cases, the imperious call of the body is not silenced, and the body-dissociated mental processes are still felt to be rational only when ministering to the bodily life, though it may be indirectly. A solemn, but often ineffective, protest is recorded by our moral, aesthetic, religious, and speculative aspirations, though they, too, sometimes appear to accept bribes of the emissaries of this body.

8. Will is essentially a denial of the existing sense-order; knowledge, too, by its very nature, is an emergence from the body, i.e., from sense-homogeneity. Yet both are ordinarily *for* the life of the body. But the moral will, on the one hand, and

2 This seems to be written under Hegel's influence. It is to be noted that the author completely outgrew this influence in his later years.

aesthetic intuition on the other (not to speak of other forms of absolute consciousness[3]) disown this slavery and affirm the independence of the idea. The body, however, does its best to ignore their protest. They are felt to be only aspirations for pure knowledge, not knowledge; they tell us only that the body *ought not* to be the truth, though it unhappily seems to be the truth. The ineffectiveness of their protest is explained from our present point of view by the contrast felt between the sense-percept and the idea when they coexist, it being erroneously supposed that our ideas always coexist with some sense-percept, with the presentation of the body at least, if no other presentation is forthcoming. That with mere idea, we may have what may be called a 'feeling of knowledge', the consciousness of knowing as distinct from thinking or imagining, is brought out, however, in dreams. This explains the importance that is attached in Indian Philosophy to this unique psychological phenomenon. There is no other phenomenon in our ordinary psychic life like it; even in hallucination, as has been recently pointed out, there is some real sense-objective and some real peripheral excitation from within.

9. Dreams are, however, illusory. An idea is felt to be true so long as it is not contradicted by sense-perception. For though sensations do not produce knowledge, they signalise the occasions, cosmically determined, when breaches are effected in the leaden walls of insensibility, when the idea, in fact, unconsciously follows the law of truth[4]. The ideal of knowledge is, however, attained when the idea freely or consciously follows law, without being drawn down to interpret a sensation. Dreams, no doubt, are illusory; but then if only we possessed ourselves in dreams, if only we could exercise the control of attention over the riotous dance of the images which there comport themselves as percepts without sensations, if only, having cut away from the moorings of this oppressively constant presentation of this body, we could find secure anchorage in a freer, purer, more comprehensive self, we could assure ourselves of a far more complete vision of the truth than we could conceive ourselves to attain in this waking life. We could then transcend this space and time which

3 i.e., consciousness unreferred to the body.

4 Cp. Hegel.

have the body and the present moment as their points of reference, this space and time which coop us up and cabin us in; we could, then, not only intuitively perceive the distant, the past, and the future, take in at a glance what we have now to explore piecemeal—dimly, slowly, laboriously—, we could aspire to know noumenon, life, self.

10. All this may be entertained as a hypothesis, if not as a demonstrated fact. That, however, it may not be deemed inadmissible even as hypothesis, its 'objective possibility' has to be exhibited by tracing its *vera causa*. There are three suppositions: (1) perception without sensation; (2) the self-conscious knowledge of all space as one object, and of all time as one unfolded panorama; (3) the swooning into the realisation of noumenon, life, self. The *verae causae* respectively are (1) conscious dream, (2) self-conscious dream, and (3) dreamless sleep. That the conscious dream explains the possibility of perception without sensation has already been explained. The other two require elucidation.

11. Most of our dreams are self-conscious. Here the self's relation with the object is peculiarly different from its relation in waking life. In waking life, as has already been indicated, the object reports itself by a sensational shock; here, however, the object comes in and goes out unquestioned without startling us. Besides, here the self is, or seems at least to be, free from the body; sometimes it even sees the body lying asleep; it is not located anywhere and yet it books at space. Violations of continuity do not surprise it at all (section 3), though the objects are still in space. This could be understood in the merely conscious dream, where each isolated image, as it floats up, turns into a percept; but how can there be *self-conscious knowledge* of such *spatial* objects violating the laws of space-conntinuity, unless we suppose that the self sees here *with the whole of space as one* function? Similarly with time. Besides, here seeing is apparently creating (for here is no *given* abrupt sensation); the self seems to freely create its world, its space and time, its joys and sorrows. No doubt it only *seems*; really these creations are the images of waking percepts now freely accepted and so apparently created.

12. But why should there be this or that specific combination of images rather than any other? That implies the functioning of certain synthetic[5] concepts from behind, i.e. concepts on

5 i.e., synthesising.

the same level as the self[6]. We have here to admit, therefore, a new level or 'plane' of consciousness. These synthetic concepts might have been generated by individual experience or inherited as the capitalised value of ancestral experience—anyway they are now timeless[7] psychic forces ordering the distribution of the images.

13. A similar question may be asked with regard to sense-experience also. The sensations have been described as the cosmically determined occasions on which knowledge is permitted to manifest itself from within. But why should the right interpreting idea materialise itself on the occasion of a sensation? There must be some correspondence between the life within that supplies the right idea and the life without that supplies the sensation. It reminds one of the objection sometimes taken to Kant's doctrine of the forms that it does not explain why the manifold of intuition does not get into wrong forms. Dualism of subject and object has to be admitted, at least so long as we conceive ourselves to be individuals; only this correspondence between them is mysterious. It will not do to say that the object not only gives the sensation but also begets the association-traces which bring the right idea to the interpretation of the sensation. For so long as we admit that to know anything is to assimilate it, the *primum cognitum* cannot be explained by the causality of the object. We must admit an idea behind all presentation: a *regressus in infinitum* has to be accepted. So why a person should have certain sense-experiences rather than any other can only be understood in the light of the principle that every man freely accepts, if not makes, his circumstances. Every man is born with the seed of all his future psycho-physical existence, with instincts for action and original dispositions for certain forms of cognition. How these themselves have been generated is an enquiry which will lead us away from our present topic. It will suffice here to indicate that the knowledge-seeds and the action-seeds are not absolutely distinct, and that it is a community of these *Karma*-seeds, as they might be called, of different persons, that gets manifested into this common phenomenal world.

14. Can we rise in knowledge above these functioning concepts or *Karma*-seeds? In self-conscious dream, there is time,

6 Because they are timeless.
7 i.e., not having any specific time-location.

though it is apparently created at every moment. But the hidden springs of these creations cannot themselves be in time. They are in timeless unity with the self. How, then, can knowledge transcend them? This. however, is shown to be possible by dreamless sleep or suṣupti as it is called. In this stage, the self, dissociated not only from the body but also from the mind[8], rests in itself. It is then *immediately* conscious of itself, not conscious of itself as returning to itself, in reflection. It is then identical with what Kant calls 'transcendental unity of apperception'; only it is then not the mere 'fringe' of determinate empirical consciousness but is in complete isolation. It is not a mere thought, an unreal abstraction, but a concrete reality.

15. Here we meet with an objection from ordinary psychology. Admitting the existence of the self as an entity behind the mental states, one may hold that in dreamless sleep, the self is unconscious, not self-conscious. Let us dwell on the stock Vedāntic argument on the point. When a man rises from dreamless sleep, he becomes aware that he had a blissful sleep during which he was conscious of nothing. This he knows directly from memory. Now memory is only of a presentation. Therefore the bliss and the consciousness of nothing must have been *presented* during the sleep. If it be objected that only the *absence* during sleep of disquiet and knowledge is *inferred* from a memory of the state before the sleep and the perception of the state after the sleep, it is asked in reply: can we *infer* anything. the like of which was never presented? If reasoning is only a manipulation of rarefied images, the images can have been derived only from percepts. But it may be urged that the negative concept, at any rate, could not have had any percept corresponding to it, and therefore one may justifiably hold the *absence* of knowledge and disquiet during sleep to have been inferred. To this it is replied that absence cannot be inferred, unless it be conceivable. The absence of knowledge cannot be referred to, unless the absence be the object of a direct consciousness of it *during the absence.* Like knowledge, the absence of knowledge cannot be known by external perception or any form of inference founded on it, but by internal perception or self-feeling. No *inference* can ever warrant us in attributing absence

8 'mind'= empirical consciousness.

of consciousness to any object. If the paradox were allowed, a psychic thing or absence of a psychic thing, if conceived, is actual: its *esse* is its *concipi*—a peculiarity of hypothesis in Psychology which deserves to be noticed. Not that the absence of determinate knowledge need be known explicitly during the absence; one who is born blind is not conscious of not seeing. But if such a man comes to see, like Cheselden's patient, he will have an explicit perception of the previous absence of seeing which will at the same time be a *re*cognition of the absence as that implicitly cognised during the absence.

16. If, then, the direct consciousness during the absence be granted, then the consciousness of the absence immediately after the absence, i. e., immediately on waking, would be called memory rather than inference. Now what is the direct consciousness of the absence of knowledge and disquiet during deep sleep? It can only be the 'undifferenced knowledge and bliss' set over against negation. The mind or empirical consciousness lapses here altogether; we have pure consciousness against a 'dark ground', pure consciousness of a blank objectivity[9] or 'object in general' (Kant). All sensation and all concrete image then lapse into a blank homogeneity. Through a right understanding of this s u ṣ u p t i state, we reach the conceptions of c a i t a n y a or the pure self, and of a v i d y ā or the primal blank which is rendered definite by the self; so that to say that the pure self is immediately conscious of itself in deep sleep is only to state a verbal proposition.

17. The nature of the self, as pure consciousness, is often disputed, and the dispute turns on the way in which this s u ṣ u p t i is understood. It has been variously held against the foregoing view that in this state, the self is (1) non-existent, or (2) unconscious, or (3) both conscious and unconscious. All these views find their parallel in the views which have been held about self-consciousness. To know is to *re*cognise: when the self first comes to know itself, it recognises itself. But recognition means a previous moment of self-forgetfulness. Now when the self forgot itself, was it non-existent or only non-intelligent? (1) If the *esse* of the self is its *percipi*, the unknown self would be the non-

9 i.e., of *some* object though not of any object in particular.

existent self. (2) But if the present self-consciousness be taken as a proof of the eternal existence of the self, then the self should *be taken as sometimes unconscious, sometimes conscious—unconscious when dissociated from the empirical mind, conscious when* associated with it. (3) Or if self-consciousness means consciousness of the self as having been *operative*, not merely existent, in the consciousness preceding it (and giving the whole truth to it), then when the self forgot itself, it was both conscious and unconscious. Finally, if the self, as it comes back to itself, feels that its self-alienated stage was utterly illusory, then it is not only eternally existent and consciously operative, but eternally *self*-conscious, too.

18. The empiricist, of whom the dogmatic nihilist and the absolute sceptic are the logical descendants, holds the self before self-consciousness to be immediate negation. The abstract conceptualist holds it to be immediate position, and that essentially, even during self-consciousness, as to him 'being cognised' is adventitious to the being of an object. The Kantian takes the self before self-consciousness to have been immanently operative in consciousness ; yet when the self comes back to itself in empirical self-consciousness, in recognising itself it still feels that it does not know its essential nature, for the same thing cannot be at once subject and object. The self, as it comes back, just gives a flash of recognition, but anon it shoots forward, by its inertia, as it were, in a spiral rather than in a circular orbit. The self constantly aspires to catch itself and as constantly slips from itself. As long as self-consciousness is a process—and no determinate knowledge that is not a process is conceivable—it is thus a spiral motion, apparently beginningless and endless. The rapidly intermittent flashes of recognition appear to give a continuous line of light or a knowledge of the self, which is, however, only a 'paralogism of the pure reason'. The Hegelian takes the motion to be an eternal *circular* or perfect motion, consciousness before self-consciousness being only an arc of the circle setting up for itself, each minute arc itself a straight line ; but when the circle is completed (i. e., when self-consciousness arises), the self recognises that these straight lines are only *for* the circle, that the circle is the truth that contains in itself the ideality of the straight lines. Here the Vedāntist will, however, hold that the self at each point only illusorily *fancies* itself to be moving in a straight line ; and

as long as it moves, it can never take in the entire circle at once; and so even when it recognises itself, the illusion does not completely disappear. The blind impulse forward is real by reason of its very imperiousness; the flashes of self-recognition appearing now occasionally, now frequently, and at last continuously, the self feels at once in triumph and in humility that it is moving in a spiral inwards towards the centre of light (the true self), though the centre is still infinitely remote, content only to have more and more light; and ever as it presses forward with accelerated speed, it takes the past dimness as due only to his limitation of ignorance, till behold, it has reached the centre of light itself where it quiescently spins a circular motion. Who could have imagined that the spiral had the centre within a finite distance? This quiescent circular motion was all along the ideal of the process of knowledge; this was the contentless aspiration towards the thing-in-itself, this the formless indefinable sense of the Beyond in all determinate knowledge. Nor was the circle of light, constituted by the flashes of self-recognition, ever becoming more and more refulgent, altogether a 'paralogism'; for though the spread-out character of the process was false, the light was the reflection of this central self-manifesting light. Thus Vedānta reconciles Kant and Hegel by admitting the impossibility of the self being caught in a process of self-consciousness; and yet holding the process to be a self-manifestation of the self.

19. Does not, however, Hegel too admit that the self's movement in a circle is illusorily self-alienated in consciousness and that it is self-contained in self-consciousness? Does not Vedānta admit that even at the centre, the self, though quiescent, is spinning a circular process? The difference, as will be more fully explained afterwards, is that whereas Vedānta takes even this central motion to be the reflection of the self on the negation which falls beyond it, i.e., to be absolutely free self-creation, Hegel takes this reflection on the negation to be the ultimate reality. Not that even Hegel takes it to be *necessity* or God's *given nature.* No one is a more strenuous advocate of freedom; but then freedom has two sides, the quiescence of self beyond will and its quiescence in pure will. The former is Vedāntic Brahman, the latter is Vedāntic Īśvara, a point to be cleared up later on. The latter is also Hegel's Absolute Idea, to which will and intellect are the same.

20. This difference between Hegel and Vedānta is connected with a fundamental difference regarding the conception of self between Kant's synthetic unity of apperception and the Vedāntic ātman or caitanya. They are generally regarded as the same, and in fact there is a good deal of similarity between them. Kant's self, though transcending empirical consciousness, is individualised in a sense, for it is this which becomes practical as will, emerging as a postulate directly implied by morality. Even if we do not allow the conclusions of the practical reason to prejudice those of pure reason, even if we take the self to be the formless prefix of all cognition, transcending even the categories and forms through which it works in knowledge, we have yet to admit that in Kant, this self is *for* knowledge of the thing-in-itself, is relative to a constant something, has the thing-in-itself constantly before it; its very nature is aspiring to know the thing-in-itself, the 'object-in-general' being the obverse of this aspiration, the blank canvas on which it wants to have the thing-in-itself pictured (what, however, is never accomplished). So whether individualised or not, it is still *agent*, the form of *knowing* rather than of knowledge. In Vedānta, however, the self is the breath of this knowledge, the light of consciousness, something eternally accomplished rather than being accomplished. The accomplish*ing* self cannot be said to have finally triumphed over empiricism or absolute scepticism. This seems to be the trend of Spencer's views also. He would not admit the current argument against absolute scepticism, that it is proving the falsity of reason by reason; that, he would say, at best shows that within the sphere of determinate cognition, the self (or rather the dominating cohesion of the ideas of subject and object) is the highest truth; but then this cognition itself tells us that it is a cohesion generated by experience, and that, therefore, we cannot pronounce it to be absolutely necessary. Who knows that even this cohesion may not break down with further experience? That it cannot be conceived is no argument, for the moment something is said to be inconceivable, it is pronounced to be conceivable by implication. The subject of the proposition, 'this cannot be conceived' is in fact a *conceived* inconceivability. This is only a negative conceivability, however. It is only an 'indefinable sense of the Beyond', mere *matter* of knowledge without positive *form*. In the very humility of accepting absolute scepticism as a possible

view, there is the transcendence of it, in which, however, there is no differenced self to enjoy the triumph.

21. Hegel does not admit the possibility of an absolute scepticism impugning the reality of the self or reason, and therefore does not recognise an undifferenced consciousness. Kant's pronouncements are rather uncertain on the point; but then his 'Refutation of Idealism' may bo taken as founded essentially on the recognition of a form of cognition other than the determinate. Much has been made, ever since Schopenhauer's unfortunate pronouncement on the point, of the so-called inconsequence in Kant of taking causality to be a category of the self and yet riding out on this category beyond the self to the thing-in-itself as the cause of our sensations. Kant, it should be remembered, expressly points out a fundamental difference in applicability between the dynamical and the mathematical categories. The difference comes out again in the different solutions he has given of the first two cosmological antinomies on the one hand and the last two on the other. The mathematical categories have no reference except to phenomena in space and time, but the dynamical categories while referring to phenomena refer essentially beyond them to the free and the self-existent, although this reference cannot be concreted by intuition. The thing-in-itself in Kant is not, however, to be confounded with his noumena or Ideas of the Reason, which are only the reason-pictures of the essentially unknowable. The self, as causality imbedded in all determinate cognition, asks for the cause of itself. Experience demands its own cause; the causal aspiration is like a flame informing the fuel of experience and yet freely existing by itself. This demand of the self is not satisfied by the idea of the reason, for that is only the way in which the cause of the self, i.e., of causality, i.e., of experience, would be known, if it could be known at all. This difficulty with regard to causality applies more or less to the whole of the understanding, i.e., the self as knowing objects; for even when the self recognises itself, it is puzzled to find itself *unconsciously* informing objects. It asks 'Why did I know object at all?', just as it might ask in another connexion, 'Why did I sin at all?'. It feels the ground insecure beneath its feet. So Spencer finds that the cohesion within our knowledge of subject and object demands itself an object beyond knowledge, the Unknowable, from both the points, object-cons-

ciousness and subject-consciousness. Now this demand, alike in Kant and in Spencer, is indeterminate but none the less real.

22. Neither Kant nor Spencer has brought out in full the implications of this indeterminate consciousness. They have not made it clear whether it is a subjective process only or the absolute reality. As indeterminate, can it be said to be different from the thing-in-itself or the Unknowable? It seems to have equal relations with the self and the Unknowable. The self itself becomes real in it. It is the undifferenced consciousness that plays on all determinate cognition. Beyond the will, there is the self-affirmation of the intellect; but beyond this self-affirming pulsation, there is the pure undifferenced self or Caitanya. The thing-in-itself cannot be said to be different from this undifferenced Caitanya, cannot be said to be its reference. Yet it is significant that neither Kant nor Spencer calls this undifferenced self-doubting consciousness the self or the subject. This vacillation on their part is explained by the fact that when this consciousness and the determinate consciousness (which is always accompanied by the former) coexist, the former, though felt to give all the reality that the latter has, still appears to be a formless shadow in comparison with the latter which is informed by it. It is in fact the old difficulty about the percept and idea reappearing on a higher plane. Schelling and Hegel disregarded the contrast and imagined they found, in the aesthetic and religious consciousness especially, the consciousness negating individuality to be much more real than determinate experience. Kant, however, would have argued against them that these coloured conciousnesses, the aesthetic and the religious, can never warrant us in taking the de-individualised consciousness as more than a mere aspiration, i.e., as knowledge, as the absolute self, as an eternally accomplished cognition. If Hegel argues that his Absolute Idea is not accomplish*ed* only—for then there would be no difference between him and Schelling—but that it is eternally accomplish*ing* itself also, that it eternally mediates itself through that absolute consciousness which denies individuality, it is replied that this, too, is only *thought*, only the shadowy fringe of determinate consciousness.

23. It may, accordingly, be asked : does not this argument of a Kantian against Schelling and Hegel press against Vedānta too? Knowledge, according to Vedānta, is not only different

from the knowing activity. it cannot even be described as the (contingent) result of the activity. Its essential character is its eternity, its self-manifestation (s v a y a m - p r a k ā ś a t v a). The mental mode, however. in which knowledge manifests itself is contingent, being the result of mental activity. So, too, in the case of such knowledge as leads to m o k ṣ a or 'liberation', there is first a hearing of the Scriptural texts, a reflecting on them, a refutation of doubts, and a final fixing of the mind on the texts—all this repeated times without number, till the transparency of the mind is secured, and then knowledge shines through and is recognised to have been eternally complete. So, too, the M o k ṣ a that is reached is taken to be B r a h m a n itself, 'unchangingly eternal' (K ū t a s t h a n i t y a); it is not only quiescence itself : as just passing into it, one feels all the past strife[10] after it to have been utterly illusory, and, what would sound paradoxical, the feeling of illusion itself lapses, there being nothing left but the self shining by itself. Of knowledge, not of B r a h m a n only, but of any object, the object is not the cause in any sense. The knowledge. as it shines forth, is felt to shine as it were in free grace. So neither the activity of the self nor the activity of the object can be said to be a *means* to it; as Ś a ṅ k a r a characteristically declares there is no *claim* to knowledge. All this is expressed in another way by saying that perception[11] as an (apparently) processless *accomplished* cognition is B r a h m a n or the self itself—of course in the murky atmosphere of sensation which, however, is only *our* limitation. Yet so long as we seek to know this self, this breath of knowledge, as a determinate object, it necessarily eludes our grasp. It is only to be characterised as n e t i n e t i, 'not that,' 'not that'.

24. Yet is not this suicidal, one might ask, to call this breath of knowledge the absolute self and yet to deny its positive conceivability? One feels as if the triumph gained over absolute scepticism was more imaginary than real, only a fond hope, not an accomplished reality. But here V e d ā n t a points out that as the objective possibility of 'perception without sensation' and of knowledge of noumenon was demonstrated by dream and dreamless sleep, so the objective possibility (which is here indistinguishable

10 i.e. striving.
11 See Sec. 88.

from actuality) of this undifferenced consciousness of the absolute lies in a concrete psychological state called the turīya or samādhi state where this consciousness is isolated and is not a mere fringe of determinate consciousness.

25. The discussion of suṣupti or dreamless sleep has thus brought us over to the consideration of this samādhi or ecstatic consciousness. Waking, dream, and dreamless sleep are intelligible facts easily performing the role of *veræ causæ*, but this samādhi seems to explain *obscurum per obscurius.* It accordingly requires an elucidation. In the suṣupti state, the mind is dissociated wholly from the self which is then in the immediately conscious attitude. It is conscious, but conscious of a blank only. It has then the direct cognition of the absence of specific cognition, the consciousness of a positive nothing, and hence it flashes back on itself. It is the light flashing in circumambient gloom, revealing nothing but the gloom. The suṣupti state, however, gives the possibility only but not the actuality of the knowledge of noumena; the self does not here swoon into the knowledge of noumena. Like the dream-state, it is a state in which the self has no control over itself, not a state to which the self rises by a continuous effort. So if we could control ourselves in this state, we could promise ourselves the attainment of a far more potent and comprehensive species of knowledge than we could attain even in the actualised dream-state. The progress of knowledge in the waking state might be conceived to be in a line stretching away from us to infinity, and the end is the knowledge of all finite phenomena in their relations to one another. The progress of knowledge in the *actualised* dream-state as distinct from the passive uncontrolled state, is *in* infinity, though the knowledge is still phenomenal; the end here is the knowledge of the infinite of phenomenon getting determined into finites. The progress of knowledge in the *actualised* suṣupti-state is from infinite to infinite and not phenomenal. The phenomenal infinite is turned by noumenal screws which are fixed like the axle of a revolving wheel. We may distinguish three stages here (1) the objective possibility of the self being isolated in suṣupti, (2) the actualised but determinate self-isolation in what has been called savikalpa-samādhi or determinate ecstasy, (3) the actualised indeterminate self-isolation in nirvikalpa-samādhi or indeterminate ecstasy. These stages are often not

distinguished, especially in earlier Vedāntic literature. They are all absolute stages where the sense of duality is non-existent.

26. Now what is the difference between suṣupti and savikalpa-samādhi? The difference, as ordinarily given, is that in the former the (empirical) mind with all its modes lapses altogether, whereas in the latter it does not lapse but only gets concentrated into one absolute irrelative mode which thus becomes actualised in the highest degree. The one represents the greatest *dispersion*[12] of attention, the other its utmost *concentration.* In both, the consciousness of duality lapses; in both, the self enjoys undifferenced bliss; in both, the timeless seeds of knowledge and action (vidyā-karma) persist, accounting for the recognition of the past on awaking from them. But whereas on awaking from suṣupti, the self remembers that it was in the attitude of knowing object though the object was there a blank, on rising from samādhi it ought to remember it *was* the object in that state and not in the object-knowing attitude at all. In the former, the self as always limited was simply isolated: in the latter, it burst its bonds, destroyed the barrier between subject and object, and became the absolute.

27. The ecstasy, far from being unconsciousness or bare consciousness, is supra-consciousness. If Hegel's 'speculative consciousness' or 'notion' be the truth of discursive understanding, this intellectual or ecstatic intuition of Vedānta is the truth of the speculative consciousness. If Hegel's thought is concrete and creative, it is not so as thought but as reality or being, i.e., as ecstatic identity of thought and being.

28. The method of attaining this ecstasy is not the method of scientific investigation. A phenomenon has not only a relational aspect but also an intrinsic *aesthetic* aspect merging into a mystic aspect. The former aspect is caught by our discursive reason, the latter by imagination which is in fact intuitive reason. Here, too, as in the case of the moral intuition, it has been objected that the notions reached through this imagination are "heuristic rather than determinative" (Kant). But the consideration of the dream-state has already demonstrated the possibility of these notions being isolated and so turned into eternal percepts. This

12 Because there is no determinate object to which the attention may be directed.

imaginative isolation is effected by prolonged attention. Discursive thought about the relations of an object may no doubt help *in this imaginative isolation,* for it means a detaining of the aspects of the object in the mind, an oscillation of the mind round *it, though it may not always be followed by* a definite settling of the mind on it. Generally the mind buzzes round an object, and then moves on to another and then returns to it; and thus if making progress at all, it moves in wider and more complicated figures, but still never effectually settles on any object. While science or philosophy is thus ever and anon *moving* in its figures, with or without a consciousness of the whole, one quite loses sight of the other discipline, viz., that of contemplating an individual object, of getting glued down to it, of sinking into the heart of it, by suppressing within us the urgency of distracting desires and the subtle caprices of thought, and by tranquilising the surface of the mind while holding before it a symbol of the object we are seeking to know, instead of struggling to catch the object with a self-stultifying eagerness.

29. There are different grades of noumena (devatā) which the self may realise in ecstasy. From the ecstatic intuition of all other determinate objects, there is waking; but there is no waking from the ecstatic intuition of God, for the simple reason that so long as there is limitation or the slightest trace of individuality, there can be no intuition of this Infinite Determination, no becoming infinite. This is the highest stage of savikalpa-samādhi. The mind-capsule of the self, persisting in all such samādhi, and ever expanding, reaches here its utmost tension and utmost tenuity. This perfectly transparent envelope still constitutes the determinateness of God as Īśvara. He is the actualised 'Ideal of Pure Reason' of Kant, the 'Absolute Idea' of Hegel, self-realised not in thought but in ecstasy. Although, said Kant, this is the most adequate reason-picture of the thing-in-itself, the thing-in-itself is the real, negating even this picture; of the thing-in-itself, as Spencer would have put it, there is only an indeterminate consciousness, an 'indefinable sense'. Vedānta's addition to this is the suggestion that both the reason-picture and the indeterminate consciousness are capable of being isolated and actualised in the concrete states, savikalpa-samādhi (intuition of determinate noumena), and nirvikalpa-samādhi (intuition of the reality transcending

all determinateness). The latter is undifferenced not only in the sense that the consciousness of duality is absent, as it is even in suṣupti, not only in the sense that the unconscious ring of the Unknown constituting the limitation of all noumena lower than God is removed, as it may be in savikalpa-samādhi, but also in the sense that even the consciousness of this removal is absent. This is the highest stage, this is the truth, this is Brahman.

30. Waking, dream, dreamless sleep, and ecstasy with the intermediate stages constitute, then, a *new dimension* of the mind. This is not only *a* dimension of the mind but *the* one dimension of existence in which even the deepest of all distinctions, viz., that between the subject and object, has place. The ordinarily conceived duality between them gives place in Vedānta to the conception of a gradation of existences, one pole of which is the lowest waking stage in which the self completely forgets itself, the stage of the mere object, and the other pole, the ecstatic stage in which the self not only denies the existence of everything else but denies the denial itself, the stage of the pure subject. The gradation is not eternally spread out; the samādhi state is not only a stage among stages, it is the truth of the other stages. So, too, in the series, each stage is the truth of the preceding stage. The gradation between subject and object is also the gradation between truth and untruth, between good and evil. The self, as identified with any stage, feels the stage below it to be illusory ; thus there is a reconciliation between the absolute distinction of truth and untruth on the one hand, and the continuous gradations of truth on the other. The final duality of Brahman and Avidyā (illusion) which at the same time is no duality of positives, is the exemplar of the relation between truth and untruth.

31. It remains to recognise the fact that each stage is not only present in its isolation but also unconsciously informs the lower stage. In fact on the waking plane we can trace the projections of all the other planes. Psychology recognises the stages, perception, imagination (reproductive and productive), thought (understanding) with the explicit consciousness of subject and object, and the indefinable consciousness of the beyond (Spencer). Now the last three, as we have pointed out, might be regarded as the projections of dream, dreamless sleep, and ecstasy on the

waking plane. Of these, the earlier stages adumbrate the later and the later react on the earlier. This is the empirical counterpart of Kant's apriori psychology. In the perception of object, there is the given matter of the sensations, fitted, partly as reproduced *ideas, into the forms of space and time (generated, it may be, out of ideas; this time* again shooting forth the rays of productive imagination, the schemata, to touch the categories which are the eyes of the self or the synthetic unity of apperception: this self all the while feels the pressure of the thing-in-itself and so thinks the object under the form of infinity, i.e., in relation to the infinite world, to the subject, and the *ens realissimum,* still failing, however, to catch the thing-in-itself and having only a contentless aspiration towards it. Vedāntism finds the concretes of these apriori elements which all operate in waking perception, in the distinguishable internal characters of the several stages, waking, dreaming, etc. The general correspondence between the Vedāntic stages and the Kantian elements has been sufficiently made out; a more detailed correspondence can be exhibited only after a modified presentation of Kantianism. This, however, space will not permit.

CHAPTER II

Vedāntic Metaphysics

32. The position of the pure subject and the material object in the Vedāntic system has been indicated. The primary duality of self and negation, which is no duality of positives, has been found to transfigure every stage of existence. As a consequence of this unconscious transfiguration, each stage in the series, waking, dream, etc., in its unconscious form, becomes *co-ordinate* with the lower stage. This is particularly apparent in the waking stage where the distinctions among the several aspects of existence, adhyātma, adhibhūta, adhideva, adhiloka, etc.. come out explicitly as co-ordinate with each other. These distinctions are intelligible only in the light of a metaphysical view which is dimly traceable in the Upaniṣads and which can hardly be said to have been completely brought out even by the commentators. The exposition of it, to be attempted presently, would therefore require to be justified by an elaborate discussion of all passages in the Upaniṣads which lend colour to it. For the present it is set forth only as a hypothesis.

33. In the waking stage, the sentient body is the adhyātma or subjective aspect, and the objects of sense-experience constitute the adhibūta or objective aspect. They are so distinct here that language is strained in calling them *aspects* of the same thing. But they are related to one another. The self as identified with the body takes the object to be 'useful', to be subservient to its pleasure and pain. The experience of the object rouses desire, desire again begets experience—a restless whirl of relation. In the aesthetic consciousness, however, such as is roused in rapt contemplation or upāsanā, one rises to a universal standpoint from which is witnessed the *identity* of the different sentient elements of the body with the different aspects of the object. The restless relations, the attractions and repulsions between the body and the object, are then felt to be illusory differentiations of quiescent unities. The eye and the visible aspect of things, for example, constitute a unity. The Upaniṣads bristle with aesthetic intuitions of such unities, ranging from the most profound to the most superficial, viewed as devatās or objects for upāsanā.

This upāsanā consists in a *continuous* direction of the attention to an aesthetic symbol revealed by the śāstras, i.e., by some seer. The attitude in it is quite the reverse of the attitude of that cheap rationalism which makes a parade of its independence of authority; the existence of the devatā or the aspect of the object worshipped may not have been proved by reason or may not have at once appealed to one's leaden aesthetic sensibility, but through the will to believe or śraddhā, through prolonged contemplation, the devatā may be seen to be gradually shining out.

34. The adhideva aspect is to be understood in relation to the adhiloka aspect, which requires an elucidation. Every devatā demands a loka. Psychologically put, an absolute unity, to be real, must be not only thought but realised in some sort of intuition. In aesthetic (visual) intuition, for example, we realise a devatā, like the sun, the unity of seeing and the visible world. Now as here the realised object ceases to be an object and gets manifested as the absolute identity that it eternally was, though unrecognised because of the individual's limitations, so the intuition, too, is divested of its merely subjective aspect and appears as an eternal shining world (div) with which the limited subject is raised to identity. The distinction between the subject and object in ordinary knowledge appears in the absolute sphere as a distinction between loka and devatā. Only in ordinary knowledge, the subject takes the lead, whereas here the devatā which corresponds to the object, is the higher reality. What is from the lower standpoint *my* intuition of an object is from the higher standpoint, a devatā shining, revealing himself in a loka.

35. It may be urged, however, that the distinction between subject and object is altogether annulled in the absolute sphere and therefore a devatā must be conceived to shine by itself. The demand for a locus for such intelligible entities springs from a feebleness of the mind which will have sensuous symbols where it ought to entertain pure concepts of the reason; it springs in fact from that hypostasising tendency with which Plato has been charged with regard to his Ideas.

36. To this it is replied that an existence that is nowhere is unintelligible and that the demand for a locus even in the sensuous sphere springs from a necessity of the reason. The locus of an extended object involves the conception of the *attribute* of

extension (which is nothing but the whole of space) being in space. The sensuous conception of an object in space would thus be utterly unintelligible *unless a relation be conceived to be dual—a being and a process*—the being transcending the process and yet resting on the process.

37. This necessity of the reason applies not only to such a sensuous relation, it applies to the highest relation, the relation of subject and object. To Absolute Idealism, the Self is the absolute identity of subject and object. It is self-relation, the being and the relation being here identical; and so far it is self-existent, it might be deemed absurd to demand any *locus* or external relation. To this, Vedānta will reply that such an absolute or irrelative reality *is*, or is realisable only in, an ecstatic consciousness (which Hegel does not admit) and that to us who have not reached it, who only *think* of it, this has to be thought of as resting on the relation to an individual. To ecstatic consciousness, such relation is not; but mere thought has to postulate a dual absolute—the absolute for the absolute consciousness as resting on the absolute for the individual, the unknowable absolute on the knowable absolute. The self that excludes the object as absolute negation is at once the same as and higher than the self that has the negation within it as a moment. If the self be but relation,[13] as Hegel takes it, it must be taken to depend on the *nature* or the limitation of the terms of the relation; even in the self-relation of the self, the selves that are related to each other are bounded by negation[14] and hence their relation cannot be wholly free. If it be said that the relation is prior in reality, that it is the universal which freely particularises itself, it is replied that such a particularising is inexplicable in the last resort and therefore the universal that is in and through particulars is a *fact* to be accepted, not a free function of the reason. The last principle of philosophy *for us* must be a *necessity* of the reason founded on a *given fact*, though the aspiration of philosophy must ever be to reach a principle that is wholly rational. Brahman, the self-existent, must therefore be conceived by us to rest on His own glory (sve mahimni tiṣṭhati). So lower down, every devatā is to be conceived to be in a loka.

13 Of *identity* of subject and object. See above.

14 Because 'nature'=limitation=negation.

38. The necessity of the several aspects, adhyātma, etc., has been vindicated at what might appear to be a disproportionate length, were it not for the fact that these are just the conceptions which require to be raised above the mythologic region in which they are supposed to be. Given a loka or intuition-ground, we have against it a devatā or an absolute unity of subject and object. A concrete intuition-medium, a Platonic heaven in necessary to ensure to these devatās or Ideas reality. It will not do to say that they exist in thought or reason: that appears from the waking standpoint to be too thin to support reality.

39. The doctrine of adhyātma, etc., is thus capable of being affiliated on Absolute Idealism, as modified by Vedāntic transcendentalism. The devatās have the character of absolute identities but do they resemble the Platonic Ideas in being *universalia ante rem*? Is the Vedāntic view one of (conceptual) realism? The fact that Schopenhauer's view finds room for the eternal ideas, the grades of the objectification of the will, encourages us to look forward to something like them in Vedānta.

40. A devatā is differentiated transversely[15] into adhyātma and adhibhūta, but is it also longitudinally[16] differentiated into particular individuals? It would appear to be so, for a devatā like the sun is said to be the unity of the senses of sight supposed to be severally possessed by different persons and of the visible aspects of things. There is an instructive difference in this respect between Vedānta and Sāṅkhya; according to the latter, each sense, as sense, i.e , as aḍhyātma, is one, and different souls partake (by reflection) of this one sense; but according to the former, a sense as sense is many, being different in different individuals, but then these many are only the illusory differentiations of one devatā which corresponds to the particular sense. (The difference is explained by the Sāṅkhya view that the individual soul is real and that there is no such thing as *one* cosmic illusion but only individual illusions of separate eyes, separate minds, etc., there being one real prakṛti which eternally and really evolves into mahat, etc, including the archetypal senses. The Vedāntic view is that this prakṛti is but Māyā or cosmic illusion, and that therefore not only the indivi-

15 i.e. element-wise or aspect-wise.

16 i.e. as recurrent.

dual illusions but also the *archetypal* senses and the correlated primal matters are but its differentiations). In any case, the many particular senses of sight and the many visible aspects of things are said to find their unity in the Sun-deity.

41. But still this would be *aspect*-realism rather than true class-realism. The aspects, visibility, audibility, etc, have their Ideas, concrete basal devatās as they might be called; but are not these only superficial aspects of things? What of the natural kinds like man, gold, etc.? Have not they, too, their Ideas? Vedānta, while admitting that not only the class but every individual has got its eternal 'name and form' (nāma-rūpa) will demur at first to an implication of the objection. These sense-aspects in Vedānta are the *primal matters*, the absolutes of the senses, hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell. They constitute no superficial aspect but the central substance, and 'names and forms' are but the illusory differentiations of this substance. When, by means like upāsanā, we have risen to the absolute consciousness in the waking state, these external sensuous aspects are viewed as the basal devatās (they themselves are the illusory differentiations of still higher, more substantial realities, as we shall see presently): they are viewed as the substance (relatively speaking) of the object of which the form (taken in its widest sense) is only the manifestation or illusory differentiation. Within the form, there are again relations of matter and form, for each stage of the form is matter in relation to a further differentiation of it. Now each of the stages is capable of being actualised into devatās by ecstatic contemplation. Now when a rationalist takes the sensation to be lapsed thought or thought become unconscious, and when an empiricist holds that our thoughts are only the complex manufactures out of sense-material, by themselves, only illusory refinements and useful only in reference to sense-reality, their antagonism is transcended by the Vedāntist who reinstates both by pointing out that without an absolute intuition-continuum, the thought cannot be real and that the devatā is therefore the sense reality, divested of its limitation of unconsciousness.

42. These devatās again have an order among them—an order really of emanation but capable also of being viewed as of evolution from the human standpoint—the absolutely formless indeterminate matter being one pole, and the full-blown waking reality the other pole. We may notice two orders of differences,

the one comprising the several grades of matter, the other comprising the forms as manifested in each grade. Yet the grades themselves are formed or determinate matter. The same (formless) matter *persists* through all the grades in all the forms; so, too, each formed matter persists in its differentiations in the grades below it, the grades corresponding to dreamless sleep, dream, etc., the successive materialisations of the same reality. This then is the difference between ordinary realism and Vedāntic realism; the Ideas are not only concrete universals but *substantial matters* of different grades from the pure subject to the grossest material object. The pure subject is the formless matter, the sole reality, the truth of the grades of materialisation, and of all the determinate objects therein. The full-blown reality minus this formless matter is absolute negation, the very principle of illusion. Yet what are the multitudinous 'names and forms' of this full-bloom reality? These empty husks of reality are not reality: but they get filled in with the formless matter. Why does the reality enter these unreal forms? It shows that these forms are neither real nor unreal. Such a contradictory thing can only be the principle of illusion; it is darkness only that can be at once revealed and destroyed by light. This is the famous principle of Māyā, which is one yet manifold, the matrix of all 'names and forms.' These, too, must be eternal, coeternal with the pure subject. Yet this does not necessarily argue a despair of explanation. Of the forms which constitute individuality, no explanation is possible except that illusion is at its root. No universal can exhaust the infinite variety of the individual. If even we could trace a consecutive differentiation from the highest universal downwards, each step of the differentiation would be unintelligible. It is the very essence of differentiation to escape the universal. To recognise the necessity of this unknowability is to recognise the principle of māyā.

43. Not that universals among these shadowy names and forms, concatenating them, are unknown in Vedānta: The realistic jāti or universal is admitted both in Nyāya and Vedānta, though the latter emphatically disclaims the eternal jāti of the former. According to Nyāya, this jāti is an eternal reality inhering in the vyakti or individual things and is eternally connected with it. Vedānta denies both its eternal reality and its being co-ordinate with individual things. As has

been already indicated, to Vedānta nothing is an eternal reality except the pure self. As to the other point, if an individual and its jāti be taken to be distinct (and co-ordinate in reality), they cannot be unified in any way. The inherence, according to Vedānta, is a fiction. (This recalls the famous criticism of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas by Aristotle in his Nicomachæan Ethics). In 'A is B', if B the concept is distinct from A, their copular relation is a fiction; for it is asked, what connects A or B with the relation? If another relation, what connects that with its members? And so there is a regress to infinity. Once you set up two utterly distinct things, you cannot bridge over the gulf; only you may pronounce the effort to combine to be itself illusory. Without an admission of identity-in-difference, not only this inherence, but also any kind of connexion even space connexion, would be inconceivable. What view, then, does Vedānta itself hold? It understands the jāti not as the denotational real but as the connotational real, not as co-ordinate with and distinct from the vyakti or individual, but *identical* with it on the one hand and of a different grade of reality on the other. The identity between attribute and substance dharma-dharmin is characteristic of the hylozoistic speculations of Vedānta and Saṅkhya (regardnig māyā which is one yet many, or regarding prakṛti which really evolves), following logically on the denial of inherence as a distinctive principle. This dharma or attribute is again the essence, the persisting matter in relation to the dharmin or thing, infinite in every individual, having the whole of the phenomenality behind it.

44. Vedānta might very well admit the co-ordinateness of jāti and vyakti in the sphere of the pure 'names and forms', that realm of shadows. The relation between jāti and vyakti, which has already been discussed, is in the region of formed matter where the more differentiated is less in reality. The realm of shadows or māyā may be compared to space, the principle of separation or 'spread-out-ness', the nearest determinate symbol of the principle of difference, in which a mode may be said to be different from another in which it is included.

45. We have thus to recognise three systems of eternal entities in Vedānta: (1) in regard to matter, formless matter and its several emanatory grades corresponding to the stages, samādhi, suṣupti, etc., including the intermediaries; (2) in re-

gard to formed matter, the basal devatās, corresponding to the primal matters, and also the essences like 'cow-ness', 'horse-ness' (gotva, aśvatva) incarnated in the above grades; (3) in regard to the 'names and forms', the abstract differences, which are neither real nor unreal. We have still to recognise two other orders, (4) the Karma-unities or will-unities in the several grades, and (5) the universal unities of these with their cosmic reactions, the universal emanations of Brahman, including the lesser gods, the inquiry into which is for the present postponed.

46. Lest the identity-in-difference implied in Vedāntic realism be taken to be an unwarranted importation of Hegelianism, it is necessary to refer to discussions bearing on the law of contradiction in Vedāntic philosophy. It may be noted at the outset that in this Vedāntic conception of identity-in-difference, as distinct from a simliar conception in Hegel, the identity is the truth and the difference is illusory and even the negation of the difference through which the identity is affirmed is illusory. In connexion with the discussion of illusory perception, as of the nacre taken for silver, the point is raised: when the appearance of the silver is corrected and the nacre in its real nature known, can it not be held that the thing is *sometimes* silver and *sometimes* nacre? The reply given is that it is the very nature of the later or correcting perception to deny the truth of the former perception once for all. When the illusion of silver ceases, one is not conscious of the real silver being absent but only of the illusory silver having disappeared. But a further difficulty may be raised: when the silver is known to be illusory, is not the knowledge itself self-contradictory, as expressible in the form 'the (existent) silver is non-existent'? The reply is: the knowledge is rather expressible in the form, 'the illusory silver is absent'. The very perception of the illusory character of a thing is the perception of the illusory thing being absent: to light up the darkness is to destroy it. The question really is: if illusion is known through contradiction, is not contradiction itself conceivable? The Vedāntic reply appears to be that the contradicting perception completely destroys the phenomenal reality of the contradicted percept. The contradiction is therefore not real[17]. We have really two cognitions here, (a) *this* phenomenally real silver, (b)

17 Because one of the terms is non-est.

that illusory silver is absent. The cognition of this phenomenally real silver, *plus* the contradicting percept of the nacre amounts to the cognition of the illusory silver being absent. In identity of contradictories, the identity is known through recognition: the relation of identity is nothing but the identical thing. The union of contradictories is uncritically accepted at first, only to be rejected when it is known to be a union of contradictories. This view of illusory perception is only the reappearance in a lower plane of the dualism of Brahman and māyā which yet is no dualism of positives.

47. In this connexion, we may refer to a discussion of Śaṅkara in his commentary on Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad V—i, where he combats Bhartṛ-prapañca's views of Brahman being at once one and dual (dvaita-advaita, the causal Brahman different from the effect Brahman, though identical at the retraction of the world). Śaṅkara argues that although rules of action may admit of exceptions or alternatives, a truth does not; truth does not depend on any one's choice. Two contradictory attributes, dvaita and advaita, dual and single, cannot both be true of the same thing. The Vedāntic doctrine of adhikāri-bheda (accommodation), that the truth to be taught must be relative to the students' capacities or qualifications, is not only a practical principle of pedagogy, secular and religious,—it is founded on an epistemological truth. The duality of Brahman and the world is true to one steeped in desires, and encased in individuality; their unity is true to one who has come to *know*, to transcend individuality. Truth is relative to the knower. This, however, is no Protagorean subjectivism. So long as the individual is an individual, there is duality between teacher and taught, the teaching appearing to be something foreign, imposed from without; but when there is a flashing from below, there is one homogeneous flame of advaita-jñāna or monistic knowledge, when, however, the individual does not remain an individual to recognise the contradiction between it and the previous dvaita-jñāna or dualistic knowledge. To us, from the outside, dvaita and advaita are both true, as possible stages of knowledge, but dvaita is inferior in reality to advaita; they are not co-ordinate. In every act of knowledge, the duality between subject and object presents itself only to give way to their identification.

48. It may be urged against the foregoing account of V e d ā n t i c *realism that it does not provide for a principle of change, as distinct from one of mere difference*, whether change is regarded as emanation (v i v a r t a) or as evolution (p a r i ṇ ā m a). The three orders of eternal entities which we have recognised are all static; where is the dynamic principle?

49. One would imagine such a principle is likely to be met with in a discussion of causality. Referring, however, to an elaborate and acute discussion of the subject in Ś a ṅ k a r a ' s commentary on B ṛ h a d ā r a ṇ y a k a U p a n i ṣ a d I, ii, we find only a clearer enunciation of the static view of the world which we have already presented, but the dynamic principle appears to be nowhere. It would not be, however, quite out of place here to present, in a slightly modern garb, the salient features of Ś a ṅ k a r a ' s argument, both as a specimen of his reasoning and as a further explication of the foregoing views.

50. Before the world began, no difference was manifest; everything was shrouded by death. Not that there was a mere void, for then causes and effects were in their seminal unmanifested condition. (To justify this, he proves first that the cause, meaning by it only material cause, and next that the effect, meaning by it the effect-form, are eternally existent.) (1) *Eternity of cause.* That effects are possible only when the causes are present is a matter of experience. It might be objected that when a pot is fashioned out of a lump of clay, the lump is first destroyed and then the pot comes into being and so the cause is not immediately antecedent to the effect. But it is replied that not the lump-form but the clay is the cause. All causes in their causation destroy their previous manifestation in introducing their present manifestation, for the same cause cannot exist in two different forms at the same time. But the cessation of the previous manifestation does not mean the cessation of the cause itself. Yet why not take the lump-form also to be a cause, seeing that the clay cannot exist except in some form? Because the form is variable but the matter is persistent. But still must it not have some form? No: in the production of the pot, the clay for a moment has left the lump-form and is passing over to the pot-form. (That is the *mystery* of production. Change means the conflict of manifestation and the consequent momentary *nakedness* of the substance.) But is this naked substance perceived? May it not be

that the lump of clay only *resembles* the pot that is made out of it without the clay persisting identically in the change? No; the identity is *perceived* but the similarity is only *inferred*. Inference is based on perception, and if perception were to be questioned by inference here, there would be an illicit regress to infinity. The denial of identity would mean the rapid succession of momentary acts, which means the denial of knowledge *of* any object. For where is the evidence for the object? If in another act of knowledge, where is the evidence for this again? And so on. Similarly if you do not trust in your immediate perception of identity and ask 'what is the evidence for it' and reply 'because there is the felt similarity', you must ask for the evidence for that again, and so on, which means that you cannot *affirm* anything. Besides, the consciousness 'this is like that' is possible if the same self or knower is present to both the momentary cognitions, 'this' and 'that', which, however, cannot be admitted by one who denies identity. Is it replied that whether there be a self or not, the likeness is a feeling (itself an event of the mind)? But it is no blind feeling; 'this' and 'that' refer to each other; it is an objective assertion If it were only a subjective feeling, 'this' and 'that' also, being individually known by assimilation with their likes, would be merely subjective, false: and then the knowledge of this subjectivity or falsity would itself be merely subjective or false. (Such a sceptical suicide then is the only alternative to the view that the cause is perceived to be persisting self-identically in the effect.) (2) *Eternity of effect.* The effect-form, too, does not accidentally emerge into existence but is eternally existent (i) As an object hidden under darkness or behind an opaque wall manifests itself when a lamp is lighted or when the wall is removed, so is the form of the pot hidden under the previous form of the clay, the lump-form, and is manifested when the previous form is removed by appropriate means. *Objections*:—(a) In order to prove that all that is manifested was previously existent, it is necessary to know that what was previously non-existent is not manifested, but the absence of manifestation cannot be perceived. Hence it can only be said that a thing is existent when manifested. *Reply*:—It cannot be held either that it is existent *only* when manifested, for that amounts to saying that all existents are manifested, which, however, is not true. (b) The previous form, lump-form, as

agent producing manifestation, is different in nature from the *darkness* or the opaque wall; for the wall occupies a space-position distinct from that of the object hidden by it, but the lump-form does not do so. *Reply*:—This difference is not important; in milk, the milk-form prevents the manifestation of the water-form and yet occupies the same position as the latter. (c) But there is another difference: to *see* the pot hidden under darkness, one has to make an exertion (light a lamp, etc.), but to *see* the pot emerging from the lump of clay, no such exertion is required (though it is required in the production of it). *Reply*:—In both cases, to see does not require any exertion: the exertion put forth is for production only—in the former case for investing the pot with the attribute of lightedness, in the latter case, for destroying the lump-form, etc.

(ii) The past being of the future being of an object may be peculiarly distinct from the present being, but it is still being. Knowledge of the future is knowledge of some *existent* object, for otherwise how is the future *willed*? Willing (as distinct from merely desiring) means directly an objectification of the future. The Yogin in his clairvoyance is said to *see* the past and the future as we see the present. Besides, God's foreknowledge would be meaningless, if the future object were not eternally existent (cf. Anselm's reconciliation between divine foreknowledge and man's free will). (Existence or reality immediately means 'transcending time.') Again, what does non-existence of the future object, 'pot' mean? Only that some other object is now present. Non-existence of pot itself is not existent positively: it is not defined by being distinguished from other non-existences, as that of the cloth. And what is non-existence *of* pot? Is non-existence an attribute of pot? Then it means non-existence of non-existent pot, not of the positive pot. Finally, if we say, 'A is produced or comes into being', A, the subject, must be already existent in order to have the predicate, 'comes into being'.

51. This elaborate discussion of causality leads to the recognition of Brahman as the material cause of the universe and of the primal hiding principle, co-eternal with Brahman, viz., māyā which by itself is nothing, like the blue tint which seems to pervade objects viewed through blue glasses. Still therefore the dynamic principle remains undiscovered.

52. What is śakti or power? It is sometimes identified

with the principle of illusion or māyā. In Pañcadaśī, for example (Chapter II, slokas 47 seq.), we have pronouncements to the following effect:—māyā, or the power of the Lord, is no reality (in the presence of Brahman), is inferrible from its effects, and only from these. The power of the Existent is not the Existent, even as the power of the fire is not the fire. What, then, is it apart from the Existent? It cannot be called the void, as that is taken to be the effect of māyā; it is something then which is neither the void nor the existent. Yet it exists only as through the Existent, for substance and attribute are not separate entities. It may, no doubt, be manifested in effects, but before creation, such manifested power did not exist, and so power cannot be a principle separate from Brahman. (Yet to show that Brahman transcends it, it is added) this power does not pervade all Brahman but only a portion or aspect of Him (it). This Universe is only a quarter of Him; full three quarters are self-luminous. So in Bhagavad-gītā Kṛṣṇa says, 'by a portion of myself, do I pervade the Universe'. So too śruti, 'having pervaded the universe, He extends a space beyond' (atyatiṣṭhad daśāṅgulam); and there is the Vedānta-sūtra, 'Also there is a form of the Lord not abiding in effected things' (Thibaut's translation). (It is admitted, however, that this attribution of parts to the Indiscerptible is only provisional). 'That power, as residing in the Existent, produces effects'. The power that creates ākāśa (space or ether, its first effect) creates also its identity with the Existent and thus (in the inverse order) makes the existent an attribute of ākāśa; as substance. It is really the Existent that becomes ākāśa; to take the existence as *of* ākāśa is what might be expected of māyā or the principle of illusion.

53. We have to note four points in the above passage:—(1) that this *power*, by itself, is only māyā: (2) that it exists and functions only as residing in Brahman, i.e., only as Brahman informing māyā; (3) that though thus informed, it is transcended by Brahman; and (4) that Brahman existing in the power becomes the effect: the effect is thus not non-existent. The passage presents both sides of the Vedāntic doctrine of māyā—the world being unreal apart from Brahman and real in the reality of Brahman. The latter side is frequently overlooked.

54. Power then as existent is the Existent assuming forms, i.e., making the unreal real. The One Existent Blissful Intelligence, entering māyā becomes self-dirempted into Īśvara and aparā-prakṛti, i.e., the Determinate God (and the 'object in general', the primordial matter in which God) is to energise. Brahman against the 'dark ground' of māyā is Īśvara, māyā against the light of the self is aparā-prakṛti. Yet Īśvara is said to be *free*, to be related to the dark ground, *yet floating on it, to have conquered it once for all, employing it 'only as a servant'.* This attribute of freely relating Himself to the dark ground, being *itself* absolute (for in Him attributes and aspects are concrete realities), is to be viewed as an entity by itself, viz., as parā-prakṛti, and the nisus of this again towards aparā-prakṛti is to be taken as a third entity śakti, or power of the Lord.

55. This parā-prakṛti is the intelligence of Īśvara, appearing in its determinate form only as reflected from the aparā. As Brahman, the undifferenced intelligence, shines on this māyā; it turns it into an object and forthwith becomes the Determinate Subject of this object, functioning towards the object. This triply stratified māyā with the reflection of the Lord, viz., as comprising parā-prakṛti, śakti of the Lord, and aparā-prakṛti, may be considered to be the concrete archetype of the abstractions, sattva, rajas, and tamas (light, intelligence, or goodness; activity; darkness, insentiency, heaviness, evil), those universal aspects of existence to understand which is to understand the differential genius of Hinduism itself. Conformably to the general trend of Vedāntism, one would expect a projection of parā-prakṛti and śakti on aparā-prakṛti: thus aparā-prakrti is of the three guṇas (attributes, elements), sattva, rajas, and tamas, all compact. The Sāṅkhya principle pradhāna, is this aparā-prakṛti, a stage more determinate than mere māyā, differing from it much as Aristotle's matter as potentiality differs from Plato's *me on*, the negation-soil in which he plants his Ideas. Sāṅkhya, however, takes it to be an ultimate reality incapable of being derived from higher principles.

56. The parā-prakṛti has been taken to be the determinate intelligence (buddhi) of the Lord, but it should be noticed that this buddhi is also taken to be an evolute of

the a p a r ā - p r a k ṛ t i, in fact its first and most perfect evolute. So we have to understand the p a r ā as the b u d d h i in its subject-aspect, i.e., as informed with B r a h m a n; the other b u d d h i is its passive aspect, its object aspect, for active b u d d h i knows passive b u d d h i, as the eye sees light. But what is this b u d d h i, active and passive, as distinct from B r a h m a n? Here an understanding of the psychology of the faculties recognised in V e d ā n t a, viz., b u d d h i, m a n a s, a h a ṅ k ā r a, and c i t t a is necessary.

57. All knowledge is self-affirmation. The V e d ā n t i c self is as we have seen already, beyond this self-affirmation, something transcending determination the indeterminate, the unknown and unknowable, that which being presupposed in all knowledge is incapable of being caught in any determinate mode of knowledge. This determinate self-affirmation, too, as (eternally) *completed* or *accomplished*, is beyond the self-affirming activity. This activity implies the consciousness of a limited, unrealised agent proceeding or functioning towards an object. The consciousness of such a limited agent or subject as (illusorily) indentified with the self (which is really *absolute*, not only in the sense of being above duality but above all determination also) is what Kant calls empirical self-consciousness. This activity itself is to be conceived as manifested in two grades, the intellectual and sensory, the synthesis of concepts and the synthesis of apprehension. The self is manifested in self-affirmation or knowledge; knowledge is manifested by the self-affirming activity of the self-conscious individualised self; the activity is that of the interpretation of the sense-manifold, *given* as *one* apprehension. The relation of the senses to the objects will be discussed later on. The senses are only blind receivers and incapable of being themselves perceived (a t ī n d r i y a). The essential character of the four faculties of a n t a ḥ - k a r a ṇ a here discussed—m a n a s, c i t t a, etc, (m a n a s in its widest sense comprising all the four) is that they have both spontaneity and receptivity and are capable of being self-perceived. M a n a s in the narrower sense is the faculty of simple *apprehension* (not a mere *sense*). It has for its specific function, s a ṁ ś a y a (doubt), s a ṁ k a l p a and v i k a l p a (assertion and negation, intellectual or conative). These functions, so widely different, are capable of being connected with one another. As an organ of simple apprehension, m a n a s just raises the ques-

tion, 'what is it' (sensation), but answers it not, just gives a start to attention; so its function on the intellectual side is to doubt. Saṁkalpa is mental impulse (mānasa karma), conation as it appears in desire or motor impulse, in attention, even in objectification. This blind spontaneity is essentially that element in an assertion which goes out beyond the mere judgment, the element of free will in intellection to which Descartes attributed error. Vikalpa is just the negation of this saṁkalpa, a mental impasse, attention as homeless, not as fixing itself on an object but as moving away from it or in its transition from one object to another, will in the air appearing as aversion, hesitation, doubt or as consciousness of difference, the stress of the will in and beyond the negative judgment. Citta is the faculty of intellectual synthesis as distinct from mere apprehension, intellectual, in a wide sense including smaraṇa (remembering), anusandhāna (inquiring, seeking to know *what*), etc. Citta thus is intellectual pravṛtti or self-affirming activity directed outwards, i.e., towards the object; the consciousness which is directed inwards, i.e., the consciousness of self as agent or subject being ahaṁkāra. Buddhi is the faculty of knowledge (as distinct from knowing), intellectual synthesis (niścaya or adhyavasāya) not as activity but as an eternally accomplished (pariniṣṭhita) affair, the unquestioning, quiescent self-affirmation in the copula of a judgment, in belief, in the feelings of pleasure and pain. The relation of knowing to knowledge is peculiar; the latter is manifested, eternally accomplished, not effected as a contingent product or result. In knowledge, however, two elements may be distinguished, the vṛtti or mental mode (section 88), and the light of cit or self playing on it and investing it with its timeless or eternal character. The former can be described as the result of the knowing activity, of the ripening of the seeds of vidyā-karma or the saṁskāras; and so buddhi or mahat in this aspect—the completed organism of knowledge—has been sometimes described as the adhibhūta aspect of citta, the knowing activity, which is thus the corresponding adhyātma or limited subjective aspect. Buddhi then as the faculty of determinate knowledge is the immediate home of the self, which is the light of *knowledge* transcending all determination and yet transfiguring all determinate mental modes.

58. This buddhi is either the immediate reflector of the self or the immediate envelope or body of the self. As reflector or object, it is the finest evolute of aparā-prakṛti. As the body with which the self is identified, it is parā-prakṛti. The two prakṛtis, therefore, interpenetrate one another; they have been described as the primal male and female principles, a division which appears at different stages in Hindu cosmogony but does not, therefore, necessarily involve confusion of thought. The light of the self not only gets reflected from the surface of māyā, turning it into aparā-prakṛti, it transfigures māyā in all its strata, everywhere differentiating it into sattva and tamas, itself getting next identified with the sattva and then functioning (rajas) towards the tamas. Thus it is that the sattva aspect of aparā-prakṛti is at the same time the adhyātma or subjective aspect, tamas being the adhibhūta or objective aspect. One is tempted to identify this distinction between sāttvika and tāmasika in Vedānta with the distinction between actual and potential in the Aristotelian system; there is a good deal of agreement, too, between the systems in respect of the connected doctrines, viz., that matter is unredeemed potentiality, that the soul is the entelechy of the body, and that God is *noesis noeseus*, the purest actuality (cf. Īśvara having the transparent garment, śuddha-sattva-upādhi of buddhi). But it must be remembered that whereas all the differentiation is taken to be ultimately real by Aristotle, Vedānta takes it to be real only within the sphere of māyā or illusion. In fact, as has already been pointed out, Aristotle's matter is aparā-prakṛti but not māyā; and although he recognises that there are different grades of reality, that actuality is the truth of potentiality, and that God though pure actuality still contains in Himself ideally all potentiality, yet he does not rise to the conception of Brahman to whom 'being the truth or actuality of anything' is itself an upādhi or envelope, who is absolute in being devoid not only of all external relation but also of all internal relation, who is said to be ekamevādvitīyam, one without a second, transcending svagata-bheda (having parts), sajātīya-bheda (having something similar), and vijātīya bheda, (having something different from it). He rises as far as the Vedāntic Īśvara, the first emanation of Brahman, Brahman in the attitude of creation. This Īśvara, though the

determinate God as distinct from the indeterminate Brahman, *is* still undifferentiated within Himself. This follows from the very nature of buddhi, which is pure self-affirmation, which is distinct alike from pure caitanya on the one hand, and from citta and ahaṁkāra on the other. This buddhi, has been identified with the state of the self as in suṣupti, or better still, as in savikalpa-samādhi which is its actualised state. Yet buddhi is not an abstract state but rather the concrete faculty or body in which the self is inclosed. The undifferenced character of buddhi appears still more explicitly when we consider that it is the faculty of *feeling* pleasure and pain, which is most intimately related to the self though different from it.

59. Īśvara, then is the self as shining on and in māyā which has the three guṇas (attributes or elements) of sattva, rajas, and tamas, and is accordingly both triguṇātīta (transcending these guṇas), and śuddha-sattva-upādhi (invested with a transparent body of sattva). Of Him as triguṇātīta, parā-prakṛti or the determinate actualised intelligence is the immediate prakṛti or nature; or rather as intelligence itself is an evolute of aparā, taking on two aspects (male and female) in the light of Brahman, He as triguṇātīta is the unity of parā (intelligence as facing the self) and aparā (the same intelligence in its objective or passive aspect, the sattva aspect of aparā facing its tamas aspect) and yet prior to it. This unity next gets identified with and thus contracted into the parā or the transparent garment of sattva which thus has before it the aparā, with tamas as the predominant, though not the sole element. Hence comes the peculiarity that the parā-prakṛti is both different from Brahman and an aspect of Brahman. Hence, too, the possibility of sattva being here absolutely pure, though everywhere else the three guṇas imply one another. It is the lighted surface of māyā, as reflected from which Brahman is Īśvara; to this lighted surface, all the interior is darkness, negation. On the outer confines of māyā, the 'sacred influence of light' appears, and as 'chaos retires', 'dim night' too retires, rendered dimmer by contrast. The alchemy of light turns that which it shines on into light. What was dark, negative, utterly false, becomes light, existent, parā-prakṛti which again shoots inward, stratifying aparā-prakṛti which is the equipoise of the

guṇas into its sattva and tamas aspects, and getting at every stage identified with the sattva-aspect, while the tamas-aspect is for ever retiring.

> "But now at last the sacred influence
> Of light appears, and from the walls of Heaven
> Shoots far into the bosom of dim Night
> A glimmering dawn. Here Nature first begins
> Her farthest verge and Chaos to retire."

60. From the standpoint of Brahman, all this transfigured māyā is false. From the standpoint of Īśvara, as invested with the transparent body of sattva, sattva alone is real, tamas is unreal—they are not co-ordinate. The 'glimmering dawn' shot inwards is only the promise of the conquest of the entire realm of chaos, promise of the ultimate perishableness of tamas.

61. Brahman and Īśvara have sometimes been called the higher god and the lower god. The distinction is, to say the least, misleading, and probably the over-definite language of some of the systematising scholiasts is responsible for it. No doubt there is a distinction between the conceptions. Yet Īśvara is not in reality different from Brahman. As has been already indicated, Īśvara is the absolute of savikalpa-samādhi, whereas Brahman is of nirvikalpa-samādhi, these states being continuous yet different. As a conception, however, Īśvara as triguṇātīta is different from Brahman.

62. An image will make it clear—a light-sphere in circumambient darkness. From the centre of it, the fulness of light radiates all around, without a thought of the darkness: it is the indeterminate infinite Brahman. At the circumference, however, it reaches its limit (not a resistance) and retires into itself, the limiting darkness falling outside of it; the sphere, as viewed from the circumference inwards, is the determinate Infinite or the closed-in Absolute, Īśvara. The limit, however, determines its quality, not as darkness but as darkness lighted up, which again defines the darkness (thus the darkness gets stratified). Let us view all this from the standpoint of the individual. In the dim light of reason, in that 'glimmering dawn' in the bosom of night, the individual is lulled by the bright dreams of the morn, not unaccompanied by frightful nightmares; this is the soul-clearing work of morality (sattva-śuddhi), with its lapses and its

despairs, with its toilsome march and its intervals of serenity. At length he wakes up to the glory of a sunrise, is lifted up to absolute consciousness when all the dreams which constituted life and the world he feels to be illusory, for he has now reached his *true* self which he always was but knew not. Still the dreams are there remembered, though now known to be dreams. He exclaims, 'Lo! the Sun (Īśvara) is there; He has revealed Himself unto me in grace and I am absolute in the Absolute. All that past individuality of mine was but a dream'. Forthwith the duality vanishes in the rapt feeling, 'I am the Sun', which still means 'I am nothing and the Sun is all. I am no longer the limit outside the object; the limit is but the determination of the object, the object which is conscious of the limit'. Both these stages are the aspects of Īśvara, the former being the śuddha-sattva-upādhi aspect, the latter the triguṇātīta aspect. 'In the former, He reveals Himself in me, in my absolute consciousness, puts on my absolute consciousness as a garment; in the latter, I become His very self—He not only shines in me but passes out unimpeded and I am dissolved in Him'. In the former, the light of that sphere passing outwards impinges on darkness, lighting it up; in the latter, the light retires backwards to the centre. But in either case, the light is determinate; in both, there is an awareness of the darkness; the light at first makes it an object and then unites ecstatically with it. Īśvara as triguṇātita still remembers His feat of transcending māyā; the self is conscious of its difference from Īśvara being illusory. It is just the *passing* into the indifference of Brahman, not the indifference itself. It is the indifference rendered conceivable; yet such is the nature of the conception that its content spurns the form, proclaims its own inconceivability. This conceived inconceivability is the ultimate formula; as conceived, it is the triguṇātīta Īśvara the inconceivability that is conceived being triguṇātīta Brahman. They constitute one unit, one scintillating star; that noble verse in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, śyāmāt śavalaṁ prapadye śvalāt syāmaṁ prapadye, 'May I pass from the dark blank to the figured determinate and from thence to the blank again' points to this mystic scintillation of the One reality. No wonder, therefore, that the highest epithets should be applied to Īśvara, as for example, in the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā in the Chāndogya, such as one would expect

to be applied to B r a h m a n from the characterisations, lower B r a h m a n and higher B r a h m a n, the misleadingness of which must be now apparent.

63. Yet after all it may be asked, why this limitation of a darkness at all? Why the illusion of an individuality at all? As we have seen already, the question itself is illegitimate, for while the individuality is there, it necessarily sees no beginning or end of itself, for all that it knows, it knows under the form of individuality; and when the individuality is transcended, not only is *it* felt to be an illusion; even its having been illusorily present in the past is felt to be so; so nowhere does it appear as a *contingent reality* of which only we can demand an explanation.

64. But then how should the inconceivable be thought of, referred to at all? It must be because it *reveals* itself in a form which it at the same time condemns. But are not those to whom it reveals illusory also? Why then this illusory revelation in an illusory form to illusory subjects? Once again, this 'why' is an illegitimate demand, an a t i p r a ś n a, as it has sometimes been called. As the individual is just passing into B r a h m a n, it feels all this to be illusory and then the illusion vanishes. The highest consciousness then for the individual as individual is this consciousness of the illusoriness of his own individuality. This has to be simply accepted; there is no 'why' for this or for B r a h m a n.

65. Before the moment of passing into B r a h m a n, the individual is raised to absolute consciousness (p a r ā - p r a k ṛ t i, as invested with which Ī ś v a r a is ś u d d h a - s a t t v a - u p ā d h i), when Ī ś v a r a is known to be knowing the world as His reflex, i.e, as created by His will. Not that the world is created out of nothing; for I ś v a r a assuming ś u d d h a - s a t t v a - u p ā d h i, i.e., knowing attitude, means at once having a p a r ā - p r a k ṛ t i before Him as object and material for His will to mould. But certain old difficulties at once start up. How does this will meet the matter? How does it actualise particular groupings of 'names and forms' potentially contained in this matter, and this in time, according to law? Why does He will at all, seeing that he, as perfectly actualised, cannot have anything to attain or avoid? The will meets the matter as identical with it, just as the energising body can act on the object, the body being, as we saw, but sentient space continuing itself in its move-

ment through space. As to the other questions, a preliminary discussion is required to introduce the Vedāntic solutions.

66. The absolute consciousness in which Īśvara is revealed is reached only when there is a perfect chastening of the spirit, when it is made the still mirror of truth, not simply by a discipline of the intellect but by an ethical discipline of the will, when all the desires of the individual self have been completely eliminated and the spirit is broadened out so as to comprehend the truest interests of all beings. Ignorance is but the intellectual reflex of evil willing, the shadow of which again deepens the evil, and thus it goes on ad *infinitum.* We have already introduced the notion of every man being born with the seed of all his spiritual life, intellective and conative. Each such seed of vidyā-karma (knowledge and action) has a measure of ignorance or evil in it, and the self as embodied in this seed sees no beginning of itself, for it can explain its evil or sin only as due to an ignorance which is not a temporary cloud but is ingrained in the character which constitutes its body, and further it can explain this ignorance only as due to self-imposition, i.e., free sinning, for the self cannot have anything imposed upon it from without. The absolute consciousness is reached only when this substantial ignorance has been dispelled by good willing. So when Fichte said that every man could, if he would, i.e., if he had not a sinning will, rise to intellectual perception and when Schelling thought the very reverse, that 'the capacity for it, like the poetic talent, is possessed by a select few', that the true philosopher, like the true poet, is born, not made, they held views which are reconciled in the Vedāntic doctrine which has already been presented. The ignorance that is ingrained in the seed of vidyā-karma with which a man is born shuts out certain forms or planes of thought *ab initio* from his mental horizon, which no effort of mere thinking can make accessible, just as an instinctive tendency or an ingrained habit cannot be annulled by a single fiat of the will. At the same time there are rational elements or good tendencies in that seed or 'noumenal character' which the will primarily, and the intellect secondarily (with the help of the will), can help to develop, gradually working out the ignorance and the evil. Accordingly when Hegel holds, as against both Fichte and Schelling, that the 'wonderful power of the understanding' alone can be trusted to lead us to every level of thought by a necessary

dialectic development, that therefore a bad man can rise step by step up the thought-ladder alone to the highest conceptions of philosophy, Vedānta will press against him the old objection that thought is not knowledge, that even the large range of thought to which the bad man has access is due to the fact that he is not all bad, and that though the thought is continuous with absolute knowledge or intellectual perception, yet at every step this thought, necessary as it is, has the alternative of absolute scepticism beyond it. The smoky flickering flame of mere thought clears up only when the moisture of evil and ignorance in the 'noumenal character' (Schopenhauer) is completely burnt off in the fire of morality.

67. This Vedāntic view may now be made the individualistic platform from which we may view the question already suggested, 'Why does Īśvara will at all'. Īśvara is the crown of the moral consciousness, the unity of all the 'noumenal characters' or the unities of vidyā-karma (including not only human spirits but spirits above and below, as is apparent from the Vedāntic doctrines of the continuity of spiritual gradations and of metempsychosis). He is again the organism, not only of the spirits—for ignorance, the mother of Karma, cannot have place in Him—but of nature, too, furnishing the experiences appropriate to their Karma (the *malum poena* to their *malum culpa*). He is the joint organism of moral law and natural law, the latter being only the obverse of the former, the two being the differentiations, mainly sāttvika and tāmasika, of aparā-prakṛti as interpenetrated by parā-prakṛti. Were it not for the ignorance begetting karma and *begotten* of karma, every one would *see* the unity of moral law and natural law, see that he is the architect of his own fortune, though now 'virtue and happiness seem to be synthetically connected' (Kant) with each other]. Īśvara, however, is not he immanent unity but the transcendent, the latter being his true nature. There are grades of transcendence, too. As primarily transcendent or triguṇātīta, He is in dreamless sleep, with the homogeneous unity of parā and aparā-prakṛti as the objective blank before Him, the primal glory in which He rests (sve mahimni tiṣṭhati). This unity is the avyākṛta ākāśa, the unmanifested archetype of space and matter, the absolute buddhi (though sometimes taken as only objective, as

the first objectivity of buddhi), the Vedāntic substitute for the pradhāna of Sāṅkhya. It is the home of all 'names and forms', 'unevolved but about to be evolved' (avyākṛta-vyācikīrṣita) because of its being in immediate unity with the individual wills or noumenal characters, which last in the reflection of Īśvara are the jīvas or individual souls, called prājñas in this connexion, who rest, unconscious of their individualities in this dreamless sleep of the Universal Spirit (Parameśvarāśrayā māyāmayī mahasuṣuptih yasyām svarūpa-pratibodha-rahitāh śerate saṁsāriṇo jīvāḥ.—Saṅkara's commentary to Brahma-sūtras). Next Īśvara becomes invested with parā-prakṛti, and as such transcends the *processes* of this unity of parā and aparā. The individual will-selves have here as much a dual nature as Īśvara himself. In dreamless sleep, their mind dissolves into māyā and they attain their eternally free (mukta) state, their identity with the triguṇātīta; the same souls, in relation to their life-processes and reincarnations, are viewed as invested with the first individualising sheath, the 'noumenal character' (the Kāraṇa-śarīra or the will-self). But a difference emerges here; for whereas the envelope of Īśvara in this aspect is śuddha-sattva or transparent, that of the jīva is malina-sattva or impure, partly opaque, dimming the light that shines through it. The impurity is the limitation that constitutes the individuality. But just as the aparā-prakṛti has buddhi as its evolute, so too these malina-sattva individual souls gradually move towards the śuddha-sattva type, the jīvan-mukta souls (i.e., those who have burst their bonds of individuality and ignorance in this life) being just a stage removed from the śuddha-sattva Īśvara.

68. A further understanding, somewhat after Schopenhauer of the progressive realisation of these individual spirits is necessary for a clearer explication of the nature of Īśvara. The individual wills, asserts himself against the world, nature and society; and as his will spends itself, the world recoils on him. As his willing necessarily means a limitation of vision, the recoil seems to be foreign to him; hence all the misery and apparent injustice of the world. He sets it down to blind nature (or unjust selfish society). This rough tussle with nature and society, however, de-

velops in some spirits a generalised and moralised reason, whereas in others it deepens unreason, leading them through impotent strife gradually, through a diminution of life, to the level of stocks and stones. Those in whom reason is developed come to perceive that the recoil is their own work, that a punishment as well as a reward is something that is their due, something to which they have a claim. But the Universe is not quite so simple, and it puzzles the reason to lead it peradventure to serener heights or to hurl it down again. For are not the rewards and punishments, notoriously the latter, very often disproportionate to one's Karma in this life? What is stranger still, why should evil Karma be acquired at all? Why should reason every now and then lapse into irrationality which is the essence of sin? Why again should there be the sudden conversions, the lightning flashes of good inclinations, now and again bursting forth from the leaden cloud of habits? It is only the 'noumenal character' that can explain all this the character which may not get completely manifested in any one stage of the phenomenal life, not even in one's whole life. The self as identified with it moves freely in the (knowing and), willing process; at every stage, the self recognises the character then manifested to have been pre-existent, unconsciously constituting his individuality. This noumenal seed is not explained by heredity and accidental variations which explain only the outward, naturalistic side of it. The individual self sees no beginning of itself and looks out beyond its life-processes to an uninterrupted existence before birth. The existence of a life before this is intelligible in the light of the relation between the (naturalistic) evolutionary view and the apriori view on the one hand and the Vedāntic view on the other. The concrete self or the noumenal character is known apriori, at any rate recognised in empirical consciousness to have been beginninglessly operative. The empirical account of the origin of this concrete self does not prejudice the validity of the notion of its eternal pre-existence. If its pre-existence is admitted, is it (1) timelessly transcendent, or (2) timelessly immanent in experience or rather in the most concrete experience-system, the whole species regarded as one? Vedānta will hold that it is both. A doctrine somewhat like traducianism is traceable in a passage in Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad (I, V. 17-8) on the relation between father and son; other passages may also be referred to. At the

same time just as every object and every combination of objects were found to presuppose eternal 'names and forms', so every individual soul has its individuating principle in a distinctive Kāraṇa-śarīra. This śarīra is timeless by itself, though its concrete nature, viz., its being the matrix of specific instincts and unconscious cognition-traces points to the experiences of this distinctive body before the present life. Every such will-self, itself only a name apart from Brahman—the name being what alone is said to persist after death, after the body has relapsed into the elements, gross and subtile—is a centre of many names and forms, the shadows of the objects of its experience in all time, with which, however, it is at this height in immediate unity. Such a will-self then, ranging as it does over many lives of the same individual, furnishes us with a solution that considerably lightens the heavy unintelligibility of the Karma-system.

69. From the stage, therefore in which the individual feels himself freely claiming his rewards and punishments, he passes again to the stage in which the recoil is felt to be foreign to him till that mist, too, clears up in the recognition in a far wider sense than before of himself being the *eternal* architect of his own fortune. Here, however the difficulty comes back in an accentuated form. He does not indeed ask himself, 'why was I cursed with such a noumenal character'—that would be the voice of the 'devil that is an ass'—for to ask this, one should first be dissociated from the noumenal character which, however, in this dissociation would be illusory. But in the light of the moralised reason that has been developed in him, he will cry out in Augustinian despair. 'Am I then never to escape from this self-imposed self, this radical evil in me? Is final liberation or Mokṣa impossible for me?'. In this stage of deep vairāgya (denial of the will, repentance), he learns, emotionally and intellectually, of a higher soul (a guru) from the revealed Scriptures, or sometimes by spontaneous intuition (sources which are identical in the last resort), that Īśvara is the Truth and that his individuality is a lie, that it is only through His light, in His grace (Karuṇā) that he has been hungering and thirsting for mokṣa (liberation) so long, that he, the unregenerate self, has not learnt the blissful truth by an effort establishing claim to it, but that his knowledge is but God knowing in him.

70. We are now prepared to understand why Īśvara is said to will, i.e., to actualise in grace the Karma of individual souls

in order that they may reach mokṣa or identity with Himself. By Himself, He is trigunātīta; but as the individual necessarily takes himself to have been beginninglessly existent, Īśvara is to him the *good person*, willing this evolving world into existence out of compassion for him, in order that he, by himself, may work out the evil in him. In this stage of duality, he at first takes his experiences of pleasure and pain as the reward and punishment meted out to him by a *Just* God; but as he comes to recognise that they are the necessary reflections of his own nature, he realises that justice is but mercy as viewed through the ignorance which separates him from God, the good principle that has led to this realisation being felt to be the inshining of God Himself. This mercy, then, does not conflict with justice; neither vaisamya (injustice) nor nairghṛṇya (heartlessness) can be predicated of Īśvara. In mercy, He becomes the good principle in individual spirits, He actualises them, He neutralises the evil in them by inflicting on them punishments (or, as Christians put it, by inflicting on Himself their punishments). Yet his mercy is not indiscriminate; it descends on them according to the measure of their Karma. In reality, however, *He* does not work at all, *He* does not suffer at all, except in their persons: Karma and pain are to Him alike illusory. His willing to actualise them is but the evolution of their sattva, through the dynamic of their Karma. He is but the breath of the Karma system, the organism of justice which is at the same time the organism of grace. His śakti or power is but the Karma of individual spirits pressing outwards towards fruition. His icchā or will to create is no bondage to Him. To Him, it is a glorious divine disport or līlā; to us, individual spirits, the influx of grace or Karuṇā.

71. Īśvara, as Justice, has His dread aspect, too. Through Him, those in whom sattva is dominant rise higher and higher, but those in whom tamas is dominant sink deeper and deeper. *Facilis descensus Averni.* Yet if He is universal reality, why is He specially identified with goodness, with all that is 'glorious and beautiful and potent'? It is the old problem of evil—is evil positive in Vedānta? As in Schelling, it is ultimately but the 'dark ground' of goodness. As indicated already, sattva is but tamas actualised. To most men, however, in whom sattva is but imperfectly developed, the evil is co-ordinate with the good, and therefore positive. But as the evil deepens, spiritual vision

also gets dimmed; and the misery that follows drags the sinner lower and lower; instead of chastening his soul there is an increasing helplessness till the struggle between s a t t v a and t a m a s ceases, s a t t v a getting completely involved in one dull cloud of unconsciousness (s t h ā v a r a t v a). But, apparently, this does not serve the ends of Divine Justice, far less of Divine mercy. For to whom is the unconsciousness a punishment at all? It may be replied that to the individual left with the last spark of freedom, the passage to this s t h ā v a r a t v a will appear like a sinking into 'eternal perdition'. But how is Divine mercy vindicated? The last fury of the Divine wrath is followed by unconsciousness. The last embrace of Divine love means, too, a lapse of differenced consciousness. Extremes tend to meet.

72. Let us now consider the state of the j ī v a n m u k t a which is just the antipodes of the state of s t h ā v a r a t v a. The j ī v a n m u k t a is one who after repeated births, repeated terms of probation passed successfully, at last kills off all ignorance, all K a r m a, all evil, and reaches absolute knowledge. How does he still remain j ī v a t, living, embodied, the body being only a materealisation of K a r m a ('objectification of the will'—Schopenhauer)? K a r m a is divided by Indian philosophers into three sections, s a ñ c i t a, ā r a b d h a, and k r ı y a m ā ṇ a. Not all the K a r m a acquired in previous lives receives fruition in this life. The noumenal character does not become fully phenomenalised in *one* life. The part that is manifested, that has started on its course of fruition in this life, is called ā r a b d h a (that which has begun), the part that is unmanifested is called s a ñ c i t a (hoarded) and the new K a r m a which is being generated in this life is the K r i y a m ā ṇ a. Now the J ī v a n m u k t a, having killed off his ignorance, no longer feels the solicitations of desire, and hence acquires no new K a r m a. The s a ñ c i t a K a r m a is burnt off in the fire of knowledge, destroyed in its embryonic stage. The ā r a b d h a, being a unity, must run out its course and cannot be stopped half-way. As in the case of an arrow shot through the air or of the revolving wheel of the potter, the momentum must spend itself out. But then it may be asked: while the momentum is there in life, how can there be abosolute knowledge or m o k ṣ a? If, too, s a ñ c i t a be destroyed by this knowledge which shows forth all K a r m a to be illusory, how can the momentum of ā r a b d h a be there still? It is replied that to the j ī v a n-

mukta himself, the momentum of his bodily life is nothing in reality: it is positively existent only to others with dim vision. The world, including the bodies of individuals, is but the community of the self-energising Karma-unities (energising in the grace of God, which is the deepest sense of self-energising). Natural law is but the obverse face of the moral law. If the body of the jīvan-mukta were annihilated for others also, there would be violation of this law, which is absurd. To the jīvan-mukta himself, however, the emergence of this knowledge of the illusoriness of his body must appear to be abrupt. He seems to be raised to divine grace without any merit of his own. But to Īśvara, justice does not admit of being baulked. Karma can be killed out only by Karma; the will can be denied only by the will (Schopenhauer). Yet the will, which has thus completely denied itself would stand out in spiritual pride, were it not for the fact that it gets at this stage (and even earlier) transfigured by reverence (the obverse of grace). In this reverence, in this assurance of free forgiveness, these individual souls elect to continue the divine system of justice and grace by remaining in the body, by freely continuing in the illusory form in relation to other souls. So the jīvan-mukta souls assist as the high priests at the cosmic yajña or sacrifice, the incense from which is for ever and for ever mounting to the Highest in heaven. They move about like the impersonations of the Divine grace that is dimly stirring in the bosom of the age, the beacon lights of the universe, the realised hopes of the army of the good—never self-assertive, sometimes even despondent—fighting out the great battle with the army of the evil. The good triumphs; evil is vanquished and reduced to sthāvaratva (unconsciousness). Peace reigns once again; Īśvara passes into a deep sleep. This is pralaya, Universal Death to the last of the army of the evil just swooning into sthāvaratva, the ecstasy of life to the resplendent heroes of the army of the good. When, at any stage of the world, all the jīvas come to be ranged under two classes, jīvan-mukta and sthāvara, there comes on this pralaya or dissolution; i.e., the system of Karma-forces that started on the course of fruition, the cosmic ārabdha, as it might be called, becomes completely dissipated; the mukta or liberated need not work, the sthāvara cannot work. The cycle closes; there comes the turn for the cosmic sañcita (it may be, only a part of it) to

mature itself; this includes not only the sañcita of those who have been reduced to sthāvaratva in this cycle, but also of those so reduced in other cycles. Īśvara, the soul of the Karma-organism, awakes; there is begun sṛṣṭi or creation over again.

73. And how does he create? He matures this sañcita. He proceeds according to law, according to the Vedas. The uniformity of the course of Karma-fruition is but the reflection of the Impersonal Reason, which is an emanation of Brahman co-eternal with the creative Īśvara. Īśvara, having recognised it, has breathed it out in the form of Revelation (vāk or veda). The mukta (free) souls, who have had their sañcita all burnt off by knowledge (or, it may be conceived, only those of them whose sañcita was acquired in reciprocity with the cosmic sañcita, going to be actualised in this creation), now freely, joyously get incarnated as deputy-creators of Īśvara, as the strands of His creative buddhi or grace, as His mānasa-putras (sons begotten of buddhi), as the Vedic seers (Ṛṣīs who see the mantras constituting Impersonal Reason), to quicken the sthāvaras once again into life, who now look out with young eyes of wonder on the renovated world.

74. Thus sṛṣṭi (creation) succeeds pralaya (dissolution) and pralaya succeeds sṛṣṭi. Sṛṣṭi, as through Buddhi (the will and the intellect being the same to Him), is the function of Īśvara in rajas-envelope, i.e., of Brahmā. Pralaya, its obverse, is the function of Īśvara in tamas-envelope (envelope of unconsciousness), i.e., of Maheśvara; while sthiti (or subsistence of the world) with its upward and downward trends is of Īśvara in the envelope of sattva as Providence or Viṣṇu. The alternation of the Trinity is eternal; it is only the nothingness of Karma artistically exhibited on the stage of time, the empirical picture of Īśvara being triguṇātita an *emanation*, from His being. It may also be viewed as *evolution* from the point of view of individual souls who, in their moralised reason as evolved with the procession of cycles, recognise an increasing moral purpose in the procession, assured of their progress towards mokṣa along this "eddying yet advancing stream" of Karma.

75. The nature of Brahman and Īśvara has been explicated at some length. It will suffice now only to indicate the main

stages in the onward course of creation, along the three lines (1) Īśvara (as invested with parā-prakṛti), (2) individual souls as embedded in this parā and constituting the forces or the weapons of Īśvara's activity, and (3) aparā-prakṛti as gradually differentiated in response to this activity.

76. (1) and (2). In nirvikalpa-samādhi, the individual is no longer an individual, he is undifferenced Brahman. In suṣupti, he is like Īśvara, dual; Īśvara in one aspect is triguṇātīta and in another aspect invested with śuddha-sattva-upādhi or transparent envelope of sattva (section 70), and so the individual is merged in Brahman on the one hand (cf. svamapiti, attains his self) and is invested with an envelope of undifferenced buddhi on the other. On waking from deep sleep, the individual recognises that he has slept blissfully. This constitutes evidence for the envelope of buddhi and explains why it is called ānandamaya-koṣa or envelope of bliss. This ānandamaya is called the puccha or tail of Brahman who is ānanda or bliss itself without an envelope. As having limitation in the individual, it is said to be malina-sattva or partly opaque, as opposed to the śuddha-sattva or transparent envelope of Īśvara. This opacity or limitation is due to the saṁskāras or the timeless traces of the vidyā-karma (knowledge and action) of a past life which constitute the dormant individuality in suṣupti, making up what is called the Kāraṇa-śarīra (will-self) which is viewed as merged in ānandamaya. These traces again in their kinetic aspect, i.e., *viewed as operative functions*, constitute the vijñāna-maya koṣa, the envelope constituted by the original springs of thought and volition, the tendencies which may be indifferently regarded as inherited habits or as 'reminiscences of a life before this' Thus these saṁskāras or vijñānas, too, are double-faced like Janus, and lie as it were in the borderland between suṣupti and dream, 'Manomaya' is the name applied to the body constituted by manas, the receiver or unity of presentations, images and desires (as distinct from the instinctive springs which belong to vijñānamaya). Prāṇamaya is the unity of the five sense-organs (not the bodily sites but the supersensuous principles of seeing, hearing, etc.), the five organs of action (not the limbs supplied with muscles, but rather the radical 'kinaesthetic' presentations—articulation, locomotion, prehension, etc., and

lastly the five prāṇas (not 'airs' as they are often translated, but rather the five strands or currents of vital functions in the body). (Without attempting a detailed explanation of prāṇa, apāna, etc., we may point out that these are explicitly distinguished from air, e.g., in the Brahma-sūtra 'na vāyu-kriye pṛthag-upadeśāt, where Śaṅkara describes these as the adhyātma counterparts of air. In fact it would appear from other contexts that air is taken to be life instead of life being taken to be air). Liṅga-śarīra or the subtile body is the name given to the complex of the three envelopes, vijñānamaya, manomaya and prāṇamaya, which thus comprises seventeen elements (buddhi, manas, five sense-organs, five organs of action, and five vital functions). Another name is sūkṣma-śarīra, called also śiśu and madhyama-prāṇa in the Upaniṣads, where it is not often distinguished from the Kāraṇa-śarīra. The next body or envelope is the annamaya or sthūla-śarīra, the material body which the soul enters in waking life but abandons in dream etc., and after death.

77. The individual soul, as identified with the material body is the jīva or dehin; the unity of all these jīvas, the collective or cosmic self in the waking state is Virāj or Vaiśvānara. As identified with the subtile body, the individual is the liṅgin or taijasa, and the unity of all taijasas is Hiraṇyagarbha or Sūtrātman. Lastly, as identified with the Kāraṇa-śarīra, the individual is prājña, and the unity of all prājñas is Īśvara. From Īśvara to Virāj, from prājña to dehin, is the order of sṛṣṭi or progressive materialisation, the reverse being that of pralaya or progressive idealisation or deindividualisation. As the progress is continuous each stage is double-faced, and so what is predicated of Īśvara is sometimes predicated of Hiraṇyagarbha, and so on.

78. (3). We have already traced the stages of (a) māyā as co-ordinate with Brahman, (b) the unity of parā and aparā-prakṛti as co-ordinate with the triguṇātīta Īśvara, and (c) aparā with tamas predominant as co-ordinate with śuddha-sattva Īśvara. Ākāśa in the strictly adhibhūta aspect is the last, for the second, though called avyākṛta ākāśa (Section 67), is the indifference of adhyātma and adhibhūta. This ākāśa, then, is the obverse face of buddhi, the first evolute of aparā, the blank of objectivity, the

prius of space and matter. Next comes v ā y u , more determinate in character than ā k ā ś a , the primordial force or motion filling this ā k ā ś a and poising the heavenly bodies each in its proper sphere, force conceived not in its mechanical aspect but as the cosmic life-force, that which constitutes the ś a k t i or power of the p r ā j ñ a s , binding the s a ṁ s k ā r a s , individual and cosmic, to the b u d d h i - units and which, lower down in the course of materialisation, is the nerve-force and the objective face of undifferentiated sensitivity (touch). The attribute of ā k ā ś a is said to be not only emptiness or blank objectivity, but also sound. This sensuous sound, though generated by air-wave, *is* not air-wave; the sense of hearing (not the bodily apparatus) apprehends the sensuous sound (as distinct from the air-wave); the locus of this sound is ā k ā ś a . Sound again is the necessary sensuous basis for even the most abstract thoughts; so Ī ś v a r a has been said to apprehend the Impersonal Reason co-eternal with Him and to breathe it out in the shape of that potent sound-system, the V e d a s . V ā y u or air has not only these attributes of ā k ā ś a—blankness and sound—but also touch. It is thus more determinate than ā k ā ś a, although both are said to be a m ū r t a (without form), a m ṛ t a (imperishable), y a t (going in every direction, i . e . , infinite) and t y a (invisible or p a r o k ṣ a) , in contradistinction from the three other primal matters, t e j a s , a p , and p ṛ t h i v ī (fire, water, earth), which are said to be finite and perishable (B ṛ h a d ā r a ṇ y a k a U p a n i ṣ a d . II, iii). Here, then, is a nodal point in the gradual procession or emanation of the five primal matters, the V e d ā n t i c analogues of the S ā ṅ - k h y a t a n m ā t r a s (though with a difference), the probable explanation why very often the U p a n i ṣ a d s speak of *three* the (last three) primal matters instead of *five*. Of the three, t e j a s has r ū p a or colour in addition to the attributes of v ā y u ; a p has r a s a or taste (which goes with liquidity in all its variations) in addition to those of t e j a s ; and p ṛ t h i v ī has smell in addition to those of a p.

79. It may be pointed out that the theory of these five primal matters does not, in any way, conflict with the theory of the *elements* in Chemistry. The principle of classification is altogether different. The five matters are the concretes or objectives corresponding to the five kinds of sensation, the sensations[18] being taken

18. i.e. the sensa.

as the attributes of objects (and attributes in Vedānta are identical with substance). Whether such a classification is fruitful of results or not is a different enquiry; at any rate it fits in with the peculiar idealism of Vedānta. One is tempted to connect it with Mill's dictum that the number of primary laws of nature cannot be less numerous than the distinguishable feelings of the human mind; only what is regarded as a mere abstract concept or law by the empiricist is taken in Vedānta to be substantial matter (Section 42).

80. Besides, it is to be noticed that if ākāśa is conceived to stand on the level of suṣupti, and vāyu on the borderland between suṣupti and dream, the three other elements stand on the level of dream, while the elements of Chemistry are all on the level of waking or the level of gross matter. On this waking level, Vedānta would introduce these primal matters, not in their simplicity but as compounded or pañcīkṛta (quintupled). Pañcīkaraṇa is the name given to the process of the combination of the matters according to a formula like $\frac{1}{2}$a, $\frac{1}{8}$b, $\frac{1}{8}$c, $\frac{1}{8}$d, $\frac{1}{8}$e where a, b, c, d, e, stand for the matters. Sometimes when the last three matters are alone taken, the process is called trivṛtkaraṇa or tripling ($\frac{1}{2}$a, $\frac{1}{4}$b, $\frac{1}{4}$c). The ākāśa, vayu etc., which are perceived by our senses, are only the modes of this compounded matter, the primal matters being supersensuous.

81. The shadowy 'names and forms' imbedded in the primal māyā get actualised as material objects in this pañcīkṛta matter. The noumenal will-self here gets materialised into a dehin; here then is the sphere of Karma-fruition and also of moral probation.

82. We may conclude the present study with a paraphrase (with interpretations) of two cosmogonic accounts from the Upaniṣads, in illustration of the Vedāntic views already discussed. The first is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

VI, ii,—This empirical world, differentiated into names and forms) was barely existent in the beginning (was the bare 'that' as distinct from the 'what'), one without a second (homogeneous with it or heterogeneous). It was (aikṣata, thought and willed, which mean the same thing to it), 'I shall be many: I shall generate', and accordingly created tejas (fire). Then tejas thought, 'I shall be many, I shall generate', and accordingly created water.

Water next thought, 'I shall be many, I shall generate', and created earth (annam).

[This one Existent (sat) is then intelligence and not the unintelligent pradhāna of Sāṅkhya. This creation according to Śaṅkara, is emanation (vivarta), for nothing can be distinct from Sat. Fire, water, etc., also thought, i.e., as embodied in these, Sat thought and instituted the successive steps of creation. Each link in the chain of causation is not only a medium but a true cause in the reflection of the First Cause. This amounts to saying that God creates reasonably, according to Law.]

VI. iii.—All living beings, whether oviparous, viviparous, or vegetable, generate their respective seeds (These are the Jīvas or the beginningless units of individuality.)

The One God (Sat) willed, "I shall introduce myself into these three gods (fire, water, earth, the basal devatās) through this Jīva (these beginningless *principia individuationis*, i.e., as Śaṅkara takes them, the saṁskāras, in the buddhi of the Sat, of the forms of a past creation) and make 'names and forms' manifest. I shall render each of these (basal) devatās three-fold (trivṛt) which does not deny pañcīkṛta or quintupled, explained already'. So it did.

83. The next passage is from Bṛhad-āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, I. ii It exhibits the characteristic mystic imagination of the Upaniṣads. Here a large latitude of conjectural interpretation must be allowed. Śaṅkara's interpretations have been accepted wherever available.

There was nothing here in the beginning. Everything was shrouded by Death or Hunger. This Hunger is Death. He created manas, in order that He might feel Himself (invested) with a mind.

(This Death is here identified by Śaṅkara with Hiraṇyagarbha. He is, in fact, Hiraṇyagarbha as passing into Īśvara. He is the Universal Hunger which has retracted into itself the entire evolved world. Again, as Hunger is at once the destructive and creative stress of the prāṇamaya, so the self of dissolution or death is the self of creation or life. Thus Death wanting to be Life, i.e., wanting to create, created to Himself a mind to anticipate the creation. The will-self is imbedded in intelligence. We have already explained the alternation of pralaya and sṛṣṭi.)

He worshipped and was satisfied. As He worshipped (fire and) water came into being, as the 'embodied parts of his devotion' (pūjāṅga-bhūtāḥ).

[Death has now passed into the living mind, which now reduplicates itself, becomes self-conscious. Creation here is self-consciousness, self-worship. Worshipping a god is becoming that god. Nature is sometimes spoken of as the '*processio* of the Holy Spirit' or as 'a sacramental system'. Of the 'embodied parts of the worship', fire (with special reference to the sacrificial fire of the aśvamedha sacrifice) is the direct embodiment, and water is the indirect embodiment; for, fire is said to be situated both within and outside water. The series from ākāśa to pṛthivī is one of growing determinateness, and after vāyu, of descending magnitude, too.]

(Fire thus situated) thickened the froth of the waters and turned it into Earth. As He thus created Earth, He became fatigued and forth exuded from within his fiery perspiration.

[The self-worship of Hiraṇyagarbha means the encasement of Himself in the primal matters evolved out of tamas (i.e., out of the imperfections or Karma of the individual selves) and then the irradiation of this envelope with the fire of the self within, which makes the whole a living, developing 'mundane egg'. 'Self-worship' means 'being at once the worshipped and the grosser worshipping self'.]

Now this fire or life (prāṇa) within this mundane egg divided itself into three parts, āditya (the sun, being the eye and soul of ākāśa), air and fire, without losing its identity. (Thus all the five matters are mentioned.) This last (fire) rests on water.

He (Death) wanting a second body (other than manas) effected a junction between His mind and vāk (the World). The generative seed (entering the waters) developed into the year (sam-vatsara).

[This second body is the pañcīkṛta body of Virāj. Vāk is objective or Impersonal Reason, that which is coined into words in the Vedas. He united thought with vāk, i.e., reflected on the order of creation as laid down in the Vedas, on the eternal Logos or the Law. The generative seed is the cosmic system of vidyā-karma acquired in a previous life of Hiraṇyagarbha, the collective self of all individual units of

vidyā-karma. No creation out of nothing; the matter (fire, etc.) is but aparā-prakṛti, the ignorance constituting individuality, as encasing the self; the forms are the primordial *principia individuationis*, the Karma-units; the law is eternal and is only recognised by this mind-endowed (samanaska) Hiraṇyagarbha. He makes Karma fructify, in grace (its obverse being self-worship), according to law, by reflecting on it (for His knowing is willing). The Logos, quickened by reflection becomes the generative seed (parā-prakṛti) planted in the waters (in the primal matters generally, in aparā-prakṛti) and develops into the year. The year is the eternal Idea of the concrete year; the yearly procession of events as a whole, ever repeating itself in the kaleidoscope of sensuous apprehension, represents a single pulsation (differentiation) of His life. It is the prototype of the infinite of waking time, not yet born.]

It took a year for the egg to be hatched. Thus came the year into being; there was no year before this. When the babe Virāj was born, Death opened His jaws to devour it, and virāj screamed out in terror. Thus speech came into being.

[The babe is the waking world just beginning to see light. It is the first waking actuality, the potentiality of all the future. The phenomenal world, however, from the moment it comes into being, is in the jaws of death (cp. Chāndogya, mṛtyunā grastameva); it is an illusory differentiation. Virāj screamed as the babe just born would scream, as its blank consciousness emerges from the dark unconsciousness which still hangs over it. Sound is, in more senses than one, the bridge between the visible world and the invisible.]

Death paused and thought, 'Why devour the babe? (Let it have its spell of sensuous development.)' So it developed according to vāk (Impersonal Reason) into the articulate Vedas, Vedic metres, sacrifices, men, animals etc.

[Vāk has three forms: (1) Objective Reason, (2) this as actualised in thought or reflection, (3) this as sensuously developed into the Vedas .... The Vedas are again prior in reality to the phenomenal world. The position of sound (ākāśa) between phenomenon and noumenon is to be noticed.]

All this sensuous creation He seized to devour. Death desired to celebrate a second Aśvamedha (horse-sacrifice, the first being that performed in a previous life by virtue of which

He came to exist at the beginning of the cycle). He became weary and began to practise susterities (tapas). Forth departed from His body (the Virāj-body) sentiency and power, leaving it 'turgid and defiled'. But his mind never lost sight of it.

(The Virāj-body has to die, to be sacrificed in order to live. He was weary, impressed with the nothingness of the sensuous body as such, which is always in the jaws of death. But this sensuous life has to be lived through. Let it be a life of self-sacrifice then. Let the body be purified. So His heart was all along set on this purification.)

He thought, 'Let this body be medhya first, i.e., worthy of being sacrificed, and then I shall get embodied in it'. Meanwhile the body had become 'turgescent' (aśvat), and so as He entered it once again, He became an aśva or horse (a sensuous body which the higher self fills, but with which it does not get confused. May we not trace here something like the stages of modern Ethics : (i) naive sensuousness, (ii) a division in spirit and asceticism, the sensuous body to be thoroughly mortified, (iii) reinstatement of the sensuous self as conscious of its nothingness by itself yet justifying its existence as an organ of duty?)

He let the horse loose for a year (as they do at the Aśvamedha ceremony) and then tied it up and offered it as a sacrifice, offered up each animal as a sacrifice to its proper god (offered up Himself as a sacrifice to Himself) and thus attained the state of Prajāpati. Thus He conquered the second death (became the archetypal Life, and is not born again to be devoured by death).

[The year here stands for the cycle of saṃsāra, the wheel of Karma from which jīvas fly at a tangent into mokṣa (liberation), into a Death which has conquered itself, into Eternal Life. 'Letting Loose' represents the fact that God lets the individual eliminate his Karma by Karma, till in knowledge the individuality lapses altogether.]

CHAPTER III

VEDĀNTIC LOGIC

(Mainly based on Vedānta-paribhāṣa)

84. The central truth of the Vedāntic system, the pure self or Brahman as undifferenced 'being, consciousness, and bliss', together with other ancillary truths about supersensuous things, is taken by Vedānta to be essentially revealed, not ascertained by any human evidence like that of perception or inference. The self that is immediately perceived, for example, is not known to be existent, far less to be existent after death. (Śaṅkara says this in his introductory note to Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, and it is pretty much the same as what Kant says about the 'paralogisms of the Pure Reason'.) True, even in Vedānta, arguments are advanced in proof of the existence and immortality of the soul, but these are *only suggestions of the Beyond by* phenomenal signs, not proofs positive, as they have been taken by Naiyāyikas. If the ecstatic intuition in which alone the supersensuous is knowable is not forthcoming at once, and if the phenomenal world only *suggests* the noumenon as a thought, though it may be necessary thought, how is the enquiry into it to begin at all? Some provisional belief (śraddhā) is required to start the enquiry. A mere thought, even though necessary, can never induce belief, can never be mistaken for knowledge; for in knowledge there is an unmistakable intuitive or 'given' character. This provisional belief can only be induced by authoritative statement (śabda or āgama) which may, for aught we know, be disproved afterwards. But the statement gains in reliability if on acting on it or after contemplation of it we attain a progressive *satisfaction or realisation*. That is the only justification which we may expect to have of the truth of what is claimed to be revelation, from below, i.e., before we have finally realised its truth. Whether metaphysical enquiry necessarily presupposes a revelation is an issue which need not be confused with the other issue whether the Veda itself is revealed or not. If it be granted that spirit can only teach spirit and that truth can only be *recognised* and not created by mental activity, it must also be granted that revelation is necessary, and that the Word is God, and that

accordingly there should be an eternal succession of omniscient teachers.

85. At the same time Vedānta allows that for the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman, there is required not only śravaṇa (hearing of revealed texts and trying to understand them) but also manana and nididhyāsana. The exact relation of these processes has been disputed, but the processes themselves are recognised in all Vedāntic schools. Manana is defined as 'the mental act which generates knowledge by means of arguments defending the truth embodied in the texts against objections preferred by other evidences' (pramāṇa). Inference, and the other natural sources of knowledge, cannot yield the sacred truths but only point to them. So the proofs of the existence of God in European philosophy have sometimes been pronounced to be no proofs, for the conclusion there necessarily transcends the premises. Inference, etc., however, show the direction along which one may proceed to the truths. They refute heretical objections; and by detaining the thoughts about the truths, they enable the mind to get a tight grip of them and thus prepare the way for realising them in ecstatic intuition.

86. Hence the position of logic in Vedānta. It considers all the pramāṇas or sources of knowledge. They are six in number: pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, āgama, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi. It is advisable to keep up the Sanskrit names, instead of giving the ordinary translations, some of which are, to say the least, misleading. Other schools of Indian Philosophy give shorter lists, but Vedānta vindicates the necessity of each of these pramāṇas. It will be noticed that logic here is conceived to have a more extended scope than is ordinarily allowed to it, including as it does a consideration not only of mediate but also of immediate knowledge. It necessarily comprises a good deal of epistemological matter.

87. Knowledge is of two kinds: anubhava, reached through evidence, which may be both true (when it is pramā) and false, but which is always something *new*, previously unattained; and smṛti or memory-knowledge which, however, is not something new. In the persisting cognition of the same object, there is a single unchanging presentation illuminated by, i.e., subsumed under the form of the self. Such a persisting

determinate cognition (as distinct from the presentation) ceases, however, when it is contradicted by another cognition standing on stronger evidence. The theory of the persistence of the presentation fits in with the peculiar realism of V e d ā n t a which demands an intuition-continuum for every grade of abstract thought (Section 34). The necessary thought of the identity between a presentation and an idea must have its basis in the continuity of the presentation in some real medium. Besides, as knowledge is viewed in V e d ā n t a from the standpoint of the self as spontaneity and not from the empirical standpoint, the logical activity of the self (and not the presentation) is taken to determine *how long* a mode of cognition can be said to endure as one and the same; it is said to cease only when contradicted.

PRATYAKṢA

(EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PERCEPTION)

88. Perception, as has already been explained (Section 23) is B r a h m a n itself, the immediate identity of knower and known. In fact the attitude of n i r v i k a l p a - s a m ā d h i is retained in the perception of phenomenal objects. There is a difference, no doubt, between the timeless knowledge of B r a h m a n and the abrupt emergence of the perceptual knowledge; but even in the latter the knowledge by itself is timeless and quiescent, its manifestation only being in time. The image of dust-motes getting into a quiescent sunbeam will furnish an apt illustration. Presentations are in time; they manifest the self and limit it at the same time. All determinate knowledge is a self-abnegation, involving as it does a stratification of the pure consciousness or c a i t a n y a into three forms: P r a m ā t r - c a i t a n y a or determinate self-consciousness, v ṛ t t i - c a i t a n y a or modes of consciousness, and v i ṣ a y a - c a i t a n y a or empirical object.

89. In perception the m a n a s (streaming out of the sense-orifices of the body in visual and auditory perception and keeping at its bodily seat in the other forms of sense-perception) is said to take the form of the object, i. e., get determined into a mode or v ṛ t t i like the object, occupying the same position in space and time as the object, both being pervaded by an identical (determinate) consciousness or c a i t a n y a, provided, of course, the object is capable (y o g y a) of being cognised by the senses. An explanation is necessary.

90. That an influence from the object produces sensation in us need not be denied by Vedānta. The point here is the explanation of that extra-organic localisation which specially marks visual and auditory perception. Now in perception, there is a tendency to slur over the sensation-sign and pass at once to its significate, constituted by motor and other ideas. What is this *signifying*? Rapid association, mental chemistry may be granted, but what is it from the point of view of the self? From the standpoint then of the self, as invested with manas, as knowing the not-self *in space* viewed through the glasses of the manas, may it not be held that the Vedāntic account of the mind going out to meet the object is truer than the confused physiological account that the object or influence from the object comes to meet the mind as located in the body? Even in the grossest form of consciousness, when the body is taken to be the point of reference, not being distinguished from the self, Vedānta recognises in this going out the priority of the knower to the object and so still keeps the meaning of knowledge intact. If it be argued that growing reflection will shift the point of reference from the body to something more spiritual, it is replied that unless one rises to levels of consciousness higher than the waking, the self cannot be thought of except as located in the body. The objection that the streaming out of manas involves a materialistic conception is easily disposed of if we remember that Vedānta recognises no absolute distinction (Section 42) between the self and material object but admits grades of emanatory existences between them, each being material in relation to the grade before it, what we mean by matter coming last in the series. Ultimately no doubt Vedānta will hold that the body is phenomenal, this space also is phenomenal, and that this 'going out' of the mind is only illusory.

91. 'The mind takes the form of the object'. It is the idea of the conformity of the mental order with a *given* order. No idealisation can completely do without this *given* element. Below ecstatic intuition where this 'given'-ness completely disappears, dualism is inevitable.

92. The mind and the object occupy the same space-position. This distinguishes perception from inference. In inference, the mind only *thinks* of the inferred object but does not go out to meet it. The distinction is practically that drawn in modern psycho-

logy, only viewed from the point of view of the self's spontaneity, that in perception the given element and its interpretation are welded together in a unity, while in inference they are kept distinct. In perception, the self as invested with the mental mode (the interpretative concept which, relatively to the sensation, is the beginningless vāsanā or saṁskāra, analogous to the eternal names and forms actualised in creation) becomes further materialised into the particular function of the sense-organ excited by the particular stimulus (and this might be regarded as a maturation of its Karma). In inference the self just expects to be realised: it descends from its plane to a lower plane, but not to the lowest. (Sometimes the tension is so great that it discharges itself in the waking plane; in other words, inference lapses into a percept, as in 'I see my brother'. Does not this show that all perception is illusory, as it is always *seeming* to see, the mind forgetting itself and becoming the body)?

93. The perceptive act and the object occupy the same time-position. The object of memory precedes the act of memory. But it may be ekadesa with it, i.e., occupy the same position as it, in the same sense in which, in internal perception, a pleasure is said to be ekadeśa with the perception of the pleasure. What then is this deśa? It should be remembered that in Vedānta, ākāśa appears in all the stages, waking, dream, etc., and there is the theory of the intermediate existences between self and matter.

94. One caitanya pervades both viṣaya (empirical object) and vṛtti (apprehending mental mode). This is readily understood in the light of Kant's theory of the self working unconsciously in the object-consciousness: all consciousness in *implicitly* self-consciousness. This 'implicitness', this indistinguishable blending of the subject and object, is precisely what is brought out in this identity of caitanya (self) covering viṣaya (object) and vṛtti (mental mode).

95. Yogyatva or 'the object being capable of being perceived' distinguishes perception from śabda (knowledge through authoritative statement) which last can take cognisance of supersensuous objects as spiritual merit and demerit (dharmādharma).

96. In the case of a judgment in which the subject is perceived but the predicate is inferred, or in which the terms are per-

ceived through different senses, if the judgment be *one* substantive mental state, the foregoing account of the perceptual process is not tenable; for how can manas at once go out of the body and be in it, or go out of two different sense-orifices at the same *time? But then, according to Vedānta, the judgment is not one* state but rather a process from the subject-thought to the predicate thought. It would appear, from its criticism of Nyāya, that a judgment, according to it, does not involve a conceptualistic universal, co-substantial with the terms and eternally connected with them (Section 43). Vedānta might hold that this transition from the subject to the predicate is a necessary thought of the union of the terms, but then this does not mean their concrete identity-in-difference. If the thought be concretely *realised* (in the Vedāntic sense, i.e., through the judging self being de-individualised), the relation will cease to be relation; one would *see* their undifferenced identity. When the copula is concretely realised, the terms are lower in reality; when the copula is only abstract, the terms are of higher reality.

97. The perception of object so long discussed may not amount to the knowledge of object as object, i.e., as distinct from the subject and yet related to it. Mere perception of object requires only the coincidence of vṛtti-caitanya with viṣaya-caitanya (Section 88), but the perception of object as object requires also their coincidence with pramātṛ-caitanya. It requires that the self should not be a mere logical pre-supposition: it should come out as determinate self-consciousness as distinct from object-consciousness. The vṛtti or mental mode in relation to which the object exists—for the object is only empirical object—is a determination of pramātṛ or the determinate self. The vṛtti then points two ways, towards the self and towards the object. At each moment, the whole of manas gets modified into vṛtti (this being vivarta or emanation, not pariṇāma or real modification), by the ripening of some saṁskāra or Karma-seed, under the stress of the cosmic Karma-organism appearing as stimulus. So on the one hand the saṁskāra gets materialised into a percept and the percept into a bodily (cerebral) impression; on the other the cosmic stress takes the form of the phenomenal object (and that gives the sense-stimulus). (This account has to be expanded a little to explain the extra-organic localisation in visual and auditory perception.) Thus the

pramātṛ-caitanya rests on the viṣaya-caitanya in the perception of the object as object.

98. In the internal perception of the self, the pramātṛ-caitanya does not rest on viṣaya-caitanya, but rests simply on vṛtti. Not that it is then the *pure self* seeing the vṛtti as object; it sees, only as *invested with* vṛtti, only as determined, i.e., as it sees in a dream. So Śaṅkara, in his commentary on Bṛh. Upaniṣad IV. iii. points out that in the stage of dream the self-luminous (svayaṁ-jyoti) self sees the dream-forms as object and therefore is itself revealed; but in the stage of suṣupti, where vṛtti or mental mode lapses altogether, the self-luminosity is *not* revealed, being present in its purity. To be visible, an object must not be perfectly transparent.

99. So it is held on the one hand that ahaṁkāra (section 57) requires a vṛtti or empirical mode and on the other that even in illusory object-consciousness, there is a real materialisation of the self. The last point requires explanation. When the nacre is mistaken for silver, the nacre, a mode of māyā (as every phenomenal object is) modifies the mental mode coincident with it by the idea of silver which it revives by similarity. The self looking through it sees the objective illusory mode, silver. This theory of an objective illusory mode or anirvacanīya existence is characteristic of Vedānta.

100. *Objections met*:—(1) If the illusory object, silver, is created in the absence of silver, we could see anything of which we have an idea, i.e., there could be no difference between image and percept. So it is held by the anyathā-khyāti-vādin that in such a case, the self freely, perversely applies to the nacre a predicate, silver, which does not belong to it but to something else. No illusory object, silver, is here created. We only *think*, pass *intellectually* to, the object silver which, however, exists somewhere. The reply is that to take the interpretative element in perception (true or false) to be merely intellectual or merely associational (representative) would be alike wrong: it is really a concept based on an associated image. This concept is the necessary *objective* element, the image is the *subjective* element. Yet though the subjective element is there, Vedānta would argue against the ātma-khyāti-vādin that the silver in this case is not *consciously* remembered. Such a subjectivity, unconscious of its subjectivity, is nothing but the anirvācya or

'inexplicable', prātibhāsika or illusory objectivity. The objectivity, however, which is contrasted with a conscious subjectivity, would be the phenomenal or vyāvahārika reality. In the presence of the thing-in-itself or pāramārthika reality, these two realities are just the same, both illusory; but this *thing-in-itself is knowable precisely because in the reflection of* its light, māyā itself is differentiated into the (phenomenally) real and the illusory.

101. (2) How to know that this nacre is silver? Through the coincidence in position (ekadeśatva) of the two objective modes of māyā, the corresponding subjective modes, and pramātṛ-caitanya. (3) Why is not the illusory silver apparent to all? An object-determination is a determination of the particular subject who has the illusion. That most things, however, appear much the same to all is explained by a community of the Karma of different selves. (4) If in all judgments, there is a transition from one cognition to another (Section 96), how can there be a false perceptual judgment at all? It is replied that in the perceptual judgment 'this nacre is silver'. there is a coincidence of the determinations of caitanya corresponding to 'this' and 'silver'; as a single cognition, therefore, it admits of truth and falsehood. (5) Why not say, 'this is sometimes silver, sometimes nacre'?—Because when the (apparent) percept of silver ceases, one is not conscious of the real silver being absent but only of the illusory siver having vanished (Section 46). When a percept is contradicted by another percept. there is indeed no final guarantee that the contradicting percept is not illusory instead of the contradicted percept—for there can be such a thing as illusion of illusion; still there is the psychological fact that while in the contradicting perception, one has to believe that it is true and that the contradicted perception is false. It is the abrupt disappearance of the silver when looked at carefully with the naive belief (coupled in many cases with a reflective inferential belief) that what is looked at carefully is real, that accounts for our disbelief in the persistence of silver.

ANUMĀNA (INFERENCE)

102. The Vedāntic theory of the nature of inference is best studied in relation to the Nyāya theory of inference in its two aspects, inference as the process of discovering truth for

oneself (s v ā r t h a), and as the form of proving or exhibiting the truth to others (p a r ā r t h a). The main contention between V e - d ā n t a and N y ā y a is in regard to the former.

103. Three stages in the inferential process are recognised in N y ā y a. In the example, 'the mountain has fire, because it has smoke', there must have been established, first, a constant concomitance (v y ā p t i) between fire and smoke, from their occurring together in kitchens, etc.; then this smoke must have been perceived in the mountain (p a k ṣ a - d h a r m a t ā); and finally this last relation is combined with the memory of the v y ā p t i (t ṛ t ī y a - l i ṅ g a - p a r ā m a r ś a) in order to get the conclusion, 'the mountain has fire'. In other words, the middle term is first (inductively) related to the major, then to the minor, and then the two relations are related to one another. The three processes may be symbolised thus:—(i) Am connected with Ap, Bm—Bp, Cm—Cp......therefore m-p; (ii) Xm has m (is like Am, Bm.... which have p); (iii) Xm has m, m-p; (reappearing in memory); the two together leading to 'therefore, Xm has p'.

104. To this account V e d ā n t a has the following objections: (a) The first two stages precede the inference and are no part of it; (b) 'm-p' in the third stage is more a function (s a ṃ s k ā r a or v y ā p ā r a) than a substantive mental state, though it is a conscious function, being quickened with the consciousness of the middle term; (c) 'm-p', the function, though retained in memory, is not operative as a conscious *remembrance*. (A conscious remembrance of it may sometimes accompany the inference though forming no part of it). (d) The whole proposition, 'Xm has p' is not inferred: p only is inferred, Xm being perceived.

105. The second objection, in a sense, comprehends all the others. It is connected with the V e d ā n t i c position on j ā t i already explicated (Section 43). When Mill holds that the conclusion in a syllogism is drawn, not *from* the premises but *according* to them only, that not rules but facts constitute the evidence, he agrees with V e d ā n t a (and Hegel) in disbelieving in the abstract universal being co-substantial with things and eternally connected with them. How can an eternal thing be eternally connected with non-eternal things? The so-called axiom of the syllogism cannot possibly subsume particulars under it, for the simple reason that no premise is absolutely true. From the purely conceptualistic

point of view (that of Nyāya), the unity of the inferential act is never really attained; the relation of relations, as in tṛtīya-liṅga-parāmarśa, is unintelligible. So long as the universal is regarded as a substantive state of the mind and not a spontaneity (a 'transitive' state, as James would call it), the judgment must be regarded as pieced out of terms and reasoning as pieced out of the separate judgments, instead of reasoning being regarded as the unity prior to them all. Not that Vedānta accepts the Hegelian solution of the identity of contradictories. To it, the entire inferential process is summed up in the single word 'function', which does not constitute a substantive unity with the given minor term and the major term. Hence, too, the conclusion is taken to be, not the whole proposition 'Xm has p' but only p. This accords with the Vedāntic view of the judgment, already presented under perception (Section 96). This is also intelligible in the light of the general Vedāntic position that a grade of reality (to which, for example, the jāti as the connotational universal belongs) (Section 42) is unconsciously immanent in the next grade (to which the corresponding vyaktis or individuals belong) which it transcends but where, if consciously emergent at all, it is taken as an abstract thought lower in point of reality. Buddhi which is the self-affirmation in the copula, transcends manas which is yet informed by it. The axiom of the syllogism, like axioms in general, stands on the level of buddhi and is a timeless saṁskāra.

106. It must not be supposed, however, that Vedānta takes this process or function to be merely blind expectation, the working of an anudbuddha or unawakened saṁskāra. The awaking of it helps on the function (tadudbodhasyāpi sahakāritvāt). It is in fact a conscious function, an intellectual synthesis and not an imaginative or associational synthesis. The major premise, according to Mill, is only a concurrent or subsequent justification of the conclusion. But is not the justification essential to inference as distinct from association? So Spencer holds in his Psychology (Special Analysis, Reasoning), where he says that though the major premise comes after the conclusion, it is recognised to have been operative before the conclusion, the recognition being the completion of the reasoning, without which in fact the reasoning would not be reasoning. In 'the mountain has fire because it has smoke', the perception of the

smoke rouses into conscious activity the saṁskāra of the relation between smoke and fire. This saṁskāra, though conscious, is not present as a conscious memory (smṛti). The logical ground of inference is objective; it is not subjective memory. In illusory perception and in dreams, the anirvacanīya object (Section 99) is a memory-image, unconscious of its memory-character.

107. As to the major premise itself or vyāpti, it is not an inference by itself, being only the saṁskāra generated by the observation of the concomitance (anvaya) between the major term and the middle term (and non-observation of non-concomitance), but not by the observation of the concomitance of the absences of the terms (vyatireka). As against Nyāya, it is argued that the positive evidence alone generates belief. The negative evidence only assures the reason, constitutes a collateral justification. It is clear that this criticism of Nyāya is directly connected with the Vedāntic position that the major premise is only a *function*, a consciously *operative* universal, and not an abstract reason only. All inference is then anvayirūpa, i.e., founded on positive concomitance. It is not, however, to be called Kevalānvayi, as arguments like 'this pot is knowable because nameable' are called, where according to Nyāya, vyatireka-vyāpti, i.e. concomitance between not-nameable and not-knowable is not ascertainable, because the terms do not stand for anything existent. According to Vedānta, there is no Kevalānvayi inference; as Brahman is the constant *ground* of all differenced reality, the negation of all things is existent. According to nominalistic existential logic, the negative concept 'not-A' which has no positive existent equivalent, it altogether inadmissible in logic; and therefore a positive concept like A, of which the negation is non-existent, is also inadmissible. According to conceptualistic logic (including Nyāya), there is a place for all that is conceivable, and therefore there is a place for a concept like A, though not-A be non-existent. In realistic Vedānta (realistic like Kantianism), even the self-contradictory, not to speak of a mere conceivable, is positive; and what would sound paradoxical, the self-contradictory is the only positive both in the sense that the phenomenon in which contradiction is immanent is the only thing determinately knowable, Brahman being indeterminate, and in the sense that, apart from Brah-

man to which all contradictory predicates aspire, the phenomenal system is a house of cards or mere negation.

108. Vedānta further holds that the *number* of the instances observed is inessential to the induction or vyāpti. How to reconcile this with the view of empirical logic that it is *the one* essential point in induction? Spencer, in his discussion of the Universal Postulate, holds, as against Mill, that though the belief in an axiom is generated by the instances, they are not separately registered in the mind but rather operate as a consolidated function, the inconceivability of the opposite being its negative justification. So the positively operative universal is not the separate instances but the knowledge of the objective relation between the middle term and the major term. How this knowledge or belief is itself generated, how the number of instances affects its *strength*, is a question for psychology rather than for logic. The so-called syllogism of inclusion or exclusion is no inference at all or is inference only because the number leads us to expect some necessary connotational connexion. Logic is concerned primarily with truth and only secondarily, if at all, with the intensity of the belief and degree of certainty.

109. So much for the process of inference (svārtha). To exhibit its cogency to others (parārtha), we require an ideal form like the syllogism which is no inference but only the form of inference. Here, too, a difference emerges between Nyāya and Vedānta. Where Nyāya states five members of the syllogism—(i) The mountain has fire; (ii) Because of the smoke; (iii) Whatever has smoke has fire, as the kitchen; (iv) This mountain has it; (v) Therefore it has fire.—, Vedānta states only three, either the first three, (analytical) or the last three (synthetical). The third member represents the major premise with the statement of an instance ('the kitchen'), other than the minor term, falling under the middle term, which is necessary to obviate the appearance of a petitio principii in the syllogism. The second or the fourth member represents the minor premise and the first or the fifth the conclusion. The two premises, appearing only as functions in svārtha inference, have to be exhibited as substantive propositions in parārtha inference. The considering of them together to secure the unity of the inference, which is taken by Nyāya to be a distinct step in svārtha inference, is exhibited by it in the parārtha inference by presenting the

minor premise twice, first as the second member which is the bare cognition of the middle term, and then as the fourth member which is this cognition spread out as a proposition, and sandwiching the vyāpti-function, here spread out as the major premise between them, the conclusion, too, is put both at the beginning and at the end. All this, apparently, according to Vedānta, is artificial; for in parārtha inference, we should trust the hearer to *function* for himself and content ourselves with sketching the outlines of the language-picture which might start the necessary functioning in his mind.

110. Hegel has taught us to look beyond logical forms, to the absolute realities of which they are shadows. Now the absolute of pratyakṣa or perception is Brahman (Section 88); it reveals Brahman even in a phenomenal object. To admit empirical reality is at the same time to admit the concept of reality. So inference reveals to us the unreality of the phenomenal universe, the members of the absolute inference being, 'This universe is unreal, because different from Brahman; all that is different from Brahman is unreal, like the silver in the nacre'. It has already been explained that when one is just passing into an intuition of Brahman, one feels that everything different from Brahman is unreal. Had it not been for the well-known difference between illusion and phenomenon (prātibhāsika and vyāvahārika) which gives us the concept of unreality, the unreality of phenomenon would have been inconceivable as being absolutely without analogy; mokṣa would have been an abrupt irrational affair. On the other hand, had it not been for the implicit consciousness of Brahman or Reality, there would have been no difference between truth and untruth within phenomena. Thus the absolute of inference is Brahman informing all knowledge against illusion within the phenomenal region and availing Himself of this self-created antithesis to negate the whole phenomenal existence, to work out Karma by Karma, and thus to return to His undifferenced self. This process of Brahman is Īśvara or Hegel's Absolute Idea.

UPAMĀNA

111. Upamāna is the source of the knowledge of similarity. It is an independent pramāna. Whatever gives us new and certain knowledge is pramāṇa. Now the knowledge of similarity

is certainly *new* knowledge, not mere memory. It is direct knowledge, not inferential, for it is felt to be so; besides, what possible proof can there be of similarity? Can it be called 'perception' of similarity? No; two like things may not be both presented at the same time. Yet, it may be urged that the idea of the one and presentation of the other are synchronous; and is not perception itself a presentative-representative process? The reply is, this will explain only the perception of the common elements, not the consciousness of the *relation* of similarity. If, however, the relation be taken *only as a feeling*, as it is taken by all thorough-going empiricists, e.g., by the Buddhists (cf. Saṅkara's reply to this, Section 49), by Mill (in his Logic), and by Spencer (in his Psychology), it may no doubt be said to be perceived. But knowledge is always viewed in Vedānta, not from the empirical standpoint, but from the standpoint of the self as spontaneity. It may be objected that from this standpoint, the consciousness of similarity is the same as the recognition of identity (knowledge which is mere memory, no new knowledge or anubhava at all). But they can hardly be taken to be the same. It will not do to say with some psychologists that similar things have an identical element and that suggestion of a similar is only assimilation followed by contiguous association. The artificiality of such a view is manifest. Identity is no doubt the truth of the similarity, but the psychological difference between the two is absolute to us, so long as we are confined to empirical consciousness. In the ecstatic intuition of Brahman, one is not conscious of a similarity with (or difference from) other experiences. The consciousness of similarity lies midway between the blind feeling of familiarity and the ecstatic intuition of identity. In this consciousness, there is a process, a swinging of the self backward and forward, bespeaking a limitation of its freedom. Hence it is a new kind of pramāṇa. First B is felt to be like A and then, as a result of it, A is felt to be like B. B at first suggests its similar A through the *function* of similarity (cf. Bradley on Association in his Principles of Logic), though here, too, as in the case of the *function* of vyāpti in inference, it is consciously operative (Section 104); and then the self swings back from A to B (i.e., the functional activity of similarity is transformed into the substantive consciousness of similarity).

ĀGAMA

112. Vākya, a sentence or series of sentences in which there is a principal one to which the others are subordinate, is said to be a pramāṇa or independent source of knowledge. The right appreciation of this pramāṇa will depend on the understanding of a certain theory of language with which it is bound up. When we say 'a word *means* a thing', we do not mean that the word reminds us of the idea of a thing. We may no doubt consciously pause to remember or visualise the ideas, but this remembering is not understanding the meaning of the word, any more than any irrelevant idea, of which we are reminded by a word, is a part of the meaning. The word *directly* refers to the thing, expresses the thing, *touches* it (Bṛh. Upaniṣad I, V, 3) in a sense. Psychologists speak of the primitive tendency to *reify* names, but have we got beyond this reification even now? With the same naiveté with which we objectify our ideas in perception, we *objectify the word*. The free concept not only requires the name for its support but is identical with it, though transcending it. Just as the presentative and representative elements of perception are not only associated but identified, being covered by the same determination of the self and objectified by it, so too in conception, the same determination of the self gives the name and the concept an identical object-reference. This unity of the name and the concept works unconsciously even in perception.

113. The sentence at once refers to an objective relation. The moment it is employed (provided of course it is a complete sentence, satisfying certain conditions, to be explained presently) a belief is generated in something objective. So Mill argued against the conceptualistic theory of judgment that 'the sun is hot' does not mean that the idea of the sun is the idea of hot. The copula of a judgment is the self[19] pointing necessarily to an object and the unity of the sentence is but this self clothed in language. The primordial objective reference of a judgment is a provisional belief, a belief, it may be, with a certain general cautiousness induced by experience; if it is only *thought*, it is at any rate *continuous* with knowledge. The mere absence of conflict with other evidence is sufficient to turn it into knowledge: we do not require a positive confirmation by other evidence.

19 The author, perhaps, means to say that the copula represents the assertive function of the self.

114. The understanding or the self in judgments transcends judgments and points to the Ideas of the Reason or noumena. They are to be realised only in ecstatic intuition, but till that is forthcoming, the necessary thought of them must have some intuition-basis, viz., a name. Yet just as an Idea of the Reason intrinsically spurns all sense-intuition as being completely inadequate, so too ordinary names constitute only the means by which such an Idea is pointed to, not its support or *expression*. Each noumenon demands its true expression, and as Schopenhauer remarked, a potent musical sound constitutes its direct objectification whereas other aesthetic symbols are mere imitations of its grosser objectifications. Such potent sound-symbols are supplied by the mantras, by such mystic syllables as the Om, the power of which is not to be judged by any apriori reasoning but only through the persistent attempt to realise them by devout intonation. A conventional word comes to *mean* a thing, to be provisionally *identified* with a thing, only through this necessary demand of the thing for its true sound-symbol.

115. The same result is reached in another way. Though every vākya, as having a direct objective intention, has the appearance of impersonality, yet as it may be ambiguous or false and may have reference to phenomenal truth, a subjective personal element has also to be taken into account. It is only in true statements about the supersensuous that this personal element is wholly eliminated. The supersensuous, as has been already explained (Section 84), to be thought at all, must have been revealed. The Vedas claim to be the repository of all such true statements about the supersensuous; and whether the claim is allowed or not, the true revelation, wherever it is found, must have also the true form, and therefore the perfection or the sacredness of it must transfigure every sound (or letter) composing it.

116. To this theory of the identity between thought and language, Nyāya takes an objection which easily connects itself with the conceptualistic theory of the judgment. The subject and predicate of a judgment are, according to it, subsumed under the same abstract universal. In modern language, the proposition states the 'congruence or confliction of concepts'. The sentence, then, has not an immediate, objective reference; the objective reference is mediate, i.e., gained through inference like the following: Sentences (satisfying certain conditions) in the past gave rise

to thoughts which were found to accord with objective relations: here is a sentence (satisfying these conditions), therefore it is expected to accord with objective relations. In the last resort, then, a word is taken to be eternally connected with its meaning by mere convention (saṅketa) or by the will of God (Īśvarecchā). In the case of the Vedas, they are taken to be a system of sounds *created* by the personal author, Īśvara (pauruṣeya).

117. Vedānta, however, holds that the system of sounds is not created but only manifested. When a letter is articulated it is not created but only manifested in sensuous form (dhvani). Whenever a sound is produced, we recognise it as 'that sound'. If we are to believe in this recognition, every distinctive sound-form must be taken to have a persistence, not as air-vibration, but as sound-form (in its immediacy, as sensuous objectivity). The manifestation alone is in time but the sound-form is eternal. Thus the eternity of 'names' (nāma-rūpa) and the impersonal reality of the Word are intelligible. The question of the *primum cognitum* naturally leads to the theory of the eternal pre-existence of all differences that come to be manifested (section 42). The Word which is thus manifested to us is to be regarded as the Word existent in all previous cycles, now freely *remembered* and manifested by Īśvara. So Virāj at birth remembered he has Brahman ('aham Brahmāsmi'-Bṛh. Upaniṣad). To Īśvara, who is eternally free in intelligence and volition, all these remembrances before each creation (sṛṣṭi) are one, and all these sṛṣṭis are but the timeless actualisation of the same Vedas or objective Reason. To the individual, however, the manifestation in a particular cycle is *new*.

118. The Word is co-eternal with Īśvara, both being Infinite determinations of Brahman, and it is noticeable that the same word śakti or power is used to indicate both the relation of Īśvara to created (manifested) things and the relation of the Word (and therefore any word) to its objective meaning. In both cases, this śakti, though but māyā investing Brahman (Section 52), is turned into an impersonal reality by the irradiation of Brahman.

119. The meaning of a word is two-fold, direct (śakya) and implied (lakṣya). The object which is directly meant is that towards which the word functions through its śakti. A word refers to a thing through its jāti or class. The reference

to the individual is not independent of the reference to the universal (substance and attribute being taken to be identical in Vedānta), except in cases where the name directly points to the thing. The śakti is there said to be svarūpa-satī, i.e., functioning in itself but not jñātā-hetu, i.e., not functioning as known. No doubt the direct reference of a word to (or its identity with) the universal also is unaccountable, but it is still jñātā-hetu, i.e., self-conscious reference and not a mere pointing out with the finger. Although essence and an existent partaking of the essence (viśeṣaṇa and viśeṣya) are not different in reality, they are absolutely distinct aspects to the judging or discursive reason. The self of the understanding is, as Kant said, for the objective judgment, is unconsciously immanent in the empirical object, and at the same time it is an idea of the Reason, a noumenon transcending the empirical object.

120. The reference to the individual through the universal is to be taken as only an implied reference or lakṣaṇā. This lakṣaṇā is not the function of a single word but of the whole sentence. The sentence reacts on each word that it contains. How is that possible? How do śakya and lakṣya blend? Just as in perception, the concept unconsciously synthesises the intuition, so in a judgment the copular unity modifies each of the terms. 'A is B' is really equivalent to 'AB is AB'. The sentence is an organic unity and each word in it partakes of the common life. The judgment has a tendency to lapse into a concept. This is noticeable in eulogistic or abusive sentences which are not meant to be literally taken but express simply praise or abuse. Ultimately the sentence-unity is only for the knowledge of particular objects, and the members of this unity, the concepts, also refer to them.

121. Not every combination of words, however, constitutes a true sentence, but only such as has the conditions of ākāṁkṣā, yogyatā, āsatti, and tātparya. These might be roughly translated as 'syntactical connexion' (the mutual demand of the essential parts of a sentence for one another, as the demand of a verb for its subject of a transitive verb for its object, etc.), 'compatibility of meaning' (of parts of the sentence), 'proximity of the parts', and the 'objective intention'. The abstract assertive form of a sentence is determined by ākāṁṣā, as the self thinks of object through the categories, though sometimes the assertive form appears

almost in its purity as in the appositional construction (abhedānvaya) 'this pot is a blue pot', where there is no ākāṁkṣā ('syntactical connexion' therefore is too wide a rendering). This assertive form, determinate or otherwise, may be perfect, though there may not be compatibility of meaning, as in 'this square is round'. This compatibility of meaning is what is ordinarily called consistency, though it has a material aspect, too, for in one sense even a self-contradictory sentence is conceivable through the propositional form. Āsatti or the proximity of the parts has reference to the articulatory or written form of a sentence rather than to the thought-unity, though this form is but the expression of the unity. It is that which makes us understand omitted words in elliptical constructions and unites the direct meaning of the words of a sentence with their implied meaning. Tātparya is the capacity of a sentence to produce objective knowledge. It is not the subjective intention of the person uttering the sentence, though in cases of ambiguity the subjective intention has to be taken into account. It is the objective intention which, in cases of ambiguity or the like, is not contradicted by the subjective intention. So a true sentence, even when uttered by one not understanding or misunderstanding it, has an intrinsic tātparya. If yogyatā be the formal compatibility of meaning, tātparya is compatibility in a material reference, the unity of the sentence and the corresponding objective relation. There might be higher unities, too, but these go beyond the sentence form.

122. The first thought roused by a sentence may be one of doubt or misunderstanding. Should it then be said that the objective knowledge produced by a sentence is dependent on a prior belief induced by other evidences? No, says Vedānta; a sentence by itself has the objective reference. The knowledge of the objective relations through other pramāṇas may no doubt remove doubts and misunderstanding, but is not necessarily demanded by the sentence. The sentence shines by its own light. The ascertainment of the meaning of a sentence, however, may be aided by the knowledge of the topic through other evidences, as in the case of sentences having secular reference. In the case of revealed texts, however, the meaning is evolved through mīmāṁsā of the texts themselves, i.e., through their mutual criticism and not through any extraneous pramāṇa; for no other pramāṇa can speak of the super-sensible.

ARTHĀPATTI

123. Arthāpatti is the supposition (or conception) of the premises, reason, or cause from the conclusion, consequence, or effect. Here is one getting stout though he does not take food during the day; the reason supposed is that he takes food at night. It includes all inference through vyātireki-liṅga, i.e., negative mark or middle term which, according to Vedānta, is not inference at all. In reference to the stock example given in Nyāya of Kevala-vyātireki inference, 'earth differs from other primal matters, for it has smell', Vedānta would point out that here earth, as a new primal matter, is conceived only, not inferred. It is like the framing of a hypothesis from given facts. So, too, where Nyāya holds that the major premise is reached both through positive and negative evidences, Vedānta holds that inference from it appeals to the positive instances or facts only; the negative instances simply define the positive instances, enable us to *conceive* the major premise clearly. The so-called inductive methods are therefore mixtures of anumāna and arthāpatti, deduction and hypothesis. In all inductive method there is an element of hypothesis, i.e., an assuring of ourselves, before the deductive verification, whether by tact or by conscious method, that in the absence of a certain antecedent, a consequent will also be absent. In the conscious framing of a hypothesis, our aim (though not always accomplished) is to find out something explaining facts that no alternative supposition will explain. In fact all hitting at the cause, all solving of riddles, all colligation by concepts involve a conscious or sub-conscious employment of negative instances, suggested by the positive data—and this is arthāpatti. This appears clearly in understanding omitted words in a sentence. So, too, a negation presupposes an affirmation, the presupposing being arthāpatti.

ANUPALABDHI

124. Abhāva is negation, including non-existence relative whether to all time, to particular times, or to particular natures. How is it known? It can no doubt be inferred but can it be perceived? It may be a percept, but the percept is then not the effect of a process of perception directed towards it. The self sometimes may not perceive a thing, even though it exerts the perceptive activity, yet the percept of the locus, *minus* that thing, is therefore the percept of the minus-ness or abhāva. But we cannot say

that the percept of this a b h ā v a is the result of the process of perception directed towards it; the perceptive process is directed only to the locus of the a b h ā v a, not to the a b h ā v a or to the thing that is non-existent. The non-existence of the thing, therefore, is an accidental percept *implicated* in the percept of its locus and not the intended objective of the actual process.

125. What is meant by saying that a percept is at once differentiated from everything else? Does it involve an explicit perception of the difference? No. In the stage of thought, the relation itself is definitely attended to, but in the stage of perception, it is only sub-consciously, implicitly present. The substantive presentation or percept is alone explicitly perceived. But then what is this *implicitness* of its relations from the point of view of the self's spontaneity? Need we admit a new process, a new p r a - m ā ṇ a for this implicit percept of difference? Why not call it implicit perceptive process only? From the point of view of the self knowing or functioning, this 'implicitness' is meaningless, being only a metaphor borrowed from the unintelligent object. So the language of implicit and explicit is not employed in V e d ā n t a at all. So in inference, where one might have said that the t ṛ t ī y a - l i ṅ g a - p a r ā m a r ś a of N y ā y a (Section 103) gives at any rate the *implicit* articulations of the inferential act, V e d ā n t a prefers to say that there is a single mediating function, and no substantive mental state somewhere out of the ken of consciousness, as the word 'implicit' would imply. It marks an essential difference between apriorism on the one hand, and intuitionism and empiricism on the other Should we not admit a passive or presentative side to this functioning? We may, but the self, while functioning in a particular way, cannot at the same time apprehend the functioning in its passive aspect as object, for the self is identified with the envelope of that passivity (or ignorance). It may view it, while shaking it off, as an outworn slough. When we speak of p r a m ā ṇ a or logical evidence, we view the mental process from the point of view of function and not of passivity. Hence it will not do to say that implicit perception is the process of which the result is the percept of a b h ā v a. For implicit perception, we have to substitute a distinctive positive function of the mind, a n u p a l a b d h i. When the a b h ā v a of a thing capable of being perceived is cognised where no other p r a m ā ṇ a can take cognisance of it, it is cognised through this a n u p a l a b d h i. It

has for its object not the absent thing but the absence itself. It is the bare awareness of the absence, though what is absent may not be known. Again, the thing that is absent must be, unlike spiritual merit or demerit (Section 95), capable of being perceived, i.e., it must be of the same order of reality as its locus which is perceived; otherwise the percept of its absence cannot be implicated in the percept of its locus. The negation must not be absolute indeterminate negation : it must be the negation of something intuitable.

126. An objection: If a b h ā v a be a percept, though not the result of a perceptive process directed towards it, is it a percept even in the illusion of a b h ā v a? In the case of the nacre taken for silver, the objectivity of the silver is constituted by its implicit subjective existence (Section 99) or a n i r v a c a n ī y a t v a. Has the illusory a b h ā v a also this 'inexplicable' existence? No, it may be replied: here we have a n y a t h ā - k h y ā t i (Section 100). Objectivity is through implicit subjectivity in those illusions only in which the mind and the senses are in contact with the object mistaken. But here the object mistaken being a b h ā v a, they are not in contact with it, i.e., although the objective appearance is there, it has no subjective counterpart. If there is anything at all, it must be the implicit subjectivity of the absence of sensation, i.e., the implicit consciousness of the absence. This is only *partially* similar to the implicit subjectivity of the silver in the case of the nacre. The consciousness of absence is half-way between positive and negative, and because knowing comprehends and also transcends the known, it is, relatively speaking, phenomenally negative and really positive. Not that the illusory objective appearance of a b h ā v a is B r a h m a n, for though B r a h m a n is the substrate or a d h i s ṭ h ā n a of m ā y ā and so of all phenomenal and illusory existence, it is not their u p ā d ā n a or modifiable material. (B r a h m a n is still sometimes spoken of as the material cause of the universe. As against the non-intelligent p r a d h ā n a of S ā ṅ k h y a, V e d ā n t a proposes a spiritual material, B r a h m a n; but then it is not naked B r a h m a n but rather B r a h m a n as informing m ā y ā.) So the implicit consciousness of the absence of sensation is not the same as the implicit consciousness of the pure self but rather that of m a n a s (or its objective obverse) which is the material capable of being differentiated into the sensation-modes though now without them.

ŚAṄKARA'S DOCTRINE OF MĀYĀ

ANALYSIS

(1-3) The doctrine of Māyā is the logical pendant to the doctrine of Brahman. It is the conceptual formulation of the feeling of vanity of life just as the other doctrine is of the demand for absolute certitude. Both māyā and Brahman are accepted in faith and only interpreted in thought. The 'vanity' of life means the lapse of its 'value' and does not apparently mean the lapse of its 'reality'. But in Śaṅkara's acosmism we have not merely the denial of value but also of all *given* 'reality'. This denial of the given would be unintelligible but for the fact that the illusory itself is *given* in our ordinary experience. (4-6) The stock Vedāntic example of illusion—mistaking a rope for a snake—may be analysed in three stages:—(a) The snake is presented and believed to be real. (b) The belief is corrected by the perception of the rope as rope. After correction the snake continues to be a presentation to the mind though it comes to be invested with the quality of unreality. The first percept of the snake is *degraded into an illusion* when we have the affirmation of the rope. In this stage the snake persists as a possible object and the past perception of it as a subjective fact is not yet questioned. (c) The snake is contemplated not only as non-existent now but as non-existent even when it appeared to be perceived. There is the doubt even about the past perception of it as a subjective fact. *That* snake is no possible object. Existence is denied of it absolutely and the objectivity of the illusory content is called in question. The objectivity of the unreal snake, as persisting in the second stage, is now reduced to what is determinate neither as objective nor as subjective, to bare given-ness. (7-8) *That snake* then, shorn of its objective reality in the second stage and now of its reality either as objective or as subjective is still given to us as a positive unthinkable: it cannot yet be rejected as absolute nought. The indescribable *should* be nought but is still given in absolute mockery of thought. (9-12) The snake in the three *stages* of illusion is given respectively as implicitly real object, as unreal object and as the indescribable. The last stage leads to the realisation of absolute nought which is not given at all.

Corresponding to the stages there are the three processes in illusion *as presented to uncritical thought*, to critical thought and to faith respectively. Again, corresponding to the three processes, we have the stages of māyā as the predicate of the illusory object: (a) Vāstavī, (b) anirvacanīyā, and (c) tucchā. (a) renders intelligible the theory of māyā as cosmic magic turning up the unanticipable; (b) furnishes the clue to the conception of māyā as the absolute freedom, the unthinkable free power of the Lord to put forth and retract objective appearance; (c) makes intelligible the theory that the cosmic appearance is not merely retractable but that the retractation itself is unreal. (13-14) What is neither sat nor asat is nonsense and yet we have such unthinkable nonsense actually presented in the illusion—'the unreal, unobjective snake there'. The illusion has no longer to be logically corrected, that correction being finished; there is demand only for the correction of the hidden subjective defect through which it is still given. The nonsensical here is presented not through any caprice of a verbal combination but through a deeper subjective distemper. To say that the snake is nought though not felt as such is to express a faith in and a demand for its realisation by a cure of this distemper. (15) Though the snake is not an apparent object, it is not known for certain to have been perceived. To faith there was no perception of it; to reason the past perception is unproved; while to immediate belief it is a fact. There is belief now in the past perception as a subjective fact without a belief through memory in the snake having been perceived. The snake as a given unthinkable is but a percept *presented as an unreal subjective fact* to an eternal consciousness. (16-17) In an illusion in respect of a subjective fact, the subject knows the object through the wrong act of identifying with the Vṛtti. Now it is only as a subjective illusion is corrected that the distinction of pure consciousness from the Vṛtti and the unreality of the Vṛtti are suspected. This suspicion is in some sense a self-freeing act of the subject, though it is only incomplete self-freeing. Such freedom implies a faith in the spiritual possibility of progressively annulling the act of identification and thus attaining complete freedom. (18-20) That a given object should be a *given* unthinkable is a standing scandal to human reason. The faith that the given-ness is only apparent does not effectively remove the felt fact. The consciousness of the practicability of annulling the given-ness of a particular illusion is what alone yields the conception of truth as not given, as transparent, as self-certified or svayamprabha . That the unthinkable is still given though it should not be given brings up the thought and faith that the Vyāvahārika world is also just given and is not necessary, that its ultimate ground is dark and inexplicable i.e., māyā and that the system of relations is not self-justifying truth.

ŚANKARA'S DOCTRINE OF MĀYĀ

1. Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā is the logical pendant to his doctrine of Brahman as the undifferenced self-shinning truth. Both Māyā and Brahman are taken to be incapable of being established by reason, by any natural pramāṇa. They are believed to be scripturally revealed, though they are claimed as intelligible contents of pure consciousness. They are in fact to be accepted in faith and only interpreted by thought. For purposes of philosophy, we may generally substitute in place of faith in scriptures, spiritual experience and, in this connexion, the feeling of the vanity of life and the demand for absolute certitude. The doctrine of māyā and Brahman may be regarded as the conceptual formulation of this feeling and demand. The value or validity of the experience, feeling or faith is not to be questioned within philosophy which should start with it and seek only to interpret it. The present paper confines itself to the enquiry how far the interpreting concepts are intelligible and at what precise point, if at all, logical thought can make room for the faith in the illusoriness of things other than Brahman.

2. Is the theory of the illusoriness of the world the necessary formulation of the feeling of the vanity of life? The feeling implies the evanescence of value from the objects that interest us. Does the lapse of value mean lapse of reality? If the value of an object lapses to our consciousness, the given form of the object, it may be said, need not disappear or change into some other form. Even if the given form changes, the formless given-ness of the object may be said to persist, for the new form is not felt to be separately given. It may be supposed that the given form is turned with the lapse of value into a mere subjective idea but then the reality of the idea has to be admitted as given. Or it may be that the form is realised to be not a given idea but only the subjective activity of forming or constructing it; but even this free activity is given as the presented process of the becoming or defining out of the idea. The lapse of value does not mean the lapse of all given-ness; some given reality has apparently to be admitted, whether objective or subjective, determinate or indeter-

minate. The acosmism of Śaṅkara goes beyond both realism and idealism by reducing the world to absolute illusion, by interpreting the vanity of life as implying the denial of all given reality. Is such absolute denial of given-ness, with the correlated notion of truth as utterly ungiven, i.e., as self-luminous (svayamprabha) intelligible?

3. The denial or the illusoriness of the given would be inconceivable but for the fact that the illusory itself is given or experienced as such. Were it not for the experience of prātibhāsika or illusory being, the possible unreality of the vyāvahārika or empirically real world—the elimination of its given-ness—would be utterly unintelligible. The presentation of an object as illusory is, as will appear presently, fundamentally different from the presentation of a fact, objective or subjective. The difference between the given-ness of the illusory as illusory and that of fact, objective or subjective, can only be expressed as a difference in the felt quality of reality, the former being less real than the latter. The quality of reality is explicitly felt only when it is experienced as dissipated in an illusion. The experience of illusion thus marks an actual step towards the elimination of given-ness and is as such a unique datum for epistemology.

4. The metaphysical doctrine of māyā is best approached through the epistemology of illusion. We may analyse the stock Vedāntic example of illusion—mistaking a rope for a snake—in three stages. The snake is first presented, it is next corrected, and then it is contemplated as corrected. It is in the first place presented and believed as real, though it is not affirmed or judged as real, its reality being only not denied. The belief is next corrected by the perception of the rope as rope. The correction has to be accepted as an ultimate fact of consciousness. It is not yet a negative judgment. The rope is indeed affirmed or judged to be real but the snake remains a presentation[1] though invested with a new immediate quality of unreality. The affirmation of the rope and the peculiar presentation of the snake presuppose each other. The affirmative judgment need not presuppose a negative judgment: it presupposes only the presentation of immediate unreality. Illusion or the corrected and degraded percept is at least one form, if not the sole form, of the presentation of unreality.

1 i.e. something presented to the *mind*.

In the present example, the rope is affirmed as real in explicit contrast with the illusory snake; and the first percept of the snake is degraded into an illusion in reference to the affirmation of the rope. The affirmative judgment and the illusion[2] emerge together—as fact and not by any thinking necessity—as mutually implicated. Mutual implication is but a name for confusion which, however, in this stage is not realised as such. The attitude is still objective and the cognition does not appear as confusedly dual because the objective content that is known—viz., 'rope not snake'—is a related unity. The relation, it may be noted, is unique: the unreal implies the real[3] but real does not imply nor is it in any way affected by the unreal. The rope is a complete content which does not require to reject the content 'snake' and is neither the better nor the worse for having rejected. The snake, however, in the context is there *as* rejected or corrected by the other content, as illusory in its presence. The real has the unreal here as its free implication.

5. In the second stage we are directly concerned only with this objective content. The rope is affirmed as real and the snake though presented as unreal is still regarded as objective. Though corrected, the snake is neither forgotten nor presented as a mere subjective fact: it persists as an objectively presented no-fact. It is still a possible object and the past perception of it as a subjective fact is not yet questioned. The unreal object, however, here is a subordinate or implied element in the known content, the real object being the principal element. In the third stage, the unreal is made the principal element, the direct object of contemplation. The snake is known not only as non-existent now but as non-existent even when it appeared to be perceived. It is not now felt to be remembered and that means a doubt even about the past perception of it as a subjective fact. As now felt to be neither perceived nor remembered, is it a possible object at all? Snake, no doubt, is a possible object but *that* snake appearing at the previous moment to the particular observer is no possible object, as it never existed, does not exist and will not exist: existence is denied of it absolutely. The judgment in fact—'it does not exist' is inadmissible: its subject *it* lacks existential

2 i.e. the sense of illusion.
3 i.e the sense of the unreal implies the sense of the real.

import, standing as it does now for what was only apparently existent. The absolute denial of existence annuls the starting subject altogether and no judgment about the snake appears to be left over. The unreal snake which was still an object in the second stage now turns out to be no possible object at all. Not that, however, it is known now as a mere subjective image; it is known as what appeared to be perceived. The qualitative difference between what is perceived and what is imagined does not disappear even when the former is known to be perceived wrongly.

6. But is it still believed that the wrong perception of the previous moment was a real subjective fact? If it was a fact it must be vouched for by memory which however only tells us here that the snake was *felt to* be perceived, not that it *was* perceived. The past perception is known as a fact, only if its object is now felt to be remembered. The snake is not so felt and so the facthood of the past perception is at least not known. The facthood is not denied when the snake is taken to be an unreal *object* in the second stage. But now that its objectivity itself is called in question, the facthood of its perception becomes open to doubt. That is why memory testifies apologetically that it was only felt to be perceived. It means on the one hand that it is not felt to have been merely imagined and on the other that the facthood of the perception cannot be affirmed with certainty: Thus the objectivity of the unreal snake, as persisting in the second stage, is now reduced to what is determinate neither as objective nor as subjective, to bare given-ness.

7. In the third stage then the implied unreal object of the second stage turns out to be no possible object at all, to be incapable of being presented as the subject of a judgment of which existence can be denied. While existence is denied of the starting subject absolutely,[1] non-existence is not now predicable of it, for no possible object remains. The snake now is referred to not by a negative judgment but by a self-contradictory judgment which is no judgment. The judgment 'that snake is unreal'—the implication of the cognition 'rope, not snake'—is now realised to be a contradiction. The contradiction, however, is still felt to be given, unlike a contradiction like square circle which is but a verbal or thinking sport. All contradiction is, in a sense, given: the failure to

4 i.e. both as objective and as subjective.

think is not thought but only felt. The illusion—*that* unreal snake—which is a contradiction in the sense of being indescribable either as existent or as non-existent (sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa)[5] is given in a deeper sense. Square circle is sought to be only imagined, not known, and the feeling of the failure tells us that it is absolute nought (tuccha). But '*that* unreal snake' is sought to be known, being felt to be perceived in the first instance. The problem of thinking is itself given or forced upon us and it is given as insoluble in the feeling of the failure to think. *That snake* then, shorn of its reality[6] in the second stage and now of its bare objectivity[7] also, is still given to us as a positive (bhāva-rūpa) unthinkable (anirvācya): it cannot yet be rejected as absolute nought.

8. There is a difference between the contradiction between existent and non-existent and that between 'not existent' and 'not non-existent'. The unreal object of the second stage might be taken as at once existent and non-existent but the 'indescribable' of the third stage is what is neither existent nor non-existent. Strictly speaking, the latter is no contradiction at all: the concepts 'not existent' and 'not non-existent' do not get related at all to contradict one another, being predicable of no assignable subject. At the same time they have been brought together not arbitrarily or accidentally, but under the constraint of a given presentation. They are not indeed thinkingly related but are *given* as related in the way of contradiction. As given, the relation may be regarded as a symbolism for thought-contradiction, as a problem or demand to realise the given-ness as false. The 'indescribable' should be nought but is still given in absolute mockery of thought. It marks, in a sense, the frontier between thought and faith, being the given limit of thought on the one hand and the promise of the annulment of given-ness on the other.

9. The snake in the three stages of illusion is given respectively as implicitly real object, as unreal object and as the indescribable. The last stage may be regarded as leading to the realisation of absolute nought which is not given at all; and each of the first two stages may be viewed as leading to the next stage.

5 Here the concept of 'sadasad-vilakṣaṇa' appears to be interpreted in a novel way.

6 i.e. reality as objective.

7 i.e. reality either as objective or as subjective.

We may thus speak of three processes in illusion[8] as presented to uncritical thought, critical thought and faith respectively. They would roughly correspond to the three views of māyā—viz., as concrete (vāstavī), as unthinkable (anirvacanīyā) and as nought (tucchā).

10. The first process in illusion is the reduction of an implicitly real object to appearance. The reduction cannot be regarded as merely subjective process. If the magic transformation of the present snake into an appearance to a particular mind could be taken as an objective process, it would mean the opening up of a new dimension of becoming in which objects come to acquire or lose reality. The hard reality of a world once and for all given would give place to a perpetual swing between dream and waking manifestation. The world would be intelligible as a system of appearances materialising and dematerialising to individual spirits, as a play of cosmic imagination or līlā. The emergence of the new in causality would be understood as the emanation or vivarta of an appearance from the timeless cause, the law of causality would be a law of appearances—the effect-appearance being as real as the causal appearance and so a pariṇāma of it, and causal power would be a name for cosmic magic. Thus the first process in illusion renders intelligible the pictorial conception of vāstavī māyā, the inexplicable world-process creatively turning up the unanticipable (aghaṭana-ghaṭana-paṭīyasī)—an analogue of the Bergsonian real time.

11. The second process in illusion, viz., the reduction of objective appearance to the given unthinkable, furnishes the clue to the conception of māyā as unthinkable free power, the freedom to put forth and retract objective appearance. It is because we thinkingly reduce objective appearance to the given un-objective or unthinkable that we can conceive or intellectually apprehend freedom—freedom of willing, for example, which is a process from the un-objective to the objective—as real. Māyā as the anirvacanīya power of the Lord means His absolute freedom, freedom to create or put forth as also to destroy or retract objectivity. It is the freedom of retractation that we first understand through the analogy of the dissipation of objectivity in an illusion. Creative freedom is intelligible as the reversed process of the re-

8 i.e. processes in the correction of an illusion.

tractive freedom. The common conception of creative freedom without destroying freedom[9], of the Lord being able to put forth will but not to retract it is not the conception of absolute freedom.

12. The third process in illuson is the reduction in faith of the given unthinkable to absolute nought, the elimination of the indescribable given-ness. The corresponding cosmic conception would be that of Tucchā māyā which the Vedāntist would accept as revealed or presented in faith. The conception of māyā as absolute nought is necessary for the vigorous monism of the Śāṅkarite school. The monism implies not merely that the world is an appearance and that this appearance is retractable but also that the retraction itself is unreal, is not even real as the free nature of Brahman. Brahman is not like Īśvara detached from or free in respect of a māyā that is present to him but has not māyā before him at all. He not only need not exercise free power: power is not real to him. Brahman is the truth and is not merely real. Neither the real nor the true as content requires to deny the opposite to be itself; but while the *knowledge* of the real as such depends on the correction of the unreal, the knowledge of the true as such is not dependent on the correction of the false. The knowledge of the falsity of the world is no necessary element of the knowledge of Brahman. The knowledge of Brahman is no mediate affirmation but an intuition which is not a result that is reached but is felt when it comes to have been eternally there. That means that the ignorance of Brahman was itself unreal, to the last vestige of which the correction of the world as false and its cosmic obverse, the retraction of free power, appeared real. The conception of eternal truth implies the falsity or tucchatva of given cosmic unreality, the mithyātva of given mithyātva, not only rejection of the world as unreal but absence of any reference to it by way of rejection. Such a conception is possible only through a consideration of what we have taken as the third process in illusion.

13. We have shown so far how the consciousness of illusion renders the conception of māyā intelligible. Our experience of illusion—as about the snake—supplies in its different stages not only *an* analogy but the only analogy for the conception of cosmic māyā as magic, as freedom and as nought. It remains however

9 i.e. freedom to destroy.

to show definitely where the transition is effected from a particular illusion to cosmic m ā y ā and how the faith in the latter fits in with logical thought. For this, a farther analysis is required of the consciousness of illusion in the stage where the given unthinkable appears to faith as absolute nought.

14. What is neither s a t nor a s a t should be a chimera but persists as given in the illusion. It is instructive to ask what this persistence implies and whether and how it can be got rid of. It was pointed out that when the objective appearance of the snake is known to be not objective at all, to be beyond affirmation and denial, the subjective facthood of the past perception of it itself becomes doubtful. The snake is not felt to be remembered, i.e., to have been perceived. At the same time it is not felt to be merely imagined but as given, though not to present perception or memory. It is given as an unreal but not as being subjectively constructed nor as what had but has lost reality. Though not objective, it is referred to a real point in the objective world as where it is *not*. It is not only contradictory but nonsensical to say that the square circle is or is not there; and yet we have such unthinkable nonsense actually presented in the illusion—'the unreal un-objective snake there'. The illusion has no longer to be logically or objectively corrected, that correction being finished; there is demand only for the correction of the hidden subjective defect through which it is still given. The nonsensical here is presented not through the mere caprice of a verbal combination as in the case of square-circle but through a deeper subjective distemper. To say that the snake is nought though not felt as such is to express a faith in and a demand for its realisation by a cure of this distemper.

15. If the snake is not even an apparent object, it should be known as what was not perceived. It is not actually so known; we cannot get rid of the belief that it was perceived, though as it is not felt to be remembered, it is not known[10] to have been perceived. To faith there was no perception of it[11], to reason the past perception is unproved[12] while to immediate belief it is a fact. There is belief now in the past perception as a subjective fact without the object of it being felt to be remembered,

10 i.e. known for certain, see sec, 6.

11 Because the indescribable is incapable of being perceived.

i.e., without a belief through memory in the snake having been perceived. It means then that the past appears to be now directly perceived; that the snake, as past percept[13] and not as a past objective fact, is presented to consciousness without an empirical psychosis or vṛtti. To say, however, that the snake is now presented as a past percept is not to admit that it is consciously presented as a real subjective fact. A percept is never like an image distinguished actually as subjective from the object perceived, being so distinguished only in name. In the case of an illusion indeed, it is actually distinguished but not as an assured subjective fact. The pastness of the percept does not mean that it was present, i.e., was a fact having a position in the objective time-order. Pastness here is but a *quality* of the percept, a name for the presented unreality of the subjective fact, which as timeless is presented to a timeless consciousness, is sākṣi-bhāṣya, 'lighted up by pure consciousness.'

16. We may say then that the snake as a given unthinkable is but a percept presented as an unreal subjective fact to an eternal consciousness. A subjective fact is but the subject with an empirical vṛtti, not the vṛtti with the form of the subject. It is the subjective act of identifying with the vṛtti, not the presentation of the subject as objectified in it. A subjective illusion[14] is an ethically (or spiritually) wrong act rather than a logically false cognition: it is the subject wrongly working through the vṛtti, not knowing the vṛtti, but knowing the object through the wrong act of identifying with the vṛtti. The identifying is a pure act of the self, the heart of will and is implied in all knowing short of the ecstatic intuition of the self. Now it is only as a subjective illusion is corrected that it is known as such, that the identifying act is known, that the distinction of pure consciousness from the empirical vṛtti and the unreality of this vṛtti are suspected. That suspicion of the distinction is already a distinguishing or self-freeing act of the subject; it is only by *being* free that the subject *knows* its freedom, detachment or distinction.

17. To suspect, however, the distinction of the subject from the vṛtti is not to get rid of it altogether. It is to be free

12 Because the snake now is only *felt* to be perceived.

13 i.e. as the 'content' of a perception.

14 i.e. illusion in respect of a subjective fact.

in a measure and yet to be identified. A contradiction like this is real to the spiritual will but not to thought, being intelligible only as a subjective act of incomplete self-freeing or realisation. Such freedom, however, as is already realised in the suspicion of distinction implies a faith in continued realisation, in the spiritual possibility of progressively retracting the act of identification. Now the snake as a given unthinkable corresponds to the suspicion of the self being free from the perception of it, a suspicion that does not yet exclude a belief in or identification with the perception as past or unreal. The given unthinkable again is in faith absolute nought. The faith corresponds on the subjective side to the faith in the practicability of progressively realising the subject's freedom from the past perception and of annulling the identification that the belief in it implies. But for the faith in subjective or spiritual practicability, that the given unreal should be nought would be no living faith but only a dreamy suggestion of it; and absolute certitude would be deemed unattainable.

18. That a given object, stripped first of its reality and then of its objectivity, should still be a *given* unthinkable is a standing scandal to human reason. The faith that the given-ness is only apparent does not effectively remove the felt fact. So long as it is not removed, absolute truth is only conceived but not known. It is possible however to go at least one stage beyond this Kantian impasse. The annulment of the objectivity of a given illusory object implies a doubt about the subjective reality of its perception—the starting experience of getting freed from empirical subjectivity. The unthinkable no-object is accordingly felt to be only non-empirically given to the pure self, the given-ness is felt to be removed one step from a merely blind imposition and the persisting though enfeebled identification of the self with empiricality already presented as illusory is believed to be progressively retractable. That is how absolute truth, though unknown, is believed to be not unknowable but as demanding to be known. The faith emerges not only in truth but also in the knowability of truth.

19. Here then we have the transition from a particular illusion to the thought of and faith in absolute illusion or m ā y ā. The consciousness of the practicability of annulling the given-ness of a particular illusion is what alone yields the conception of truth as not given, as transparent, as self-certified or s v a y a m p r a-

bha. Such conception of truth is at once a faith in the knowability of truth. If in one case—viz., the case of a particular illusion, truth is believed to be attainable by the practicable spiritual process of freeing oneself from empiricality, absolute truth—absolute freedom of the self with the reduction of all empiricality to illusion—is conceived to be attainable. For what does the act of freeing in the particular case imply? If a given object turns into illusion, it is by fact and not by any necessity of thought. If the perception of it is suspected to be only a subjective illusion, it means that the self or pure consciousness has so far freed itself, that the conception of and faith in the self as truth has emerged. That implies the consciousness not only that the self is not identified with this perception, this particular empiricality, but that being unconsciously identified cannot be predicated of the self at all. The accomplished act of freeing from any empiricality is the consciousness of the act itself as free, i.e., of the self as not affected by the act, as *ever* free, transparent or svayamprabha and not merely *making* itself free or repenting of a previous helpless lapse.

20. A single act of freeing from an empirical subjectivity implies thus a faith that all such subjectivity and identification with it are illusory. The same faith is reached in another way. When the snake appears as an illusory object, the rope is taken to be real as against it. When the snake appears as a given unthinkable, the rope in contrast with it is believed not only to be real but as justifiable by reason or pramāṇa, as in a world of vyāvahārika, i e., thinkable and practical reality, as conformable to Veda or Objective Reason or—what amounts to the same thing—as in a world of laws or system of relations. That the unthinkable is still given though it should not be given brings up the thought and faith that the vyāvahārika world—with Veda itself as objective reason—is also given and is not necessary, that it is a free revelation, that its ultimate ground is dark or inexplicable, i.e., is māyā, that the system of relations is not self-justifying truth. What is given and justified by something else, i.e., logically thought is still only *real*, not *true*[15]. The

15 Here, 'real' is that which is justified by something else; and 'true' is that which is self-justifying.

in a measure and yet to be identified. A contradiction like this is real to the spiritual will but not to thought, being intelligible only as a subjective act of incomplete self-freeing or realisation. Such freedom, however, as is already realised in the suspicion of distinction implies a faith in continued realisation, in the spiritual possibility of progressively retracting the act of identification. Now the snake as a given unthinkable corresponds to the suspicion of the self being free from the perception of it, a suspicion that does not yet exclude a belief in or identification with the perception as past or unreal. The given unthinkable again is in faith absolute nought. The faith corresponds on the subjective side to the faith in the practicability of progressively realising the subject's freedom from the past perception and of annulling the identification that the belief in it implies. But for the faith in subjective or spiritual practicability, that the given unreal should be nought would be no living faith but only a dreamy suggestion of it; and absolute certitude would be deemed unattainable.

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THE ADVAITA AND ITS SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE

ANALYSIS.

(1-4) *Adhyāsa and spiritual detachment*—The illusoriness of the individual self is the central notion of Advaita Vedānta. Individuality which involves an identification of self with the body is never, however, *felt* to be illusory in our secular life. It is at best *thought* and accepted in faith. But this notion would not occur to a person who has no experience of himself as a spirit and of the object as distinct from the subject. That experience is furnished by a deepening of the moral consciousness in which we not only repent of our past actions but find it hard to imagine how we could perform them. In such a state one is aware of the self that is castigated as not merely 'me' but also as 'I'. In a further deepening of this stage, the past 'I' is not only sought to be disowned but is cognitively viewed as a sort of 'You' that is yet 'I'. One is aware here of the individual self as somehow at once true and false, true as the unobjective subject and false in so far as it appears as 'you'. The individual self means the self feeling itself embodied and the illusoriness of the embodiment is the illusoriness of the bodily self and not merely of the self's identity with it. (5-6) *Two illusions*—There are apparently two illusions—(i) of the 'I' appearing as 'you' (objective subject) and therefore also as 'me' (object), and (ii) of the 'you' appearing as 'I'. Under the first illusion one is aware of the 'me' or the body as only felt, as one's embodiment; and the correction is the realisation that such a body was only his individual illusion. In the other illusion that continues, the body appears to be distinct from him and yet as somehow 'he'. With the correction of the first illusion, he sees that this appearance should also be illusory, but still he does not actually disbelieve it. To be conscious of oneself as individual or 'me' is to be conscious of the 'me' as illusory and of the subject or 'I' as the truth. It is the illusion of the individuality that suggests the theory of objective illusion called anirvacanīya-khyāti-vāda.

(7) *The Concept of Māyā*—This brings in the concept of Māyā which is neither real nor unreal. Māyā is the beginningless nescience that conditions the individuality of a finite self as also his subjective ignorance. Since there are many individuals, māyā may be taken as the corpus of the many beginning-

less individualities and may be characterised as the manifold of nāma-rūpā. (8-11) *Brahman* and *Īśvara*—This last conception of *Māyā is intelligible only as the cosmic principle of illusory individuality*. As cosmic, Māyā is to be understood as what is not Brahman. Brahman, however, can but need not be understood as what is not Māyā. He is Īśvara, the Lord of individual selves and the creator of the world. Creation is understood as manifestation in the soil of Māyā. Brahman, in a sense, *becomes* the world without losing His transcendence. Brahman does not, however, *become* the Jīva: the Jīva is Brahman but wrongly views himself as other than Brahman. Īśvara is conceived as an absolute emanation of Brahman and not as merely relative to the individual's thinking. The creativity of Īśvara is like that of the magician. His śakti is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal. As absolutely free with his Māyā-śakti, Īśvara is not only not a false idea of the Jīva, He is not also an absolute appearance like the world. Īśvara has a dual form, as wielding māyā-śakti and thus immanent in the world (vikāra-vartin), and as dissociated from it, transcendent (triguṇātīta). As transcendent, Īśvāra is conceived as what is not Māyā: while Brahman is understood without reference to Māyā and the world. Īśvara and Brahman are characterised by the same epithets—nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta.

(12-14) *Mokṣa and its means*—Mokṣa is not anything to be reached or effected but is the self itself or the svarūpa of Brahman. The individual, however, thinks that he is not free and wants to be free. For him, accordingly, there is the necessity of a sādhana. This sādhana must be such as will lead him to realise that his bondage is an illusion and that he is eternally free. To know the truth about himself can, therefore, be the only discipline for him. The sādhana, therefore, is primarily that of knowing (jñāna) and secondarily that of willing and feeling (karma and bhakti). The latter makes for clarity of spiritual being and is thus implicitly or explicitly the clarity of knowledge. Without rejecting any other sādhana, the religion of Advaita Vedānta regards knowledge of the self as its distinctive sādhana and regards it as self-sufficing and requiring no supplementation (samuccaya).

(15) *Universal outlook*—Advaitism as religion and philoso-

phy in one is at once individualistic and universalistic in its outlook. As religion, Advaitism insists on the conservation of one's spiritual individuality (svadharma), while as philosophy, it recognises the svadharma of everyone else as absolutely sacred. (16-17) *Practical Idealism*—Advaitism stands for a strong spirituality and for efficient practice of idealism. While it prescribes nivṛtti or renunciation of the world in spirit, it demands that it should be achieved through such discipline as is suited to the adhikāra or the spiritual status of each individual. The absolute freedom from law which Advaitism aims at is to be achieved by the willing of the law, by niṣkāma-karma or by merging one's individuality in institutional spiritual life which represents a sacrificial concert of gods and men. (18) *Toleration*—Toleration is to Advaita Vedānta a religion in itself. The Advaitin feels that the religion of others is not only sacred to them but to himself also. There is no prescription, however, of universal brotherhood and the duty to relieve distress is to be performed as duty rather than as a matter of altruistic enjoyment. The brotherhood that is practically recognised is the brotherhood of spirits realising their svadharma. (19-21) *Respect for individual differences*—The difference of spiritual status is not necessarily a gradation, and in so far as it is, it does not suggest any relation of higher or lower that implies contempt or envy. The notion of adhikāra means just an acceptance of realism in the spiritual sphere and the highest adhikārin should feel it a privilege to join in the worship of the humblest. The Advaitic scheme of life would view with positive disfavour iconoclasm in any sphere or form. There is no room in Advaitic religion for the duty of profaning one god for the glorification of another. The idea of hustling people out of their reverence in their own spiritual interest would be scouted in this religion as self-stultifying profanity.

(22-25) *An integral part of Hinduism*—Much of what is here attributed to Advaitavāda is the implied creed of Hinduism and Hindu society. Advaitism is sometimes characterised as rationalistic religion. But the abstract cult of self-knowledge derives its whole meaning from the concrete religion of ceremonial and worship. It represents a protest against concrete religion only in so far as the latter resists 'inwardisation'. Advaitism, far from encouraging premature quietism, positively prescribes Karma,

though rigorously as a duty and not for gain. The religion of j ñ ā n a, however, is in no sense a protest against the religion of b h a k t i. The A d v a i t a knowledge is understood as an intuition that amounts to ecstasy and does not in any sense mean a supersession of b h a k t i. Although b h a k t i implies individuality, it represents the individual's joy in surrendering his individuality.

THE ADVAITA AND ITS SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE

1. The illusoriness of the individual self is apparently the central notion of Advaita Vedānta. Every vital tenet of the philosophy—Brahman as the sole reality, the object as false, Māyā as neither real nor unreal, Īśvara as Brahman in reference to Māyā, mokṣa (liberation) through knowledge of Brahman and as identity with Brahman—may be regarded as an elaboration of this single notion.

2. An illusion, unlike a thinking error, excites wonder as it is corrected. One's apprehension of something as illusory involves a peculiar feeling of the scales falling from the eyes. To be aware of our individuality as illusory would be then to wonder how we could feel as an individual at all. As we are, it is indeed only in faith, if at all, that we accept the illusoriness of our individuality. But even to understand the position, we have to refer to some spiritual experience in which we feel an abrupt break with our past and wonder how we could be what we were. A person behaves as though he believed he were his body, and although he never explicitly says that he is his body, he never also ordinarily feels detached enough from the body to wonder how he cannot yet get rid of the belief. The notion of adhyāsa or the false identification of the self and the body would never occur to a person who has no experience of himself as a spirit and of the object as distinct from the subject, as another person is from oneself. It is only one who felt such a distinction of the self and the body that would wonder at his own implicit belief in their identity. He can take the identity to be illusory, only if he feels it to be impossible and cannot yet deny its appearance. Vedānta starts with the notion of adhyāsa and presupposes such an experience of spiritual detachment from the body, including the empirical mind.

3. We can conceive this spiritual condition as a deepening of the form of moral consciousness in which we not only repent of our past actions, but find it hard to imagine how we could perform them. In this consciousness, our past being is felt not only to be strangely alien to us, but as an intellectual absurdity, as apparently at once subjective and objective, at once I and me. One at best

thinks of one's body as me and not as I; but in repentance, unless it is a senseless whipping of a dead horse, one is aware of the *self that is castigated as not merely me but also as I; not only* as a thing of the past, alienated or objectified, but as still tingling with subjectivity. In the further stage, in which the past appears unintelligible, this past I is not only sought to be disowned, but is cognitively viewed as a sort of you (y u ṣ m a d) that is yet I (a s m a d), a contradiction that yet appears. This alienated I which is not mere me is the individual self, and it is on this spiritual plane, and not lower, that one is cognitively aware of one's individuality. One is aware, however, here of the individual self as a contradiction, or as somehow at once true and false, true as the unobjective subject and false in so far as it appears as another I (you), as at once me and I. The notions of the individual self, of the individuality or me as false, and of the eternal self as the I that is never me, are born in one and the same spiritual consciousness.

4. The individuality is understood as me, i.e., as the illusory objectivity of the subject and not merely illusory identity with the object taken as real. The identity of the self and the not-self has the form of the self, being in fact the embodied self and not the conscious body. The individual self means the self feeling itself embodied, the embodiment being only a restrictive adjective of the self; and the illusoriness of the embodiment is the illusoriness of the body itself and not merely of the self's identity with it. The idea of the object, in fact, as distinct from the subject is derived from the idea of the embodiment, which itself is born in the consciousness of the individual self as false in respect of its individuality.

5. There is, however, a complexity. The me is taken as illusory not primarily because it is objective, but because the individual self already appears to itself false in so far as it takes itself to be an objective subject, to be a sort of you which is at once me and I. As the individual self is felt to be false, it is realised that the I cannot be me; but this does not prevent the me or the body from appearing as I. There are apparently two illusions—of the I appearing as you (objective subject) and therefore also as me (object) and of the you appearing as I. In the spiritual consciousness in which a person wonders how he could be what he cannot be, he corrects the former illusion, but not the latter, for

unless the past self were still present, there could be no sense of intellectual absurdity. His past self (you) is still somehow he, though he sees he cannot be that self. Under the first illusion he is aware of the me or the body as only felt, as his embodiment or limiting character; and the correction is his realisation that such a body was only his individual illusion. In the other illusion that continues, the body appears to be a substantive fact, distinct from him and yet as somehow he. With the correction of the first illusion, he sees that this appearance also should be illusory, but he still does not actually disbelieve it. Hence it is that he wants this illusion to be dissipated and meantime realizes that it is not his individual illusion, but a cosmic illusion, the dissipation of which would mean for him realization of the body and the entire world, of which it is the point of reference, as illusory.

6. To be conscious of oneself as individual or me is to be conscious of the me as illusory and of the subject or I as the truth. The me is the prototype of objectivity, and to feel it to be illusory is to be aware of the possibility of objectivity itself being illusory. We take a particular object to be illusory only as we believe in the objective world, but we could never conceive the illusoriness of the world itself unless we started with the illusoriness of the me. Were it not also for this starting illusion, an illusory object would not be conceived, as it is conceived in Advaita philosophy, namely, as anirvācya as an unassertable that is yet undeniable. The illusion of a snake being corrected rouses wonder. Wonder should mean that this (rope) being a snake is a contradiction that yet was presented, but there is apparently no actual consciousness here of a contradiction presented as such, viz., of this being at once snake and rope. The spiritual consciousness of one's illusory individuality is, however, explicit consciousness of the contradiction of the self having been believed as not-self. It is the illusion of the individuality therefore that suggests the theory of objective illusion called Anirvācya-khyātivāda.

7. This brings in the concept of Māyā or the principle of illusion as what cannot be characterized either as real or as unreal. It is primarily the illusion through which the self believes (in willing and feeling) that it is an individual. As this belief persists even when the individual sees that the self cannot be individual, the individuality appears neither as real nor as unreal, for if the belief were removed, there would be no individual self to see

the unreality of individuality. The principle of individuality, then, is prior to the individual's actual consciousness of himself as individual and of this world as his experience (bhoga); and as yet this individuality is what cannot be real, it has to be taken as the cosmic principle of illusion. Māyā is the principle of individuality, the beginningless nescience that the individual self has to conceive as positively conditioning his individual being as also his subjective ignorance. To the individual there are many individuals, and so Māyā may be taken as the corpus of the many beginningless individualities. Again, as the world is understood as the system of experiences of the individual self, which apart from the self are but empty distinctions and forms, nāma-rūpa as they are called, Māyā may be characterized as the manifold of nāma-rūpa—the name and form—which has no self-identity and yet is undeniable.

8. This last conception of Māyā, however, is intelligible only through the conception of Māyā as the cosmic principle of illusory individuality. As cosmic, it has to be understood in reference to the unindividual self or Brahman, though only as what is not Brahman. Brahman has, however, no necessary reference to Māyā: He can be, but need not be, understood as what is not Māyā. Understood as what is not Māyā, or as it is figuratively put, as shining against Māyā without being identified with it, or as a master using this principle as his servant, He is Īśvara, the Lord of the individual selves and the Creator of the world. The world is understood as the system of the experiences of the selves, and as they believe themselves to be individuals so far as they will, the experiences are to be taken as their bhoga accordant with their karma. Īśvara then is conceived as actualizing their karma into their bhoga or experience, and thus manifesting the manifold of nāma-rūpa, which as experienced is just this world or jagat.

9. Īśvara has different relations to the individual selves and to the world. He is the Creator of the world, but not of the selves, the notion of creation of souls being foreign to all Indian philosophy and not to Advaitavāda only. Creation is understood as manifestation in the soil of Māyā. Brahman in a sense becomes the world without losing His transcendence. The world is an absolute appearance, at once real and unreal, real as Brahman, the cause that continues in the effect, and un-

real as alienated from Him. It cannot, however, be said similarly that Brahman becomes the Jīva: the Jīva is Brahman and only views himself as other than Brahman, the otherness being no absolute appearance, but only the content of his wrong belief. As explained, however, the principle of illusion itself has to be taken by the Jīva as cosmic, and hence, though his individuality is not an absolute appearance, Brahman in relation to him appears absolutely as Īśvara.

10. Īśvara in Advaita Vedānta is conceived as an absolute emanation from Brahman, though He has been sometimes erroneously supposed to be Brahman as merely viewed by the Jīva in reference to himself and the world. This reference to himself and the world is not his thinking only; that creative thought (īkṣā)—'Let me be many', etc.—belongs to Brahman and is not simply referred to Him allegorically by the Jīva. At the same time this manifold that is manifested by him is manifested as (partially) unreal, as already 'in the jaws of death', as in fact as much retracted as created. Hence His creativity is like that of the magician; as the creativity of absolute appearance. His freedom or śakti is neither absolutely real nor unreal, and this is just how the cosmic Māyā is characterized.

11. As absolutely free in respect of creation as Brahman Himself, with this absolute freedom or Māyā-śakti—a determination that means no restriction of His being—Īśvara is not only not a false idea of the Jīva, a mere symbol adopted for his upāsanā (worship), He is not also an absolute appearance like the world. Īśvara is as much unconstituted by Māyā as Brahman, and both are characterized by the same epithets—nitya-buddha-śuddha-mukta (eternal, omniscient, pure, free). Īśvara has a dual form, as wielding Māyā-śakti and thus immanent in the world (vikāravartin), and as dissociated from it, transcendent (triguṇātīta) and merging back into Brahman. As transcendent, Īśvara is conceived as what is not Māyā, as determined not by Māyā but by freedom from Māyā, as other than the world that is put forth by Him as an appearance, while Brahman is understood without reference to Māyā and the world. The current conception of Brahman and Īśvara as the higher God and the lower God appears to be a fallacious exaggeration of this simple distinction.

12. Brahman is the eternal self that has not only no positive determination, but has not even the negative determination of consciously rejecting positive determination. He is indeed characterized as Sat (existence), Cit (knowledge) and Ānanda (bliss), but these are not determinations, being each of them the unspeakable Absolute viewed by us as beyond the determinate absolutes Sat, Cit, and Ānanda formulated by our consciousness. The individual self has not only to correct for himself his subjective illusion of individuality, not only to wait for the cosmic illusion of individuality to be corrected, but also to contemplate all correction to be itself illusory. He has to contemplate mokṣa not as something to be reached or effected or remanifested, not even as an eternal predicament of the self, but as the self itself or the svarūpa of Brahman. The self or the absolute is not a thing having freedom but is freedom itself.

13. The individual illusorily thinks he is not free and wants to be free. To his consciousness, accordingly, there is the necessity of a sādhana or discipline to attain freedom. This discipline to him must be such as will lead him to realize that his bondage is an illusion and that he is eternally free. To know the truth about himself can be the only way of attaining freedom, and the discipline, therefore, is primarily that of knowing (jñāna), and secondarily that of willing and feeling (karma and bhakti). The latter is in the first instance helpful as a preparation for knowledge, as securing the spiritual attitude in which the inquiry into spiritual truth can start. In reality it is more than mere preparation, since with the progressive transparency of the mind effected through any discipline, the truth begins to shine in, though it may not be in the intellectual way. Knowledge that is demanded for freedom is spiritual being rather than the detached consciousness of a spectator, being knowledge of the self not as distinct from but as one with the knowledge. The spiritual being that is secured by karma and bhakti cannot, therefore, be very different from jñāna. The clarity of spiritual being is implicitly or explicitly the clarity of knowledge.

14. Vedānta is primarily a religion, and it is a philosophy only as the formulation of this religion. All religion makes for the realization of the self as sacred, but the religion of Advaita is the specific cult of such realization understood explicitly as self-knowledge, as sacred knowledge, and as nothing but know-

ledge. Without rejecting any other *sādhana*, it prescribes knowledge as its distinctive *sādhana* and regards it as self-sufficing and requiring no supplementation (*samuccaya*). The self is to be known—accepted in the first instance in faith, which, as confirmed, clarified, and formulated by reason would be 'inwardized' into a vision. This work of reason is philosophy, which is thus not only an auxiliary discipline, but an integral part of the religion and its characteristic self-expression.

15. *Advaitism* as religion and philosophy in one is at once individualistic and universalistic in its spiritual outlook. Religion is nothing if not individualistic; it is an 'inwardizing' of one's subjective being, a deepening of one's spiritual individuality, this being the unspoken inner function even of a religion with the salvation of all as its professed objective. Philosophy, on the other hand, is essentially universalistic in its attitude, presenting a truth that is for all, and is not merely a mystic experience of the individual philosopher. As an explicit religion, *Advaitism* insists on the conservation of one's spiritual individuality or *svadharma*, while implicitly as philosophy, it recognizes the *svadharma* of everyone else as absolutely sacred, being in this sense the most catholic and tolerant among religions. Again, as an explicit philosophy, it takes every individual self as the one self or reality; and at the same time as an implicit religion, it denies the world that is common to all and retires into the solitude of subjectivity. In either aspect it appears to combine the boldest affirmation with the most uncompromising denial.

16. *Advaitism* stands for a strong spirituality, for efficient practice of idealism, for unworldiness that is neither sentimental nor fanatical. It not only asserts the detachment or freedom of the self from the world, it boldly denies the world, though it does not take even the illusory object to be merely imaginary (*tuccha*). So too, while it prescribes *nivṛtti* or renunciation of the world in spirit, it demands that it should be practically and methodically achieved through such discipline as is suited to the *adhikāra* or actual spiritual status of each individual, and may not involve even in the case or the highest *adhikāin* a literal adoption of the hermit's life. While the spirit is taken as the only reality, the object is understood not as absolute naught, but as absolute appearance, as a necessary symbolism of the spirit. Logic, law, and the revealed word itself are all in this sense.

symbolism—unreal in themselves and yet showing the reality beyond. The object has thus to be accepted in order to be effectively denied. One has to be a realist to outgrow realism. It is for the strong in spirit to attain the self, and strength consists not in ignoring but in accepting facts—accepting the conditions of the spiritual game in order to get beyond them.

17. *Advaitism* aims at the absolute freedom of the self, freedom from all relativity, including the relativity of good and evil. Freedom from law is, however, to be achieved by the willing of the law, by the performance of one's moral and spiritual duty without desire—desire not only for pleasure but even for spiritual merit, and by merging one's individuality in objective or institutional spiritual life which represents a *yajña* or the sacrificial concert of gods and men. It would imply the strenuous cultivation of a dispassionate serenity of soul and the strength that it implies to keep out illusions and stand unruffled in one's subjective being.

18. Toleration is to *Advaita Vedānta* a religion in itself; no one who realizes what any religion is to its votary can himself be indifferent to it. The claim of a religion on its votary is nothing outside the religion and is itself as sacred to others as the religion is sacred to him. While then an individual owes special allegiance to his own religion or *svadharma*, which chooses him rather than is chosen by him, he feels that the religion of others is not only sacred to them but to himself also. This, in fact, is the practical aspect of the *Advaitic* view of all individual selves being the one self. The oneness is not contemplated in the empirical region, and there is no prescription of universal brotherhood in the sense that the happiness of others is to be promoted as though it were one's own happiness. There is indeed the duty to relieve distress, but such work is to be performed as duty rather than as a matter of altruistic enjoyment, the dry detached attitude of duty being consonant with the spirit of the religion of *jñāna*. The brotherhood that is practically recognized in this religion is the brotherhood of spirits realizing their *svadharma*, the *dharma* of each being sacred to all. If then, in this view it is irreligious to change one's faith, it is only natural to revere faiths other than one's own. To tolerate them merely in a non-committal or patronizing spirit would be an impiety, and to revile them would be diabolical. The form in which

the truth is intuited by an individual is cosmically determined and not constructed by him, and the relativity of truth to the spiritual status of the knower is itself absolute. Even the illusory object in this view is a mystical creation (prātibhāsika-sṛṣṭi), the three grades of reality that are recognized—the illusory, the relational, and the transcendental—being in fact grades of this absolute relativity.

19. The doctrine of adhikāri-bheda is an application of this epistemological notion of absolute relativity to the specifically religious sphere. The difference of adhikāra or spiritual status is not necessarily a gradation; and so far as it is a gradation it does not suggest any relation of higher and lower that implies contempt or envy. The notion of adhikāra in fact means in the first instance just an acceptance of fact or realism in the spiritual sphere. It is a question of duty rather than of rights in this sphere; and a person should be anxious to discover his actual status in order that he may set before himself just such duties as he can efficiently perform in spirit. It is a far greater misfortune here to over-estimate one's status than to under-estimate it. A higher status does not mean greater opportunity for spiritual work, since work here means not outward achievement, but an 'inwardizing' or deepening of the spirit. Again, from the standpoint of toleration, one not only respects the inner achievement of a person admitting an inferior status, but can whole-heartedly identify oneself with it; the highest adhikārin should feel it a privilege to join in the worship of the humblest. There is aristocracy in the spiritual polity; spiritual value is achieved by the strong and is much too sacred a thing to be pooled. At the same time every individual has his sacred svadharma and has equal opportunity with everyone else to realize or 'inwardize' it.

20. The merit of Advaitavāda lies in having explicitly recognized that spiritual work is this 'inwardizing', the deepening of faith into subjective realization, the striving after self-knowledge. This work can start from any given point, any spiritual status or situation that happens to be presented. Men are intrinsically higher and lower only in respect of this inner achievement. The problem of altering traditional society, of equalizing rights in order to create opportunities for self-realization, has accordingly a subordinate place in the Advaitic scheme of life, being recognized mainly negatively as the duty of abstaining from

acts of conscious injustice. This scheme of life would view with positive disfavour iconoclasm in any shape or form, any violent tampering with an institution that is traditionally held to be sacred; but it would not also apparently require one to vitalize artificially such an institution if one believes—not by hearsay, but after loyally trying to work it—that it is moribund or dead. Spiritual realism would demand both reverence for and dissociation from what was sacred. One sacred custom can only be superseded by another sacred custom, the former being either reverently allowed to die a natural death or incorporated in an ideal or symbolic form in the latter. There is no room in Advaita religion for the duty of profaning one god for the glorification of another.

21. The idea of hustling people out of their reverence in their own spiritual interest would be scouted in this religion as a self-stultifying profanity. Social life and tradition are viewed as sacred, as a yajña being performed through the ages, the sacredness being the shine of the one Self, the shadow of Eternity. It is the life of the gods, and we can help it best by merging into it, by realizing it as our subjective life. This subjective realization may sometimes come spontaneously, but so far as it can be effected by sādhana, it can be effected by each individual for himself. He can indeed help others in the work by education, but he can educate only in the measure he has himself realized this life. He can wish and pray that other's self-realization might be expedited; but for an *ordinary* person to suppose that he can and ought to emergize and vitalize other spirits is, to the religion of Advaita, a delusion and a curious mixture of arrogance and sentimentality.

22. Much of what is attributed here to Advaitavāda is the implied creed of Hinduism and Hindu society. This philosophy is the most satisfying formulation of the distinctive spirit of Hinduism, and in this sense it may claim to be a synthesis of other systems of Indian philosophy, which all seek to formulate this spirit; and it has also explicitly influenced the historical evolution of Hinduism. As it is not only a formulation of the religion, but is itself the religion in the simplified and unified form of the realization of subjectivity or self-knowledge, it is sometimes characterized as a rationalistic religion; and there is a tendency to isolate it in the abstract and to interpret it as disowning all Vedic and post-Vedic worship and ceremonial. But the abstract cult of self-

knowledge derives its whole meaning from the concrete religion of worship and ceremonial, and is recognizable as a religion only as its concentrated essence. It represents a protest against the concrete religion only so far as the latter resists 'inwardization'; but it implies no rejection but only an interpretation of the concrete religion. The Advaitin would whole-heartedly join in the traditional worship and would be false to himself if he professed contempt for it, though he would recognize that the contemplation of the abstract significance is itself a part of the worship and at a certain stage may be the whole spiritual activity.

23. The contemplation that is demanded is more than mere philosophic thought, being a specific enjoyment of the thought as sacred and representing a new stage of spiritual consciousness. The truth has to be felt as a self-revelation, as a light that shows itself. Light is a sacred symbol, not a mere metaphor, from the contemplation of which the Vedāntic conception of the self itself may be taken to have emanated.

24. The Advaita discipline of jñāna is primarily a protest against the discipline of karma, of moral (and ceremonial) activity which is apt in all ages to be taken as a self-sufficing religion. The discipline of karma is important as a preparatory chastening of the soul, but taken as a religion by itself, it is understood to work against the attainment of mokṣa. To will is to energize in ahaṅkāra (egoism), even though it be willing without desire, the specific willing to deny will, to sacrifice one's individuality. At the same time, such willing without desire tends unconsciously to dissolve the ahaṅkāra, though the tendency requires to be confirmed by bhakti, by the dedication of the spiritual merit of the willing to the Lord, or by the feeling of merging oneself in the cosmic yajña, the symbol of the life divine. All good willing means self-purification, and although it requires to be superseded so far as it involves ahaṅkāra, the supersession is itself effected through willing in an attitude of detachment, in the implicit consciousness of the self being beyond ahaṅkāra. Hence Advaitism, far from encouraging a premature quietism or renunciation of karma, positively prescribes karma, though rigorously as a duty and not for gain, and conceives it possible even for one who has risen above morality to perform karma in lokānugraha, for the education of others and for the conservation of the social order.

25. The religion of *jñāna*, however, is in no sense a protest against the religion of *bhakti*. To it the higher stages of *bhakti* at any rate not only mean soul-clearing, but also involve the enjoyment of the truth in one's being. It is indeed demanded that the felt truth may be self-revealed as known truth, but this knowledge is itself understood as an intuition which amounts to ecstasy and does not in any sense mean a supersession of *bhakti*. Although *bhakti* implies individuality, it represents the individual's joy in surrendering his individuality. The *bhakta* may feel his individuality restored through the Lord, but that is a mystery of divine life with which the *Advaitin* would not dally. The individual's own achievement terminates with the surrender of individuality.

STUDIES IN SĀṀKHYA PHILOSOPHY

PREFACE

Much of Sāṁkhya literature appears to have been lost, and there seems to be no continuity of tradition from ancient times upto the age of the commentators. In such systematic works as we have, one seems to have a hazy view of a grand system of speculative metaphysics. There is so much that is clothed in a poetic or mystic garb on which commentators do not help us much but which are suggestive enough to tempt us to construct the system anew. The interpretation of all ancient systems requires a constructive effort; but while in the case of some systems where we have a large volume of literature and a continuity of tradition, the construction is mainly of the nature of translation of ideas into modern concepts, here in Sāṁkhya the construction at many places involves supplying of missing links from one's imagination. It is risky work, but unless one does it one cannot be said to understand Sāṁkhya as a philosophy. It is a task that one is obliged to undertake. It is a fascinating task because Sāṁkhya is a bold constructive philosophy. Sāṁkhya is not the avowed formulation of religious experience which Vedānta is primarily, nor analytical and critical like Nyāya but is based on speculative insight and demands imaginative—introspective effort at every stage on the part of the interpreter.

ANALYSIS

CH. I. PAIN AS EVIL (SEC. 1-15).

(1-2) Mukti or freedom from pain is believed to be attainable. The wish for freedom from pain is necessary; for what is not wished to be terminated is not felt pain. The wish thus has to be regarded as conditioning the facthood of pain and is thus itself an evil. Reflection on pain thus develops into reflection on itself as evil, freedom from which too is necessarily wished. Of the two wishes the one for freedom from pain is *secular*, while the wish for freedom even from this secular wish itself is *spiritual*. (3-6) To the spiritual wish the feeling of pain is not a fact in the sense in which it is to the secular wish. To the latter, pain is an undoubted fact and yet a puzzle because the self *as subject* appropriates something that is known as an object and is thus opposed to itself. To the spiritual wish, however, pain is no absolute fact though it is not eliminated from consciousness. The feeling of pain is regarded both in Nyāya and Sāṁkhya as real; to Vedānta it is only phenomenal fact and not real. (7-8) All the views admit that the feeling of pain involves an illusion. Pain appears to developed reflection as the self opposing itself. The self knows itself as object as it opposes itself and it opposes itself as it objectifies itself. The objectification is intellectual illusion and the self-infliction is conative evil, the two as inseparable making up spiritual illusion or avidyā. (9-10) Error about the self and wrong will condition each other in the reflective self, but views differ as to which of them is immediately presupposed by spiritual freedom. In Vedānta and Sāṁkhya the last evil that is sought to be got rid of is error, so that freedom is ultimately through knowledge alone. Pain, in all the views, involves spiritual illusion. Pain, felt pain and the feeling of pain are the same to the Vedāntist and the Buddhist but are taken by them to be synthetically or analytically identical with spiritual illusion. They are distinguishable in Sāṁkhya, felt pain being real evil, unfelt pain real but not evil and the consciousness of pain being evil but illusory. (11-15) Freedom from actual pain is an affective experience of the mind to Sāṁkhya, freedom from the mind itself being absolute freedom or apavarga. The first freedom for its completion demands the second freedom and is continuous with it. But there is in Sāṁkhya no

discipline for freedom over and above reflective detachment which, again, is the beginning of freedom.

CH. II. REFLECTION AS SPIRITUAL FUNCTION (SEC. 16-32)

(16-17) Reflection is primarily reflection on pain and is at all stages a freeing process. It is spiritual in the sense that it is as much conative as intellectual. It may indifferently be called the will to deny will or the knowing function. In Sāṁkhya, there is really no will to deny will as in Yoga. The reversion of the will is nothing but the knowing process, and its consummation is viveka in which the mind detaches itself from the body and gets lost in unmanifest prakṛti. (18-19) Two processes of mind—the progressive one which is natural life and the regressive one which is reflection or the spiritual function of freeing from natural life. Sāṁkhya admits a continuity between life and reflection, while Yoga does not. To the former, life starts reflection and viveka comes as a stage in the process that is conditioned by aviveka. But to the latter the upward movement of the mind is utterly distinct from its downward course. (20-23) This difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga is connected with their difference regarding the relation between viveka or self-knowledge and absolute freedom. According to Sāṁkhya, viveka is the residual mind which *spontaneously* drops off; but according to Yoga, a further effort of the mind, namely, asamprajñāta is necessary to terminate itself. Sāṁkhya, like Vedānta, recognises no positive prescription to achieve mukti, but it differs from Vedānta which holds that the reflective process towards mukti starts miraculously and is no part of natural life. Reflection to Sāṁkhya is no ascetic effort and is itself an experience. (24-25) To one who has begun to reflect, the only prescription of Sāṁkhya is not to will at all but to let reflection naturally deepen or fulfil itself. The process of yoga is taken as a natural self-deepening of reflection; it is a process of active freeing, though it is not any voluntary doing. Reflection as a spiritual process is above ahaṁkāra, but the voluntary striving for yoga would still imply ahaṁkāra. (26) Sāṁkhya thus presents a religion of spiritual naturalness or reflective spontaneity. Its metaphysics springs from this religion and reflection which is the spiritual freeing process is also the organ of metaphysical knowledge of tattvas or *noumena* of

S ā ṁ k h y a philosophy. (27-32). The t a t t v a s are known by inference, faith and y o g a, but these are all understood as implied in different ways in the one natural-spiritual process of reflection. A metaphysical condition is immediately known in reflection to be constitutive of a fact. Such reflection involves inference which is reduced to a view of the conditioned getting distinct from itself as its condition, of a self-distinguishing process in the content *as still given*. Reflection involving such internal perception is *transcendental reflection*. Transcendental reflection in S ā ṁ k h y a involves inference that implies a faith in its continuous passage into intuition. The self-concretion of reflective perception is y o g a and faith in such y o g i c intuition about metaphysical entities is faith in scriptures. Assertorial certitude about metaphysical reality cannot in the S ā ṁ k h y a or V e d ā n t a view be yielded by inference apart from scriptural testimony.

CH. III. THE BODY OF THE SELF (SEC. 33-47)

(33-37) S ā ṁ k h y a admits a dualism of subject and object, but the object has a necessary reference to the self. This reference is characterised as unconscious teleology which is a metaphorical description of the objective process being real only as an identifying of the object with or its distinguishing from the self. (38-41) The body is understood as a complex of elements having its unity in their non-distinction from the self and the distinction of two bodies is not understood as existing in the pure object. Object not constituting any body would be unmanifest p r a k ṛ t i : manifest object must be the body of a self. There are two broad grades of the manifest object viz., mind and matter constituting the mental and the material bodies of the self. Each is a body in the sense of being a complex of objective t a t t v a s undistinguished from the self. (42-47) The two bodies are known in two grades of reflection which are identical with the two kinds of reflection—secular and spiritual—mentioned in Ch. I. To reflection on the mind, the mental body and the material body are presented as two distinct bodies, the vanishing and the standing. The material body has the mental body immanent in it; but though the mental body stands or lapses as a whole, the material body is taken as capable of lapsing before the lapse of the mental body.

CH. IV. CAUSAL AND NON-CAUSAL MANIFESTATION (SEC. 48-61)

(48-49) Concepts of liṅga and bhāva interpreted anew. Bhāva as the subjective function of referring to the bhogya. Two kinds of manifestation of buddhi: the causal and the non-causal. The world as the non-causal manifestation of the body. (50-52) The world related to the perceiving body as the content of a thought is related to the thought. The world as bhogya is the projection or necessary construction of the feeling body. (53) The world as construction out of unmanifest guṇas. (54) The manifestation of prakṛti into buddhi as at once a causal and a non-causal process, causal in regard to the existence of buddhi and non-causal in regard to the content of buddhi. (55) The eight bhāvas of buddhi and the two grades of bhāvas. (56) The bodily self as a bhoktṛ. (57) The caused and uncaused manifestations meet in the material body which is constituted by all the manifest tattvas. (58) The analysis of the feeling body into liṅga and bhāva gives the clue to the Sāṁkhya theory of Evolution. (59) The views of Nyāya, Sāṁkhya and Yoga on the referential relation of the world to the experiencing self elaborated. (60-61) The Sāṁkhya and the Yoga views on the constitution of the phenomenal world compared.

CH. V. TIME, SPACE AND CAUSALITY (SEC. 62-75)

(62-64) Causality in the phenomenal world versus causality in the world of tattvas. Pariṇāma as self-distinction and its two varieties, the unmanifest and the manifest. The causal process as an unfolding or self-distinction and the effect as the cause unfolded. (65-66) The implication of causality as *unfolding* brought out. Unfolding as immediately known in reflection on the mental object which is known as necessarily dual. (67-69) Causation as a process of the object towards bhoga conditioned by immanent aviveka. The views of Sāṁkhya and Yoga on the function of nimitta in causation and on the distinction between immanent change and transitive change. (70-71) The concept of kāraṇa-ākāśa or space as a function of prakṛti distinguished from ākāśa as bhūta. (72-73) The Sāṁkhya versus the Yoga theory about the ontical status of time-order (krama). Their difference on this point connected with the difference in their views re prakṛti-vikṛti. (74) The con-

cept of qualitative combination or Involution in Sāṁkhya. (75) The concepts of sūkṣma and sthūla in the context of causality.

CH. VI. THE OBJECTIVE TATTVAS (SEC. 76-92)

(76-77) The significance of the different groupings of the objective tattvas. The constituents of the mental body and the material body. (78) The mind as functional versus the mind as *standing*. The standing character of the mind explained. (79-88) The concepts of tanmātra, bhūta and indriya explained. The concepts of aviśeṣa and viśeṣa analysed. (89-92) Relation between ahaṁkāra, tanmātras and indriyas explained.

CH. VII. THE OBJECTIVE TATTVAS (CONTD.) (SEC. 93-110)

(93-96) Ahaṁkāra and buddhi as functional tattvas. Buddhi, ahaṁkāra and tanmātra as the counterparts of self-knowing, self-willing and self-feeling. Abhimāna as the function of ahaṁkāra. Ahaṁkāra as willing towards bhoga analysed. Willing towards freedom—What? (97-98) Buddhi is mind as knowing and has for its essence certitude (niścaya). The inward meaning of the evolution of ahaṁkāra from buddhi or its dissolution into buddhi brought out. (99-101) The concept of buddhi as certitude analysed in detail. (102-104) Bhāvas interpreted as functions of certitude. (105-106) Bhāvas and vṛtti as mode and function at once. Relation between bhāva and vṛtti. (107-108) The concepts of ālocana and saṁkalpa connected with the indriyas and manas explained. (109-110) The anticipatory functions of the senses and of the mind.

CH. VIII. THE SELF OR PURUṢA (SEC. 111-126).

(111) Anticipative response as at once construction and apprehension. The dual function of mind, as bhāva projecting the object and as vṛtti reflecting the object, illusorily referred to the self. (112) A new theory of 'mutual reflection' put forward as against the one advocated by Bhikṣu. (113) The self by itself not known as object. (114) Two grades of reflection implying a distinguishing from the self, the first one yielding the concepts of bhūta and tanmātra and indriya, the second yielding those of ahaṁkāra and buddhi. (115) Avidyā distinguished from asmitā. (116) The concept of viveka ana-

lysed. The self as mukta conceived as contentless consciousness. (117-118) The grounds for inferring the existence of self as in Sk. explained. The self inferred primarily for the explanation of the unity of the body. (119) The inferred self as knower. The self in its essential nature as *knowledge*. (120) Sāṁkhya pluralism interpreted. (121-125) The self known as infinite i.e., as involving all selves. The self known in buddhi as having within it a community of selves. (126) Sāṁkhya versus Vedānta on individuality.

CH. IX. PRAKṚTI (SEC. 128-140)

(128-130) Prakṛti as potential being with the actual function of appearing. Dualism inside prakṛti of *substantial being* as potential and aviveka as actual but without standing being. The difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga on this point explained and connected with their views of sadṛśa-pariṇāma and sāmyāvasthā. (131) The last two concepts further elucidated in relation to Sāṁkhya and Yoga. (132) The concepts of sadṛśa-pariṇāma and self-causation in its two aspects differently interpreted in Sāṁkhya and Yoga. (133) The reality of guṇa as in the two systems. Bhikṣu's interpretation questioned. (134) The quantitative inequality of the guṇas as qualitative distinction between dominant and recessive. (135) Sāṁkhya and Yoga on immanent change. Dharma-lakṣaṇāvasthā-pariṇāma. (136) The concept of guṇa analysed. (137-138) Private and 'public' affective characters of the phenomenal object. (139) The guṇas as absolutes i.e., as at once the potentialities of feelings and felt contents. (140) The guṇas as affective absolutes constitute the object.

CH. X. RELATION OF THE GUṆAS (SEC. 141-148)

(141) The three guṇas as the 'absolutes' of the three modes of feeling which are to be understood in terms of freedom. (142) In Sāṁkhya, the guṇas understood primarily in terms of feelings and secondarily as qualities of the object. (143) In Yoga, the guṇas understood as the triplicity of mental functions. (144) Existent object as a complex of guṇas. (145) The three grades of *felt-ness* in relation to the object. (146-148) The co-existence and mutual relation of the guṇas. The Sāṁkhya and Yoga views on the point.

CHAPTER I

PAIN AS EVIL

1. Indian philosophy starts with the belief in the attainability of mukti. Mukti, whatever else it implies, is understood as absolute freedom from pain. Is there any ground for the belief that such freedom is attainable?

2. To reflect on the feeling of pain is necessarily to wish to be free from it. To wish anything is to think that it may be attained. To necessarily wish something is to believe that it not only may but can be attained, that it cannot be unattainable. The necessary wish for freedom from pain is then the unquestioned belief that it can be attained. The necessity of the wish further implies that it is constitutive of the feeling of pain which yet is distinct from it. The wish presupposes the belief in the facthood of pain and yet if the wish were absent, there would be no feeling of pain, for what is not wished to be terminated is not felt pain. The wish for freedom is the reflective self or reason itself which thus has to be regarded as conditioning the facthood of pain and as, therefore, acting suicidally. Reflection on pain, though implying the possibility of freedom from it, is in this sense an evil, the potentiality of pain. Reflection thus develops into reflection on itself as evil, freedom from which too is necessarily wished. The wish for freedom from the reflective wish to be free from pain is spiritual wish, the latter wish being secular. It is the necessary wish for absolute freedom, freedom not only from pain, but from the potentiality of pain, and implies the belief not only that it can be attained but also that it has already begun to be attained. The belief in mukti is belief not only in its possibility but also in its actuality and in the indefinite realisability of the actuality.

3. To the wish for freedom from the secular wish to be free from pain which is the potentiality of pain, the feeling of pain is not a fact in the sense it is fact to the secular wish. To the secular wish and the reflection implied by it, pain is an undoubted fact and yet a puzzle. It is known to be given to the reflective self but not in the sense an object is given to it in sensation. In reflection on the object as perceived, the object

is known as only given, the given-ness being the sensation which the reflecting self is not aware of as its function, there being no introspective consciousness of sensing. The given-ness of pain to reflection is the feeling itself in the form 'I feel' : I am directly aware of *myself* feeling, but not of *myself* sensing. In introspective consciousness then, pain is known to be as much myself as given to or foreign to myself. The facthood of pain is not questioned though somehow it appears as both distinct and non-distinct from the introspective self. That the reflective self itself conditions the pain and thus functions suicidally is not known in secular reflection. What appears here is the contradiction that the self appropriates what it knows to be opposed to itself, the puzzle that it is not detached from pain as it must or should be. Pain is still a fact though its relation to the self is unintelligible.

4. To the spiritual wish for freedom from the secular wish, or in other words, to reflection as reflection on itself, pain is no absolute fact though it is not eliminated from consciousness. To some, as for example, to the Buddhist, its given-ness disappears, being reduced to the contradiction in the reflective self, the suicidal function that reflection is. By others its foreignness is still admitted but not as absolutely real. It is taken either to be real but *essentially* terminable or to belong to a lower grade of reality. Nyāya, which does not admit grades of reality, takes pain to be real even to the final reflection though the necessary wish for its absolute cessation implies its necessary terminability. To the Vedāntist as to the Buddhist, the wish for freedom from the reflection which conditions pain is wish not only for the non-persistence of pain but also for the present pain to be realised as a contradiction. To the Buddhist, this wish is already such a realisation though it may require to be deepened. The Vedāntist, however, would take the consciousness of the contradiction as faith in its realisability rather than its realisation. The faith is still the beginning of the absolute detachment from pain, but the demand for its further deepening implies that this initial detachment is not yet a realisation of the contradictory nature of pain. Pain, therefore, still appears given though as what cannot or ought not to be given, appears as impossible and yet as fact, unintelligible yet undeniable.

5. The Sāṁkhya view on this point is the Vedāntic view with a difference. There is the faith not only in the terminability but in the contradictory character of the feeling of pain. At the same time the contradiction is not regarded as absolute. That the self should be one with the feeling that is intrinsically opposed to it is no doubt a contradiction, but that the feeling should be non-distinct from the self is no contradiction but a terminable fact. Distinction in Sāṁkhya is not a given fact: distinction is but distinguishing which, however, is a function not of the subject but of the object, being the real objective process of the object defining itself. The object either defines itself from the self, thereby itself tending to lose its manifest character or does not define itself, in which case it tends indefinitely to put forth further manifestation. Both are real processes in the object, the second process being known in the first as what was and has been terminated. Thus the non-distinction of the feeling of pain from the self is a real fact known in reflection on it which involves its distinction from the self. In secular reflection, the distinction is only possible, but in spiritual reflection, the distinction is an actuality that has begun. Pain as actually distinct from the self is thus distinct from the feeling of pain, unfelt pain being an unmanifest reality which is equated in Sāṁkhya with rajas, one of the three guṇas that make up prakṛti, an unanalysable factor of eternal objective reality.

6. In other views, pain means the felt pain, unfelt or unmanifest pain being a contradiction in terms. To Sāṁkhya, unfelt pain as distinct from the felt pain is not only real but eternally real, being known as such in spiritual reflection, while the feeling of pain is real but essentially terminable, involving as it does along with a contradictory notion of the self a real non-distinction from the self, the termination of which has already begun. To Nyāya also, the feeling of pain is non-eternally real as involving an illusion about the self, though it involves the illusion only as its cause and does not embody it, as it is taken to do in the other views. To spiritual reflection, the feeling of pain is regarded both in Sāṁkhya and Nyāya as still real; while apparently the Vedāntist takes it to be only undeniable but not positively possible and therefore not assertible, to be only phenomenal fact and not real, and the Buddhist denies its reality altogether, understanding it to be

no longer a given feeling but an illusion that somehow persists.

7. All the views spring from spiritual reflection and all admit that the feeling of pain involves an illusion. The nature of the illusion requires elucidation. The feeling appears to ordinary reflection to be at once myself and opposed to myself, to be appropriated and rejected at the same time. The reflection implies the belief that I am free and also wonder that I am still affected in the way of pain: I do not thus wonder at being affected by the object in the way of sensation. The wonder leads to the further reflection that I am affected not from without but by myself, that I let myself be affected[a], that if I would, I could refuse to be affected—what I do not think about sensation as an affection. Sensation I do not resent but I resent the feeling of pain though the sensation is apparently more foreign than the feeling. Sensation is in the first instance at least foreign, not opposed to the self while pain is opposed precisely because it is of the self. Pain thus appears to this new reflection to be the self opposing itself.

8. The illusion that is involved in the feeling of pain is thus at once intellectual and conative. The self opposes itself and is thus object or not-self to itself. This self-opposing or self-objectifying self is the reflective self. It knows itself as object as it opposes itself and it opposes itself as it objectifies itself. The objectification is intellectual illusion and the self-infliction is conative evil, the two as inseparable making up spiritual illusion or a v i d y ā. They are inseparable in the sense that each conditions the other so that a v i d y ā has to be conceived as a beginningless series of wrong knowledge and wrong will that is necessarily terminable, because illusion is known as such only when correction has begun. The feeling of pain as belonging to the reflective self involves this beginningless self-caused a v i d y ā which is indifferently spiritual illusion or spiritual evil.

9. Error about the self and wrong will condition or imply each other in the reflective self, but views differ as to which of them is immediately pre-supposed by spiritual freedom. In some views (e.g., V e d ā n t a and S ā ṁ k h y a) the last evil that

[a] Cf. Kant—'the outer object is given to the inner sense by the self itself.'

is sought to be got rid of is error, so that freedom is ultimately through knowledge alone. In others (e.g., Yoga and Nyāya) the self is unfree even in knowledge, has still the conative tendency to be passive to itself and can be free only through a specific freeing activity, unconscious or conscious. There are again views (e g., the Buddhist view) to which error and wrong will are not synthetically but analytically connected, not causing but implying one another, so that neither lapses while the other remains, freedom being through their simultaneous lapse. To Sāṁkhya as to Vedānta, error survives wrong will and freedom is in the last resort through correction of error.

10. Pain in all these views involves spiritual illusion. To the Buddhist, it is but the illusion; the Naiyāyika takes it to be only caused by the illusion, while in Vedānta and Sāṁkhya, it is at once the effect and the embodiment of the illusion. To all but the Buddhist, pain has a natural being. Nyāya regards it as wholly natural though it is conditioned by spiritual evil, Vedānta and Sāṁkhya take it to be both natural and spiritual, its natural being being constituted by its spiritual being and yet distinct from it. To Vedānta, its natural being is accordingly only phenomenal, being nought apart from its spirituality. To Sāṁkhya, however, the natural being is self-subsistent though undistinguished from the spiritual evil, pain being on the one hand a mental fact and on the other an illusory affection of the self. By pain is meant here felt pain; and if unfelt pain be a fact as it is to Sāṁkhya, it is not understood to be an evil at all, evil being only to the feeling consciousness. Felt pain is an evil which, however, is still distinct from the feeling consciousness, being a mental fact that is the unfelt pain itself with the induced character of feltness or manifestness due to its non-distinction from the self. Pain, felt pain, and the feeling of pain are the same to the Vedāntist and the Buddhist but are taken by them to be synthetically or analytically identical with spiritual illusion. They are distinguishable in Sāṁkhya, felt pain being real evil, unfelt pain real but not evil and the subjective consciousness of pain being evil but illusory. Felt pain, however, is taken as in Vedānta and Nyāya to be synthetically connected with spiritual illusion, not merely caused by it as in Nyāya but embodying it as in Vedānta, though not therefore merely pheno-

menal. The illusion is to all an evil in itself, not as transcending or superseding the natural evil of pain but as wholly immanent in it.

11. Felt pain is thus to Sāṁkhya a real evil at once natural and spiritual and as such both terminable and corrigible Hence it is that, as in Nyāya, the striving for secular freedom from pain is regarded as continuous with the striving for spiritual freedom from the secular strife itself. Mukti is regarded as desired, not as it is to the Vedāntist as something eternal, the achievement of which is itself illusory. The unfree state of the self (bandha) is real to Nyāya, beginninglessly real though terminable. To Sāṁkhya, it is unreal as a state of the self, the self being essentially incapable of modification, but it is real as a state of the mind as object, as the beginningless but terminable non-distinction of the mind from the self. The mind is in time and its termination (which is its potentialisation into prakṛti) is as much an event in time as the termination of any particular pain. The only difference between secular and spiritual desire for freedom is the difference between freedom from actual pain and freedom from the mind that is the potentiality of all pain.

12. Freedom from actual pain is still a bhoga or affective experience of the mind to Sāṁkhya, freedom from the mind itself being apavarga or absolute freedom. The first freedom for its own completion demands the second freedom. The process towards the first is continuous with the process towards the second in Sāṁkhya, while in Yoga it is otherwise, the mind being likened to a river with two entirely opposite currents at once, one towards bhoga and the other towards apavarga. So too in Vedānta, there is the irreconcilable dualism of śreyah and preyah, of mokṣa and svarga, of spiritual will (śāstrīya karma) and natural will (svābhāvika karma), the former in each dualism implying an absolute rejection of the latter, although the latter might be phenomenally continuous with the former—what would not be admitted by the Buddhist. Nyāya like Sāṁkhya admits a continuity of secular freedom with spiritual freedom, though it does not admit with Sāṁkhya that the latter as a freeing process is not egoistic willing but only a distinguishing of the mind from the self.

13. There is apparently in Sāṁkhya no sādhana or

discipline for freedom. Even the secular process of freeing from pain is a reflective detachment rather than a willing to achieve one's good or pleasure, though the reflection happens to go with such willing. The spiritual process of freeing from the mind or the general potentiality of pain is nothing but reflection and is already above the egoistic attitude (*ahaṁkāra*) that conditions willing. Reflection or knowledge is at no stage to *Sāṁkhya* a *sādhana* or means to freedom but is the beginning of freedom[a]. Evil is throughout taken as correlative to freedom and not to the good, reflection being the freeing process started by the feeling of evil itself and not supervening from without. The current of the mind as non-distinct from the self towards *bhoga* turns of itself and continuously backward as reflection: *viveka* or the self-defining of the object (including the mind) from the self emerges in the natural process started by *aviveka* or the beginningless non-distinction from the self.

14. What is the *Sāṁkhya* conception of the good? As pain is the only evil, pleasure is the only good, both being at once natural and spiritual. Pain is not opposed to pleasure, nor is it a limitation of pleasure, nor the positive of which pleasure is but the cessation, but is only different from pleasure, both being positive. As in *Nyāya*, pleasure is not in itself an evil, being evil only as it is mixed with and shot over with pain. Not that unmixed pleasure is not attainable, as held by *Nyāya*, though such pleasure is still of the mind as identified with the self and not the self itself as it is to *Vedānta*, and is not in itself the potentiality of pain as it is to *Yoga*. It is indeed terminable but only as it terminates of itself into absolute freedom, being in fact the beginning of freedom. Pain leads to reflective detachment while pleasure as pleasure is the initial stage of such detachment.

15. The good, therefore, in *Sāṁkhya* is pleasure which by itself does not entail pain and tends of itself to be detached

[a] Vide *Māṭhara* in his gloss on Sk.37—*Na hi bhagavataḥ kapilasya mate kimapi kartavyamanuṣṭheyatayā, kintu sāmkhyānām pañcaviṃśati-tattva-jñānameva sādharmyeṇa vaidharmeṇa ca niḥśreyasahetuḥ.* Uktam ca—*Haśa piva lala moda nityam viṣayānupabhuñja kuru ca mā śaṃkām; yadi viditam te kapila-matam tat prāpsyase mokṣa-saukhyam ca.*

from the self. It is indeed in the first instance a *bhoga* or given experience, but it is already in the process of vanishing as experience into the free function of knowledge. Hence even if the secular freedom from pain be a pleasure or good, it tends to abolish itself into freedom that is no given experience at all. Pain as evil, therefore, is correlative to absolute freedom which implies freedom from pleasure also as good. It is because evil is correlated in the last resort with freedom and not with the good that freedom from pain is understood as the spiritual goal.

CHAPTER II

REFLECTION AS SPIRITUAL FUNCTION

16. Reflection starts as reflection on the feeling of pain. To wish to be free from pain is the primary reflection on the bodily self, the self that appears to feel in the body, pain unlike pleasure being always explicitly felt in the body. Pleasure may not be explicitly felt in the body, and even when it is so felt, it is felt as being dissociated from the body. The feeling of pleasure is already a feeling of freedom, the initial actuality of the reflective consciousness. Pain appears distinct from the reflective wish to be free from it, although the wish is consciously constitutive of the pain. Hence the feeling of pain, unlike that of pleasure, is only implicitly reflective and appears to be followed by but not continued in the reflection. No bodily feeling is *necessarily* followed by reflection: pleasure and pain alike may be followed by m o h a or the feeling of indolent passivity. But when they are followed by reflection, pleasure alone and not pain appears to be continued in it. To be felt in the body is to be felt in m o h a : pain is felt as struggle with m o h a and pleasure as conquest over it, which as positive is felt in the mind as detached from the body. Were it not, however, for the reflective consciousness of struggle in pain, the conquest in pleasure could not be reflectively apprehended as such. The body-detached character of pleasure or its essentially reflective being is known as such in further reflection, only because the body-bound character of pain is first known in the reflective wish to get rid of it. Reflection, accordingly, is primarily reflection on pain.

17. Reflection is at all stages a freeing process, the mind freeing itself from the body or from itself as a subtle body of the self. The process is spiritual in the sense that it is as much conative as intellectual, a detaching activity which may be indifferently called the will to deny will (will to n i v ṛ t t i) or the knowing function. It is in reflection that the self-assertive will (will to p r a v ṛ t t i) is known to have been one with the body that is sought to be freed from; and it is in reflection that the given object is negatively willed to be detachedly known. In S ā ṁ k h y a there is really no will to deny will as in Y o g a :

it is just the knowing process, knowledge as mental being a process. In Sāṁkhya the consummation of this reversion of the will, which is the knowing process, is conceived as viveka which is not eternal quiescent knowledge which would be the self but the mind distinguishing, defining or detaching itself from the self and thereby losing itself in unknown or unmanifest Prakṛti, the self consequently standing in its eternally manifest solitariness.

18. It is in the regressive movement of reflection towards mukti that the progressive movement of the self towards bhoga is known to have been a fact. The forward process is life, reflection as the backward process being the spiritual function of freeing from natural life and of knowing it as being arrested. The further question arises if reflection is continuous with natural life, whether the movement towards bhoga arrests itself and turns back of itself as the process of freeing from bhoga. Does reflection tell us that it has emerged from life or that it has inexplicably supervened on it? That unlike life which is perpetually self-caused, reflection absolutely begins is generally admitted, but there is difference as to whether it is started by life itself. If even pain be admitted to start the reflective wish to get rid if it, is the further reflection on this wish, the consciousness of the wish being itself foreign to the self, also started by the wish which is the primary reflection? This further reflection would be the same as reflection on pleasure, the consciousness of pleasure being foreign to the self, but is reflection on pleasure started by pleasure itself? Is spiritual reflection continuous with the wish to be free from pain which is natural reflection?

19. The Sāṁkhya view admits this continuity. To Yoga as to some other views, there is discontinuity between life and reflection and between the so-called natural reflection and spiritual reflection. There is no natural reflection to Yoga, the natural urge towards freedom from pain being to it no conscious or reflective wish as it is to Sāṁkhya. The conscious wish for freedom is not natural but spiritual, and it supervenes on the blind movement of life as inexplicably as the further reflection supervenes on this reflection. To Sāṁkhya, the urge towards freedom from pain is conscious wish and as such at once natural and spiritual; and this wish again is implicitly reflective on itself

which of itself becomes explicit. The freeing process of reflection is at once a part of life and a detachment from life. Life starts reflection and *viveka* comes as a stage in the process that is conditioned by *aviveka*. *Yoga* agrees with *Sāṁkhya* in regarding both *aviveka* and *viveka* as predicaments of the mind and not of the self but does not admit that *viveka* comes in the natural course of the maturation of *aviveka*, holding as it does that the upward movement of the mind towards freedom is utterly distinct from its downward course towards *bhoga*.

20. This difference between *Sāṁkhya* and *Yoga* is connected with their difference on the question of the relation between self-knowledge and absolute freedom. Self-knowledge is to both *viveka*, the spiritual discrimination of the mind from the self, which is a mental fact, the terminal stage of the self-attenuating process of the mind called spiritual reflection. *Viveka* to *Sāṁkhya* is the residual mind which spontaneously drops off or distinguishes itself from the self. To *Yoga*, a further effort of the mind—called *asamprajñata*— is necessary for the mind to terminate itself. The mind has to make an effort to lose itself in *prakṛti*, this effort being itself conscious, a conscious transition into unconsciousness. The freeing movement of reflection, accordingly, is in all stages a strain or effort to *Yoga*, while to *Sāṁkhya* it is absolute spontaneity continuous with the flow of life.

21. Pain, it has been said, is in *Sāṁkhya* only implicitly reflective, appearing as it does distinct from the reflective wish to get rid of it, although reflection on the wish tells us that the wish is constitutive of the pain. Before this latter reflection emerges, the reflective freeing from pain appears as an effort from without, which however is realised in the latter reflection as due to and embodying an illusion, as what was an effort only so far as the wish for freedom was blind or natural and was not reflection. Even the first reflection was as reflection a spontaneity of the mind and was not an effort but only accompanied by it. The reflective detachment of the mind from the body or pain involves an accidental strain, but the reflection that detaches the mind from the self does not involve it, being, as we said, freedom or detachment that has already begun to be actual.

22. Such effortless reflection consciously emerges in the first

instance as reflection on pleasure. Pleasure is felt as the already started process of the mind freeing from the body, as the immediate actuality of reflection so that reflection on pleasure is pleasure itself freeing from its apparent given-ness in the body, pleasure spontaneously withdrawing from itself as objective. Sāṁkhya Kārikās 59 and 60 may be interpreted as asserting this spontaneity of the detachment of pleasure as bhoga from the feeling self, of pleasure starting reflection on itself. With this accords also the passage from Māṭhara's gloss on Kārikā 37, quoted in section 13, which seems to suggest that the feeling self cures itself, spontaneously reflects on feeling, and frees itself in reflection without any effort of the will.

23. Sāṁkhya like Vedānta recognises no positive prescription to achieve mukti. But while Vedānta holds that the reflective process towards mukti starts miraculously and is no part of natural life, Sāṁkhya takes it to spring from life and to be continuous with the life-process. Reflection is not only no ascetic effort but is nothing foreign to experience, being itself an experience (of the vanishing of experience). To reflect is not only to abstain consciously from willing, to feel the lapse of willing but to feel the lapse of feeling also. Reflective feeling is not a self-abolishing feeling to Vedānta as it is to Sāṁkhya but only a feeling of the blindness or given-ness of feeling (bhoga) being abolished through the lapse of willing. Sāṁkhya conceives it not as standing joy as it is to Vedānta but a joy in the process of lapsing, joy that is as much objective experience as pain, though not itself a pain as it is to some other views. To neither is there such a thing as reflective pain or reflective effort: what appears such is blind feeling or willing as going along with and inspite of reflection. To both, reflection and the freedom from pain that it implies is a positive joy, but while to Vedānta the joy is consciousness itself under a limitation, Sāṁkhya takes it to be the manifest character of the mind as passing away.

24. To one who has begun to reflect and to realise that the reflection has come naturally, the only prescription of Sāṁkhya, if it is a prescription at all, is not to will, or if willing is already there, to make an object of it, to view it as itself a pain that should not be. In more explicit spiritual reference, the prescription is to avoid ascetic effort or antagonism to nature or life. It is not to push on reflection nor to wonder at it as miraculously

there but to let it, as what has naturally come, naturally fulfil itself. To one to whom reflection has not come, the prescription to rouse reflection is meaningless. One to whom it has come but not in full measure can do nothing to deepen it but can only let it complete itself, avoid misdirecting it or scaring it away by attempting to force it. One can indeed will to attend (*bhāvanā*) to the content of reflection, but such attention cannot of itself deepen the reflection, though reflection by its spontaneous deepening may lead to the fixation or unfolding of its content.

25. Apparently to *Sāṁkhya* the process of *yoga* is a natural self-deepening of reflection that has naturally emerged. In *Yoga* philosophy itself, the *yoga* process is voluntary attention passing of right into concentrated reflection or intuition. Not that *Sāṁkhya* takes *yoga* to be a passive process, for reflection that gets deepened into *yoga* is a process of active freeing though it is not a voluntary doing. There is accordingly no prescription of *yoga* in *Sāṁkhya* though it is admitted as a stage in the spontaneous consummation of reflection. The spiritual process of reflection is from the beginning above *ahaṁkāra* or the egoistic will. The voluntary striving for *yoga* would still imply *ahaṁkāra*. In *Yoga* philosophy, the will to *yoga* is not egoistic but spiritual, being ultimately the activity of *asamprajñāta*.

26. *Sāṁkhya* may thus be said to present a religion of reflective spontaneity or spiritual naturalness. Its metaphysics springs from this religion, reflection which is the spiritual freeing process being the organ of metaphysical knowledge. Reflection is started by experience or *bhoga*, unless it is prevented by *moha*; and it is a freeing from *bhoga* unless the same *moha* misdirects it towards *bhoga* again. Thinking which is not thus misdirected to the service of sense is real only as the spiritual process of freeing from sense, and it is this spiritual thinking that yields metaphysical knowledge. The freeing from sense is a knowing of the self as what the body, with which is bound up the experienced or *bhogya* world, is progressively detached from. The mind too is a body of the self in some sense and the detachment means a gradual distinguishing of the material body and of the mental body from the self with which they were identified. To distinguish the body from the self, to make the body an object of reflection is on the one hand to know the self better and on

the other to see the possibility of its dissolution into impersonal or objective but unexperienceable realities, experience being possible only through the body. The self, which is known only as distinguished from, and these objective non-empirical realities are the metaphysical tattvas or noumena of Sāṁkhya philosophy. Reflection is at once a freeing of the self from the body and the knowing of these metaphysical entities. The freeing and the knowing, the religion and the philosophy, are not means to one another: each of itself passes into the other. There is no freeing except in the knowing of the object as metaphysical, as absolutely distinct from the self, or—what is the same thing—as what was illusorily confused with the self as its body; and there is no knowledge of the metaphysical object except as what was its body and now disowned.

27. The nature of reflection as the organ of metaphysics requires further elaboration. Are the Sāṁkhya tattvas known by inference or accepted in faith or reached only through yoga? Inference, faith and yoga are none of them denied in Sāṁkhya as leading to metaphysical knowledge, but they are all understood as implied in different ways in the one natural-spiritual process of reflection. Inference in metaphysics is necessarily of the regressive type from the conditioned to the condition and ultimately to the unconditioned condition. Within phenomenal reality, condition and conditioned are in reciprocity, but what is conditioned by a metaphysical condition never conditions it again. Besides, metaphysical condition unlike phenomenal condition is always constitutive of and embodied in the conditioned which yet is distinct from it. Inference of the metaphysical condition is, therefore, always regressive; and the inferred condition is known to be embodied in the conditioned in some immediate way and not by inference again. The constitutive condition[a] is knowable as such as the immediate self of the conditioned, from which the conditioned is still distinguished. Inference may at best indicate its necessity but cannot yield assertorial certitude about it. How then is such certitude attained?

28. A metaphysical condition is immediately known to be constitutive of a metaphysical or phenomenal fact in reflection. Such

[a]A is said to constitute B when B without A is nothing that is known, though as embodying A, B is distinct from A.

immediate knowledge would be intellectual intuition if it involved no inference or superseded inference. But in the first instance, at any rate, it involves inference which is not superseded but reflectively reduced to a view of the conditioned getting distinct from itself as its condition, of a self-distinguishing process in the content *as still given*, the view therefore amounting to an internal perception though not yet to intellectual intuition. Y o g a or s a m ā d h i would be this intuition in which the self-distinguishing process is conceived to be completed, so that the dualism in reflection of internal and external perception lapses, the internal perception being but the perception of the lack of completion in the process, which is just lack of perception of the given. That a content should be but is not perceived *in the given object* is what is known in the internal perception of the content. Reflection that involves such internal perception is transcendental reflection. Inference of a phenomenal condition is knowing something about the conditioned, not knowing it better or knowing its very self. But inference of a metaphysical condition is a better knowing of the conditioned, a *reflectively* synthetic cognition of it or an insight into it. Kant's transcendental reflection is the same process : only what is founded on it is epistemology, not metaphysics.

29. Transcendental reflection as in S ā ṁ k h y a involves inference that implies a faith in its continuous passage into intuition. The inferred content is meant, in the reflection, to be intuited in the given content and believed to be intuitable. This intuition is not complete perception of the given, for the immanence of the inferred in the given cannot itself be given; and as yet a fulfilment of reflection, it must be more concrete than the internal perception that the reflection implies. This self-concretion of reflective perception is y o g a, and the faith in such y o g i c intuition as involved in reflection which is assertorial certitude about the metaphysical entities is what is really meant by faith in the scriptures. Thus inference, faith and y o g a are all implied in the transcendental reflection that is the organ of S ā ṁ k h y a metaphysics.

30. What is reflectively believed and understood as unprovable by secular p r a m ā ṇ a is not merely thought apriori but *presented* to thought independently of it, vouched for by an authority other than the thinking self. To believe in such presentation is to believe in a revelation; and to believe in any testimony as scriptural or absolutely authoritative is to believe that its con-

tent is given to our thought by something other than thought and other than sense. What testimony should be taken as revealed is a different question, legitimate or illegitimate. The primary point is whether we have reflective belief in a content as real and as yet unknowable by perception or inference. If we have, we have faith in revelation, for no content is believed unless it is presented, and what is presented but not by sense is 'revealed'.

31. Assertorial certitude about metaphysical reality cannot in the *Sāṁkhya* or *Vedānta* view be yielded by inference or necessary thought. To *Sāṁkhya* as to Kant, the certitude emanates from outside theoretical thought which, however, yields the concept of metaphysical reality. The concept does not depend on faith nor does it of itself carry belief. To *Vedānta*, metaphysical thought is itself an emanation of faith, being spiritual thought that is utterly distinct from secular thought which is only competent to refute secular doubts about the validity of spiritual thought. To *Nyāya* as to *Sāṁkhya*, metaphysical thought is nothing other than secular thought. Unlike *Sāṁkhya*, however, *Nyāya* holds that metaphysical thought is validated in precisely the same way as secular thought, although certitude from outside thought viz., from revealed scriptures is also admitted on the basis of thought as having concurrent jurisdiction with secular certitude about the metaphysical.

32. *Vijñāna-bhikṣu* discusses the question if the *tattvas* are known by inference independently of scriptural testimony and opines that they are inferred though the inference is in interpretation of scriptural testimony[a]. *Vācaspati* in his gloss on *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā* 6 indicates two kinds of contents that have to be known through scriptural testimony and not by inference only, viz., the order of emergence of the *tattvas*, *mahat* etc., on the one hand and things like heaven, *karma* *devatā* etc., on the other. Of these the former apparently are at once inferred and admitted in faith, the kind of content that we have taken as necessarily conceivable by thought but deriving its assertorial certitude from the scriptures. The latter would appear to be further removed from thought, though here too the contents cannot be inconceivable. There must be a way of understanding the meaning of *devatā*, for example, in terms of the contents of our ordinary consciousness. Faith-content of this type is not, like the cosmic evolution of the *tattvas*, purely intellectual and has to be understood apparently as a postulate of some kind of non-cognitive consciousness, of feeling or willing on the nonsensuous or spiritual level.

[a]SPB.—65.

CHAPTER III

THE BODY OF THE SELF

33. Sāṁkhya admits a metaphysical dualism of subject and object, the existence of each being conceived as independent of the existence of the other. At the same time, the nature of the object is understood in necessary reference to the self, while the self is taken to be intelligible by itself. The nature of the object is ultimately its character of manifestness to the self, for every other character of the object involves this character. The character is objective and is not the mere circumstance of the self knowing it or of being aware of knowing it. But it implies a reference to the self: the object is known as manifest to the self, though what constitutes this character is not the self but distinction from the self. The nature of the object presupposes the distinction in point of existence between the object and the subject. The reference of the object to the self is. in this sense, a necessary synthetic character and not a defining character of the object. The object may be conceived to exist without being the content of consciousness, but a character of the object can only be conceived as the content of consciousness, which is yet objectively real.

34. The essential character of the object—viz., its manifestness is understood to be at once a being and a process. The object, in fact, is known as getting manifested. To get manifested is for the object to be defined out of its own unmanifest condition, to be in this sense distinct from itself; and to get unmanifested is for this outward distinction to lapse or become retracted into itself. Either process is explicitly for the self and is intelligible only in reference to the self. To reflection on the object as known, the object appears as what was being manifested and now arrested in manifestation and as, therefore, beginning to be unmanifested. With the arrest of its further manifestation, its present manifestation gets an evanescent character, for nothing merely stands as manifest before reflection. The conscious evanescence of the manifestness of the object means a perception of its reality being independent of or distinct from the self and of the manifestness, therefore, having being conditioned by the non-distinction of the object from the self. Thus the manifesting process of the object, which is its

defining from itself, implies its non-distinction from the self and the lapsing of this definition implies a distinguishing of the object *from the self*. *The object defines itself when it does not distinguish itself from the self and it gets undefined in character when it distinguishes itself as an existent from the self*.

35. The non-distinction of the object from the self is the fact corresponding to the illusory identification of the self with the object. The self is identified with the object in the consciousness of being embodied. The body is itself a real but terminable organisation of the object, the unity of which consists entirely in its not distinguishing itself from the self. Distinguishing, as has been indicated, is a contingent but real function of the object itself, implying the termination of the equally real predicament of not distinguishing. The body as not-distinct from the self is the conscious body (and not embodied self), with consciousness not as a quality but as an associated thing. The oneness with the self from the side of the object means only undistinguishedness, but from the side of the self it means the embodiment of the self in the object. The body is thus an objective fact known as such when it has begun to be distinguished from the self (and thus dissolved) in reflection, or, in other words, when the embodiment of the self has begun to be realised as an unreal modification of the self.

36. The intrinsic process in the object of its manifestation or unmanifestation is thus reducible to the process of the object forming or unforming the body of the self. By 'object' is meant here metaphysical object (or objective tattva), not the object of sense-experience and feeling (bhoga), the status of which will be discussed later. The object in which one is illusorily conscious of being embodied, the object that can appear one with the self is not the spatial object which is experienced as out there and never as oneself. The object that is taken to manifest or unmanifest itself is the object appearing as conscious body or ceasing to appear such, the object that is as real as the self and can appear as the self, or, in other words, the object that is metaphysically real. This object is known to have a character that necessarily refers to the self.

37. The necessary reference of the object to the self beyond is characterised as unconscious teleology. The object is not conscious though it may be sometimes undistinguished from consciousness; and if it necessarily manifests or unmanifests itself *for*

consciousness or self from which it is distinct, if its entire process consists in the formation and the dissolution of the body of the self, it may be said to be spontaneously moving towards or unconsciously willing the ends of the self. Not that the self has really any end or purpose, though it illusorily appears to have it, nor also that the purpose is of the unconscious object. Unconscious teleology is thus apparently a metaphorical description of the objective process being real only as an identifying of the object with the self, or its distinguishing from the self, or—what is the same thing—as the formation or the dissolution of the body of the self, formation for the b h o g a or experience of the self and dissolution for its freedom from b h o g a. These are ends of the embodied self which, on the correction of the illusion of the embodied self, turn out to be no ends at all. The objective process is, however, real and has to be understood as having spiritual significance before it can end for the self.

38. The body is understood as a complex of elements having its unity in their non-distinction from the self. A metaphysical complex is intelligible only as for the self, as really undistinguished from the self and as having the self illusorily immanent or embodied in it. The unity of the body is necessarily understood to be a spiritual function. To reflection, it appears as what the self has become and also as what the self is getting freed from, being really a plurality of objects associated with the self forming a unity or a unity dissociated from the self dissolving into the plurality. The unity and the plurality of metaphysical objects are thus known alike as processes, processes of synthesis and analysis making up the being of the body. The body represents in itself the entire process of nature for the self.

39. The body undistinguished from the self and the impersonal objects that are its constituents are known together. One knows one's body as a complex of such objects which, again, are known only as forming or having formed the body. There is to S ā ṁ k h y a no metaphysical object or objective t a t t v a that is manifest except in a body that is forming or dissolving. Not that in reflection, we know our body as actually forming or dissolving. We actually think it only but with the faith that it is actually happening. We have faith in m u k t i and in the body getting detached from the self in reflection and thereby becoming resolved into impersonal object to the freeing self. The implication is that

as the self becomes completely free, the object ceases to be manifest to it. Must it then continue to be manifest to other embodied selves? As a matter of fact, indeed, when one self is reflective, other selves blindly press on towards bhoga: the freedom of one does not mean freedom of all. But is there any necessity that the object should be manifest in some body and that the *same* object that constituted my body should constitute some other body? It depends on whether my body in appearing as object to my reflection appears distinct from the object that another body appears to be to my reflection. Taking 'body' here to mean the material body, the matter of it as forming the body is conceived as undistinguished from myself, as constituting me or myself as object and is, therefore, not taken as a part of the external or experienced world—which never appears to reflection as one with me. This matter is then noumenal matter and is not like the experienced object taken to be in space; and as I believe at the same time in another's body, I take the matter of it also as out of space. There is thus no intelligible distinction between the two bodies other than that they are identified with distinct selves. So, too, my mind and another's mind are understood to be distinct only in reference to the distinction between ourselves.

40. The distinction of two bodies is not understood as existing in the object and hence the same object that constitutes my body can be said to constitute another's body. But why must the object be conceived to constitute some body? Noumenal object is known only as constituting a body; and although reflection on the body yields the knowledge of the object as a reality distinct from the self, it is only as still identified with the self that it is manifest as object. Object not constituting any body would not be denied but it would be only unmanifest prakṛti: manifest object must be the body of a self. But when this body dissolves to a mukta self, must the stuff of it constitute at the same time the body of an unfree self? The object as manifest has a necessary reference not to this self or that self but to self in general i.e., to *any* self *as self*, as subject embodied in the *same* object. 'Self in general' means self-hood which is constructively one as implying identification of each self with the one object[a]

[a]As will be shown later, to be aware of oneself is to be aware of other selves, all as embodied in the same object, the object as thus embodying the self in general being known as devatā.

The object that is manifest to a freeing self as unmanifesting itself is manifest to it as manifesting to other selves*. The potentialisation of the knownness of an object to one self means to the self its actualisation to another.

41. The metaphysical object is one in the sense of being indivisible, but it admits of many distinct grades, the many objective tattvas being such grades. There are two broad grades of the manifest object--viz., mind and matter, known as constituting the mental body and the material body—what are called the subtle and the gross bodies of the self. These bodies are known in the first instance, the grades of object being known as these detached from the self in reflection. Each is a body in the sense of being a complex of objective tattvas undistinguished from the self. The material body is the complex of the five matters (bhūta), and the mental body is the complex of the mental karṇas or organs—including buddhi, ahaṁkāra and the eleven indriyas—on the one hand, and of the mental stuff including the five tanmātras on the other. These constituents of the body are the objective tattvas to be explained later.

42. The two bodies are known in two grades of reflection, one in which the material body is distinguished from the mental body which here appears as the self, and the other in which the mental body is distinguished from the pure self. The first reflection is identical with the reflection that has been taken to be implied in the wish to be free from pain which is explicitly felt in the body. The second reflection is what was called spiritual reflection, reflection on the first reflection. Reflection is the consciousness of oneself as objective, of the *me* as what appeared as *I*. In the first reflection, the *me* is the material body which no longer appears as *I*. In the second reflection, it is the mental body which still appears as I. The *me* as distinct from the *I* is the body which is material if it cannot be reflectively called *I* and mental if it can be. The mental body as at once *me* and *I* is thus explicitly self-distinguishing. More accurately, it is what is manifest as the *me* or the body forming or dissolving, as the lapsing of I into *me* or the turning of *me* into mere object, object that is explicitly not myself.

*To know an object as ceasing to be manifest is still to know it as manifest.

43. The material body is also like the mental in the process of making or unmaking, but the process is not explicit in the *first reflection and only comes to be suspected in the second re*flection when the mental body is known to involve the process. The material body appears to have a finished being like that of the experienced object, but unlike it a being that is self-sustained and independent of the mind or self. That it only appears to be and is not a standing independent being is realised as possible in the second reflection. Even then it does not cease to appear as such, while the mental body is manifest to reflection as in the process of cessation. Hence to reflection on the mind, the mental body and the material body are presented as two distinct bodies, the vanishing and the standing. The reflection implies the thought but not the actual knowledge of the mental body as isolable from the material body, though it is actual knowledge of the latter body being constituted by and distinct from the former.

44. The unity of the body is understood to consist in the non-distinction of its elements from the self, in its being the *me* as distinct from the *I*. The non-distinction is real as objective identity with the self, not as the subjective function of identifying with the object. The identity of the matters (bhūta) with the self is, however, mediate, being their identity with the mind as immediately one with the self The material body has the mental body immanent in it. The mental karaṇas or functioning organs are taken to be the life-functions that hold the material body together[a], and the mental stuff (tanmātra) is conceived to causally become the stuff of the material body. The mental elements including the life-functions, however, hold together as the mental body through the transcendental function of the mind which is the original aviveka manifested as the bhāvas of buddhi.

45. There are apparently only these two bodies to Sāṁkhya. Does Sāṁkhya like Vedānta admit a kāraṇa-śarīra over and above the mental body (sūkṣma-śarīra) and regard the latter as a complex of bodies (koṣas)? There is mention, no doubt, of a body of the unfree self existing even at the time of pralaya, but apparently it is conceived at this stage either to be no body at all, being aviveka itself or karma by itself or to be the mental body of a previous cycle as surviving

[a]SK. 30, 32

it*. The mental body, again, is conceived as a complex of tattvas but not as a complex of bodies (koṣas), there being no suggestion of the sense-body lapsing while ahaṁkāra and buddhi stand as body, or of the will-body (ahaṁkāra) lapsing with buddhi alone standing as the body. Apparently the three karaṇas—buddhi, ahaṁkāra and manas stand or lapse together. In the regressive process of dissolution (pratisañcara) manas indeed lapses into ahaṁkāra and this into buddhi, but so long as buddhi does not tend to lapse (in its pure bhāvas), the mental body stands represented in buddhi with its impure bhāvas—which may be regarded as the ideality or *manifest* potentiality of the lower tattvas making up the body.

46. But if the mental body stands or lapses as a whole, why should the material body be taken as capable of lapsing before the lapse of the mental body? As already explained, the material body is only mediately identified with the self. The lower factors of the mental body, however, cannot be said to be identified with the self mediately through the identification of the higher factors with the self. To reflection, the material body does not appear conscious as the mental body appears, though the consciousness is not its attribute but its undistinguished associate. There is thus a felt discontinuity of the mental with the material body. There is no such discontinuity among the factors of the mental body. Each appears conscious and none appears as an unconscious object to any other in the way the material body appears to the mental body. The knowing mind is aware of the willing mind not as an object but as subjective or conscious like itself, and so, too, is the willing mind aware of the sentient mind. Mind as a whole is object to viveka, but below the stage of viveka, every factor of the mind appears endowed with the I-form and never as mere object relatively to any other factor.

47. Viveka itself is a *mental* function appearing conscious and does not imply an immediate lapse in being of the mental body into pure objectivity (unmanifest prakṛti) though it is knowledge of this lapse as already begun. This explains the state of jīvanmukti which is detachment of the body from the self in knowledge but not yet in being. The self that has reached viveka no longer subjectively confuses itself with its body though the body still inexplicably remains non-distinct from the self.

*SS. VI. 67-69.

CHAPTER IV

CAUSAL AND NON-CAUSAL MANIFESTATION

48. Na vinā bhāvaiḥ liṅgam
Na vinā liṅgena bhāva-nirvṛttih.
Liṅgākhyaḥ bhāvākhyaḥ tasmāt
Dvividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ.

(SK. 52)

Liṅga here means the manifest objective tattvas from buddhi downwards. Bhāva is apparently subjective function of the body, mental or material, function implying the *I*-form, function of the object as non-distinct from the subject and as illusorily taken to be function of the self. We have said that the metaphysical object as known is known only as constituting the body, the body being taken as one with the self through beginningless aviveka. The bhāvas would be the different aspects of this oneness as manifest in the manifest metaphysical object—meaning specially the grade of the mind called buddhi. Aviveka runs beyond manifestation, being taken to be the function of prakṛti even at the time of pralaya. The bhāvas, therefore, may be taken as the specifications of this primordial function, manifested in the first manifest object—viz., buddhi and, therefore, also in its evolutes. The above kārikā then denies that the metaphysical object can be manifest without appearing to function as a subject and also that the subject really or apparently functions without being identified with a body; and it asserts two kinds of manifestation of buddhi viz., into the outward grades of objective *substance* on the one hand and of objective *function* appearing as subjective function on the other. As will appear presently, these two kinds of manifestation of buddhi may be characterised as causal and non-causal manifestation of the metaphysical object.

49. We may start with the presented dualism of the (material) body and the external world. The external world is external to the body which yet appears to be comprised within it. This implies a confusion which is cleared up by reflection showing that the body to which the world is external is not in space, being felt as distinct in itself and known as distinct from I (the mental self)

but not from the world i.e.. from space. Felt as undistinguished from or one with space, it is not *in* space: and every external object is known as in space which is itself distinguished from or external to the body as felt from within. Perceived object necessarily refers to the body and implies distinction from it but the body does not imply distinction from the object but implies only distinction from I. In this sense, the external world depends on the body but not vice versa. Not that the body causes the world in the sense that it becomes the world, nor that it makes anything else (e.g. unformed matter) become the world. It is neither the immanent cause nor the external cause of the world : not immanent cause because the effect would then be distinct *in* it, not *from* it as the world is actually, and not external cause because then its material would be other than the material of the world. The world, as will appear presently, has for its material not indeed the manifest matters (bhūtas) that compose the body but their primordial potentialities, the guṇas that make up prakṛti. The world, therefore, is a non-causal manifestation of the body.

50. A non-causal manifestation of a real is just what is called its 'phenomenon'. The real in fact at any stage is understood as what phenomenon implies to reflection. The external world to reflection immediately implies reference to the body as real, the metaphysical appearing in the first instance as one's body. The world is a manifestation of the body in the sense that, in point of existence, it is not other than the body, though in respect of its manifest character it is distinct from and dependent on the body. A causal manifestation of a real is a distinct real, existing distinctly *in* the cause and not as distinct *from* it. The perceived world has no manifest reality apart from the percipient's felt body though it is manifested as distinct from or external to it, externality of the world to it being a function of the body.

51. The externality of objects in the world to one another is implied in the externality of the world to the bodily or percipient self. The world is space as cut up into objects and the externality of this variegated space to the conscious or perceiving body means only that this space is the content of the bodily consciousness, distinct from it as any content is distinct from the consciousness of it, being at the same time nothing manifest apart from the consciousness. By 'bodily consciousness' we mean perceptual cons-

ciousness, consciousness or self as illusorily identified with the material body, the corresponding fact being the conscious or perceiving body, the material body as undistinguished from the self as an associated thing. The external world is related to the perceiving body as the content of a thought is related to the thought—viz., as constituted by and distinct from (not distinct *in* the perceiving body.

52. The external world is nothing manifest apart from the perceiving body or bodily consciousness, being manifest through it as distinct from it. The perceiving body is the body as feeling the object and the object as presupposing it may be regarded as its feeling projection or necessary construction, the necessity being the necessity of the manifestation of aviveka as bhoga. This projection as bhogya (phenomenon) through the necessity of bhoga (experience) of the self as identified with the bhogāyatana (body) is the external world. The entire manifest aspect of this world, spatial and qualitative, is an appearance projected by the feeling body. It is the appearance of the real matters constituting the body, appearance as distinct *from* the body and, therefore, not as their immanent determination. The space (-time) of the world is no mode of the metaphysical substance ākāśa, and the qualities of the world—colour etc., which presuppose this space cannot also be regarded as the other substances appearing under a limitation. The world is not a construction by the percipient *out of* the noumenal bhūtas, being a construction in respect of its material as well so far as it is manifest.

53. The world as external to the body is distinct from the matters that directly constitute the body and from the other manifest tattvas that indirectly condition its manifestation. Yet we are aware of it in our experience (bhoga) as *given* and have accordingly to conceive it as a construction (in the interest of bhoga) out of *unmanifest* real matter (which is the three gunas of prakṛti) out of which the body and its constituents have emerged by real causal combination and not by imaginative construction. Thus prakṛti gets manifested in two ways—in the causal way as the manifest tattvas that constitute the body (including the mental) and in the non-causal way as the external world[a]. As the world is manifest primarily through buddhi (and *only* through it to the jīvanmukta), the dual manifestation

[a]Cf. SK. 15 'avibhāgāt vaiśvarūpasya'

may be said to be the bifurcation of buddhi (dvividha-sarga)

54. Apparently, then, the manifestation of prakṛti into buddhi has to be understood as at once a causal and a non-causal process. Both the existence of buddhi and its content—viz., the external world are the manifestation of prakṛti. The former is what prakṛti becomes and the latter what it appears, neither being intelligible apart from the other. Manifestation as buddhi is thus as much a causal becoming as a non-causal appearing, for the distinction between them emerges only through buddhi—as distinction within buddhi between its existence and content (or function of reference to content). Buddhi begins to get un-manifested and its reference to the object begins to be withdrawn in one and the same act—viz., in the reflection that distinguishes buddhi from the self, and thus we have to conceive the manifestation of prakṛti into buddhi as the in-difference of a dual process. The two manifestations of buddhi are also inseparable but distinguishable as the evolution of lower objective tattvas on the one hand and as the emergence of its bhāvas or the subjective functions referring to the bhogya or experienceable world on the other. The world is a given appearance or phenomenon of prakṛti, being as much given to a bhāva as constructed by it, as much a perceived object as a percept.

55. The world as a percept is a construction of the 'subjective function' that is primarily resident in buddhi and, therefore, resident in the lower tattvas (that are distinct *in* and not *from* buddhi) as well, being in fact the function of the material body with the mental body immanent in it. Sāṁkhya-Kārikā speaks of eight bhāvas of buddhi and also of two grades of bhāva—karaṇāśrita and kāryāśrita, meaning respectively bhāva as resident in the mental body comprising the karaṇas or psychic organs and bhāva as resident in the material body. The unity of the body, as has been indicated, consists in its non-distinction from the self, in what appears as its self-form or subjective function. Thus the unity of the material body is kāryāśrita-bhāva presupposing indeed the karaṇāśrita-bhāva (comprising the eight bhāvas of buddhi) but distinct from it as the subjective function of feeling non-distinct from the external world, feeling of being an actual experient un-

detached from the world or one with space. The psychic bhāva involves the feeling of being a detached possible experient, of being one who might experience or is going to experience or experienced in the past.

56. The conscious material body or the bodily self is the actual experient (bhoktṛ) undistinguished from the experienced (bhogya) world. The experience is primarily a feeling, being knowledge of and conation towards a content as felt. The world to reflection is the content of bodily feeling or projection of the feeling body which is yet felt to be given to the self as distinct in existence from it but not from the body while being distinct from both in its manifest character. It is never mistaken like the body for the self, being thus manifested as distinct from it, though it is nothing manifest apart from the bodily self or feeling body. It is a phenomenon in the sense that it is manifest only through the bodily self but as yet given to it.

57. The caused and the un-caused manifestations of the unmanifest reality are respectively noumenal and phenomenal; and they meet in the material body which is constituted and conditioned by all the manifest tattvas from the bhūtas up to buddhi and is undistinguished from the external world, appearing immediately as a part of it but to reflection as one with the whole of it. Not that this reflective awareness is complete and amounts to the positive accomplished knowledge of one-ness with the world, there being a persisting feeling of a part of the world as *mine* (abhiniveśā). Some other parts of the world (viz., my property etc.) are also felt as *mine*, but they are known definitely to be not *me* or my felt body, unlike my observed body which is not known as not *me* though not also known as *me*, being only felt as me, felt in fact as at once *me* and *mine*. The material body, felt as the bodily self feels a part of the world as undistinguished from itself and knows it at the same time as an appropriated object. Why this should be so is as much inexplicable as why there should be an external world, the uncaused manifestation of objective reality being just, as a matter of fact, given as thus related to the body. The further significance of this ultimate fact will appear later in our discussion of solipsism.

58. The given-ness of the world or the non-causal appearance of reality as thus related to the body (felt as the self) is what suggests the central Sāṁkhya enquiry into the causal evolu-

tion of the manifest objective tattvas. The guiding clue in the enquiry is the analysis of the body into liṅga and bhāva, into its constitutive elements and its apparently subjective functions unifying them. Bhāva is a function of the body appearing as conscious, the function of referring to the external world. The causal and the non-causal processes of manifestation are the strands of the single cosmic process of prakṛti towards the bhoga of puruṣa.

59. The external world is generally viewed in Indian philosophy as having necessary reference to the experiencing self. In some systems, it is taken as entirely constituted by the subjective demand for bhoga or the necessity of aviveka to lead to bhoga; while in others, it is taken to be constructed by it out of some given material. In Sāṁkhya, no manifest or actual material is admitted as given as in Nyāya and yet the world is taken to be given, the implication being that the given is here the unmanifest reality. Yoga philosophy appears to present a view intermediate between those of Sāṁkhya and Nyāya. With Sāṁkhya, it holds, though not in the same sense, that the world is an imaginative or phenomenal construction out of given material and not a real combination of it in the sense it is conceived to be in Nyāya. But it differs from Sāṁkhya and agrees with Nyāya in holding that the material is the five actual matters that constitute the body. Sāṁkhya has been so far taken to present the view that not only are the finite spatio-temporal aspects of the experienced object a construction of buddhi in the interest of bhoga but even its qualities like colour etc., are projected into this cut-up space by buddhi, its given material being thus utterly unqualified or unmanifest. Is there any justification for such an interpretation of the Sāṁkhya view?

60. Can Sāṁkhya admit with Yoga any real or causal combination of elements in the phenomenal object? The phenomenal object, indeed, appears as having a plurality of qualities, but is the mode of their combination more than spatio-temporal appearance? The body is conceived as a unity of elements that is illusory from the side of the subject but real from the side of the object, being the real but terminable non-distinction of the elements from the self. It is only as the elements can be really non-distinct from or one with the self that their combination into the

body can be real and cause a real unity. But the external object cannot in any aspect be really or even appear as one with the self and cannot therefore present a real or causal combination. Even that part of the phenomenal world that is my body as observed appears only as *mine*, not as *me*, not as undistinguished from the self.

61. Yoga admits a real combination of the bhūtas within the phenomenal object apparently because its view of the unity of the body differs. The metaphysical elements that constitute the body are taken to be as much appropriated by the self as the body as external, and even the extra-organic objects are appropriated. Primordial avidyā, in fact, is conceived in Yoga as conative appropriation, identification of the self with the body as object in sva-svāmi-sambandha, while in Sāṁkhya the identification with the body is intellectual from the side of the subject, a mistaken *knowing* of the self as the object (which is real non-distinction from the side of the object), consciousness of the body not as *mine* but as *me*, while the external object is not *me* and can be *mine* only. There is appropriation of or sva-svāmi-sambandha with the external object only and not the object constituting the body. In Sāṁkhya, there is real combination only of the objects that are not appropriated, enjoyed, or experienced, objects that are regarded as *me* and not as *mine*. Since then there is no real combination in the phenomenal object, the object cannot have real elements too as the manifest substratum of its phenomenal (spatio-temporal) unity. The phenomenon is a manifestation that is not distinct *in* the body (like its manifest constituents) but distinct *from* it as its projection or transeunt appearance. The external world does not emerge at the end of the causal evolution of the tattvas. Sāṁkhya and Yoga agree that it is not a new or transeunt tattva caused by the bhūtas (tattvāntara-pariṇāma); but Yoga asserts, what Sāṁkhya would deny, that the material substratum of the world is an immanent modification (dharma-lakṣaṇāvasthā-pariṇāma) of the bhūtas. In fact the distinction of phenomenon and noumenon emerges in Sāṁkhya with the emergence of buddhi as a liṅga with bhāva (which is reference to or anticipation of phenomenon as its content). The course of causal evolution of prakṛti is from the beginning co-ordinate with and has explicit reference to its non-causal manifestation, the bhogya world or phenomenon. Although there is bhoga or experience only when the causal evolution is completed, there is the necessary anticipation of the bhogya in the emergence of the very first stage of the evolution—viz., of buddhi.

CHAPTER V

TIME, SPACE AND CAUSALITY

62. The external world being an uncaused manifestation or phenomenon of prakṛti has no place in it for causal change through real combination. Causality is understood in Sāṁkhya only in connection with the evolution of the tattvas from buddhi downwards. There is indeed an appearance of causation or change through combination in the external world, which implies space and time as mutual determinants. But the causation being only an appearance, space as the form of combination and time as the form of change in the world are also mere appearances. The phenomenal implies the real (though not as its manifest substratum) and we have accordingly to admit causation with space and time as its moments in the real world and within unmanifest prakṛti itself. Prakrti has to be conceived as the potentiality of change through combination, as an unmanifest plurality of elements which is manifest only as it becomes a unity by being together. Its reference to the manifest unity and to its coming to be through combination is intrinsic, the unmanifest being understood only as the presupposition of the manifesting process. The manifest unity is buddhi, the form of the manifest in general; and its becoming through combination is the form of the causal process as the unity of time and space, is ākāśa as causal, as the manifesting process of the unmanifest as distinct from ākāśa as effect or evolute, the first bhūta which is space-time as a manifest being. Buddhi is in this sense in the making i.e., as ākāśa within prakṛti*.

63. To Sāṁkhya there is real object, distinct from the self, which is eternal-in-change (pariṇāmi-nitya) unlike the self which is unchangingly eternal (kūṭastha-nitya). Pariṇāma as manifest is change but since an unmanifest pariṇāma within prakṛti is admitted, pariṇāma in general means either the process or the product of self-distinction. Distinction, as already pointed out, is to Sāṁkhya the distinguishing process which is a function of the (real) object referred by a necessary illusion to the subject. Self-distinction would be the process of

*Cf. Vijñāna-bhikṣu SS. II. 12; V. 25

being distinguished from itself, the emergence from a real of another real which is yet the same. Within prakṛti, a guṇa is only as it reproduces itself, becomes *merely numerically* distinct from itself as effect; and within the sphere of manifest reality, the real that emerges from a real is, as it emerges, distinct in *nature* also from the cause, though in all cases the effect is distinguished *in* the cause as resident in it, is evident as the cause itself unfolding a distinction. The effect as the unfolded cause and the unfolding process also are called pariṇāma of the cause.

64. Self-distinction of the object means its unfolding, the causal process being an unfolding. Where the effect is manifest, it is manifest as having been unfolded: the product appears immediately to reflection as the terminus of the unfolding process. The effect is not only the cause unfolded but is manifest as such, as with the cause within itself unmanifest and manifesting. The cause is evident in the effect as its dark ground or implicit being. To paraphrase Sāṁkhya-kārikā 9, the effect is immediately known as what was implicit in the cause, as what has now the cause for its matter or material, as the only determination of the cause, as what the cause alone can become and as partaking of the nature of the cause. The cause in fact is manifest in the effect as its very self, the effect immediately showing it. The effect reveals the cause as having become it, as still becoming it and, so far as it is itself manifest, as including the manifest effect within it.

65. Such are the implications of causality as self-distinction or unfolding. Mental being is immediately evident to introspection as self-distinct; and apparently the mind or, more specifically, buddhi is taken in Sāṁkhya as the pattern of all metaphysical or body-forming object. Unfolding in fact is knowable only in internal perception about the mental object or in what is on the same level, viz., aesthetic perception of the material object. The matter constituting the material body does not immediately reveal its cause to reflection on the bodily self. But to reflection on the mental self, the elements constituting the mental body more or less reveal their cause, and hence comes the suggestion of gross matter also as having a subtle counterpart, viz., mental stuff (tanmātra) as its cause. Elements of the mental body lower than buddhi are only imperfectly manifest as self-distinct, but buddhi is manifest to reflection as self-distinct only, as the process of distinguishing from itself—distinguishing from itself as

manifest and as ultimately unmanifest—, and as being in the making and no standing being at all.

66. Psychologists speak of the content of introspection being modified by the introspection. What is not ordinarily noted is that the modification *as such* is known in the *same* introspective act. The implication of this circumstance is that to be reflectively aware of the mental is to be aware of a dual content—viz., of the modification and also of that of which it is a modification. The latter is again presented to the same reflection as modification of a further content and so on, the endless series pointing to the unmanifest beyond of which the mental in general is a modification. Now what is known of the mental is known in introspection. Hence the mental as known is necessarily dual, explicitly distinct from or manifestation of itself. The mental may also be known in introspection as independent of it in being, and so far as it is so known, it is not known as self manifested. Such independence is not, however, known as itself a content independent of the introspection and hence the lower grades of the mind are and are not at once known as self-manifested, or, in other words appear partially as being self-manifested and partially also as standing. The mental as b u d d h i, however, is not known as distinct from the reflection on it, being, as will appear later, the absolute mind which lapses of itself into p r a k ṛ t i and not through any further reflection on the reflection.

67. Such we imagine is the metaphysical basis of the S ā ṁ k h y a theory of causality as self-distinction, the further implications of which have now to be elaborated. Causation is understood as a process of the object towards b h o g a, the self-manifestation of the object conditioned by its beginningless non-distinction from the self. The cause is the substance of the effect, substance that is only as it of itself becomes the effect (or retracts its becoming) and a v i v e k a as the condition of the becoming is not a circumstance outside the substance but a beginningless (and terminable) predicament of it. The immanent cause (s a m a - v ā y i) and the external cause (n i m i t t a) of the V a i ś e ṣ i k a school are here undistinguished : the cause not only persists in the effect but becomes it of its own motion. It can also retract the becoming and there is no necessity that the cause should become, for there is no necessity of the primitive illusion (or non-distinction) continuing. Illusion is known only as it is corrected, being

only undeniable but not assertible as a fact. *When* the illusion comes to be known as such, *when* in fact reflection sets in is utterly indeterminate, though as the corrective or retractive reflection comes it is known as continuous with the becoming. So it may be said that the cause freely—i.e., not only spontaneously but without necessity—becomes the effect. In Yoga philosophy, the cause necessarily becomes, though only when an external nimitta—God's absolutely free will in the last resort—removes the starting arrest; and the becoming is arrested and retracted through the equally free operation of nimitta. Sāṁkhya and Yoga agree in taking the cause as an inherently active substance that becomes without being acted on; but Yoga still demands a nimitta to remove the circumstance that prevents the becoming and thus to *let the cause cause*. Sāṁkhya does not demand such nimitta.

68. Pariṇāma is self-distinction where the effect, if manifest (as in all visadṛśa-pariṇāma) is distinct in nature from the cause, (not merely numerically distinct as in sadṛśa-pariṇāma). Buddhi, for example, becomes ahaṁkāra where a new character emerges. Within buddhi, too, one state (vṛtti) of it appears to become another: and it may be asked if this is also pariṇāma. Yoga philosophy distinguishes it as immanent change (dharma-lakṣaṇā-vasthā-pariṇāma) from transitive change (tattvāntara-pariṇāma) like that of buddhi into ahaṁkāra. Can Sāṁkhya admit real immanent change? The question is about the relation of the modes of a tattva to one another and to the tattva. Sāṁkhya would not apparently admit any unmodalised tattva. Buddhi, for example, is never without vṛtti: there is nothing in this system like the saṁskāra-śeṣa-buddhi conceived in Yoga to be buddhi that has not yet lapsed into prakṛti though its vṛttis have lapsed. In Sāṁkhya apparently, the lapse of all vṛtti means the lapse of the tattva that has vṛtti, the substance apart from its modes being nothing but the substance that is its cause. An effected substance is manifest only in its modes and so the relation of a mode with its naked substance is but relation of the effect-substance with the causal substance. As to the relation of the modes to one another, one mode is only distinct from another and is not what the latter becomes, or, in other words, is not distinct *in* the latter. Each mode is indeed noumenal,

is the tattva, but it succeeds another mode only phenomenally, being noumenally merely distinct from it. Each mode in fact is distinct as anticipatively referring through its resident bhāva to some external bhogya object: vṛtti and bhāva, as will be shown later, are indeed distinct but involve one another.* Now the apparent succession of the modes of a tattva is but their bhāva-reference to succession within the phenomenal world. The real relation of the modes is distinction which is indeed a one-directional process like succession, the process of self-distinction, but does not amount to change, being like the process of self-reproduction (sadṛśa-pariṇāma) of a guṇa the self-reproduction of the tattva. The tattva is in fact *any* mode as involving all others so that the distinction of one mode from another is the simple self-reproduction or merely numerical self-distinction of the tattva.

69. Sāṁkhya then admits real change only in the sense of change of one tattva into another, this alone implying real manifest time. The so-called immanent change of Yoga is real as simple self-distinction and not change, being in time only reflexively in reference to the time of the phenomenal world. Sāṁkhya may admit it as pariṇma in the wide sense that includes sadṛśa-pariṇāma, as immanent pariṇāma that is not change, being conceivable as the manifest form of sadṛśa-pariṇāma. This interpretation accords with the Sāṁkhya-sūtra II. 12.—Dikkālāvākāśādibhyaḥ, where Vijñānabhikṣu explains dik-kāla as nitya kāraṇa-ākāśa, a character or function of prakṛti. As already pointed out, this ākāśa, is the causal prototype of ākāśa as bhūta, both being real ākāśa, as distinct from the constructed space-time of the phenomenal world.

70. This kāraṇa-ākāśa has already been interpreted as the form of changes implied in every metaphysical object and, therefore, in prakṛti itself. Change is through combination and combination is for change. What changes is a complex and elements combine for the production of a new unity. Change is real time and combination is real space. Each implies the other, their unity being called ākāśa, ākāśa as the general form of change that is inherent in the real object. Such ākāśa is implied

*In Yoga, there may be bhāva without vṛtti, as in asamprajñāta.

in *prakṛti* as the potentiality of change. The form or function of change is not potential, for the distinction of actual and potential is intelligible only of what changes and the function does not change. *Prakṛti* is conceived as *avyakta* in being only, but the function which is the primal *aviveka* itself is still taken to be *vyakta* within it. *Kāraṇa-ākāśa* is this manifest function of unmanifest being.

71. Time as a moment of this *ākāśa* is understood as real becoming (*pariṇāma*) which is change only when it is becoming of a different and not simply of a numerically distinct, or, in other words, becoming of a manifest effect. Within *prakṛti*, it is becoming as mere self-reproduction of a *guṇa*. Nothing is real if it is not becoming either in the sense of self-reproducing or in the sense of changing and when it is not yet changing, it is still self-reproducing which is active persisting. As change is to this active persistence, so is combination to bare plurality. So *ākāśa* as the function of *prakṛti* is the active persistence of each of an unrelated plurality (triplicity) of *guṇas*, persistence being the time-function and unrelated plurality the space-function of *prakṛti*.

72. The procession of the manifest *tattvas* from *prakṛti* is conceived in *Sāṁkhya* as in or rather as one manifest real time. The evolution of *prakṛti* from *buddhi* downwards is a single process of which each *tattva* is a nodal point, a real continuity of discontinuities. In *Yoga* philosophy, each change (whether of *tattva* or of phenomenal object) is a real instant (*kṣaṇa*) but the succession (*krama*) of the instants is not real as time. The *krama* of *kṣaṇas* is still real as eternal law to the creative *buddhi* of *Īśvara*. In other words, though the change of A to B and that of B to C are each real time, we cannot speak of the series A—B—C as real time, which only appears to be a continuity through the constructivity of our intelligence (*vikalpa* or *buddhi-nirmāṇa*). In *Sāṁkhya*, change of *tattva* alone (and not of phenomenon) is real time, antecedent and consequent being understood as abstractions from causal process so that in the causal series A—B—C, A, B, C, are three kinds of real object, cause only (A), at once cause and effect (B), and effect only (C) respectively. To *Yoga* apparently, *prakṛti-vikṛti* does not indicate any new kind or grade of reality; it is not as in *Sāṁkhya* effect with an immediate causal

character, something at once emergent and becoming, a transitive being—but is only alternately cause and effect having only the speciality of being liṅga or immediate expression of a liṅga or unmanifest prakṛti—the vikāras being without this character of manifesting their causal self.[a] There is nothing special in their causal character, the speciality being in their expressive character. Hence kṣaṇa-krama is real not as a causal process or becoming but as an absolute thought-content (logos). The Sāṁkhya view of A—B—C (which is a scheme of the entire process of evolution) as a real temporal continuity is bound up with its recognition of prakṛti-vikṛti as a qualitatively new grade of reality and a new category within becoming.

73. Change of the object in the interest of bhoga is a free process in Sāṁkhya, not a necessary process with God as the nimitta letting it start as in Yoga. Change is of a permanent that is in three stages—as what can change but has not begun to change (prakṛti), as what has begun to change and can yet change (prakṛti-vikṛti), and as what it has changed to and no longer changes (vikāra). The causal process is one—the potential becoming actual, where the becoming is a distinguishable real—distinct from the potential which does not necessarily actualise (as in Yoga) and having the finished actual distinct from it, there being no necessity for the process to terminate (cp. sleep, beginning to wake, persistent wakefulness—freely and not necessarily continuous at each change). It is accordingly a continuity of discontinuities, a line of nodal points (Hegel). Now each of these three is substantial being, whatever is distinguishable as real being substantial in Sāṁkhya. Thus the object is causality and causality is a triplicity of substances of which the intermediate (prakṛti-vikṛti) is the concrete continuity of the extremes, (manifest) time being this continuity in the abstract. Concrete continuity is cause and effect in one and hence implies the notion of its reversibility (pratisañcara). For a process to the substantial is to have its sense or direction cancelled by admitting the backward direction as continuous with the forward direction. Thus time is to Sāṁkhya a cyclic.

74. Space is intelligible as the manifest form of noumenal combination which is represented in the unmanifest as unrelated

[a] Cf. YB.II.19.

plurality. The character of real combination is bound up with the character of real change, combination and change being understood as not *in* space and time but space and time themselves. Combination in Sāṁkhya is throughout understood as qualitative, as having one element explicit—i.e., dominant in manifestation—involving the others as implicit in different senses. The elements are together not as phenomenal objects are together, each outside the others but as one with the others internal to it, i.e., modifying its quality, forming with it a qualitative unity and not a quantitative whole (extensive or intensive). (Cp. combination of feelings or of musical notes.) Involution and not spread (or degree) is the character of qualitative combination and the form of involution is intelligible space. All visadṛśa-pariṇāma implies combination in such space of the unmanifest guṇas ultimately; and mediately it may be of the manifest reals also. The body, for example, is a combination of manifest reals not indeed as making up a cause (for the body does not become anything) but as making up an effect (for the body has come to be); the unity of the body thus implies intelligible space.

75. The causal elements are said to be subtle (sūkṣma) relatively to the effect which is said to be gross (sthūla) in the sense of being both actual and complex as contrasted with the cause or causes which are potential and simple. There are grades of the real object viz., the vikāras, which are only effects. not causes. These are not only relatively but absolutely sthūla or gross in nature, being wholly actual either as mental receptivity (indriya) or as inert matter (bhūta). They do not change into any further tattva and the so-called immanent change of Yoga, which in the case of the other tattvas implies a qualitative interpenetration of vṛttis, would here imply a mutual outsideness of their vṛttis. This outsideness is still qualitative, a spatial continuity of distinct determinations which yet are not in space, a combination that does not become any new qualitative unity but is only non-causally manifested in the external world. The space that is implied is not distinct from perceivable space which, however, is distinct from it. The vikāras are then sthūla in another sense—viz., they are undistinguished from the perceivable world, appear to be one with the perceived.

CHAPTER VI

THE OBJECTIVE TATTVAS

(Bhūta. Tanmātra and Indriya)

76. Sāṁkhya philosophy is mainly the philosophy of the twenty-four objective tattvas in reference to the self taken as the twenty-fifth tattva. There is considerable difficulty in the interpretation of the objective tattvas and some light is thrown on it by the different modes of grouping of the twenty-three manifest tattvas. One grouping is into the seven prakṛti-vikṛtis and the sixteen vikāras. Another is the demarcation of the eighteen tattvas that constitute the mental body on one side from those five that make up the material body on the other. There is again the division into the thirteen karaṇas or organs (internal and external) and the stuff or material of the mind and the body—viz., the tanmātras and the bhūtas. A further point to be noted is that the senses on the one hand and the tanmātras on the other are taken to be co-ordinate (evolutes of ahaṁkāra) while the rest of the evolution is in a single line.

77. The grouping in reference to the two bodies presents the main clue to the interpretation of the tattvas. The constituents of the mental-body are taken to be buddhi, ahaṁkāra, and the eleven indriyas on the one side as the karaṇas and the five tanmātras on the other. The karaṇas or organs are the mind as through its Bhāva functioning towards the external world and the tanmātras appear in contrast to be the mind as standing or existent. Both are substances but they embody the self or are endowed with the self-form in different senses. Mind as karaṇa appears as subject—i.e., as the self experiencing—prehending (āharaṇa) and revealing (prakāśa) the external object (and also as holding the material body together). while mind as tanmātras (or their original bhūtādi) appears as the objectively persisting or standing self. The former aspect is sāttvika and rājasika while the latter is tāmasika.

78. To explain this standing character of the mind. The mind consciously stands so far as it feels or enjoys itself. The self or consciousness is beyond time, beyond persistence and change. The persistence of the self is therefore the persistence of the mental

body as non-distinct from the self which is illusorily taken as the mental self. Now to be conscious of the persistent self is to be conscious of the persistent *me* and not *I*, the consciousness of the mind as knowing or willing being that of the objective or embodied *I*. The consciousness of *me* is feeling, being unreflective when the *me* is the material body and reflective when the *me* is the mental body. The mental body, unlike the other body, is at once *me* and *I*, is the felt (me) as feeling (I). The persistent self then is the mind feeling itself as felt, and the mind as (narcissistically) felt by itself, as manifest objectivity of feeling is the standing stuff of the mental body called bhūtādi, the parent of tanmātra. The mind functions as the karaṇas and stands as the tanmātras.

79. The material body as distinct from the mental stands only as a complex of matters with no functions of its own other than the functions of the mind that animates it. If mental stuff is mind as felt by itself, the stuff of the material body is what is sensed by the mind. The relation of tanmātra and bhūta thus appears to be that between felt and sensed objectivity. If the pure sensed content can be shown to be a causal manifestation of the pure felt content, tanmātra would be intelligible as the subtle or causal form of bhūta. Again if sensing and sensed content are knowable only as immediately constituting bhoga or perceptual experience with its differentiation into pleasurable, painful etc., we can understand why the indriyas and bhūtas should be called viśeṣa-tattvas. What immediately constitutes bhoga *appears* i.e., is non-causally manifested in the bhogya or phenomenon: it does not become or change. That would explain why the indriyas and bhūtas are called mere vikāra or effects that are not causal again.

80. We may now consider the tanmātras, the indriyas and the bhūtas together, the two former being co-ordinate constituents of the mental body and the two latter co-ordinate as viśeṣas or vikāras. Tanmātra and indriya are directly manifest as with the self-form, the former as the (objectively) persisting self and the latter as the functioning self, and hence they are taken as belonging to the mind. Bhūta is manifest as with self-form only through them, only as they are immanent or undistinguished in the material body. Indriya and bhūta are alike distinguished as viśeṣa and vikāra

from tanmātra; which thus is undifferentiated and causal stuff and is just subtle or psychic matter.

81. To explain the undifferentiated or aviśeṣa character of tanmātra. To experience is to subjectively function in the material body towards the external world directly. The functioning is apparently of the self but really of the body undistinguished from the mind which again is undistinguished from the self. It is other than functioning in the mind or mental body which is consciously detached functioning towards external world, what may be called 'thinking feeling' or imaginative feeling. Experiencing is feeling the external world in an undetached or sensuous way. Experience as specific function of the material body is feeling and it is knowing only as the function of the mental body as immanent in the material body. Now the only function of the mind that is consciously immanent in the experiencing body is sensing. Bodily feeling is at once the standing being of the body and its experiencing function; and conscious sensing is one with the experiencing function which yet may be without it. The content of all subjective function is the external world which is distinguished from the function in all cases except when the function is sensuous experiencing. Experiencing and empirical world as feeling and the felt are indistinguishable and may be both designated sense-experience or bhoga.

82. Bhoga is, however, distinguished alike from the mere feeling and the mere sensing. The mere feeling is the standing being of the body and is in fact its constituent matters, the bhūtas. The mere sensing is the mind functioning in its lowest or outermost grade, being the indriyas. Each is one with bhoga which however is distinct from each; they necessarily imply one another in this sense. Each is understood as the non-causal presupposition of bhoga and not as causally becoming bhoga. Bhoga or bhogya is not their effect but the phenomenalisation of prakṛti as revealed by and reflected in them. As undistinguished from the bhogya, they are conceived as having the originals of its characters. Its characters are not only presentative but also affective. The sense-qualities of the phenomenal world are represented in the real world by the bhūtas on the one hand and by the indriyas on the other. But each quality has its distinguishable affective aspects—its pleasurable, painful and 'indolent' feel, these being the manifest

forms of the three guṇas of prakṛti of which the phenomenal is the non-causal expression. These distinguishable aspects are then conceived to be manifest also in the bhūtas and the indriyas which accordingly are called viśeṣas or the affectively differentiated tattvas.

83. The viśeṣas are also the non-causal vikāra-tattvas, being viśeṣas through their one-ness with non-causal manifestation. Affective differentiation and non-causal character are thus connected: what is affectively differentiated does not become and what becomes is not so differentiated. Becoming in fact is *for* bhoga or phenomenal manifestation and is distinct from it while what is undistinguished from bhoga no longer becomes. Thus what becomes is aviśeṣa-tattva which would include all the other tattvas. The term aviśeṣa, however, is actually used in the Kārika (38) to mean the tanmātras and in Yoga-bhāṣya (II.19) to include ahaṁkāra also.

84. So tanmātra is a causal tattva that is the content of feeling manifest to feeling but not manifested or reflected in the external object. It is not experienced in the body but is necessarily conceived as experienced in the mind, though our actual experience is always in our body. It is accordingly conceived as experienced by a devatā or a Yogin. As felt-content, it is, as already explained, stuff or matter and not function; as causal, it is the subtle counterpart of bhūta which is non-causal; and as affectively undifferentiated, it is taken to be pure joy in the objective and is accordingly designated devatā along with ahaṁkāra and buddhi. These prakṛti-vikṛtis are unlike the vikāras absolute entities in a sense. The derivation of tanmātra from ahaṁkāra will have to be understood in connection with their absolute character.

85. To discuss details about bhūta, indriya and tanmātra. There are the five bhūtas corresponding to the five presentative senses or jñānendriyas and the five tanmātras. There is some sort of development within each pentad but the five-fold character is suggested by experience of the external object and not apriori. The second bhūta—vāyu, for example, presupposes the first—ākāśa--but is not its evolute in the sense in which bhūta is evolute of tanmātra. The tattvas within each pentad present progressive concreteness, but apparently a pentad as a whole is taken to be evolved from its

cause. Now the five experienced or perceived aspects—viz., sense-qualities—of the external object have for their noumenal prototypes the five b h ū t a s which are by a sort of aesthetic abstraction or transcendental reflection known to be the reals symbolized by the phenomenal aspects. They may in fact be identified with the sensa with the metaphysical significance—not ordinarily assigned to the sensa—that they are like Platonic Ideas in the sensuous sphere of which the phenomenal or perceived qualities are the ectypes.

86. The space-aspect of the phenomenal object is pre-supposed by the other aspects which are ordinarily called sense-qualities. Admitting what is common to most Indian systems—viz., that space as the so-called bare form of the object is really the space of sound, the five sense-qualities appearing in space (of the phenomenal object) answer in the noumenon to five qualitied spaces—viz., ā k ā ś a with the sound-quality, v ā y u which is that ā k ā ś a as restricted by the emergent touch-quality, t e j a s which is that v ā y u as restricted by the further quality of colour and so on—sound-space and its four emergent but immanent determinations. These noumenal qualitied spaces—each infinite unlike the cut-up or finite space of the phenomenon—are the b h ū t a s. The qualitied spaces may as well be called spatial qualities, qualities by themselves real (not qualities of object *in* space which would be phenomenal).

87. These noumenal spaces or qualities make up the felt material body. Ā k ā ś a as the eternal form of becoming is the causal space-time already explained. B h ū t a as ā k ā ś a is effect—ā k ā ś a that no longer becomes. I n d r i y a also is effect that no longer becomes, being, however, effect as function while b h ū t a is effect as matter. The non-causal function of sense is to *reveal* the external object while b h ū t a is matter that *appears* as external object. Sense is said to reveal object by coming in contact with it without leaving its place in the body (S. S ū t r a s V. 104-7). That appears to imply that the sense-function has to be symbolised in the phenomenal as a sort of standing motion. The v ṛ t t i of sense as of the mind in any grade is constituted by its b h ā v a or subjective function of referring to the (phenomenal) object, v ṛ t t i being the standing state or made and b h ā v a the function of reaching the object and constituting the v ṛ t t i at the same time—what is symbolised as standing motion. Thus the

sense-function like bhūta may be understood as non-causal ākāśa with the difference that it is time with space implicit in it, while bhūta would be space with time implicit in it. Bhūta as spatial quality that is referred or projected on to the object, while indriya is the time-function of instantaneously reaching the object. It is non-causal ākāśa in both cases with varying stresses on the space-aspect and time-aspect.

88. If bhūta means spatial sense-quality by itself, tanmātra would stand for non-spatial sense-quality. Spatiality as a character of sense-quality as distinct from a perceived object is extensity rather than extension, is spread that is no whole but a simple unity of (infinite) repetitions (units) of the same quality which yet persist in the unity in their distinctness and is thus neither extensive nor intensive quantity. Bhūta is thus conceived to be qualitatively spatial, with only two qualitative magnitudes—aṇu (here, simple unit-character) and mahat (here, bigness), the simple sensible unit being itself a complex of supersensible plurality, which explains also the 'degrees' of sensible bigness[a]. The supersensible constituents of the simple sensible unit are called tanmātra. Each tanmātra is one, and the five tanmātras are only intellectually distinct from one another unlike the bhūtas which present an intuitable continuous series of qualitative spreads[b].

89. Ahaṁkāra is conceived as predominantly rājasika or active, being—as will appear presently—the principle of egoistic conation. This conation matures into egoistic cognition and egoistic feeling which are respectively the sāttika and tāmasika developments within the conation. As one wills, one imagines the object willed and feels it in anticipation. To imagine is to anticipate sensing and to anticipate a feeling is to begin to be immobilised into a standing being. The anticipatory sensing is the conation itself maturing as knowing, and the anticipatory feeling is the same getting accomplished into a restful or indolent being. Conation or ahaṁkāra in the former aspect is technically called vaikṛta, the original of indriya and in the latter aspect is bhūtādi, the original of the tanmātras. Neither vaikṛta nor bhūtādi is a tattva other than ahaṁ-

[a] SS. V. 87-88, 90
[b] STK. on SK. 38

kāra, but these now evolve the new tattvas viz., the indriyas and the tanmātras.

90. Sense or sensing has two aspects—as revealing (prakāśa) and as reaching or pervading (āharaṇa) the object—and is accordingly divided into the cognitive (jñānendriya) and the active (karmendriya) senses. Āharaṇa apparently would be the mental (āhaṁkārika) counter-part of the bodily use of the object that is revealed by the cognitive senses. Such use is as much a condition of sense-knowledge as it is conditioned by it—their correlation being through manas. To speak is for the mind (ahaṁkāra) to be the spoken sound, to pervade it, to cover it actively. To hear is for the mind to reveal (not to receive or be passive to) the sound, to anticipatively though undetachedly take its form. So in the case of the other senses, though what jñānendriya and karmendriya correspond to one another is obscure except in the case of śrotra and vāk. The mind *uses* the object in the sense of being or pervading it. Both kinds of indriya function by reaching the object (prāpti), though it is reaching without leaving its position.

91. As combining the two functions, manas is conceived as a further sense—the internal sense as distinct from the others called external, which is the lowest of the internal karaṇas or organs of the mind, having as their common function the holding of the material body together (dhāraṇā). Manas as internal sense not only co-ordinates the vṛttis of the external cognitive senses but also those of the external active senses, and these two sets of vṛttis with one another, having for its distinctive vṛtti—saṁkalpa (and vikalpa) which would be defining or characterising the sensed content.

92. It remains to explain how tanmātra as the felt or tāmasika transformation of ahaṁkāra is also the non-spatial sense-quality that becomes spatialised as bhūta. As felt, it is, as has been explained, the standing being or stuff of the mind. But why should pure or simple sense-quality be taken as the same as mental stuff? What is felt but not in the (gross) body is the mind as felt by itself. The mind here means the individualised mental body of the self, as embodied in which the individual self is a finitised ego excluding other egos, wills in other words to maintain its finitude. What finitises the individual self which is in-

finite is a h a ṁ k ā r a *as resting in* b u d d h i, *the will anticipating its fulfilment. The finitising ego-hood is in fact the will in its* objectivity which as transformed into felt fulfilment or standing being is the stuff of the mental body. This standing being is the *me* that was *I* or the ego but is not it any longer, having its place still within the mind only through its *conscious* absence of ego-hood. B h ū t a as making up the material body is also *me* but what was never reflectively taken as the *I*. The distinction of the material *me* from the mental *me* is the spatiality of the former. Spatial sense-quality as denuded of its spatiality by aesthetic abstraction is manifest as a pure aesthetic content. Aesthetic feeling and aesthetic content are one, the former being necessarily expressed in the latter which is immediately expressive of the former. Aesthetic feeling is self-enjoying and aesthetic content is self-enjoyed. The aesthetic (t a n m ā t r a) in fact is an absolute mentality like willing (a h a ṁ k ā r a) and certitude (b u d d h i).

CHAPTER VII

THE OBJECTIVE TATTVAS (Contd.)

(Ahaṁkāra and Buddhi)

93. Ahaṁkāra and buddhi are taken along with manas as the three internal organs (karaṇa); and along with the tanmātras as prakṛti-vikṛtis and as other than the viśeṣas. They are functional tattvas that are internal (mental) causal and aviśeṣa. Aviśeṣa, as has been shown, is manifest necessarily as mental and causal, and so it will suffice to characterise them as manifest functional aviśeṣas. The affective differentiations—pleasurable, painful etc.—are manifest only in the tattvas that do not become but are immediately reflected in the bhogya world that is distinct *from* them and not distinct in them. The affectively undifferentiated tattvas are also manifest as absolute in the sense of being *causa sui*, cause (prakṛti) and effect (vikṛti) at once and not alternately, or self-caused. The self-caused is understood in three forms—self-known, self-willed or self-felt; knowing, willing and feeling amount to self-becoming in the region of the absolute. Buddhi, ahaṁkāra and tanmātra are the absolute mind as corresponding respectively to the illusions of the self objectifying itself—knowing itself, willing itself, and feeling itself—objectifying in each form being really the self-distinguishing causality of the mind. These forms of the absolute mind are really three stages: buddhi as self-knowing becomes ahaṁkāra as self-willing which in its turn becomes tanmātra as self-feeling.

94. Buddhi, ahaṁkāra and tanmātra may be regarded as self-consciousness in the objective, as the real mental counterparts of the illusion of self-objectification. Tanmātra as the counterpart of self-feeling has been explained. Ahaṁkāra is taken as corresponding to self-willing. Sāṁkhya-Sūtra VI-54 says that the agent is ahaṁkāra, not the self. The finite ego-hood of the self (which is in essence an infinite individual) is manifested in willing. The knowing self may be finite but the finiteness is not manifest in the knowing. The feeling self is finite but is manifest as *me* and not as *I* or ego. Ahaṁkāra

is the finite ego-hood of the mind as willing. Now willing as in the (gross) body and directed towards the external object presupposes willing in the mind towards itself, the mind as active *I* becoming the standing *me*. This is the self-willing of the mind which answers to a h a ṁ k ā r a.

95. The specific function of the mind as a h a ṁ k ā r a is said to be a b h i m ā n a—what appears in the gross form as pride or vanity or complacency and is in essence the conscious identification of the self with a finite being—expressible as 'I am this being (and therefore not other being)'. This finitising function is, as intellectual, a b h ā v a of b u d d h i, the 'subjective' function of a s m i t ā which is one of the v i p a r y a y a s, not a causal manifestation of the objective mind. The function, however, is the transcendental or anticipatory form of conation as the causal function of becoming finite. Transcendental a s m i t ā manifested as causal or conative is a b h i m ā n a: the consciousness (illusory) 'I am this being' matures into 'I am going to become this being'. This is the pure conative or r ā j a s i k a manifestation which as partly fulfilled will is self-feeling (t ā m a s a) a b h i m ā n a, the self-immobilising activity of the mind, taking form as pride or complacency. B h ū t ā d i is this t ā m a s a a b h i m ā n a as self-felt and not self-feeling. It still implies conative activity (resting on a s m i t ā), though as a recessive fringe only. With the complete fulfilment of this immobilising activity, a b h i m ā n a as self-felt mind is turned into t a n m ā t r a.

96. A h a ṁ k ā r a is the mind as willing. Willing is understood as willing towards b h o g a. B h o g a is in one's (material) body which is manifestly exclusive of other bodies. Willing towards b h o g a too implies exclusiveness, being in fact the mental prototype of the bodily exclusiveness, and it is accordingly the nucleus of what has been called the mental or subtle body. Willing towards freedom has also been conceived, willing to get rid of the finitising body, of the will towards b h o g a which though free in the sense of self-causing—the sense in which all the p r a k ṛ t i-v i k ṛ t i s are free—is really self-contracting, being the mind acquiring *impotentia* (a ś a k t i or a n ī s v a r a t v a). The so-called willing towards freedom is properly free activity, activity that does not wait for the result, being intrinsically unimpeded, though there may be lapses from it. This unimpeded activity of the mind—activity and fruition in one or spiritual efficiency—is called

a i ś v a r y a and is a function of b u d d h i. It is not willing at all because willing must have for its object what was not and is to emerge. Activity that is necessarily efficient is not willing because it has no object *to be* accomplished. The activity towards freedom is but the exercise of freedom.

97. As a h a ṁ k ā r a is primarily the mind as willing, though it may develop knowing and feeling aspects (as v a i k ṛ t a and b h ū t ā d i), so b u d d h i is primarily the mind as knowing which may take the appearance of willing and feeling. The essence of willing is a b h i m ā n a while the essence of knowing is n i ś c a y a. N i ś c a y a means certitude, the formula of which in subjective terms is 'I am I' as distinct from 'I am this being', the formula of a b h i m ā n a. The formulation of a b h i m ā n a is factitious, for it does not appear as a certitude though it involves certitude which, were it to be expressed as a judgment, would be expressed as 'I am this being'. N i ś c a y a or certitude by itself is nothing if not explicit as a judgment. Both the formulas therefore express certitude, certitude with or without reference to willing, or—what is the same thing—certitude about object and certitude about the subject, the expression of which is synthetic judgment (identity of differents) and analytic judgment (self-identity). Identity, in fact, is the objectivity of what subjectively appears as certitude. B u d d h i as object distinct from the self is mind as undifferenced manifestation[a], undifferenced either in the sense of not referring to difference at all or in the sense of superseding or anticipating difference. Even in the latter sense, the difference is not in b u d d h i, the anticipatory reference to which is an u p a r ā g a or reflection of t a m a s in b u d d h i[b]. So even the so-called synthetic identity is analytic, the difference of its terms being presupposed by but not constitutive of the identity.

98. N i ś c a y a (certitude) or a d h y a v a s ā y a (judgment) is primarily understood as synthetic in reference to willing. Knowledge may not lead to willing but willing presupposes knowing in the form 'this should be done' which in the last resort implies 'I as this ideal being have to be actual', or 'I am this being in possibility'. The a s m i t ā ('I am') that starts willing is a synthetic identity of the differents—'myself as possible' and 'myself as actual'. This

[a] l i ṅ g ā - m ā t r a or v y a k t a t ā m ā t r a—YB. & YV. II. 19
[b] SS. II. 15

may be taken to be the original of a synthetic objective judgment like 'A is B': identity-in-difference is intelligible in reference to willing. The reference is anticipative or retrospective. Synthetic knowledge is to be or was necessarily embodied in willing (or feeling). This seems to be the inward meaning of the evolution of ahaṁkāra from buddhi or its dissolution into buddhi through reflection.

99. Certitude though primarily isolated in reflection on willing as a self-function which is objectively identity-in-difference is not what is primary in being. Synthetic identity presupposes (and lapses into) analytic identity, the subjective form of which is 'I am I', the pure sāttvika asmitā. Analytic identity as objective is nothing but the function of manifestation (liṅga-mātra) or manifest being in general (vyaktatā-mātra). 'I am I' really means that the self is not really the content of judgment; the content of judgment is objective, and the analytic identity is but the objective representation or symbolism for the self from which it is distinct. Mind is essentially buddhi or manifestation in general, manifest being and manifesting function. As function, it manifests not only all object constructed and caused, but also the primordial distinction of object from the self; and as being, it is the manifest form of the object as distinct from the self and as such unmanifest (prakṛti). As being, it is manifested by itself as function which as thus prior to manifest being has to be understood as actual and not lapsed in prakṛti[a], actual as aviveka, the vāsanās or memory-traces of a past life.

100. The primal certitude 'I am I' is thus equivalent to 'mind (buddhi) is not I'. The implication is that even analytic identity is not subjectively an intuition but thought or distinguishing reflection, a negative judgment. To Vedānta, it would be nirvikalpa perception (with the negation of the apparent relation of identity), and to Yoga, it would be asmitānugata samādhi, the highest grade of samprajñāta. To Sāṁkhya, knowing is distinguishing, even this final knowing called viveka. Niścaya as analytic identity appears indeed relatively to synthetic identity as intuition, but the intuition is only a higher grade of distinguishing, distinguishing itself from the being of the self on the one hand and from the un-manifest pra-

[a] Cf. SPB. II. 15; V. 25; VI. 12

kṛti on the other. Viveka is buddhi distinguishing itself as function (thinking) from puruṣa and as being (intuition) from prakṛti.

101. Certitude, identity or manifestness constitutes the substantial reality of the mind. Like ahaṁkāra, it is mind as self-objectifying or self-causing: self-knowing is also a becoming or causal self-distinguishing of the mind. The difference is that here the becoming is not a self-finitising, the mind as effect being as infinite as the causal mind. As already explained, even identity-in-difference is self-repetition: certitude of the form 'I am this being' confers the infinity of the *I* on 'this being' or *me*. Buddhi then may be said to present within itself the *manifest* form of sadṛśa-pariṇāma and hence the vṛttis of buddhi may be taken to be self-repetitions.

102. Certitude is explicit as knowing but it may appear also implicitly as the proto-type of willing and feeling. Mind as self-identity—whether analytic or synthetic—has four bhāvas or modes of referring to a content. These are jñāna, aiśvarya, vairāgya and dharma belonging to the mind as analytically self-identical or pure buddhi, and their opposites ajñāna, anaiśvarya, rāga and adharma—belonging to the mind as synthetically self-identical or buddhi with the uparāga of tamas. Now the first three bhāvas in each set correspond respectively to knowing, willing and feeling. The bhāvas in the second set have negative names though they are also positive as subserving bhoga unlike the bhāvas in the first set, which represent withdrawal from bhoga.

103. Ajñāna would mean such certitude as is implied in the knowledge of the object to be enjoyed or experienced, implied in what may be called empirical judgment. It is called ajñāna, as experience or bhoga implies wrong knowledge, the false identification of the self with the not-self. Anaīśvarya would mean conscious inefficiency, certitude about the will being impeded or having restricted efficiency. All willing is impeded willing, unimpeded willing or aiśvarya, as we have seen, being not willing at all. Willing would be ahaṁkāra, but the reflective certitude about its limitation is a bhāva of buddhi. Rāga or avairāgya (to distinguish it from rāga as a stage of ajñāna or viparyaya) is conscious attachment or reflective consciousness of being attracted or immobilised by the felt object.

Vairāgya is feeling of detachment or freedom from the bhogya object, disinterested feeling. Like aiśvarya, however, which is free activity that only appears as willing, vairāgya which is free being has only the appearance of feeling, disinterested feeling being only symbolised as feeling. Jñāna, however, is mental freedom and is understood literally as the mind knowing itself as distinct from the self and as a symbol of the self.

104. The pure bhāvas of buddhi are the spiritual functions, modes of freedom referred to the self but really belonging to the mind. The impure bhāvas are modes of being unfree which, however, are realised as such and, therefore, also imply spiritual mentality. Both are functions of the mind as infinite, as completely self-manifesting or self-identical, as with the form not only of the self but of the self *as self-conscious*. The two remaining bhāvas however—viz., dharma and adharma—do not have the conscious form of the self. They mean spiritual merit and demerit and not conscious spiritual activity, moral and ceremonial, as they have been taken to mean by some commentators. Merit and demerit are actual (manifest) but unconscious tendencies of buddhi, being included among bhāvas as due to self-conscious activity of the self (mind).

105. Bhāva and vṛtti of buddhi (as also of lower tattvas) have to be distinguished. Vijñāna-bhikṣu interprets vṛtti as dravyarūpā or substantial (mode of substance) like a flame, though he points out that it sometimes means self-maintaining function (sva-sthiti-hetu-vyāpāra[a]). Even in the latter sense, vṛtti is dravya-rūpā in the sense that it is the being of a tattva as self-maintaining. The former meaning is taken to be indicated by sūtra V.107 where vṛtti is said to be other than part (bhāga) and quality (guṇa), being at once in the tattva and outside of it, implying a sort of 'standing motion'.[b] Apparently then vṛtti is mode and function at once, one or other aspect being stressed in the two meanings (as dynamic state or standing motion). Bhāva is mere function —the function of referring to or appearing conscious of the objects

[a] Cf. SS. V. 105-8

[b] Cf. also Aniruddha-Vṛtti on the sūtra where vṛtti is characterised as prasarat-rūpa.

is not dravya-rūpa or substantial. Bhāva and vṛtti are indeed dependent on each other: there is no bhāva without vṛtti (such as seems to be implied in the asamprajñāta of Yoga philosophy) and no vṛtti without bhāva (no merely mental state without conscious reference to the object). No tattva is without either: it has a standing form through its reference to the object (buddhi e.g., anticipatively, and really, takes the form of the object) and its reference is possible through its standing form, the two together making up its real pratibimbana or mirroring of the object.

106. With this is connected the Sāṁkhya theory of knowledge. Knowledge is a bhāva or subjective function through which a content or object is non-causally manifested. This manifestation is at once knowledge of the content as given and projection or construction of the content. The function is primarily of buddhi but secondarily of all the karaṇas. The karaṇas are the four—buddhi, ahaṁkāra, manas on the one hand as internal organs and the external senses on the other. The knowing function as through these karaṇas is called adhyavasāya, abhimāna, saṁkalpa and ālocana respectively. Each of these in reference to the particular object known is connected with a particular mode (vṛtti) of the karaṇa as substance. Jñāna as bhāva is a function of a vṛtti of a karaṇa. So adhyavasāya etc., are each a knowing function in one aspect and an existent mode in another of a substantial karaṇa-tattva.

107. The external (cognitive) senses yield knowledge of the object as barely given and not yet endowed with a distinguishable character, nor related to the willing and feeling ego, nor manifested as true or self-identical i.e., as the content of certitude. This bare acquaintance with the given is called ālocana. Some take it is knowledge of the object as vastu-sāmānya i.e., as without particularity (viśeṣa) which to them is distinguishing and distinguishable character known only in the way of saṁkalpa by manas. Others like Vyāsa[a] and Vijñānabhikṣu[b] take ālocana as of two grades—acquaintance with the vastu-sāmānya called nirvikalpa, and acquain-

[a] YB. III. 47
[b] SPB. II. 32

tance with it as this and not another, as particularized (viśiṣṭa) or savikalpa. Apparently to them this particularity is a distinguishing but not distinguishable character (the knowledge of which is saṁkalpa): the sense-datum may be sāmānya-viśeṣātmā, though the viśeṣa here does not appear as viśeṣaṇa distinct from viśeṣya.

108. Manas is called an indriya though it is also an antaḥkaraṇa. Its specific function saṁkalpa consists in distinguishing the viśeṣaṇa or determinant in the viśeṣya or determinate object of the external senses. As it only explicates what was already known implicitly in the determinate sense-cognition, manas is itself a sense, the internal sense; and in the words of Kant, every representation of the external sense is also a representation of the internal sense. Saṁkalpa is not judgment (adhyavasāya); or if the word 'judgment' is used in a wide sense, it is only a 'judgment of perception' (Kant) or an 'analytic judgment of sense' (Bradley). Manas shares with ahaṁkāra and buddhi the character of being concerned with all time, unlike the external senses which are concerned with the present only.[a] Memory, immediate expectation and immediate relating of sense-data would be among its functions.

109. Ahaṁkāra is specifically manifest as willing but it is also 'knowing' in its vaikṛta aspect, knowing of the sensed or sensable object as related to willing (—feeling) ego, as *mine* or to *be mine*, as object of *my* bhoga. It is not knowledge of a content as true, as fact independent of *my* experience or 'public' object which would be knowledge proper, adhyavasāya or niścaya. Certitude is explicit at least in the first instance in negative reference to one's private experience: to be aware of something as certain is to be aware of it as not merely a fact to me. A higher grade of certitude would be the positive knowledge of the pure self as a self-evident or analytic self-identity. Certitude as negatively referring to egoistic experience is only the implicit form of this certitude.

110. Now all these karaṇas are taken to refer to the object spontaneously. There is no idea of the external object affecting or causing an impression on them nor of any one organ affecting any other. The function of each is an anticipatory response:

[a] SK. 33, 35

each acts freely for the self.[a] The internal k a r a ṇ a s are said to have the common character of life, of holding the body together; and their knowing function is apparently an aspect of this life-function. Each anticipatively take on a v ṛ t t i reflecting the form of the object, the v ṛ t t i of each higher k a r a ṇ a being accordingly undistinguished from the corresponding v ṛ t t i of a lower k a r a ṇ a. The k a r a ṇ a s thus function in concert, as though each knew the mind of the others.[b] They function either simultaneously or in succession[c] so that although a higher function implies a lower, a lower does not imply and may psychologically precede a higher. All the lower k a r a ṇ a s yield their contents ultimately to b u d d h i. Object is reflected in a v ṛ t t i of external sense, that again in a v ṛ t t i of m a n a s and so on; b u d d h i - v ṛ t t i further is said to be reflected in the self but in a new sense to be discussed in the sequel.

[a] SK. 31
[b] p a r a s p a r ā k ū t a - h e t u k a - v ṛ t t i—SK. 31
[c] SK. 30

CHAPTER VIII

THE SELF OR PURUṢA

111. In the S ā ṁ k h y a theory of knowledge, the mind in its many grades is understood to anticipatively take the form of the external object, to restrict itself to a v ṛ t t i reflecting the object. This reflecting or mirroring is apparently also the projecting or constructing function of the mind. As pointed out, it is the mind getting modalised into a substantial v r t t i similar to the object and also non-causally functioning as b h ā v a apart from which the object has no manifest or known aspect. The mind thus as much casts its reflection, making a phenomenal object out of the given (p r a k ṛ t i) as gets the reflection of the object constructed. Reflection means different things in the two cases: the idea is constitutive of the object and the idea is like the object. Anticipative response is at once construction and apprehension of the b h o g y a object. The object is ultimately projected by and reflected in b u d d h i as b h ā v a and v ṛ t t i. Now mental function, whether substantial or otherwise is non-distinct from the self and appears to embody it. V ṛ t t i of b u d d h i accordingly appears as the self reflecting the object and b h ā v a as the self projecting the object. The dual function of the mind is illusorily referred to the self. The self appears to take the reflection (p r a t i b i m b a) of b u d d h i-v ṛ t t i which reflects the object and to be itself reflected in b u d d h i - b h ā v a which projects the object.

• 112. This is how the theory of mutual reflection of the self and buddhi may be interpreted. V i j ñ ā n a - b h i k ṣ u who presents this double p r a t i b i m b a theory, however, understands the reflection of the self in b u d d h i to mean the v ṛ t t i for self-knowledge taking the form of the self (like the v ṛ t t i for object-knowledge taking the form of the object), the presentation of the self as *me* and not as it has been here taken as b h ā v a of the form 'I know'. He assumes this presented *me* to explain self-knowledge: if the self is known, it is known in a v ṛ t t i of the form of the self, a v ṛ t t i reflecting the self. Such v ṛ t t i, again, is reflected in the self in order that the reflected self may be

known, just as vṛtti reflecting the object is reflected in the self in order that the reflected object may be known. The reflection of the self in vṛtti is then real mode of buddhi, not the illusory embodiment of the self in bhāva as we have taken it to be. But the self-form as a real mode of buddhi would be the *me* and not the *I*, and the knowledge yielded by the further reflection of this mode in the self would be but the knowledge of the *me*. The real Sāṁkhya view, therefore, appears to be that the self is known as what buddhi (object) is not, known in viveka (the pure bhāva, jñāna) which indeed implies a vṛtti but vṛtti of the form 'I am I' or, less adequately, 'I am *me*' but not of mere *me*. This vṛtti is what has been called vyaktatā-mātra, the native form of buddti, buddhi in the bare form of self-identity. The reflection of the self in buddhi or more generally in the mind is the embodied *I*, (the I as constitutive of the body or me), not the presented *me* or the body which is the object with the self-form.

113. The self then as what the mind is not is objectively manifest as constituting the mental body and as the non-causal subjective function or bhāva of this body. It is manifest both in the pure and the impure bhāvas but adequately in the pure bhāvas which have for their specific content the distinction of the mind from the self. The content of the impure bhāvas of buddhi is the mind (reflecting the object) as distinct from the self, buddhi being self-conscious in both. We know the self not as object but in knowing the distinction of the object from it or in knowing the object as distinct from it. The self is never known by itself: there is properly no intuition of the self.

114. All knowledge is reflective i.e., implies a distinguishing from the self. We start by distinguishing the external object from the self as embodied in the material body. Then we distinguish the material body from the self as embodied in the mental body, thus knowing the former no longer as *me* but as the impersonal cosmic bhūta. Next we progressively distinguish the mental body from the self as willing, thus obtaining the concept of the cosmic tanmātra on the one hand and the cosmic indriya on the other; and then from the self as knowing (or more generally, as self-certitude) and thereby coming to conceive the cosmic tattva, ahaṁkāra; and lastly from the pure self with the thinking of buddhi as the cosmic

tattva. This second reflection or distinguishing is progressive but the mental body holds together till buddhi itself is known as object. The knowledge of buddhi in its pure bhāvas as distinct from the pure self would be viveka, the goal and original of all reflection. The reflection that makes an object of the mental body is a single process in many stages, for that body does not lose its self-form till pure buddhi loses it.

115. The self is known as actual in all reflection but as embodied. The second reflection in its final stage is indeed a distinguishing of buddhi from the pure self, but the pure self is here known as what buddhi is distinguished from and yet embodies. In other words, the identity of the self with viveka as bhāva is known to persist in the consciousness of viveka as vṛtti. Viveka is the knowing function conscious of buddhi as a knowing state or mode. The identity of the self with the function persisting along with the distinction of the state from the self is just what is called avidyā[a] as distinct from asmitā.

116. Viveka as implying both identity and distinction of buddhi with and from the self is necessarily of a vanishing character. In fact as one in viveka knows viveka itself to be object, its manifest character as substantial buddhi tends to lapse. The knowing function also being of the same buddhi and not of the pure self tends to cease absolutely, the lapse of substantial buddhi being only a potentialisation into prakṛti. Hence, too, in the evolution of buddhi from prakṛti, the object-knowing function which conditions the evolution is understood as actual within prakṛti: buddhi as ajñāna-bhāva is actual within prakṛti. Thus the destiny of the knowing function of viveka is to end absolutely as function which means the termination of the illusion of embodiment on the one hand and of the content of knowledge on the other. The self as mukta or in its essential nature is accordingly conceived to be contentless consciousness.

117. The self is pure consciousness, not embodied consciousness nor consciousness of a content having the form of the object. It is known immediately in reflection and is not really inferred. Inference may indeed help in rising to and clarifying the reflection—which has been shown to be transcendental reflection in

[a] YV° II.6

Sāṁkhya. The self is taken in Kārikā 17 to be inferred on various grounds of which two—viz., saṁghāta-parārthatvāt and adhiṣṭhānāt—appear to be inferential grounds proper, the others being only aspects of the self immediately revealed by reflection. There is immediate introspective consciousness of the object being other than the self (triguṇādi-viparyayāt), of the self as feeling or experiencing (bhoktṛ-bhāvāt) and as striving for freedom (kaivalyārtha-pravṛtteḥ). 'Saṁghāta' means a combinational unity, all combination being understood as qualitative. All object, whether noumenal or phenomenal, is a saṁghāta of the three guṇas interpenetrating one another. In this connection, although this general sense is not excluded, what is immediately meant by saṁghāta appears to be the unity of the body. The body is obviously purposive, being for the bhoga and apavarga of the self; and hence the clue to the general proposition that the emergence of simple functional unity in a qualitative (interpenetrating) combination is necessarily teleological. It would be the Sāṁkhya version of organic unity. With this accords also the explanation of the other ground for the inference of the self—viz., aḍhiṣṭhānāt. The body has the self not only as final cause but also as immanent cause.

118. So the self is inferred primarily as the explanation of the unity of the body. The body and, in fact, any complex that functions as a simple unity can so function because of a simple unity from which it is undistinguished and which appears to function for its own good. If a simple real could atc, as it cannot, it would achieve only value and be no new existent. If a complex acts as a simple, it must appear to achieve the good of an external simple unity which is reflected in it. The nature of this simple real thus inferred has to be recognised to be the self that immediately appears to reflection as what all object is distinct from, as enjoyer of object or as freeing itself from the object. The further understanding of the object being distinct from it brings out its character as the subject (sākṣin)—viz., as an absolute distinct (kevala, alone or unrelated), as affectively detached (madhyastha), as knower (draṣṭṛ) and as no agent (akartṛ).

119. The self that is thus inferred and immediately known in reflection as subject is called knower (draṣṭṛ) in reference

obviously to asmitā. But in the last resort, the self is conceived as knowledge or consciousness, though still, as will appear presently, as pure individual. The mukta self is no longer sākṣin, for to it there is no object to be conscious of. Viveka leads at once to its lapse into prakṛti and to mukti of the self, so that the self is essentially contentless jñāna and not jñātṛ. This essential nature of the self as beyond avidyā cannot be inferred: it is evident to the terminal reflection viveka.

120. Sāṁkhya admits a plurality of pure selves or puruṣas. The plurality is also taken to be inferred from the circumstance of the birth, death, organ, willing and feeling differing in different embodied selves[a]. A prior enquiry, however, is how a body other than mine is known to be of another self, for such knowledge is obviously assumed in the above inference. The kārikā starts with the common sense belief in other embodied selves, but the inference of many pure selves would be invalid if the datum can be shown to be due to illusion, as it is sought to be shown by the Vedāntist. The Sāṁkhya view then can be defended if buddhi in its pure asmitā-function is taken to yield knowledge of *I* as in a community of *I's* or in reference to the object, if my certitude about an object be taken to involve others' certitude about it. This would be holding that the common-sense belief in many selves *cannot be* due to illusion corrigible as in the Vedānta view within buddhi-knowledge.

121. Mere sense-knowledge (ālocana and saṁkalpa) is unreflective, not consciously referred to any self, though to reflection it belongs to oneself and not to others. The knowledge of the object as *mine*—or *to be mine*, such as willing involves (abhimāna)—is consciously referred to oneself to the exclusion of other selves. Of the knowledge involving conscious certitude about the object (adhyavasāya), one is aware that it is impersonal and does not belong *exclusively* to oneself or, in other words, that the content known is not affected by relativity to the knower. Such awareness is equivalent to—though only implicitly—to the awareness of its being knowable by all selves.

[a] SK. 18.

122. The self is known in buddhi in its pure bhāva not only as not finite, (i.e., as above ahaṁkāra) but as not me (i.e., as object to itself). Now the self as infinite *I*[a] can only mean *I* as involving all *I's*. Infinity in Sāṁkhya is infinity as in the finite. It is in reference to the finite phenomenal object the universal[b] and in reference to a constituent of one's exclusive body the corresponding cosmic substance, but what is it in reference to the subject '*I*'? There is the concept of puruṣa-sāmānya[c] which does not mean one self but the abstraction 'self-hood'. It cannot be taken as a universal in the sense gotva is a universal of individual cows, nor as a single substance like an objective tattva with an apparent differentiation within it corresponding to different bodies. It is an abstraction in the sense that it cannot be represented like a universal or a substance as really or apparently *comprising* individuals (or modes) under it, being intelligible only as the svarūpa (or character of being itself) of the individual. It is not abstraction in the sense of being a secondary character of a primary attribute (like intensity, brightness, universality). The subject is manifest as what has no character (nirdharmaka), but this characterlessness is itself taken as its character of self-manifestness[d]. Thus the subject is manifest simply as individual thing, as being itself. The pure individual is necessarily intelligible as individual among individuals. The subject that is consciously manifest as simply individual is manifest to itself as a self among selves.

123. Each self then in the pure buddhi-function of asmitā involves all selves. The self is essentially individual, *any* individual implying others. The term 'I' is to the person who uses it singular though he is necessarily aware that others can use it of themselves. Puruṣa-sāmānya or self-hood is this necessary universality of a singular, being universal only if uniqueness or the unique-in-general is universal. Unique-in-general means *any* unique, not *all* uniques. 'All A is B' indeed means 'any A is B' but 'any A is B' need not mean 'all A is B', for even the distributive *all* has an implied collective character. As

[a] Cf. sarve eva puruṣā Iśvarā iti in SPB. II. 15.
[b] SS. V. 91. etc.
[c] SPB. I. 154; V. 116; VI. 66.
[d] prakāśa—SPB. I. 145-146.

applied to the object, *any* and *all* may be regarded as equivalents but not as applied to the subject. Subjects cannot be understood as together in *being* : they can be together only in *function*. In point of being, each subject is absolute, but they can be conceived to function in harmony. In this sense we may say that the self is known in buddhi as having with it a community of selves. The self is known in the form 'I am I' which is an analytic self-identity, the enunciation of which is significant only in its being the form of many such self-identities. I say 'I am I' only as I am aware of others saying of themselves 'I am I'. I am a spirit only in the recognition of other spirits and hence, too, my certitude about an object implies others' (possible) certitude about it.

124. So far as I know through buddhi, I know the object as not to me alone but to any knowing. This applies both to the phenomenal object and to the objective tattva. The bhogya is indeed relative to me as exclusive bhoktṛ but it is none the less taken by me as given, as having an existence that is for any bhoktṛ. So when the body, mental and material, is viewed through buddhi as object not only to me but to all, the constituents of the body become manifest as cosmic tattvas.

125. The self is thus known in pure asmitā as an individual involving a community of individuals, each being an infinite or Īśvara. There is no suggestion in Sāṁkhya of a self really or illusorily differentiated into many selves, nor of a single Īśvara as in Yoga distinct from the selves and mystically working within them. Each self is essentially an Īśvara and pure buddhi as revealing and embodying the many infinite selves is called mahat or the great which gets restricted by rajas and tamas conditioning the movements towards bhoga. Of the self as mukta which to one's final reflection is absolute (kevala), we cannot say if it is an individual aware of itself involving a community of individuals. There is no reason to regard it as not individual in being, but all we can assert of it is that it is contentless consciousness, not consciousness of itself or of object.

126. The distinguishability of puruṣa-sāmānya in the puruṣa known in asmitā lapses when the asmitā lapses, and hence the mukta self is at least not consciously individual. To Vedānta, unconscious being or individuality of the pure self or consciousness is meaningless. To Sāṁkhya the being of

consciousness can be manifest only to buddhi. When buddhi lapses, the self would not be aware of its being. Vedānta would take it to be then ecstatically self-conscious. Apparently to Sāṁkhya, the being of the mukta self or absolute consciousness is then unmanifest or unconscious. Whether it is then individual or not can never be asserted. The conflict between Vedānta and Sāṁkhya on this point may, therefore, yet disappear. Only Sāṁkhya would insist that through buddhi, you cannot know the individuality of the self as illusory. Apparently, Vedānta will rely on some spiritual feeling or Śāstra for its denial of individuality and seek not to disprove individuality by reason (buddhi) but only to disprove objections to the faith in its illusory character.

CHAPTER IX

PRAKṚTI

127. Prakṛti, the primal objective tattva, is best considered after puruṣa, for buddhi lapses only by revealing and distinguishing itself from puruṣa. Viveka is primarily the distinguishing of buddhi from puruṣa, through which the conception of prakṛti and of its unmanifest distinction from puruṣa emerges. In the order of being, the distinction of buddhi from puruṣa is derived from that of prakṛti from puruṣa; but in the order of knowing, the latter is conditioned by the former. The order of the tattvas may, therefore, be thus represented.

Puruṣa
|
Prakṛti—Buddhi—Ahaṁkāra etc.

The direct relation of puruṣa is with buddhi alone among the objective tattvas.

128. The reflection that distinguishes the mind from the self is also the consciousness of the mind as having been manifest through non-distinction from the self; and as the mind (as buddhi) is object with the sole character of manifestness (vyaktatā), the distinguishing of it from the self means its lapsing into the unmanifest (avyakta or prakṛti). To be aware of manifestness thus lapsing is to be aware of its having emerged, of the unmanifest having manifested manifestness, such manifesting being as much becoming as appearing. The unmanifest prakṛti is thus purely causal or potential being with the actual function of appearing which is but the beginningless aviveka or non-distinction from the self, the objective aspect of what is subjectively called the experiencing function (bhoga). 'I enjoy' is but illusion, the corresponding objective fact being that unmanifest reality (thing-in-itself) *appears* as the external world (phenomenon, bhogya). As it so appears, it *becomes* buddhi and the other tattvas (liṅga) constituting the enjoying or experiencing body (bhogāyatana).

This appearing function is beginninglessly actual and never potential, though it can end absolutely. Hence if the unmanifest becomes manifest, it does not require any external cause (like God's will in Yoga) to wake it up: it is already awake in its appearing function which in good time will actualise its being.

129. Prakṛti then presents, both potential being and actual function. As in the region of the manifest (which practically means 'within buddhi'), liṅga and bhāva are distinct but interdependent, so within unmanifest prakṛti, there is the dualism of 'substantial being' potential as the guṇas and of 'aviveka'—comprising the traces (vāsanās) of previous births—which is actual but without standing being. This aviveka is mere function that is somehow at once sat and asat, real and unreal, being the identity of subject and object (mind), which is real as objective non-distinction and unreal as subjective identification.[a] In Yoga, this dualism does not appear to be put within pradhāna or a-liṅga: the guṇas are conceived to be not determinate potential being as in Sāṁkhya but as an indetermination of being and non-being (niḥsattā-sattvam etc.)[b]; in other words, the indeterminateness that appears in the Sāṁkhya conception of the function of aviveka is transferred to the conception of potential being. In Yoga, sattā or being means vyaktatā or manifestness, so that the unmanifest guṇas are neither determinate being nor determinate non-being.[c] In Sāṁkhya, potential or unmanifest being as of the guṇas is still determinate being which has an indeterminate function.

130. This difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga is reflected in their views of sadṛśa-pariṇāma and sāmyāvasthā. Prakṛti is taken as an indefinite plurality of elements which are not combined into a unity. The manifest object (tattva) is an effect and effect is a unity of elements in qualitative combination, having a manifest quality of its own. The elements by themselves are the causes which by qualitative interpenetration become a unity with a manifest simple quality. This becoming is called visadṛśa-pariṇāma. Cause then is a

[a] SS. V. 56.
[b] YB. II. 19.
[c] YV. II. 19.

plurality of elements which before the emergence of the effect is ununified and has no simple quality. The simple quality of the effect is the quality of one of the elements, the qualities of the other elements being either unmanifest or manifest in a way that does not affect the simplicity of the effect. The quality of one element is in this sense dominant and not in the sense of being more intense than the qualities of the other elements. This difference between dominant and recessive is not manifest in the cause where the elements are accordingly said to be in sāmyāvasthā, same in the *nature* of manifestation and not in manifest *degree*, the above difference being difference in nature of manifestation. The persistent interpretation of sāmyāvasthā as equality of degree of the elements appears to make no sense.

131. Sāṁyāvasthā of the elements called guṇas implies their utter unrelatedness and the consequent non-dominance of any one of them. Prakrti is these elements and is not their unity or substratum: it is each of them or their alternation and is not even their togetherness. Is sāmyāvasthā the defining character of prakṛti? Vyāsa[a] calls it a-liṅga-pariṇāma to distinguish it from the other tattvas, though he points out that the good of the self (puruṣārtha) which is the nimitta of the other pariṇāmas is not the nimitta of this pariṇāma which is pralaya nor of its termination in sṛṣṭi, God's absolute will being apparently the sole nimitta here. Sāṁkhya-sūtra[b] appears to take it as the definition of prakṛti, though Vijñāna-bhikṣu interprets it in the manner of Yoga-bhāṣya as a contingent character (upa-lakṣaṇa). Prakṛti is taken as nitya, persisting partially even along with the other tattvas; and this does not justify one in taking sāmyāvasthā as a contingent character. Sāmyāvasthā of prakṛti is retained even along with the visadṛśa-pariṇāmas emerging as distinct in prakṛti. But as these *come* to lapse again into prakṛti, is not sāṁyāvasthā a contingent character as well? This lapse or retraction—whether for the mukta self or in cosmic pralaya—is properly no effect in Sāṁkhya and is even in Yoga an effect outside the causal process in the object. Causal process in the object is the

[a] YB.II.19.
[b] SS.I.61.

downward process towards bhoga, the opposite process being utterly discontinuous with it to Yoga, and no causal process at all to Sāṁkhya though continuous with the causal process. Puruṣārtha or the good of the self is not the nimitta of this reverse process to Yoga and to Sāṁkhya; it is not nimitta even of the forward process, there being no nimitta-cause outside the immanent cause in this system; and unconscious teleology is just the nature or spontaneity of the (noumenal) object and no causal circumstance at all. The reverse process then to Sāmkhya is purely spontaneous, and so to its sāmyāvasthā which is its terminus is just the eternal existence of prakṛti as distinct from its manifestness, existence that is no character, either necessary or contingent but the existent itself.

132. Now sāmyāvasthā or prakṛti itself, being the cause or potentiality of all that is manifest, must be taken to have within it something corresponding to the manifest causal *process*. This appears to be the sadṛśa-pariṇāma of each guṇa as unrelated to the other guṇas. Sadṛśa-pariṇāma means mere self-reproduction of a guṇa, its self-repetition without the emergence of qualitative difference. A manifest tattva is understood as self-caused or self-causing, and buddhi—the highest of the manifest tattvas—is *manifest* as such. Substance, then, even as unmanifest guṇa must imply self-causation: there is no conception of a merely static substance in Sāṁkhya or Yoga. The reality of an object consists in its becoming. Manifest reality is necessarily what becomes different from itself and manifestness as reality is what has become different from itself as the utterly unmanifest and is becoming further specificated. As to be manifest is to be different from itself in nature, the self-caused-ness of the unmanifest can only mean bare numerical distinction from itself. Now a self-caused tattva may also be taken as self-causing but there is difficulty in Sāṁkhya about a vikāra-tattva which to it no longer causes, while to Yoga, it still causes though only immanent pariṇāmas of itself. There is difficulty also about prakṛti or guṇa in Yoga, for it can hardly be called effect of itself, if by effect is meant what has determinate being, guṇa being understood in this system as indeterminate. Thus Sāṁkhya would generally characterise objective reality as self-caused and Yoga as self-causing.

133. Consequently, in Sāmkhya, the reality of guṇa

consists in its being self-caused, while in Yoga it consists in self-causing. It implies the cessation of self-distinction to Sāṁkhya and the emergence of self-distinction to Yoga: it is a being comprising self-distinction to the former and breaking up into self-distinction to the latter. To Sāṁkhya a guṇa is one, the material identity of many self-repetitions, presupposing but superseding their difference; while to Yoga it is a nominal universal, the many particular guṇas being the reality, though even here they are not co-existent as conceived by Vijñānabhikṣu. He reads this view of a guṇa being a mere name for many co-existent particular guṇas not only in Yoga but also in Sāṁkhya and takes it not only to be implied in certain texts,* but as the only explanation of quantitative variation of a guṇa and of immanent pariṇāma within a tattva. Sāṁkhya will, however, hardly admit such quantitative variation and immanent pariṇāma within the real, and even if it does, it will not necessarily explain them by the conception of particular guṇas.

134. There is properly no increase or decrease of the tattvas in Sāṁkhya. The so-called quantitative inequality of the guṇas in a visadṛśa-pariṇāma appears to mean only the qualitative distinction between dominant and recessive. Two tattvas or modes of a tattva may appear to have more of a certain guṇa, say sattva, in one than in the other; but this can be explained by saying that the guṇa is in one less manifest, less obscured by the other guṇa than in the other, the degrees of manifestness of a guṇa being really its qualitative relations to the other guṇas—called abhibhava, janana, mithuna and āśraya to be explained presently (sec. 147).

•135. Immanent pariṇāma—what is called in Yoga dharma-lakṣaṇāvasthā-pariṇāma as distinct from tattvāntara-pariṇāma— as already explained is properly no change in Sāṁkhya. For one thing, it does not admit a tattva without vṛtti which changes into vṛttis: a tattva is always in a vṛtti. Buddhi, for example, as referring in its bhāva to a particular object is a particular buddhi-vṛtti. The vṛtti being the tattva itself is a causal fact unlike the bhāva, and so the pratibimba of

* SPB. I. 127-28; YV. II. 18.

viṣaya in the tattva is taken as a real pratibimba, though there is no such thing as the tattva without any pratibimba. The passing of one vṛtti into another, however, is not a causal process, being apparently only the non-causal passing of one bhāva into another. As still each vṛtti is the tattva, each in its bhāva referring to the others, the vṛttis only present mutual difference and not change and may therefore, relatively to the change of the tattva to the next tattva, be said to be in a sort of space arrangement. The so-called immanent change then need not be explained by a quantitative re-arrangement of particular guṇas. That there are different vṛttis does indeed imply that the guṇas have no static being[a], but that need not mean that each guṇa is perpetually changing in respect of attribute, temporal quality and state (dharma-lakṣaṇāvasthā). It may mean only that each is in sadṛśa-pariṇāma where bare numerical distinction and no distinction in nature emerges. So the conception of particular guṇas (guṇa-vyakti) seems to have no place in Sāṁkhya.

136. The object, whether phenomenal or noumenal is taken to be constituted by the three guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas. Guṇa does not mean attribute; it is substantial reality, called guṇa as being for another (parārtha or paropakāraka[b] for the bhoga of puruṣa, that being the character of object. The guṇas are three, corresponding to the three modes of bhoga —sukha, duḥkha and moha (prīti, aprīti, viṣāda). The object is for the self in these three modes, and the three guṇas being accordingly defined as having these feeling-modes as their ātmā, svabhāva or lakṣaṇa. An object is pleasurable not in the sense of being an external cause of pleasure in one's mind but as being, so far as it is pleasurable, the pleasure itself, as being manifested as the pleasure and manifested or shown by the pleasure as its implicit being or causal self. No object is all pleasurable and hence the pleasurable object is in its other affective aspects the other bhogas—duḥkha or moha—also. What is (dominantly) pleasurable to one person may indeed be painful to another, but this inconstancy in the mutual relation of the guṇas in the same object appears only in non-causal

[a] calam ca guṇavṛttam—YB. II. 15; III. 13.
[b] STK. 12.

or phenomenal manifestation. That an external object is the same *to different persons though it affects them differently does not imply that it is really other than its affective character but only that its common or public character is also its affective character that is* distinguished in some way in buddhi from the affective characters presented to someone individual only.

137. All characters of the external objects are affective, being non-causal manifestation of the guṇas. Even the 'private' characters are (phenomenally) real: prakṛti is conceivable as phenomenalised to each self as the public world with some aspects that are for that self only. There may indeed be doubts about which aspects are public: what are taken as such may turn out to be only private. But that does not invalidate the general distinction between public and private. The illusory is only what having appeared public now appears private, the previous appearance being still believed as having been given or put forth by prakṛti though as a corrigible manifestation. Thus the conception of the illusory as at once real and unreal (sadasat)[n] applies both to transcendental illusion (aviveka) and to objective illusion. Non-causal manifestation then may be not only public and private but also illusory in this sense.

138. The inconstancy of the mutual relation of the guṇas in the external object may thus be explained as constituting no bar to the conception of the object being nothing but affective experience. There is no dualism of experience (bhoga) and the experienced (bhogya), and even experience as knowledge (of the object as public) is affective bhoga. The apparent dualism of bhoga and bhogya is really the dualism between the body (bhogāyatana) and the object (bhoga or bhogya) which has emerged out of the same objective reality (prakṛti). Experience appears to be of the embodied self and the body is constituted by the manifest tattvas each of which is the causal manifestation of prakrti—i.e., of the guṇas, the reals that are non-causally manifested as the three modes of experience or bhoga. The causal and non-causal manifestations bifurcate at buddhi: buddhi is aware of itself as having emanated both as being and function, liṅga and bhāva from prakṛti and as at once becoming the lower tattvas or orga-

[n] SS. V. 36.

nising the gross experiencing body on the one hand and constructing or projecting the world on the other. The same tattvas that make my body make also other bodies, the difference between the bodies being not in material but in the distinctive modes of aviveka with which the many selves are beginninglessly invested. Thus what appears as 'private' characters of the external object correspond to the distinctive modes of aviveka constituting the bodies.

139. The manifest object then, whether phenomenal or noumenal, is but the guṇas, the reals that are causally and non-causally manifested into the experiencing body and experience (or the experienced). The guṇas become the body and appear as experience. It is from the side of experience or the modes of bhoga that the guṇas are understood in the first instance; and it is as bhoga of itself leads to reflection, that the body, with the tattvas as matter and aviveka as form, is gradually traced back to the guṇas. Hence the guṇas are defined as what are manifest as the bhogas, as the potentialities of the three modes of feeling, as the feel*ables* that may not be actually felt. As further they are known in reflection to be constituents of the tattvas which make up the body undistinguished from the self that appears to feel, they may be regarded as the potentialities of the three feelings as well. Thus the guṇas are at once the potentialities of feelings and felt contents, being absolute in this sense. The external world also is both experience and the experienced, feeling and the felt, but the dualism does not appear here at all. The prakṛti-vikṛtis, where the dualism of the feeling and the felt appears in the form of causal self-distinction, are absolute in another sense. In prakṛti, the dualism is unmanifest but has to be still inferred as subsisting between the potential being of the guṇas and the actual though unconscious aviveka which constitutes their function of sadṛśa-pariṇāma which may be called their self-feeling, both the being and the function being absolute as self-felt and self-feeling respectively. The vikāras alone are not absolute in any sense: the senses only feel and the bhūtas are only felt.

140. That guṇa or the absolute of feeling and felt-content is object itself that is utterly distinct from the self requires to be explained. Pain, which is bhoga par excellence, appears to be the only entity that is immediately intelligible as utterly distinct

from the self. The realistic view of the object as what can exist unknown or unrelated to the self would be unintelligible unless knowledge itself testified to the necessary existence of the object as unknown. The idealist's case is that reflectively the object is only known to be now unknown in some particular way (e.g. perception), being still known to be known in some other way: the object as utterly unknown is a self-contradictory notion. There is no perception and therefore no memory of an object existing unknown. We may indeed be aware in knowing an object that it *was* unknown but this is not to *remember* its past unknownness and hence we cannot expect or conceive that it may exist unknown, for we expect or conceive on the basis of memory. We can conceive a content to continue out of consciousness only if our present consciousness necessarily refers to such continuation. This can be said only about the consciousness of pain, for to be reflectively aware of pain is to wish to be free from it: the necessary wish is the necessary idea of the pain being foreign to and therefore ceasing to consciousness. There is the consciousness of the pain as given and, therefore, the idea of its ceasing to consciousness is not the idea of its ceasing to be real. It is then only here that we have the idea of a content of consciousness possibly existing out of consciousness. The exemplar of objective reality then is pain, and, as will be shown, the other bhogas are intelligible only in reference to pain. Hence objective reality is essentially feeling or felt content. Object as known is but such felt content to detached reflection. The guṇas as affective absolutes constitute the object.

CHAPTER X

RELATION OF THE GUṆAS

141. The three guṇas are the absolutes of the three modes of feeling—sukha, duḥkha and moha. Pleasure and pain are known as the two primary modes or tones of feeling, but what is moha? For one thing, it is a conscious feeling, feeling of not being able to feel, feeling of affective insensibility and not insensibility itself. It is the feeling of absence of affective freedom, pleasure and pain being feelings of restful freedom and restless freeing activity. It is a feeling of indolence, stupidity or fascination. Moha is thus intelligible as a primary mode of feeling co-ordinate with pleasure and pain, the three being understood in terms of freedom. The immediate manifestation of the guṇas in buddhi in its reference to the external object is feeling or bhoga. Of the modes of bhoga, pleasure even in the grossest form is as pleasure a conscious detachment or freedom from the object, implying a beginning of reflection. Pain implies the active wish to be free from pain which is, however, unfulfilled so long as it is pain. The feeling of pain is thus a freeing activity, ideal or actual willing. Moha is the feeling not only of the want of freedom (which pain also is) but also of not actively wishing or willing freedom. It is still a positive feeling, feeling of indolence in mind and body, feeling of being stupefied before the object or being fascinated by the object. The three feelings are all positive, different from one another but necessarily opposed, being capable of being combined into a unitary feeling.

142. The feeling of freedom is described as the feeling of lightness in the body or mind, lightness of mind being felt in the spiritual qualities of sincerity, mildness, truthfulness, purity, kindness, intelligence, forgiveness etc. So the restless and distracting activity of the mind in pain is reflected in the qualities of antipathy, hatred, anxiety, deceptiveness etc., and the feeling of moha in the qualities of indolence, ignorance, pride, fear, lack of faith etc. Necessarily the feelings are described in objective metaphors; and in Sāṁkhya at least the guṇas are understood primarily in terms of the feelings and secondarily as qualities of the object. Sukha, duḥkha and moha are primarily

the felt mental qualities of lightness (freedom. laghutva), restlessness (calatva) and heaviness (gurutva), and their analogues in the object are expression (prakāśa), action (kriyā) and standing being or persistence (sthiti). The necessity and sufficiency of the triple characterisation of the object are justified by the introspective testimony about the necessity and sufficiency of the elementary feelings.

143. Yoga philosophy starts with the triple characterisation of the object,[a] and then apparently, as the mind is also object, reads it into the triplicity of feelings or into the triplicity of mental functions—knowing, willing and feeling (prakhyā-pravṛtti-sthiti),[b] relying more on imagination than on introspection. Prakāśa as a quality of the object is its manifestness, definiteness or expression which is known-ness as an objective character. Knowability as a character of the object is its aesthetic character of expression or expressiveness. Beauty is the perfect form of presented intelligibility, the unobscured self-revelation of the object which may be called its freedom, corresponding to the feeling of freedom which is pleasure. Thus is prakśa connected with knowing (prakhyā) and with pleasure; kriyā or activity in the object may be easily connected with willing (pravṛtti or self-assertion of buddhi) and with the restless character of the feeling of pain; and sthiti or persistence of the object is the obvious and aesthetic correlate of the feeling of moha. Whether sthiti as a character of buddhi should be taken as a feeling is not so obvious; and some take it to mean unconscious mental persistence as saṁskāra. But as prakhyā and pravṛtti are understood as conscious mental functions, conscious mental persistence appears here to be primarily meant by sthiti; and this can be nothing but feeling which in contrast with knowing and willing is consciously being unfree or undetached from the object.

144. That the elementary feelings are three will be taken by Saṁkhya as evident to introspection, and the triplicity of the conscious buddhi as also of the object that is its content would be derived from this introspective testimony. The three feelings constitute the immanent nature of the three guṇas, which is

[a] YB. II. 18.
[b] YB. I. 2.

characterised by the terms laghu (light, free or pliant), cala (restless or changing) and guru (heavy or stiff). Their transitive functional aspects are prakāśa (manifestation of itself or of others), upaṣṭambha (acting on or compelling others) and varaṇa (obscuring of prakāśa,—more generally, niyama or retarding or arresting of both prakāśa and kriyā). The substantial being of the elementary feelings is the guṇas. Existent object is a complex of the guṇas, their unity being conceived after the manner in which the feelings are introspectively found to be combined.

145. The object is the felt content. What is known or willed is still a felt content. The object even to the jivanmukta is feelable content which he does not feel and is aware of in a disinterested way, such awareness being not bhoga but a seeing (sākṣātkāra) of the felt or the feeling. The known aspect of the object is its expression which, to the ordinary knower, is the embodiment of aesthetic feeling which in the context of other feelings which pervert and obscure the expression; and it is presumably to the pure knower (jīvanmukta) the perfect embodiment. The willed aspect of the object is its going to be felt or going to be the expression of its felt non-being and its initial blind felt-ness or given-ness. The object is felt in three grades—detachedly felt as expressing itself, half-detachedly felt as going to be, and undetachedly felt as existent or persistent. The second grade of felt-ness is the most obvious form of objectivity, in reference to which the other two grades are appreciated. Without reference to it, expression would be regarded as only imagintd and persistence would not be manifest to consciousness at all. Expression is regarded as *known* objective fact only so far as it is felt to be the continuous fulfilment of going to be; and one is conscious of the object as persisting only as it is felt to be prevented from being another. Pleasure appears objective to the self in so far as it is felt as relief from pain or different from pain co-existent with it; and moha appears to consciousness when one feels unable to wish or will away pain. We are reflectively aware of pain along with pleasure and moha and of the object in change as having its past integrated in its expression and as persisting in and through the change.

146. Pain, as pointed out, is what is immediately manifest as the not-self or object. An object is known as object only as

we are conscious of it as what may exist out of consciousness; and such consciousness is primarily of pain. We are aware of an object as such so far as it is painful and we know it as fact so far as it is at the same time pleasurable or expressive and blindly given or helplessly accepted in moha. Thus the experienced object is of pleasure, pain and moha, all compact, and it is in reference to the experienced object that the tattvas or noumenal objects are known. Object, whether phenomenal or noumenal, is manifest as pain (hostile to the self), and so far as it is manifest as pleasure or moha, it is manifest as with the heart of pain. The necessity of the co-existence of the three guṇas is derivable from the very conception of the manifest object.

147. How are the guṇas related to one another in the manifest object? They are related as the elementary feelings are found related in a complex feeling. Four kinds of relation are mentioned in S. Kārikā 12, which are differently interpreted by the commentators. Abhibhava means the arresting of manifestation, and janana appears to mean the excitation of manifestation. Each guṇa may arrest the manifestation of the others and each may also excite the manifestation of the others. Āśraya probably means being the object of another's function: each guṇa may function towards the others as object. Mithuna means being present along with and subordinate to another: each guṇa may be manifest as subordinate to another. Apparently one guṇa only can be dominant in an object, the others—one or the other or both— being recessive, either unmanifest or manifest. In the former case, the dominant may rouse an unmanifest guṇa into manifestation, and in the latter case, the dominant may have the others either as the object of its function or as adjectival to its substantive being. For example, in buddhi, sattva prevents rajas and tamas from being manifest (abhibhava); it may reveal (prakāśa) rajas and tamas as object or content (āśraya); it may lead to willing (ahaṁkāra) and consequent feeling (tanmātra)—i.e., excite the manifestation of rajas and tamas (janana); and it may be adjectival (mithuna) to rajas (to indriya as proceeding from sāttvika-ahaṁkāra) and to tamas (tanmātra as pure aviśeṣa pleasure). There may be consciously unmixed joy; one may aesthetically delight in the contemplation of pain or

moha; pleasure may lead to pain or moha; pain may have a pleasurable aspect or there may be pleasure in being 'fascinated'.

148. Yoga-bhāṣya II, 18 refers to the relation of the guṇas: ete guṇāḥ parasparoparakta-pravibhāgāḥ pariṇāminaḥ saṁyoga-vibhāga-dharmāṇah itaretaropāśrayeṇa upārjita-mūrtayaḥ parasparāṅgāṅgitve api asambhinnaśaktipravibhāgāḥ. Each guṇa as substantive or dominant with the others reflected in it tends to change; each may be associated with or dissociated from the others and as associated, becomes a manifest object; and each, while organically connected with the others, retains its distinction. The last part 'parasparāṅgāṅgitve api' definitely means something like organic unity.

STUDIES IN YOGA PHILOSOPHY

ANALYSIS

CH. I. SĀṄKHYA AND YOGA. (Sec. 1-15)

(The place of Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra and Asamitā)

(1-5) The nature of will and its place in spiritual life according to Sāṁkhya and to Yoga. The relation of will to ahaṁkāra and to buddhi. The concept of asmitā analysed. The nature of nivṛtti and pravṛtti to Sāṁkhya and to Yoga. The status of viveka and its relation to asamprajñāta. (6-7) The practice of yoga and its relation to mokṣa according to Sāṁkhya and to Yoga. Two kinds of yoga, samprajñāta and asamprajñāta, the former terminating in pure knowledge and the latter in the super-conscious free being of the spirit. Yoga as free willing for free being. (8) The nature of nirodha to Sāṁkhya and to Yoga. (9-11) The concept of Īśvara-praṇidhāna. The status of Īśvara as a tattva. The concepts of illusion and causality in the two systems. (12-15) Two aspects of bhoga: appropriation and objectification. Appropriation as a kind of conation to Yoga and as a kind of feeling to Sāṁkhya. Appropriation as primary and explicit to Yoga, the reverse being the view of Sāṁkhya. Bhoga as a function of buddhi-endowed self is real to Yoga and unreal to Sāṁkhya. Illusion as anyathākhyāti to Yoga and as sadasatkhyāti to Sāṁkhya.

CH. II. SĀṄKHYA AND YOGA (contd. Sec. 16-31)

(Causality, Becoming and Time)

(16) Bhoga as the final cause of the causal becoming of prakṛti. To Sāṁkhya the causal process is terminated by reflection and to Yoga by free negative willing.

(17-19) The nature of 'becoming' as the unity of succession and persistence. The difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga on the nature of causal becoming. (20-21) The nature and function of 'nimitta' in Yoga. The concept of pratibandha. (22-24) The concept of 'time' in Sāṁkhya and Yoga. Time and ākāśa. Time to Sāṁkhya is prakṛti in its eternal function of manifestation. Two aspects of time—

kṣaṇa and krama—distinguished by Yoga: their ontical status analysed. (25-28) Three modes of real immanent change—viz., of dharma, lakṣaṇa and avasthā recognised in the Yoga school. These not accepted as real in Sāṁkhya. Implications of this difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga brought out. (29-30) The Sāṁkhya theory about the relation between one mode of a tattva and another mode conditioned by it. (31) The nature of real time to Sāṁkhya and Yoga.

CH. III. SĀṄKHYA AND YOGA (contd. Sec. 32-48)

(The Empirical world : its status and constitution)

(32-37) The metaphysical status of the body and the external world according to Yoga, Sāmkhya and Vedānta—fact, non-causal appearance and Illusion. (38) The tattvas according to Sāṁkhya and to Yoga. Different views on ahaṁkāra. (39-44) Bhūta and its atomic nature according to Yoga. The Sāmkhya view on the point imagined. (45-47) Yoga atomism vs. Vaiśeṣika atomism. (48) Bhikṣu's ascription of Yoga atomism to Sāṁkhya gratuitous.

CH. IV. BUDDHI-VṚTTI (Sec. 49-65)

(Nidrā and Smṛti)

(49) Willing as becoming is to Yoga a prospective function, while to Sāṁkhya it is a retrospective one. (50) Two-fold pariṇāma—sadṛśa and visadṛśa—explained. (51) Difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga on the conception of self-identity or vyaktatā and sadṛśa-pariṇāma. (52-53) The Sāṁkhya concept of aviveka compared to the Yoga concept of avidyā. (54) Two kinds of dharma-pariṇāma—a-paridṛṣta and paridṛṣṭa—mentioned in Yoga-Bhāṣya.

(55-56) The Sāṁkhya conception of vṛtti versus the Yoga conception analysed. (57) The five vṛttis in the Yoga-sūtras as five types of presentation. (58-60) The nature of smṛti as a vṛtti analysed. Two kinds of smṛti distinguished by Vyāsa: Vācaspati and Bhikṣu differ in their analysis of these two kinds. (61-63) Vṛtti analysed in

reference to samādhi. (64-65) The nature of nidrā as vṛtti analysed in detail.

CH. V. BUDDHI-VṚTTI (contd. Sec. 66-82)

(Vikalpa, Viparyaya and Pramāṇa)

(66-68) The concept of vikalpa as a vṛtti analysed. Vikalpa versus viparyaya. (69) The status of vikalpa in Vedānta. (70) Vikalpa and savikalpa-samādhi. Function of vikalpa in savitarka and savicāra-samādhi. (71) Vikalpa as āhārya cognition in Vaiśeṣika. (72) The nature of error to Yoga and to Vaiśeṣika, to Sāṁkhya and to Vedānta. (74) Analysis of empirical error according to Yoga and to Vedānta. (75-76) The concept and types of kleśa analysed. (77) Analysis of avidyā. (78) Analysis of asmitā. (79) Analysis of rāga, dveṣa and abhiniveśa. (80) Avidyā and pramāṇa. (81-82) Types of pramāṇa analysed.

CH. VI. THE FIVE LEVELS OF BUDDHI (Sec. 83-98)

(83) Analysis of certitude as the function of buddhi in reference to the self. (84) The five levels of buddhi: kṣipta, mūḍha and vikṣipta characterised by implicit asmitā, ekāgra by explicit asmitā and niruddha by lapse of asmitā. (85) Prakhyā, pravṛtti and sthiti variously operative in the different levels. (86) Self-identity inferred in buddhi, introspected in vṛtti and inexplicit in the other tattvas. (87-88) The second level, vikṣipta analysed. (89) The first and third levels analysed. (90) Progressive increase of freedom of knowing or 'knowing-duration' in the different levels. (91) The mind in the first three levels working within spiritual error. (92-95) Analytic elaboration of the first three levels. (96-98) The concept of vikṣepa and its implications.

CH. VII. THE NATURE OF YOGA (sec. 99-112)

(99) The nature of yoga as spiritual activity which is activity for achieving absolute freedom. (100-101) Spiritual activity is free activity for nivṛtti or arrest of the will to bhoga. (102) This free realising of freedom conceived as a knowing process in Sāṁkhya and in Vedānta, as a feeling process in the

Bhakti systems and as a willing process in Yoga and Kant. (103) Yoga is not necessarily the type of spiritual activity in systems other than the Yoga. (104-106) The apparently mystical concept of spiritual activity reduced to an intelligible practical psychology in Yoga Philosophy. (107) The religion of yoga is not a mere system of psychical gymnastics. Is there any place for the consciousness of the sacred in this religion? (108) The procedure for attaining super-religious freedom is either religious (i.e., through grace) or super-religious (i.e., through one's might). (109) Yoga is willing of miracle or magic. (110-112) Skepticism about yoga and bibhūti considered.

CH. VIII. THE KINDS OF YOGA (Sec. 113-131)

(113) Two grades of Yoga, samprajñāta and asamprajñāta, and the different sub-grades enumerated. (114) The concept of ābhoga in connection with the samprajñāta. The concept of vitarka. (115) The concept of vicāra. (116) Transition from savicāra to sānanda-samādhi. Vācaspati versus Bhikṣu on 'ānanda' in this context. (117-118) Triple aspect of the content in the four stages of the samprajñāta clarified. (119-121) The conceptions of videha, prakṛti-laya and vivekin clarified. They represent respectively the affective, conative and cognitive types of spirituality. (122) Bhoja on asmitā-samādhi. (123-124) The varieties of vitarka and vicāra-samādhi explained. (125-126) The object of vicāra-samādhi. (127-128) The concept of samāpatti analysed. (129-130) The nature of the prajñā or spiritual wisdom that results from this samādhi. (131) Transition to the asamprajñāta stage.

CH. IX. THE PROCEDURE OF YOGA (Sec. 132-146)

(132) Yoga as absolute will is 'beyond good and evil' and in that sense is super-religious; yet it is to be distinguished from Nietzsche's concept of absolute will. (133) The steps to samādhi two-fold—preparatory and constitutive. They are again either consecutive or alternative. (134) The concepts of abhyāsa and vairāgya analysed. Different aspects of prayatna conditioning yoga. (135) The different stages of discipline for the uttamādhikārin analysed. Auxiliary practices to counteract vikṣepa. (136) The discipline for the madhyamā-

dhikārin analysed. The eight-fold discipline prescribed for the common aspirant. (137-144) The nature of the eight aṅgas of yoga analysed. (145-146) The siddhis and the attitude of the yogin to them explained.

CH. X. THE NOTION OF ĪŚVARA (Sec. 147-159)

(147) The dual meaning of Īśvara-praṇidhāna in Yoga-sūtras. (148) Bhikṣu's interpretation of Sāṁkhya atheism. The place of meditation on God in the Yoga system. (149-151) The precise nature of the proof of God in Vyāsa's commentary brought out. (152-153) The relation between faith and God elaborated. (154-155) The eternal freedom of God and his buddhi. (156-158) God, grace and bhakti. (159) No reference in the Yoga-sūtras to God's creative powers.

CHAPTER I

SĀṄKHYA AND YOGA

1. The essential difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga appears to lie in their conception of the will and of its place in spiritual life. To Sāṁkhya, willing is the function of ahaṁkāra and not of buddhi, being the activity of the finite agent to maintain its finiteness. The principle of self-maintaining finiteness or exclusiveness (not individuality which belongs to the self) is ahaṁkāra, while buddhi is infinite (mahat or vibhu) both in its existence and in its content. Willing indeed proceeds from self-conscious certitude which is the function of buddhi, certitude in the form 'this is what I am going to be' or as it might be put—'I (the infinite) am this prospective (finite) *me*'—which is just the certitude of asmitā, though willing is not asmitā. To Yoga, however, willing is asmitā: it not only proceeds from self-consciousness, but is self-conscious subjectivity, being never the mere object of asmitā-consciousness. The willing or active *me* is a continuation of the *I* that knows it: to be conscious of willing is to be conscious, explicitly of *I* willing, conscious not merely of *me* but of *I becoming me*. Since asmitā is not dropped when willing emerges as a finite mental object, ahaṁkāra is called in Yoga asmitā and is as a function taken to belong to buddhi and not to a separate tattva, as it is taken in Sāṁkhya.

2. Asmitā in both Yoga and Sāṁkhya is understood as a function of buddhi. Willing is not taken as a function of buddhi in Sāṁkhya where, therefore, asmitā is a judgment (adhyavasāya) or certitude (niścaya) of the form 'I am me' prior to willing, whence willing is supposed to spring. Asmitā in this form means indeed the consciousness of I willing, but willing is here distinguished as object (me) from the consciousness and the I is not so distinguished, so that the I-form is taken as only supervening on willing and not as intrinsic to it. Asmitā again is to both Yoga and Sāṁkhya not only of the form 'I am me' but also of the form 'I am I'. This would be in Sāṁkhya pure judgment unlike judgment in the other form which has reference to or has the shadow of willing. In Yoga,

not only the lower asmitā but also the higher is taken as willing, knowing being never divorced from willing, though willing as in asamprajñāta-yoga runs beyond knowing. Willing to both Yoga and Sāṁkhya is mental activity proceeding from knowledge. Mental activity has two directions positive and negative, called pravṛtti and nivṛtti. To Yoga both these forms are willing, while to Sāṁkhya the negative one is not willing but only reflection, a knowing process implying abstention from willing. In Sāṁkhya again, pravṛtti, which is to it the only willing, is essentially the finitising of the mind : it implies the lapse of the infinity or impersonal knowing certitude of buddhi and is as such the function of a lower tattva viz., ahaṁkāra. In Yoga, the finitising pravṛtti retains the infinity or freedom of buddhi; and there may even be a pravṛtti that is not finitising such as is said to be exerted by the yogin at a certain stage. Nivṛtti too is willing, willing explicitly to cancel finitising pravṛtti, willing in reflective knowledge where the knowledge is an aspect of the willing and is to be ultimately superseded by it. Both pravṛtti and nivṛtti emerge in knowledge, but while positive willing never outruns knowledge (as it is taken in Sāṁkhya to do necessarily), negative willing outruns knowledge in the last resort in asamprajñāta.

3. Buddhi to both Sāṁkhya and Yoga is the mind with the manifest form of *I am* or asmitā. Judgment or certitude that is said to be its distinctive function is or involves the consciousness of I *am*. What is called ahaṁkāra in Sāṁkhya has to it the form of *me* and not of *I* and is taken as having evolved from asmitā in the form 'I am the prospective me' which is a function of buddhi. In Yoga, ahaṁkāra is the same as this asmitā. Willing to Sāṁkhya is the function of ahaṁkāra having simply the form of *me* and not of I, while to Yoga it is a function always involving the I-form, even in the stage where it has the me-form and may not have the *me*-form at all. All willing then including what Sāṁkhya would call willing is to Yoga a function of buddhi, the ahaṁkāra of Sāṁkhya being to it the lower asmitā. Willing in fact is to it the essential function of buddhi which is implied in the certitude (with the I-form) that is admitted by both as its distinctive function and which may even supersede

the certitude. The perfect mode of this certitude is taken by both to be viveka—the knowledge of buddhi as distinct from the pure self, of the *I* that is the known content of consciousness as distinct from the content-less consciousness which is the pure self. To Yoga but not to Sāṁkhya even viveka involves willing, the knowledge of the distinction of buddhi as viveka from the self being an incipient willing to detach the self from viveka itself—what is actualised in asaṁprajñāta where even self-consciousness or the knowledge of *I* as content is said to lapse. Thus willing which always starts in certitude and can supersede it is understood in Yoga as a function of buddhi that is even more essential than certitude.

4. The Sāṁkhya term 'ahaṁkāra' occurs nowhere in the Yoga-sūtras. It occurs in Yoga-bhāṣya I.45. The term 'asmitā' occurs in many sūtras and is apparently used in different senses, which are not, however, altogether unconnected and means everywhere a function of buddhi. What is meant by ahaṁkāra is referred to in Yoga-bhāṣya on II. 19, where asmitā-mātra is taken as included in the six aviśeṣas which are distinguished from buddhi as liṅga-mātra. Not that it is, therefore, regarded as not belonging to buddhi: 'liṅga-mātra' in the sūtra is the essential being of buddhi as distinct from its function as an antaḥkaraṇa, the being of one stage of its function being taken to be asmitā-mātra as an aviśeṣa. Asmitā-function in this stage is still a buddhi-function, the substantive being of which is the sixth aviśeṣa which just corresponds to the ahaṁkāra of Sāṁkhya. In Yoga-bhāṣya I. 45, where the word 'ahaṁkāra' occurs, it is said—'asya (ahaṁkārasya) api liṅga-mātraṁ sūkṣmoviṣayaḥ. It need not mean that ahaṁkāra is separate as a tattva from buddhi. Buddhi as liṅga-mātra is subtler than buddhi as antaḥkaraṇa of which asmitā-mātra or ahaṁkāra is a mode. Every effect is not a new tattva. The immanent pariṇāmas of a tattva are sthūla relatively to the tattva and may admit of degrees of subtleness among themselves.

5. Thus willing which in Sāṁkhya is the self-manifestation of the being of ahaṁkāra as potential in buddhi is

taken by Yoga to be the function of buddhi that is constitutive of the being of ahaṁkāra. Yukti-dīpikā (p. 32), an old commentary on Sāṁkhya-kārikā, credits one Patañjali with the view that ahaṁkāra is but the asmitā-function of buddhi. This may be the view of the author of Yoga-sūtras, the apparent discrepancy as suggested by the inclusion of asmitā-mātra or ahaṁkāra within aviśeṣa being explained if the view is taken to imply that while the being of ahaṁkāra (as aviśeṣa) evolves out of the being of buddhi as liṅga-mātra), the function of ahaṁkāra is but the asmitā-function of buddhi. To Sāṁkhya, ahaṁkāra both as being and function is a tattva separate from buddhi.

6. Willing then to Yoga is a function of buddhi and is in fact its essential function. It has the two directions—the positive and the negative, the former being towards bhoga and the latter towards mukti. Both would be forms of asmitā of which the former with the downward trend would correspond to the ahaṁkāra of Sāṁkhya. The higher asmitā with its upward trend is spiritual willing which culminates in the mode of samādhi called asmitānugata which involves viveka and leads to a further form of negative willing called asamprajñāta where viveka itself is dropped and dissolved. Spiritual willing or nivṛtti is willing to abstain from egoistic willing, willing implicitly or explicity to secure the freely quiescent being of buddhi called samādhi. This being or standing is itself an activity, a grade of spiritual willing consisting in the self-reproduction without change of buddhi or a buddhi-vṛtti in its changeless active flow (praśānta-vāhitā). Negative willing includes both the activity for samādhi and the samādhi itself, the latter being not merely the result of the former but its continuation in a higher potency. To Sāṁkhya, nivṛtti-activity is reflection, a cognitive and not a conative process. The quiescent being of buddhi called samādhi is its passive state and not an activity and is only the result or spontaneous (unwilled) concentration of reflection. No specific activity of reflection to secure this concentration is prescribed in Sāṁkhya. To it there is properly no spiritual willing, all willing being the function of ahaṁkāra or the finitised mind, though it need not be explicity to maintain its finitude.

7. To Yoga, the explicit activity to secure samādhi or the practice of yoga is spiritual willing and is an absolutely necessary stage in the discipline or sādhana for absolute freedom. To it as to other systems, freedom is reached through the correction of avidyā or spiritual illusion. To Sāṁkhya, such illusion is finally corrected or eliminated through knowledge while to Yoga, the final elimination is possible only through the practice of yoga, a form of willing that is conditioned by knowledge. Yoga to actualise knowledge that is already reached is the immediate antecedent of the attainment of freedom and is unconditionally prescribed for all, even if yoga be only an alternative way to reach knowledge. Yoga to actualise knowledge that is already reached—jñāna-janya-yoga as Vijñānabhikṣu calls it—is the specific subject-matter of Yoga philosophy. Two broad forms of it are mentioned—samprajñāta and asamprajñāta—of which the former terminates in knowledge again, the ultimate form of which is viveka, and the latter that is started by viveka is consummated not in any further knowledge but in a super-conscious free being of the spirit. The latter apparently is the pure or essential form of all yoga, yoga being generally spiritual willing for the free being or active quiescence of the spirit, of which quiescent knowledge is only a contingent aspect.

8. Yoga as discussed in Yoga philosophy is a form of jñāna-janya willing which means free willing, willing that not only springs from knowledge but continues and actualises it. Spiritual willing is free willing in this sense and yoga would be this free willing explicitly to secure free being of the spirit. Willing in Yoga philosophy is essentially free activity for free being, the activity called 'yoga' being only the explicit form of it which again in its absolute purity is asamprajñāta-yoga. As already stated, 'yoga' means both the activity towards samādhi and samādhi itself which is also an activity, the activity of changeless self-reproduction. The activity implicitly or explicitly towards samādhi may be called free willing and samādhi itself is free being. Yoga being thus free willing explicitly for free being is the conscious activity of the mind to arrest its helpless change or differentiation into states or vṛttis. In samprajñāta-yoga the mind stands in a vṛtti and resists its change into other states, while in asam-

prajñāta it is taken to withdraw itself from all vṛttis. The will to prevent the emergence of vṛtti is called 'nirodha' which is understood as the heart of yoga, free willing being in essence the activity of nirodha. The result of the willing which means its continuation as free being is samādhi which is conceived to be a return of the mind to its native being. It is the character that buddhi has in all the levels of its being in some measure or other, its sārvabhauma-dharma as it is called in Yoga-bhāṣya.

9. Samādhi is the result of nirodha or the vṛtti-arresting will. The result is a return of the mind to its native being and may accordingly be taken to be as much reached of right by the will as coming spontaneously to fulfil it. In Sāṁkhya, nirodha is no activity at all, being the same as samādhi which is only a passive quiescence that comes spontaneously as the concentration of the cognitive activity of reflection. In Yoga, nirodha and samādhi are both activities and samādhi as a free or active quiescence is not only a new grade of freedom but is also continuous with the freedom of the nirodha-will. These two aspects of samādhi are distinct in samprajñāta: as a mode of being, it is reached of right by the nirodha-will, but as a mode of self-manifesting knowledge (prajñāloka), it comes spontaneously as the fulfilment of the will. In asamprajñāta, however, where there is no self-manifesting knowledge, the effected aspect and the spontaneous aspect appear as one free being with alternative stresses. Hence the nirodha-will that leads to it is taken as itself coming spontaneously, as the content of a cognitive reflection other than, though emerging in, viveka. This cognitive reflection is what is meant by Īśvara-praṇidhāna in Yoga-sūtra I. 23.

10. Asamprajñāta-samādhi may according to Yoga come with absolute spontaneity in the case of certain devatās but it has to be reached by us through spiritual activity. The activity may be nirodha involving śraddhā (faith), vīrya (strength of will) etc.,* in the super-intense form or it may be a unique mode of reflection on God (Īśvara-praṇidhāna). The conjunction 'or' (vā) in Yoga-sūtra I.23. has to be

* YS.I.20-21

interpreted as meaning that the praṇidhāna is a sādhana alternative to nirodha-will, and is itself a surrender of willing. Nirodha is negative willing, willing to arrest positive willng. The praṇidhāna may be called willing but it is the willing to arrest negative willing and therefore all willing, to reverse in fact the entire attitude of willing, to secure the attitude of knowing though there is no knowledge beyond viveka. This will to be in the knowing attitude for freedom from knowledge (asaṁprajñāta) as the end is the will to contemplate a mystery, the mystery of its own spontaneous emergence, of the absolute freedom through which free will itself emerges, the freedom to create freedom, which is just the mystery of God as conceived in Yoga. The will to secure asamprajñāta-samādhi then is at once the culminating phase of willing and a contemplative surrender of the willing attitude. It is the necessary alternation of willing and not-willing where the willing is negative, being withdrawal not only from vṛtti of buddhi but from buddhi itself as manifest, and the not-willing or surrender of willing is positive contemplation of the mystery of absolute freedom or God.

11. Īśvara-praṇidhāna in Yoga-sūtra I.23 is surrender of the whole willing-attitude and not simply of ahaṁkāra or of the fruits of willing, which praṇidhāna in Yoga-sūtra II.1 (also II.32) is taken to mean in the Bhāṣya. The latter praṇidhāna is taken as a kriyā-yoga, a mode of willing while the former is no kriyā or doing at all and is understood as contemplation,[a] as a bhakti-viśeṣa —a kind of 'intellectual love of God' (other than the love that consists in the committing of the fruits of action to God),[b] where God appears to be only a postulate of the contemplative attitude and not the content of knowledge reached prior to the contemplation. God is regarded as a tattva admitted by Yoga over and above the twenty-five tattvas of Sāṁkhya. Apparently, however, Yoga would not—any more than Sāṁkhya—admit knowledge of a tattva that is not implied in viveka, knowledge reached of right by the metaphysical method of distinguishing the object from the self. The knowledge of God is not thus reached: in fact, God as self-revealing is an object of faith that

[a] tajjapah tadartha-bhāvanam—YS.I.28
[b] parama-gurau arpaṇam—YS.II.1

emerges only in the characteristic attitude of contemplation (praṇidhāna) which comes after viveka along with the will to drop viveka itself which is, in fact, the will not to know. Some proof of God is attempted indeed in the Bhāṣya, the value of which, however, would be shown later to depend on this contemplation. God, therefore, does not appear to be a tattva co-ordinate with the Sāṁkhya tattvas that are implied in viveka.

12. Are the other tattvas conceived in the same way in Sāṁkhya and Yoga? They are all implied in viveka, being, in fact, reached in the process of reaching viveka, and the answer to the question depends on the conception of the nature of the process in Sāṁkhya and in Yoga. The process is conceived by both as opposite in direction to the process towards bhoga or affective experience, being, in fact, the reflective retracing of the causal process by which such experience is rendered possible and which is conditioned by an illusory identification of the self and the object. Are illusion and causality understood in the same way in the two systems?

13. Bhoga involves the illusion of identity of the self and the not-self in both the systems, this illusion being the parent of all illusion. The identification is understood both as regarding the not-self—ultimately a buddhi-vṛtti—as the self and as viewing the self which is no content of consciousness as though it were an objective content, a mode of the not-self or buddhi-vṛtti. The former is the appropriation of the object implying what is called sva-svāmi-sambandha or relation of the possessed and the possessor. The latter may be called objectification of the self in contrast with which appropriation would be the subjectification of the object. Appropriation is apparently to Yoga a function of willing and to Sāṁkhya a function of feeling. Objectification is also understood differently in the two systems—as the affective apprehension of the self as with the form of the object or of buddhi-vrtti in Sāṁkhya and the cognitive apprehension of the form of the self in buddhi-vṛtti in Yoga. The reflection of the vrtti in the self is indeed admitted by Yoga, but it seems to be taken not as constituting bhoga—the jīvan-mukta who is above bhoga being conceived also to have it—but as only the cognition of possible bhoga.

14. Of the two aspects of bhoga, appropriation is apparently taken by Yoga as the primary and explicit aspect and objectification as secondary and implicit, the Sāṁkhya conception of bhoga being just the reverse. To Yoga, the illusion in bhoga is the conative appropriation in which empirical knowledge of the object is taken to be rooted, while Sāṁkhya takes the illusion to consist in the affective objectification, a feeling of the self as wearing the form of the buddhi-vṛtti or object. Yoga would admit objectification as implicit in appropriation and understand it as the consciousness of the reflection or pratibimba of the self in a vṛtti, the reflection being as objective as the vṛtti. It is from this objectified form of the self that the self proper is known[a] just as the form of the empirical object in vṛtti is taken as the medium of knowledge of the object. The difference is that the object is *given* to the vṛtti wearing its form while the self is not given to the corresponding vṛtti. The form of vṛtti is an anticipatory construction of buddhi in either case, but while the form of the experienced object is as much given as constructed, the form of the self is only constructed and is a mere vikalpa, the self being no object of experience. The reflection of the self in vṛtti—which is the so-called objectified self—is not the self at all, while the reflection of the felt object in vṛtti is not other than the object, the presentation of the object being the object though the object is distinct from the presentation. Similarly Sāṁkhya would admit appropriation as implicit in objectification and take it as the felt non-distinction of the object from the self which, unlike the felt identity of the self with the object or the affective objectification, is not illusory but a factual predicament of the object or buddhi.

15. Bhoga is no function of the pure self either to Yoga or to Sāṁkhya; but as a function of buddhi-endowed self, it is real to Yoga and unreal to Sāṁkhya. It is real conative appropriation to Yoga, real perpetration of an illusion or contradiction, real willing of the contradiction of the object being the self. This willed contradiction is the real significance of the theory of anyathā-khyāti, the theory of illusion accepted by Yoga and Nyāya. The root of conative

[a] YS. II. 20

appropriation is called in Yoga 'a v i d y ā' which is defined[a] as the viewing of the not-self as the self etc., the false viewing being explained in the B h ā ṣ y a as not the mere failure to distinguish the not-self from the self but a positive knowing (of their identity-in-difference) other than true knowing,[b] which must be understood as an *act*, for there can be no differenced *presentation* of the not-self and the self as one. Illusion is a cognitive act, act of identifying what are indefinitely known as distinct and not a mere confusing or failing to distinguish; and a v i d y ā, the primordial illusion, is just the transcendental act of appropriation, the beginningless act of relating in s v a - s v ā m i - s a m b a n d h a.

16. To S ā ṁ k h y a, b h o g a is the feeling of the self being the not-self, wearing the form of the v r t t i, getting objectified or modified into the form of the affective object in the last resort. It is an affective identification of what are here also indefinitely known as distinct, identification of the self with the not-self which is known at the time as given to the self and as distinct from the self only in this sense and otherwise non-distinct in fact. The root of the affective illusion—as distinct from the willed contradiction in Y o g a—is a v i v e k a which, too, like a v i d y ā, is not merely privative, being the positive feeling (not presentation) of the self being impossibly affected or modified like the object. The object is actually non-distinct i.e., not yet distinct from the self while the self is felt as though it were the object (v r t t i). The non-distinction of the object from the self is an actual objective situation, factual or s a t though terminable, but the positively felt identity of the self from the object is unreal or a s a t. Hence illusion is taken in S ā ṁ k h y a as s a d a s a t - k h y ā t i. The illusory identification of the self and the not-self then which is at the root of b h o g a is understood differently in Y o g a and in S ā ṁ - k h y a. Hence the theory of the causal process, too, which is the movement towards b h o g a as distinct from the reffective, spiritual or free process towards m u k t i is different in the two systems.

[a] YS. II. 5

[b] vidyā-viparītam jñānāntaram

CHAPTER II

SĀṄKHYA AND YOGA (Contd.)

(Causality, Becoming and Time)

17. Bhoga is understood in both the systems as the final cause of the evolutionary process of the object, the downward process of the causal becoming of prakṛti. The process of dissolution (pratisañcara) is taken by neither as a causal process, being to Sāṁkhya connected with the spontaneous cognitive act of reflection and to Yoga with free negative willing. The causal process is taken by the former to stop of itself with emergence of reflection and by the latter to be arrested by free negative willing which is to it willing not to exercise causality, *not* willing to exercise an opposite causality. To both, the causal process is the function of ahaṁkāra or the will to bhoga, the will to be finite and to progress in finitude. Causal becoming (pariṇāma) is the process of a tattva becoming finite, 'becoming' being understood as the continuing of the cause into the effect in a finitised form.

18. The concept of becoming requires to be further analysed. Becoming is understood as a unitary process presented objectively to consciousness. There are systems like Nyāya which would not even admit the presentation of becoming, its so-called unity being only the content of a wrong *thinking*, thinking of distinct contents as one. Others like the Vedāntist and the Buddhist would admit it as presented though as appearance only and not as fact. To Sāṁkhya and Yoga, becoming is presented as fact. Becoming implies both succession and persistence, both of which are presented, their unity, too, being admitted by all except Nyāya as presented and not merely thought. To them the object that conditions experience is nothing but becoming, being constituted by the causal process which is immediately presented as a becoming. Causality is presented as the cause becoming the effect, the cause as a whole at once altering and continuing into the effect, not merely altering in one respect and continuing in another. This presentation may be regarded as ultimately a false appearance, being false either as succession or as persistence. It is regarded as objectively real by Sāṁkhya

and Yoga, but they appear to differ in their conceptions of the unity of succession and persistence.

19. The difference is deducible from their conceptions of the will. Causation is to both willing to be finite, willing being a function of the object, of buddhi or ahaṁkāra which is object and does not belong to the self. To Yoga, all willing including the will to be finite is a function of buddhi, being, in fact, the self-actualisation of knowledge. Causality as the will to be finite is the self-conscious thought (or thought with the I-form) of the finite (*me*) achieving its being: cause becomes effect as the *I* willing becomes the me. To Sāṁkhya, willing which means willing to be finite is the content of knowledge and not the self-actualisation of knowledge into being. It is the object as *me* getting further manifest as *me*, and getting known as having been self-manifested. Causation is the self-manifestation of a pre-existent objective being: being is not achieved but is known to have been only manifested, to have had only known-ness induced in it by itself. The being of the effect with its limitation is already in the cause in an unmanifest form i.e., without its known-ness, the cause as distinct from the effect existing only as manifesting, expressing or unfolding the effect. The manifest-ness or known-ness of the effect and not its existence is constituted by this manifesting function of the cause which exists as the effect itself getting self-manifested. Yoga does not appear to take the effect with its limitation as pre-existent in the cause. The effect is indeed the cause with a limitation but the limitation was not in the cause, having been turned up and not merely manifested by the cause. The being of the effect implies limitation and is, therefore, taken to be constituted by the causality of the cause, not as manifested by it. The causality of the cause again does not, as in Sāṁkhya, constitute the being of the cause. The cause, so far as it is distinct from the effect and is not itself the effect of another cause, is no being at all but a function. In Sāṁkhya the cause has the being of the effect and its distinction from the effect consists in its manifesting the being.

20. The cause to both Yoga and Sāṁkhya manifests itself as the real limited being of the effect which is recognised either as the fulfilment or as the definition of the cause. Fulfilment and definition are respectively the conative and cognitive formulations of the identity-in-difference of cause and effect. Causation is will-

ing in both the cases and the result of willing is identical with the willing of it. Willing involves knowing. being to Yoga knowing itself as achieving its existence and to Sāṁkhya an existent content of its own knowing. The existence of knowing which is the result of the willing is identical with the willing in the sense of being its fulfilment, while the known or manifest existence of the willing which is the result of itself as unknown or unmanifest is identical with it as its definition. The identity of cause and effect in the case both of fulfilment and definition is not mutual but is only in one direction. In Yoga, the cause constitutes the effect which, however, as *being* is distinct from it. In Sāṁkhya, the effect is pre-existent in the cause which, however, as being defining itself is distinct from the defined being of the effect. To Hegel apparently the identity is mutual: fulfilment is definition and definition is fulfilment—what would be denied by Yoga and Sāṁkhya respectively. Becoming as at once fulfilment and definition is affective specification where the cause as the (relatively) unspecified content is realised and explicated in the effect as the specified content. Cause becomes effect which is recognised as cause. In Yoga, cause becomes effect as the *I* becomes *me*; in Sāṁkhya as the *me* becomes a more definite *me*; in Hegel as the *I* becomes *me* and the *me* becomes *I*. To Yoga, for the *me* to be recognised as the *I* is retraction of becoming, not becoming; to Sāṁkhya, the *I* as distinct from the *me* does not come in at all—there being retraction of *me* into *me* which is reflection; to Hegel becoming or causation includes retraction.

21. Becoming to both Yoga and Sāṁkhya is the self-determination of the cause. The cause freely determines itself either in the way of self-fulfilment or in the way of self-manifestation: prakṛti is svatantra. In Nyāya, the samavāyī or material cause does not determine itself, being determined by another cause, an external circumstance called nimitta, in the production of the effect. To Yoga and Sāṁkhya the material cause is the only cause: the samavāyī of the effect turns up or manifests the difference in itself called the effect. Sāṁkhya admits no nimitta at all, the so-called conjunction of the object with the self, which is sometimes called the nimitta of becoming, being nothing other than the object. Yoga admits a nimitta which is, however, taken as no cause[a] and is

[a]aprayojaka—YS.IV.3

conceived to be what simply removes a counter-acting circumstance or pratibandha. The latter is not an opposed cause: it may be an inoperative circumstance in the presence of which the cause does not operate, being as it were hypnotised by the mere presence. When the cause becomes the effect, the effect is known to be nothing but the cause fulfilled or manifested. But the cause is sometimes found not to act and even when it acts, it takes time to produce the effect. The implication is that there is some inoperative counter-acting circumstance which prevents or delays causation. Its absence is a negative condition of causation and the positive circumstance that causes the absence is nimitta, the ultimate nimitta being the absolutely free will of God.

22. The question of pratibandha or nimitta arises only when the cause is known prior to the effect. If, as Yoga takes it, willing is the self-actualisation of knowledge that is already there, the cause is known prior to the emergence of the effect. If the cause does not operate in any case, a counter-active has to be admitted and hence when the cause operates, the absence of the counter-active and the nimitta causing the absence have to be inferred. Where however, as in Sāṁkhya, the cause is known only through the effect as the prior datum, the cause is known as having already operated so that the admission of the absence of counter-active as a negative condition is superfluous, being like the admission of the absence of the absence of A after the admission of A. Hence in Sāṁkhya the question of the nimitta does not rise at all and it is unnecessary to admit a divine will as a co-operant condition of becoming along with the self-determining function of prakṛti.

23. The difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga about the nature of causality is reflected in their views on the nature of time. Neither system admits time as a separate tattva: time is to both concrete becoming or pariṇāma which is not conceived as an event in time. Pariṇāma may be understood as the cause turning up its own limitation or as the limited effect having got manifested. In the former conception, the real objective fact is the act of the cause, its act of turning up or the production, the succession of cause and effect being only a retrospective construction as in the Bergsonian view. In the latter conception, the real fact is the antecedence of the cause to the effect, the prior becoming of the effect, but the causal act as the initial

moment of this becoming is but an abstraction. Hence to Yoga which presents the former conception, time is real as the causal act, the initiation or the initial moment of becoming (kṣaṇa) —what may be called the living present—and the so-called time-relation of sequence of cause and effect is not real, for the past or future moment with which the real present appears to be related is not real at all. To the latter or Sāṁkhya conception of becoming, the effect being pre-existent in the cause is never turned up so that the time-relation of sequence alone—the prior process of manifestation constitutive of the manifestness of the effect—is real time.

24. The views of time require further elucidation. Time is taken by some commentators on Sāṁkhya-kārikā as nothing but ākāśa as bhūta viewed in reference to experienced motion—say, of the sun in the sky. This conception, however, would hardly apply to the procession of tattvas and would at best interpret becoming in the world of experience. Yukti-dīpikā,[a] the commentary on Kārikā already referred to, suggests that time may be the causal process (kāraṇa-parispanda) itself, the general process of becoming. This accords with Vijñāna-bhikṣu's commentary on Sāṁkhya-sūtra[b] where the ākāśa of which space and time are taken to be differentiations is taken not as a bhūta but as an aspect of prakṛti itself. Time as an aspect of prakṛti is nitya-kāla or eternal time which appears to be nothing but the eternal becoming of prakṛti, the eternal procession of the tattvas. This ākāśa is understood along with buddhi to be manifest within prakṛti as function though not as being and may well be taken as the same as this buddhi. Time then to Sāṁkhya appears to be prakṛti itself in its eternal function of manifestation through which the tattvas from buddhi downwards have their manifest character.

25. The Sāṁkhya view of time has to be mainly guessed at but the Yoga view of time is pronounced both in the Yoga-sūtras and in the Bhāṣya.[c] The two aspects of time—kṣaṇa (instant) and krama (continuous sequence of instants)—are dis-

[a] p. 89, II. 8-9
[b] II. 12. dik-kālāvākāśadivyaḥ
[c] YS. III. 13-15, 52; IV. 12. 32

cussed in YB. III. 52 and IV. 32. The instant is explained in the first instance as infinitesimal duration, the time taken by an atom of infinitesimal magnitude to move out of its position or to reach the next position. Apparently this applies to an action in the empirical world only, but kṣaṇa and krama are understood in the metaphysical world also[a] and hence kṣaṇa would generally mean the time taken by a thing to give up its present mode or to take up a new mode. Ultimately it would be the changing act of guṇa which is as much substantial as the guṇa,[b] not the time taken by the act but the act itself as substantial.

26. Three modes of immanent change of a tattva (as distinct from its change into a new tattva) are mentioned in YS. III. 13—viz., change of dharma (character or capacity), change of lakṣaṇa (stage of actuality) and change of avasthā (state), each later of which is consequent on the former. The lakṣaṇas are taken to be three-fold—viz., future, present, and past, these being understood not as temporal modes but as stages of actuality—what in the process of causation (willing) respectively is to be actual, is actual and was actual, the three being the eternal stages of the same thing, of which the present is vyakta (manifest to all) and the other two sūksma (manifest to yogin).[c] The instant is primarily understood in reference to lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma, being the passing from the future stage to the present stage or from this to the past stage, there being no passing from the past.[d] The stages are not temporal but eternal, but the passing from one stage to another or the changing act is time which as necessarily simple or indivisible is called kṣaṇa or instant. An effected thing has all the three stages or lakṣaṇa-pariṇāmas and time as instant is also a pariṇāma, the transition of a thing from one lakṣaṇa to its 'causal next' (samanantara), being pariṇāma in the sense of act of change as distinct from pariṇāma as mode of being.

27. Kṣaṇa as the causal act is the living present—emerging or evanescing—as distinct from the present as a lakṣaṇa or stage of actuality. We may speak of the present stage of a thing,

[a] YB. IV. 32
[b] YV. III. 52
[c] YS. IV. 12-13
[d] YB. III. 14

as eternally together with its past and future, but the living present of a thing is unique and cannot be literally spoken of as being together with a past or future kṣaṇa. The passing of the future into the present and the passing of the present into the past are not together in the sense the future, present and past are together. Yet we speak figuratively of a past or a future instant and hence have the apparent concept of krama or sequence of kṣaṇas. This sequence is not an objective fact but is only a thinking (speaking) construction (vikalpa), a thought-content constructed 'at the moment of the termination of a change'* i.e., retrospectively. It is, in fact, a figurative representation of the order of the lakṣaṇas or the stages of actuality, which as an intelligible or non-temporal order is an objective fact. What then is ordinarily called time—viz., a duration differentiated into a succession—is to Yoga nothing real, being but a symbolism for the intelligible order within a change which is real time only as the durationless transition from one stage of the change to the stage that is causally next to it, the transition being the self-changing act of the thing, or its immanent causal function, the thing itself as kṣaṇa.

28. Apparently time, whether as real instant or the fictitious order of instants, is understood by Yoga only in reference to the immanent change of a tattva; the change of a tattva to another tattva and hence the entire procession of the tattvas presenting only an intelligible order is not time at all. To Sāṁkhya this intelligible order among the tattvas is the only real time, the eternal function of prakṛti. There is, as will appear presently, no real immanent change in Sāṁkhya, and the *entire* order alone is time, the passing from one tattva to the next being not a real part of it but an abstraction. Time as the function of prakṛti is one and not many and accordingly it is called (kāraṇa or functional) ākāśa. The instant or, for the matter of that, any finite determination of time is an unreal abstraction.

29. Sāṁkhya would certainly admit many characters (dharma), stages of actuality (lakṣaṇa) and states (avasthā) of a tattva and an order among them but cannot take this order to be causal. In fact, dharma, lakṣaṇa and

* YS. IV. 32

avasthā are to it abstractions, not changes of the tattva and causality is a relation to change as effect. The emergence of a difference in a substance by its own activity or the substance as with this difference is called pariṇāma of the substance as without this difference emergent in it. In tattvāntara-pariṇāma, the effect has all the characters of the cause with an additional distinctive character of its own. A so-called immanent change lacks some characters of the previous change and has some characters that it lacks. So the latter cannot be said to be the effect of the former. Are both to be taken as effects of the one substance? Unless the substance be admitted to exist without any accidental character, there appears to be no sense in speaking of it as the cause of any accidental character emerging in it. Immanent (causal) change then can only be admitted if the substance can exist without any differentiation in it, without any feature other than its defining features. Yoga appears to admit such existence of the substance—e.g., buddhi as in the asamprajñāta stage is admitted to be without any vṛtti or actual state (avasthā). Sāṁkhya cannot admit an undifferentiated substance: a substance exists only in its modes. A tattva may be admitted to exist before the emergence of the tattva that is its effect. But a tattva cannot by itself exist before the emergence of any mode and cannot, therefore, be the cause of this mode: there can be no immanent causality to Sāṁkhya.

30. What then, according to Sāṁkhya, is the relation between one mode of a tattva and another mode conditioned by it, between two buddhi-vṛttis, for example? Vijñānabhikṣu's conception of buddhi-vṛttis as like flames of the same fire or waves of the same sea does not apparently interpret Sāṁkhya view. A vṛtti to Yoga is what buddhi causally contracts itself into.[a] In Sāṁkhya, vṛtti is buddhi as referring in its bhāva-function (not causal function) to its content[b] as having the form of the content not as its real contraction but as an aupādhika or reflectional construction. The form of the content as reflected in buddhi is real only in the sense the image of a red object in

[a] YB.IV.10
[b] SS V.106

the mirror is really presented as red, not real as a modification of buddhi nor unreal in the sense the reflection of a vṛtti in the self is unreal, which again is like the image in the mirror in so far as it is presented but not as *really in* the mirror. The form of the object is *really presented* in buddhi as the form of the vṛtti which, however, is presented as only *unreally* or *magically* in the self.

31. Vṛtti then to Sāṁkhya is buddhi really in the form of object, which form, however, is not its causal modification, as it is to Yoga, (though the causality admitted by Yoga is that of buddhi itself and not of the object). It is, therefore, a non-causal but real manifestation of buddhi, belonging to its bhāva-sarga as distinct from its liṅga-sarga.* The relation of a vṛtti to another conditioned by it is like the relation of their contents non-causal. In the sphere of non-causal manifestation of buddhi, whether in its subjective or objective aspect, there can only be an appearance of causation and no real causation. The so-called immanent change of a tattva then (dharma-lakṣaṇa-avasthā-pariṇāma) is to Sāṁkhya an appearance of change or causal manifestation, which is neither real change nor, therefore, illusory, being in fact a phenomenally real manifestation of prakṛti.

33. To Sāṁkhya then real time is the eternal procession but not illusory differentiations and their succession would be, like the succession of their contents, not time but an appearance of time. To Yoga which regards the vṛttis as real changes of a tattva through its immanent causality, their succession would indeed be a non-causal construction or vikalpa, but the emergence of a vṛtti would be a real kṣaṇa.

33. To Sāṁkhya then real time is the eternal procession of the objective tattvas, the order of phenomenal objects as also of the tattva-vṛttis corresponding to them being only apparently temporal, though not illusory. To Yoga real time is the act of a tattva of causing an immanent change, the succession of such immanent changes is only constructed time, a construction or vikalpa of buddhi and the order of the tattvas is non-temporal.

* SK. 52

CHAPTER III

SĀNKHYA AND YOGA (contd.)

(The empirical world: its status & constitution.)

34. Sāṁkhya would not apparently admit the Yoga contention of the immanent causal change of a tattva. Such change, as for example of buddhi into the vṛttis, would be to it only an appearance though not illusory, a non-causal or reflectional construction which is yet really in the tattva. A vṛtti is taken both in Yoga and Sāṁkhya as implying a bhāva (rūpa in Yoga) or non-causal reference of buddhi beyond itself to the facts of experience, though it is itself regarded by Yoga against Sāṁkhya as causally manifested. What is the metaphysical status of the facts of experience according to these systems?

35. Both would deny that the empirical world is a tattva other than the vikāra-tattvas (bhūta and indriya) with which the evolution of the tattvas is taken to end. Yoga takes it, however, to be an immanent pariṇāma of the vikāra-tattvas.[a] This cannot be the Sāṁkhya view, to which the notion of immanent change is, as pointed out, generally inadmissible. In the Vedāntic view the empirical world is false, but then it is of the same status as the objective tattvas so that to vyāvahārika knowledge it is as real as the body—subtle and gross—through which the self experiences the world. The bhogya (experienced) and the bhogāyatana (experiencing body) would be, as in Yoga, immanent changes of the same stuff.

36. If Sāṁkhya denies immanent change, what would be its view of the body and the external world? The body is undoubtedly real, as real as the tattvas constituting it. The unitary form of the body is the form of the self from which its elements are undistinguished, this non-distinction being the principle of beginningless aviveka. Aviveka has here, however, a manifest form, being manifest in buddhi as its bhāva or its function of bhoga which is its non-causal reference to the

[a] YB. II. 19; III. 13; IV. 14. etc.

objects of experience or the external world. The body then is one through the buddhi-bhāva immanent in it, i.e., through its response to the external world, being itself called a kāryāśrayi-bhāva. The body as one is real as bhogāyatana or the substratum of the bhoga-function. What, however, then is the bhogya object which cannot be said to be such substratum?

37. The object of experience is not only not an immanent pariṇāma of the tattvas that are manifest in the experiencing body: it has not even like the body the real unity of a non-causal function. As experienced, however, it cannot be unreal unless experience as the function of buddhi be taken as in Vedānta to be unreal. To Sāṁkhya, experience or bhoga is indeed illusory content, but the illusory is to it not utterly unreal but real in one aspect while in Vedānta it is what cannot be asserted to be real or unreal. If the sense-experience is real, its content or the object of experience is real. Experiencing is real not indeed as a causal activity (state) of buddhi as in Yoga but as a non-causal subjective function of (the) buddhi (-self), of buddhi endowed with the form of *I*. The function is reference to the object and cannot be real without its content, the object being also real. The object of bhoga is felt to be given and this feeling does not cease even when the object is realised as nothing apart from the bhoga, as constituted by the illusory identity of the self with the not-self. It is thus unlike a manifest tattva which is known as other than the self i.e., through the correction of illusory identity. At the same time it is not an illusory appearance, because it is not, like the snake that a rope appears to be, known in reflection as what was not given as such to bhoga. To know that experience is an illusion is not to know that the experienced object is an illusion: even the jīvanmukta is supposed to perceive the empirical object as fact though he has no experience of it. The empirical object is manifest as fact though it is not a manifest tattva: as fact it is the unmanifest tattva—prakṛti—and as manifest, it is only an appearance non-causally manifested—constructed and known—by buddhi as the content of its bhāva-sarga. It cannot be an immanent change in bhūta as vikāra-tattva, as it is taken to be in Yoga because there is no real immanent change and because it is not manifest like bhūta etc., by the correction of the identity of the self and the not-self.

38. Yoga admits immanent change and specifically takes empirical objects as the pariṇama of atomic bhūta (bhūta-sūkṣma) which again is the pariṇāma of the tanmātra.[a] At the same time the spatio-temporal distinctions within the empirical world are apparently taken by Yoga along with Sāṁkhya as non-causal constructions of buddhi—i.e., as vikalpas. Vikalpa as buddhi-vṛtti is as much an immanent change of buddhi as the other vṛttis, but the content of vikalpa is a non-causal construct or buddhi-nirmāṇa which is no fact (vastu) though not illusory or is, in other words, a given appearance such as the entire empirical world is taken to be in Sāṁkhya. In Yoga, while the empirical object is otherwise a real change of vikāra-tattva, its distinguishing space-time limitations are only given appearances. The guṇas constituting a tattva are perpetually entering into new combinations[b] and hence the multiplicity of immanent changes. Of these pariṇāmas each is in essence every other[c] though one only gets manifest at a time (emergent, present or udita), the others not emerging because of some counteractive circumstance—which the particular space-time characters of the emergent change are taken to be.[d] A particular immanent change emerges only with its proper time, place, shape and occasional cause, these being no changes themselves but only the context for a change. Its time means its position in time-series or krama which is definitely taken[e] as a construction of buddhi; and presumably the same status would be assigned to the other circumstances—place, shape etc.—constituting the context for a pariṇāma.

39. An empirical object is then to Yoga an immanent change of bhūta in a buddhi-constructed context. To Sāṁkhya it appears to be wholly a buddhi-construction (so far as it is manifest), having place in the bhāva-sarga as distinct from the liṅga-sarga of buddhi; or, more accurately, it is the content of a buddhi-bhāva as immanent in the gross or bhautika body i.e., as kāryāśrita-bhāva, content that is constructed so far as it is manifest but not so far

[a] YB. IV. 14; III. 44

[b] calam ca guṇa-vṛttam—YB. III. 13, etc.

[c] sarvam sarvātmakam—YB. I'' ''

[d] YB. III. 14

[e] YB. III. 52

as it is given. It is thus a non-causal manifestation of prakṛti referred to or experienced by the bodily self as constituted by the experiencing function but not by the matter of the body. The body is itself bhūta though not its immanent pariṇāma, bhūta with buddhi-bhāva really resident in it though not as a modification. Yoga appears to take the empirical object to be of the same status as the body experiencing it.

40. The consideration of Yoga and Sāṁkhya views on the nature of illusion, causality, time and the empirical world prepares the way for an answer to the question asked before as to whether the objective tattvas are conceived in the same way in the two systems. The Sāṁkhya (objective) tattvas are referred to in the Yoga-sutras in the enumeration of the four guṇa-parvas.[a] The guṇas are taken to exist in four stages—viśeṣa comprising the bhutas and indriyas, aviśeṣa including the five tānmātras and also ahaṁkāra called asmitā-mātra, liṅga-mātra which is buddhi, and a-liṅga which is prakṛti or pradhāna. The difference in respect of ahaṁkāra in the two systems has been already brought out, their conceptions of aviśeṣa being otherwise the same. As to the viśeṣas, the main difference is about the atomic nature of the bhūtas which is admitted by Yoga and would be apparently denied by Sāṁkhya. Important differences, however, appear in their conceptions of buddhi and prakṛti.

41. As already pointed out, Yoga holds that bhūta emerges out of tanmātra in the form of perceivable sthūla atoms in the first instance, out of which again sthula complex objects emerge as immanent pariṇāmas. A bhūta in its essential form as a new evolute of tanmātra is atomic, being called bhūta-sūkṣma or sthūla-sūkṣma—having much the same status as the trasareṇus of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The bhūta-sūkṣma is a simple perceivable, though it is still a complex of the unperceivable tanmātras which are elementary manifest matter.[b] The manifest object is in the last resort composed of the guṇas which are absolutely simple and not only unperceivable but unmanifest (without the objective

[a] YS. II. 19
[b] YB. IV. 14

character of known-ness). Apparently then to Yoga there are three grades of sūkṣma matter—the guṇas, the tanmātras and the bhūta-sūkṣmas. Of these, bhūta-sūkṣma is definitely called paramāṇu[a] and mahābhūta or viśvarūpa, in the form of composite bhautika objects which are taken as its pariṇāma, is presumably composed of or immanently caused by many such paramāṇus. Each paramāṇu is composed of tanmātras, an earth-paramāṇu by all the five tanmātras, a water-paramāṇu by four (excluding smell) and so forth. The question is if Yoga admits many tanmātras or many guṇas of the same species like many paramāṇus of the same species which are very likely admitted. Are there, for example, many individual sound-tanmātras or many individual sattva-guṇas?

42. If a mahābhūta is taken by Yoga as composed of many paramāṇus (trasas), these are understood not as exact similars but as 'having different qualitative viśeṣas.'[b] The mahābhūta as avayavin is taken to be an immanent pariṇāma[c] of each paramāṇu as avayava. A paramāṇu, again, is avayavi-pariṇāma of many tanmātras of the same kind (with tanmātras of other kinds combined with them but not making an avayavin with them). A tanmātra unlike a bhūta does not admit of qualitative variations and hence its immanent (avasthā-) pariṇāmas can only be quantitatively different as degrees. Tanmātras of the same kind as the avayavas of a paramāṇu are then together as the units of an intensive, as distinct from an extensive.. quantum are together and may be symbolically described as mutually interpenetrating (cf. the Vaiśeṣika conception of two paramāṇus making up a dvyaṇuka with the same magnitude as that of a paramāṇu), their togetherness being here felt and not perceived. A unit-tanmātra is further conceived like any other tattva as a unity of the three guṇas that is predominantly tāmasika. Does this predominance, which is apparently a quantity, imply the co-existence of many individual tamoguṇas?

[a] YB. III. 44; IV. 14
[b] YB. III. 44
[c] YS. IV. 14

43. The dominant character of a g u ṇ a in a manifest object may not be merely relative to the other g u ṇ a s constituting it : it may be relatively to the same g u ṇ a in other objects where also it is dominant. In the latter aspect, the g u ṇ a as constituting an object may appear to be a quantum requiring to be conceived as a synthesis of units. Hence on certain other considerations V i j ñ a n a - b h i k ṣ u admits an infinite number of units of the same g u ṇ a. Is the conception tenable? As a g u ṇ a is conceived in Y o g a and S ā ṃ k h y a, it can hardly be intelligibly spoken of as having a given finite quantity. One object may indeed appear to have more of a particular g u ṇ a than another, but the quantity here is understood metaphorically rather than literally. It is like taking the knowledge of a greater as itself greater than the knowledge of the less.

44. The g u ṇ a s are understood in terms of the b u d d h i - function of b h o g a in its three forms--s u k h a, d u ḥ k h a and m o h a—as their unmanifest potentialities. The three b h o g a s are regarded not only as subjective experiences but as experienced characters of the object. Subjectively they stand for three apparent predicaments of the self, being the feelings of being free, being at once free and unfree, and being unfree respectively. Objectively they are presented as the three fundamental aesthetic characters—p r a k ā ś a, k r i y ā and s t h i t i ; and these understood as unmanifest or independent of the subject are the three g u ṇ a s. Apparently even an aesthetic character has a degree but the degree here is like the degree of the freedom of the self. If subjective freedom be taken as freedom of the will—as it would be taken in Y o g a, 'greater freedom' would be felt in making an effort—what is described as willing to reinforce a previous willing—which is not really adding to the previous willing but is on a higher level of self-consciousness. It is willing the willing itself, which is not a greater degree of the first willing but is creative of a greater degree. Degree of freedom and, therefore, degree of s a t t v a or p r a k ā ś a as an objective character would then be understood in Y o g a as not an accomplished or existent quantum but a quantum in the making. So generally the degree of a g u ṇ a as in a manifest object would have to be regarded as a factitious quantity.

45. Now a quantum in the making cannot be said to be composed of co-existent units. More or less of a g u ṇ a in

an object then is only a coming into being of the object, the becoming being thinkable as *any* number of becomings. The object even as tanmātra which admits of no distinguishable qualitative variations and only of distinguishable degrees admits still of qualitative peculiarities which are un-isolable in thought. These are really aesthetic characters and can be present as more or less. When an object is said to have more or less of any such character, we say loosely that it has more or less of a guṇa. Where the fact is that it has the guṇa with more or less of the aesthetic character as its upādhi, the guṇa itself being a causing function which may be thought as any number of functions and is thought as a particular number because of the upādhi.

46. Apparently then Yoga admits many paramāṇus (having nameable qualitative viśeṣas) of the same bhūta in the corresponding mahābhūta and many *degrees* (each with an un-nameable qualitative viśeṣa) of the same tanmātra in the corresponding paramāṇus explaining these viśeṣas but not many vyaktis of the same guṇa as explaining such un-nameable viśeṣas. Not that an un-nameable viśeṣa is eternal like a Vaiśeṣika viśeṣa, for the tanmātra of which it is viśeṣa is an effect. As an effected viśeṣa, it too admits of magnitude. But such magnitude cannot be a synthesis of units as the viśeṣa of a mahabhūta is a synthesis of those of the paramāṇus and not even as the viśeṣa of a paramāṇu is a synthesis of those of the tanmātras. The synthesis of paramāṇus is extensive and that of tanmātras is intensive; and if a tanmātra, again, has an effected magnitude, it cannot be the result of an extensive or intensive synthesis. As a manifest character, this magnitude must be simple, unanalysable into manifest units. But as the tanmātra of which it is a character is effected, this manifest simple must be effected. Its effectuation, however, can be only an unmanifest process. Manifest synthesis is of co-existent units which retain or lose their manifest distinction as units in the compound, though their co-existence is still manifest in the latter case, the case of intensive synthesis, where the units are felt as flowing into each other. In the un-manifest effectuation of the viśeṣa of a tanmātra, if it be called a synthesis at all, there is not even this felt flowing existence and, therefore, no

vyaktis or self-identical units at all. A guṇa constituting the tanmātra is here a pure flow, not the flow of one self-identical unit into another, not the emergence of a self-identity followed by its cessation but a flow in which self-identity does not emerge at all. Yet self-identity as emergent in a manifest tattva is an effect, the cause of which, viz., a guṇa must be understood as the *causing* of self-identity. This causing process in which the guṇa consists is just what is called its sadṛśa-pariṇāma.

47. Yoga thus presents some kind of atomic theory which, however, differs from the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣika. Paramāṇu, tanmātra and guṇa of Yoga correspond roughly to trasa, dvyaṇuka and paramāṇu of the Vaiśeṣika, these being inferred for the explanation of the magnitude-variations of a sense-perceived bhautika object. The cardinal difference between the two atomic theories is in respect of the conception of the ultimate simple constituent of objective reality—the guṇa of Yoga or the Vaiśeṣika paramāṇu. Yoga would not admit the Vaiśeṣika notion of the eternal co-existence of many simple constituents of the same kind which are absolute repetitions of one another. Objection has been taken to this notion by others on the ground that there can be no such thing as two exact similars, that what are numerically different must be also different in some character. The Vaiśeṣika reply to the objection would be that a given thing with a finite magnitude is necessarily inferred to be a synthesis of things of smaller magnitude that are exactly similar and that, therefore, ultimately exact similars of infinitesimal magnitude must exist, each with an eternal un-analysable viśeṣa. There must be co-existent exact similars because there is finite magnitude, though how they retain their distinction may not be conceivable. Yoga would admit that the notion of finite magnitude implies the notion of exact similars but not of their co-existence, that their co-existence cannot be inferred from the existence of the finite magnitude but is otherwise known where it is a fact, that exact similars cause a thing of finite magnitude without necessarily being the parts of it. Even where the parts of a thing with finite magnitude have finite magnitudes (e.g., trasas), *each* part causes or causally becomes the whole, the other parts being relatively to it only nimitta which to Yoga, as has been

pointed out, is no cause but only what removes the pratibandha of the effect. The co-existence of the parts, therefore, is no causal circumstances in reference to the effect, though it is a fact. In what is called saṁkhyā-ja-parimāṇa (magnitude due to mere number) in Vaiśeṣika where the magnitude of the effect viz., trasa is admitted to be not due to the co-existence of the dvyaṇukas, they are still regarded as vyaktis under a jāti. This would correspond in Yoga to the magnitude of a trasa (called paramāṇu) as caused by the tanmātra-magnitudes which are apparently synthesised like the units of a degree. A tanmātra then may be conceivably regarded as vyaktis under a jāti. Like a Vaiśesika dvyaṇūka a tanmātra-unit is an effect of something subtler viz., guṇa. If a guṇa appears as more or less in such a unit this magnitude cannot be said to be saṁkhyā-ja-parimāṇā. In Vaiśeṣika, a trasa has dvyaṇūkas in it, each of which is composed of paramāṇus, the magnitude of both trasa and dvyaṇuka being saṁkhyā-ja. Apparently here, however, we have not two grades of saṁkhyā-ja magnitude. The cause of the trasa-magnitude is as much the number of the dvyaṇukas as the number of the paramāṇus, there being no dvyaṇuka except as constituting a trasa. The magnitude of a dvyaṇuka does not differ from that of a paramāṇu, both being 'aṇu' and therefore not admitting of more or less. Yoga would take a tanmātra-unit as admittedly of more or less of a guṇa, though it cannot understand it as due to the number of guṇa-units.

48. The relation of the three grades of sūkṣma matter in Yoga—viz., guṇa, tanmātra and paramāṇu has to be more closely compared with the relation of the three Vaiśesika grades of matter of minimal magnitude—paramāṇu, dvyaṇuka and trasa. A guṇa (along with other guṇas) causes a tanmātra (and in fact any manifest object) but is not present as many units constituting the parts of the tanmātra. To the Vaiśeṣika, paramāṇu as causing a dvyaṇuka is two units, though it is doubtful if these units should be called parts of the dvyaṇuka. The paramāṇus causing a trasa are units that are parts of the trasa. The causal constituents of a whole that is greater in magnitude than any constituent are called its parts. If the paramāṇus are causal constituents of a

dvyaṇuka that has the same magnitude as each paramāṇu, they cannot be called its parts. Even if this objection be waived, we have to take the paramāṇus not as spatially next to one another but as only temporal 'nexts'. Everywhere else a temporal next has a space-position other than that of the persisting antecedent that forms a unity with it, but here a temporal next is not a spatial next. Whether we call the paramāṇus-parts of the dvyaṇuka or not, they are not spatially co-existent units as they are even in the trasa. So if they are two units, they are *together* in their product in quite a unique sense. To Yoga, a guṇa constitutive of a tanmātra as its effect is not many units at all. Number is a character of what are each already self-identical, but a guṇa is creative of self-identity that appears only in the manifest and is manifestness itself. The cause of self-identity is not a self-identity but a self-becoming or self-reproducing function (sadṛśa-pariṇāma).

49. Again, to the Vaiśeṣika, the paramāṇus cause the trasa, causing the dvyaṇuka as implied in the trasa. The emergence of the trasa and that of the dvyaṇuka is aparently a single process, the dvyaṇuka in fact being the trasa in one aspect. Although the paramāṇus are said to cause a dvyaṇuka and the dvyaṇukas a trasa, a dvyaṇuka cannot be inferred to exist *apart* from a trasa nor a paramāṇu *apart* from a dvyaṇuka, though their existence in trasa is inferred from the change (due to heat) of one trasa into another. The emergence that requires to be explained may be indifferently expressed as that of trasa as embodying dvyaṇuka or of dvyaṇuka as necessarily embodied in trasa, and hence the causation of the dvyaṇuka and that of the trasa are coincident processes. To Yoga a tanmātra is not necessarily formative of a paramāṇu (trasa): a higher tattva can exist by itself without causing or being embodied in a lower, causing as it does the lower only when there is a nimitta to remove pratibandha. If the Vaiśeṣika admits that a trasa breaks up into free dvyaṇukas and these into free paramāṇus at the time of pralaya though not within sṛṣṭi, admits in other words the possible destruction of saṁkhyā-ja-parimāṇa, it can be, according to him, only through the will and in the knowledge of God (Iśvara-buddhi), through and in which creation also is

possible. To our buddhi, a trasa breaks up into dvyaṇuka etc., only in passing into a different trasa: its breaking up into free parts would mean its passing out of perceptibility, which is never perceived and cannot be inferred. The tattvas in Yoga and Sāṁkhya are not properly inferred but are known through some kind of 'transcendental' reflection through which their *free* being is also known. Tanmātra, for example, as the cause of bhūta is not inferred in the sense dvyaṇuka is inferred as the cause of trasa in Vaiśeṣika philosophy. While then the causation of the dvyaṇuka and that of the trasa are taken in this philosophy to be temporally distinct only to the knowledge of God, Yoga would take the two causations —of the tanmātra and of the bhūta (-paramāṇu)—as distinct to our (transcendental) buddhi also.

50. Sāṁkhya does not admit the atomic theory either of Yoga or of Vaiśeṣika. The atomic conception in fact is alien to the spirit of Sāṁkhya, although Vijñāna-bhikṣu attributes to Sāṁkhya the atomistic notions of Yoga philosophy. To Yoga, units of the same tanmātra or of the same bhūta (as paramāṇus) would be the immanent pariṇāmas of the tanmātra or bhūta. Sāṁkhya, as has been pointed out, cannot admit immanent change at all. The so-called immanent change would be to it only aupādhika, being not real modifications but real reflections in each tattva of the objects of experience. As to Vijñāna-bhikṣu's hypothesis of guṇa-units (attributed by him both to Yoga and Sāṁkhya) to explain *more or less* of a guṇa, the conception of sadṛśa-pariṇāma has been shown to be sufficient for the explanation. That conception is entertained both by Yoga and Sāṁkhya though with a difference. The difference will come out in the discussion of buddhi.

CHAPTER IV

BUDDHI-VṚTTI

(NIDRĀ AND SMṚTI)

51. The object is to both Yoga and Sāṁkhya pariṇāmi-nitya: its reality unlike that of the self involves becoming or dynamic, as distinct from static, self-identity. Becoming is real in the sense willing is real, willing in abstraction from consciousness being real becoming. Willing (towards the object) is understood in Yoga as consciously becoming finite and in Sāṁkhya as having consciously become finite, as a prospective function in the former and a retrospective function in the latter. As not yet abstracted from the self, we are aware of it as 'I going to exist as *me*' or '*me* having come to exist'. If 'me' be taken as the type of the objective existent, objective reality would be to Yoga going to exist and to Sāṁkhya coming (or having come) to exist. It is only in the conative consciousness—consciousness of willing or having willed—that going or coming to exist is appreciated as real fact. To the mere cognitive consciousness, going to exist would be but an imagined content, a construction (vikalpa), according to Yoga; and coming to exist a mere abstraction from the emergent or manifest existent, according to Sāṁkhya. The real object is then to Yoga what is going to exist or becoming and to Sāṁkhya what has come to exist or has become.

52. Two kinds of becoming or pariṇāma are admitted in Yoga and Sāṁkhya—sadṛśa and visadṛśa. Visadṛśa-pariṇāma is causal becoming where the two terms of becoming which are identical in difference are different in character, not mere self-repetitions. Sadṛśa-pariṇāma is becoming, the terms of which are only numerically different, not different in character. Mere numerical difference may be denied as a fact, as for example, by Leibnitz; or it may be admitted as an eternal or timeless fact, as by the Vaiśeṣika, about paramāṇū or manas, or by Sāṁkhya and Yoga also about the self. *Objects* as merely numerically distinct are admitted in Yoga and Sāṁkhya not as timelessly together as in Vaiśeṣika but as terms of becoming. The second term of becoming

is not necessarily an effect distinct in character from the first: the ultimate cause, viz., guṇa, is also real as becoming, as what becomes or has become itself over again, there being no eternally real (kūṭastha-nitya) object. Distinction to both Yoga and Sāṁkhya as objective is not eternal being but the process of becoming distinct. This applies even to merely numerical distinction which in its manifest form is presented as self-identity. A manifest objective tattva is explicitly known as known object, unlike the unmanifest guṇa on the one hand which is known as unknown and unlike the experienced object on the other which is known but not as known or unknown. The self also is known as known but it is not known as object; and although it is an explicit self-identity, it cannot be conceived as becoming itself. Objective tattva is manifest in the sense of being a self-identity involving the process of becoming itself. Of the manifest tattvas, buddhi has the sole character of manifestness which is just this self-identity, the lower tattvas having other characters emergent in them more or less obscuring the pure self-identity. The pure self-identity of buddhi is itself an effect and its cause, the guṇa, has to be understood as having the potentiality of self-identity or—what is the same thing—as in sadṛśa-pariṇāma.

53. In Yoga the self-identity or manifestness (vyaktatā) of the object is taken to constitute its existence[a] or presence. In Sāṁkhya it is a character caused by the already existent guṇa in itself, manifestness being known-ness rather than existence. The cause or potentiality of self-identity is accordingly conceived differently in the two systems. In Yoga a guṇa is real but not yet existent, being what is going (or has ceased) to exist, is neither existent nor non-existent and lacks self-identity.[b] In Sāṁkhya, 'real' and 'existent' would mean the same thing: guṇa is existent without self-identity or manifestness, what is known as not self-identical, *not* like the object of experience that is not known as self-identical. The existence of buddhi is self-conserving, as contrasted with which the existence of guṇa is simply emerging, just as ahaṁkāra is self-conserving finitude and buddhi (as the lower asmitā) is only the emerging of finitude. Determinate tattva contains

[a] YB. II. 19: YV. II. 19.
[b] *Ibid.*

the prior process of emergence or becoming determinate ideally within it. It is never known without the emergence being known : the determinate is never merely given as determinate. The emergence, too, which is fact and no mere abstraction is known only in the determinate. Yoga would, however, admit that becoming may be known prior to the emergence of determinate being in the form of going to exist though not in the form of coming to exist or emerging. Sāṁkhya would deny it but admit that emerging is known in the knowing of the determinate—as constitutive of its determination. Whether in the form of going to exist or coming to be determined, becoming as prior to determinate being i.e., as an indeterminate being has to be conceived as the transition between two determinate beings in abstraction from them as its terms, the abstraction being possible through the conception of the terms being exactly similar. The identity of two terms implies one term *becoming* the other term as merely numerically distinct from it, the becoming being understood either prospectively as in Yoga, or retrospectively as in Sāṁkhya. Sadṛśa-pariṇāma is this becoming as implied in identity, the function of a being going to be itself or coming to be itself, its projection of itself in the future or its retraction of itself as past, its willed self-propagation or its felt self-integration.

54. This difference between Yoga and Sāṁkhya on sadṛśa-pariṇāma indicates their difference on the nature of prakṛti and buddhi. Existence to Yoga means manifest existence; buddhi is indifferently sattā-mātra or liṅga-mātra, prakṛti being accordingly niḥsatta or a-liṅga (avyakta). To sāṁkhya, manifestness is a contingent character of the existent, existence being no character and, therefore, not contingent: guṇa is the bare existent and buddhi is guṇa with the sole character of manifestness. The guṇas to both are the three unique modes of freedom, but freedom is understood conatively in Yoga and cognitively in Sāṁkhya, so that to the former guṇa is self-becoming before existence and to the latter self-becoming of the existent or the existent having become itself, self-becoming being perpetual in either way. The difference in the conception of freedom is connected with the difference in the conception of ahaṁkāra in the two systems already brought out.

55. Sadṛśa-pariṇama, the function of prakṛti, is understood prospectively in Yoga and retrospectively in Sāṁkhya. It may be equated with the function called avidyā or aviveka understood as the function of anāgata or atīta-buddhi—as distinct from present or manifest buddhi—incipiently operative or unmanifestly persistent within prakṛti. As in Yoga, guṇa has no existence yet in prakṛti but is only the real function of going to exist, it may be conceived to be avidyā itself as in Vedānta, though it is taken to be objectively real as the function of sadṛśa-pariṇāma, not what is neither real nor unreal but the real that is neither existent nor non-existent. In Sāṁkhya, aviveka or the function of sadṛśa-pariṇāma is real as the retrospective function of the existent guṇa.

56. In Yoga the first manifest or existent form of prospective self-repetition is apparently the immanent change of buddhi. Buddhi is liṅga-mātra or sattā-mātra which is the existent freely getting differentiated into many real modes, each of which being the undivided buddhi is every other (sarvam sarvātmakam). Immanent pariṇāma is the self-repetition of a tattva, where each repetition has a distinct identity or existence, is a vyakti, unlike a repetition of a guṇa which has no identity at all. An immanent pariṇāma of buddhi may be dharma, lakṣaṇa or avasthā. Buddhi has two kinds of dharma-pariṇāma—unconscious and conscious (a-paridṛṣṭa and paridṛṣṭa).[a] Yoga-bhāṣya mentions seven a-paridṛṣṭa dharmas—of which nirodha, dharma and saṁskāra may be specially noted. Nirodha or negative attention, the essential function of yoga, is an unconscious willing to arrest the helpless change of buddhi, unconscious at all levels of buddhi and is inferred from the saṁskāras left by such willing which, again, are inferred from the facilitation of subsequent nirodha. Negative willing, unlike positive willing, is not known by introspection (though its fulfilment as such may be conscious in samprajñāta-samādhi) but is inferred (even in the case of asamprajñāta) from the progressive spontaneity of the practice of concentration (as remembered in vyutthāna).

[a] YB. III. 15.

Dharma and adharma (merit and demerit) are the saṁskāras left by previous willing leading to bhoga or mukti, while what is specially called 'saṁskāra' in the enumeration of the seven a-paridṛṣṭas is saṁskāra of previous bhoga (experience), otherwise designated vāsanā, which leads to memory (smṛti). As opposed to the a-paridṛṣṭas, there are the conscious pariṇāmas of buddhi including the five vṛttis to be mentioned presently and also the conscious activities and feelings.

57. All these are the dharma-pariṇāmas of buddhi and the vṛttis among them are its specific dharma-pariṇāmas or avasthās. Apparently there may be unconscious functions but not unconscious states or vṛttis of the mind. Vṛttis are conscious modes of buddhi which are concrete things comparable to the flames shot forth from fire, presentations and not mere functions (dharma) or degrees of actuality (lakṣaṇa). Conscious activities and feelings are also sometimes called 'vṛtti' but they appear to be both function and presentation, function bound up with vṛtti in the narrow sense of presentation. The functions—conscious and unconscious—would roughly correspond to the bhāvas of Sāṁkhya (which, however, has no place for nirodha). Vṛtti is understood in Sāṁkhya not as presentation, not as a real mode of buddhi but as a constructive mode, as the being of buddhi understood as characterised by a specific function.

58. Vṛttis are understood in Yoga as cognitive presentations which alone are real modes of buddhi. Five classes of presentation are mentioned—viz., pramāṇa, viparyaya, vikalpa, nidrā and smṛti—which are respectively presentation of object as real, as unreal, as constructive, as absence of presentation and as presentation. The classification of vṛttis is at once psychological and epistemological, psychological so far as presentation is itself a differentiated mental object and epistemological so far as presentation is *of* an experienceable object. The function of referring to an object is itself constitutive of a real mode (and not merely of a constructive mode as in Sāṁkhya which is still existent) of buddhi, though it may be real without constituting it as in asamprajñāta where buddhi is saṁskāra-śeṣa having a-paridṛṣṭa dharma only. Presentation is at once mental object (grāhya)

and anticipatory reflection (image) of object (grahaṇa which is not subjective function or bhāva but objective function or rather subjective function in abstraction from the subject or grahītā), the kind of mental object being determined by the kind of anticipation of object or anticipated object.

59. The epistemological modes of anticipation of object or anticipated object are interesting as indicating a unique system of objective categories. Real, unreal, constructive, unpresented and presented are the ultimate predicates of the object in the sense of presented content, content of a self-identical mental state. What we assert of a presented content is either about its reality or about its presentedness. We assert about its reality in three forms—it is real or it is not real or it is as though it were real; and we assert about its presentedness in two forms—viz., that presentation or its absence is presented. Presentation of a content that is known as real is pramāṇa, of a content that is known as unreal is viparyaya and of a content that appears real even when it is known as unreal is vikalpa; while presentation of a content *as* presented—i.e., presentation of presentation is smṛti and presentation of the absence of presentation is nidrā. The distinction between reality and presentedness is the epistemological distinction between object of presentation and presentation of object, both presentation and its object being object in the wider sense of dṛśya or what is distinct from dṛk or self.

60. Each vṛtti has to be understood in reference to the corresponding subjective certitude i.e., to the self as apparently functioning through the vṛtti. No vṛtti is admitted in Nyāya, buddhi being but an attribute of the self, not a thing seemingly or really distinct from the self, as it is in Vedānta, or in Sāṁkhya or Yoga. To Vedānta, buddhi is but a manifest mode of ajñāna: ajñāna is intelligible only as a positive limitation of jñāna, self or consciousness and not as a thing by itself. Vṛtti is accordingly conceived in the system from the subjective side only, as the apparent mode of the self functioning and not as a real independent thing undistinguished from the self. In Sāṁkhya and Yoga, it is an independent thing (or state of a thing) which is indeed only as associated with the self, being dissolved in dissociation with it; but the association is a real character of the thing and an apparent character of the self. Vṛtti which is thus really objective also appears subjec-

tive and it is in reference to the apparently subjective vṛtti that the objective vṛtti has to be understood. Pramāṇa, for example, as an objective mental state has to be understood as an implication of the subjective function of true knowing.

61. To begin with smṛti or memory. It is defined as the re-presentation of an object as presented. It is not merely a second presentation of the object but an implied presentation of the first presentation. The first presentation may have been any of the five vṛttis, not merely pramāṇa or merely perception. The first presentation may be of any object, real or unreal etc.; a presentation is always itself an object to the self[a] and can never exist unknown. The object of memory is at once the object of the primary presentation and the presentation itself.[b] The explicit consciousness of the presentation or of the knowing (vyavasāya) involving the presentation is called anuvyavasāya. It is a 'subjective' function, an apparent function of the self; but if the self knows a content, it knows through a vṛtti i.e., as identified with a presentation. This is true even when the content is itself a presentation and hence a vṛtti which must be known by a self[c] is not merely sākṣi-bhāṣya but is known in a second vṛtti with which the self is identified.[d] The second vṛtti in its subjective aspect is anu-vyavasāya and, as a mental state, is memory. Memory is in this sense presentation of presentation, although it is presentation explicitly of the object of the primary presentation and only implicitly of the presentation itself, as distinct from anuvyavasāya which is presentation explicitly of the presentation and only implicitly of the object of presentation. The presentation of the object and the presentation of the presentation have both the form of the object, the latter having the form of the object with the additional character of being distinct from the primary presentation.

62. Memory (like nidrā to be considered presently) is a secondary or derivative vṛtti. Yoga-bhāṣya brings in the interesting conception of memory being either bhāvita-smartavyā as in the dream-state or abhāvita-smartavyā as in the waking state. Vācaspati interprets the two as

[a] YS. IV. 18.
[b] YB. I. 11.
[c] YS. IV. 21.
[d] YB. IV. 22.

productive and reproductive imagination ('bhāvita' meaning kalpita or constructed), although the former, being admittedly what deviates from the primary presentation of the object, does not fall under the given definition of smṛti and is only loosely described as such. Vijñāna-bhikṣu understands 'bhāvita' in the sense of bhāvyartha-sūcaka or prognosticative of the future object (or more accurately of object of future knowledge). Memory as revival of past presentation of object need not involve the memory-judgment (*'that* object which *was* presented) or a certitude about the past as such: it may be prognosticative of the future. Dream involves revival of past presentations and also a construction out of them which is no revival of the past but a free anticipation of the future, of some object to be presented, all dreams being thus apparently taken on the authority of śāstra as veridical.

63. A vṛtti has to be understood not only in reference to the corresponding subjective certitude (vyavasāya) but also in reference to samādhi which may be regarded as the pure isolated form of this certitude. Unlike an ordinary vyavasāya which is implicitly or explicitly in transition to another vyavasāya, samādhi such as is reached through yoga is a consciously standing certitude, the standing being pure self-reproduction or becoming of itself over again. What aspect of samādhi does smṛti as a certitude represent? Memory-knowledge is knowledge by the self as identified with a vṛtti of an object as presented to another vṛtti. Since a vṛtti is as it is presented to the self which knows it only as identified with a second vṛtti with the form of the object of the first vṛtti, there is apparently an infinite regress of vṛttis. But ia vrtti presented to the self is not necessarily known explicitly by the self, being known only when some doubt arises about the object of the vṛtti (of the form 'is the object presented as A or as B?). Memory of a perceived object, for example, which need not be explicit knowledge of the perception is such knowledge when the object which presents some indeterminateness about its perceived character is sought to be known more determinately. So, too, there is no explicit knowledge of memory as vṛtti unless some indeterminateness appears about the remembered character of the object. A remembered character is indeed a perceived character but it is not simply its repetition but its further unfolding. The changing

of an object is perceived but when it is remembered, certain doubts about the specific character of the changing (e.g., how much of it was perceived in one act of perception) emerge which would not emerge in the perceptual consciousness. Thus a fresh and more fundamental indeterminateness about the object emerges at the memory-stage, which leads to the explicit knowledge of memory as vṛtti, which knowledge again involves a new vṛtti, —a memory of memory. How far this regress will go will depend on the number of grades of indeterminateness about the object that can be actually conceived.

64. The presented object is sought to be known better by being remembered over and over again. Here, although the memories refer to the same presented stratum of the object, each later memory may refer also to the memory just before it, so that the latest memory would present an involution-series of memories of the primary presentation. If a later memory refers immediately to the object presented, the series is interminable; but if it refers to it through the previous memory, a qualitative difference would emerge between the first, second and third memories. The second memory would be thinking (cintā) and the third would be contemplation (dhyāna) in which it is conscious of itself as a series. A memory later than the third would have the same character and thus as a qualitative grade, the third memory is the terminus. Samādhi would be the grade beyond it which is no longer memory but intuition of the object presented as completely unfolded. Samādhi itself, however, would be of different grades which also has a terminus in the sense already explained.

65. A presented object is known *better* by having what is implicit in the presentation explicated or unfolded through presentation of the presentation, i.e., through memory in its three grades including thought and contemplation. There is again presentation not merely of presentation but also of the absence of presentation. An object that is unpresented in one way may be presented in another: an object, for example, that is not perceived may be remembered. Memory involves the consciousness of the object being presented though not perceptually presented. To be thought is also to be presented, the presentation being explicit in dhyāna or contemplation: that thought and contemplation are but grades of memory is known in contemplation. But there may be

a consciousness of presentation being altogether absent, though this consciousness is itself bound up with a presentation. This presentation of no presentation is nidrā or sleep. What was implied in a previous presentation and is now explicit in memory is remembered as having been only implicit. If the implicitness is remembered, it must have been then presented. The presentation of implicitness is sleep in general and hence in this case we may say, there was sleep along with waking. Generally it may be said that all waking short of the highest samprajñāta is overlaid with sleep (or pure feeling?).

66. Sleep as a vṛtti is taken in Yoga to be directly remembered on waking in the form 'I know no object' or 'nothing was presented to me'. It is remembered because of the saṁskāra left by sleep which because it left a saṁskāra must have been an actual vṛtti presented to the self, because no vṛtti can exist without being thus presented. Vedānta would not admit that sleep is a vṛtti of buddhi: the absence of presentation during sleep is indeed known on waking but it is known without the medium of a vṛtti (being sākṣi-bhāṣya) and is not really remembered. Some Vedāntists admit nidrā-vṛtti and its saṁskāra, not as belonging to buddhi but as belonging to raw ajñāna in which buddhi is taken to be dissolved in sleep. The difficulty however is, as pointed out by Vijñāna-bhikṣu, that then such ajñāna-vṛttis might be present in dream and waking also, so that there would be no necessity to admit a buddhi at all. So if sleep is remembered it must have been a vṛtti known then to the self presumably without any further vṛtti, there being in any case nothing in the nidrā-vṛtti to raise the question at all.

67. Sleep as a vṛtti may be of many kinds—blissful, restless or heavy and may include states like swoon which are not remembered but only inferred on waking, inferred as presented to the self without being explicitly known by it. Normally sleep is remembered as a vṛtti known to the self during sleep, the self itself being then known in the knowing of the vṛtti. Vedānta emphasises this self-knowledge during sleep and does not admit that it is knowledge of vṛtti also, the pure ajñāna-vṛtti which is sometimes admitted being not known during sleep, and not remembered on waking but only inferred. Suṣupti according to Vedānta is, so far as it is conscious,

pure undifferenced self-knowledge and has the same form as nirvikalpa-samādhi. The difference between this samādhi and suṣupti would presumably lie in the character of the unconscious saṁskāra in the two states. In the former, over and above the unsterilised saṁskāras of experience which make for re-awaking or vyutthāna, there is also the saṁskāra of the conscious contemplative or abstracting activity (dhyāna etc.); and besides, unlike the latter, it leaves a saṁskāra of itself facilitating the re-attainment of the ecstatic condition. The waking consciousness of the samādhi or suṣupti just ended accordingly differs. The self that was in these states is known as having been without ahaṁkāra in samādhi and with ahaṁkāra in suṣupti. In the latter case, however, ahaṁkāra is known to have been only implicitly present: and implicit presence is apparently to Vedānta an ajñāna-vṛtti that is not only not explicitly known but is not even presented to the self. In Yoga, suṣupti is remembered as having been a buddhi-vṛtti known to the self. Samādhi is not remembered but is known on waking (as suṣupti too is known according to Vedānta) without a vṛtti. It is known as having been no vṛtti identified with the self but as the self identified with a function or a-paridṛṣṭa-dharma of buddhi, the function of nirodha. In the case of samprajñāta-samādhi, a vṛtti is indeed remembered but not as what the self was identified with. Again, the saṁskāra left by samādhi is not a vāsanā conditioning the memory of an experience or empirical vṛtti but a karma-saṁskāra that facilitates later activity and feeling attainment in the same direction.

CHAPTER V

BUDDHI-VṚTTI (contd.)

(Vikalpa, Viparyaya and Pramāṇa)

68. The vṛtti called 'vikalpa' is implied in the consciousness of a content that is not real and is still verbally meant. The verbal expression of the content generates the vṛtti but even a vṛtti referring to an unreal content that is otherwise generated but is verbally expressible would appear to come under vikalpa. The content which is known at once as unreal and as verbally expressible is presumably what characterises the vṛtti. Viparyaya or error as a vṛtti also refers to an unreal content and may be generated by a form of words but the content is not verbally expressible (except as a contradiction) when it is known to be unreal. The content was meant by the generative verbal expression as a real object, and not as a possible object plus its reality, so that now that the reality is negated, it is not reduced to possible object only. The content that vikalpa refers to is a possible object but the content of viparyaya is not the unreality of a possible or thinkable object. The possible or the imaginary as such which is the content of vikalpa is never reached by the mere correction of error. Where then a verbal expression generates an error, the content of the error is not rendered by the expression after correction; and in fact after correction, the content of an error, however generated, is not verbally expressible at all except as a contradiction. Vikalpa as generated by a verbal expression is, however, significantly expressed by it though known to be unreal. We may be imaginatively aware of a content as unreal when there is no question of error at all; and it is not necessary that such content should be generated by the understanding of a verbal expression, though it always admits of a significant verbal expression.

69. Patañali defines vikalpa as —'Śabdajñānānupātī vastu-śunyo vikalpaḥ.[*] The first adjective may mean 'generated by śabda-jñāna' or 'expressible as implied in śabda-jñāna'. The latter is the interpre-

[*] YS.I.9

tation of Vijñāna-bhikṣu who explains the compound as 'what has śabda-jñāna as its anupatī', not as what others explain it viz., 'anupātī of sabda-jñāna'. The statement in the Bhāṣya—'vastu-śunyatve api śabda-jñāna-māhātmya-nibandhano vyavahāro dṛśyate' may refer to the vyavahāra either before or after the vikalpa. The examples given in the Bhāra are indted all of meanings generated by language, but one is not precluded from admitting under vikalpa imaginary contents of which one is aware otherwise than through the understanding of language. There is no other heading of vṛtti under which they could come and the text does not rule out the extension. Even the perception of the mere appearance as such e.g., the image in the mirror—may come under vikalpa, since it stands, though it is (inferentially) known to be no fact. Whatever being known as unreal is actually presented is the content of vikalpa, for whatever can be asserted to be now presented is verbally expressible. Of the erroneous content as such we can say that it appeared to be presented but never that it is presented. Error may still be called a presentation because we cannot deny that some content was presented though we cannot specify what was presented.

70. The content of vikalpa is presented as an unreal but possible object, as the imaginary as such which stands before the mind through the meaning function of language, if not through anything else. The image in the mirror may also be called an imaginary object standing indeed through the perceiving function but not as excluding the meaning-function, because to stand before the mind is to appear self-identical which is possible only through thought or the meaning-function. As distinct from it the content of error known as such is the unreal without self-identity, of which we can say that it appeared to stand but never that it stands—what we can say about the imaginary object. The self-identity of the unreal is presented not as real nor as unreal but *as though* it were real. Vikalpa is the presentation of an unreal not as real (which would be viparyaya) nor as unreal (which would be pramāṇa) but as though it were real i.e., *as* appearing *as* unreal. The appearance of a content is itself a content and the vṛtti referring to this secondary content is vikalpa. It is not like memory the presentation of a content as presentation but is the presentation of a content as apparently

presented or apparently objective. The verbal expression of such a content is only figurative and the content as figuratively expressed has a presented character due to the expression. Vikalpa is *the presentation* of the factitious character of a content. We speak of the head *of* Rāhu (who is all head), of *in*activity or *un*causedness as a character of an object or of appear*ing* as an activity of an object. All these are figurative expressions which are understood by being actually imagined while being taken as unreal. Ordinary language is largely figurative though not always suspected as such and the understanding of it involves vikalpa almost at every turn.

71. The importance of vikalpa will be realised when it is remembered that time itself as krama and, therefore, all space-time position of the objects of experience are taken in Yoga philosophy to be only presented to vikalpa, not to pramāṇa as it is taken by common-sense or to viparyaya as it is taken by Vedānta. What is called savikalpa perception, however, is not vikalpa (as it is taken by the Buddhist) but pramāṇa, its content being not unreal though the space-time position of the content is unreal. In Sāṁkhya, too, where not only the space-time position but even the presented quality of the object of experience is a mere appearance, savikalpa perception is not mere vikalpa, since the object is unaccountably *given* and is a non-causal but real manifestation of prakṛti. In Yoga the object of experience is an immanent causal pariṇāma of vikāra-tattva, though its space-time position is constructed. What is given as a manifest or unmanifest tattva but with a superinduced vikalpa (though not bhrama or error) is not a vikalpa but a pramāṇa.

72. In savikalpa (or samprajñāta) samādhi, the vṛtti that is cocentrated on may or may not be a vikalpa in the Yoga sense. Its content may be imaginary or a real object of experience or a real metaphysical object; and where it is a real object, it may or may not be overlaid with vikalpa (or the memory of vikalpa), though even when it is overlaid, it does not cease to be the object of pramāṇa. In savitarka and savicāra-samādhi, the content, if real is riddled with vikalpa.[a] is an object of experience (sthūla) with a space-

[a] YS. I. 42.

time limitation, or a tattva (sūkṣma) as constituting such an object. Vikalpa is the appearance of a unity of word, thought and thing (śabda, pratyaya, artha) which are really distinct. This appearance is the primary object of the contemplation leading to samādhi that develops through stages in which it is gradually dissolved. In passing from savitarka to nirvitarka, vikalpa (or its smrti) in the sthūla object is dropped but continues in the sūkṣma object in savicāra which is dropped in passing to nirvicāra. Later stages of samprajñāta are free from vikalpa and there is no vṛtti at all in asamprajñāta.

73. The difference between vikalpa and viparyaya has already been discussed. The Vaiśeṣika takes vikalpa as a form of āhārya or fictitious knowledge, thus including it within viparyaya.[a] Vedānta apparently would bring viparyaya under vikalpa: all error is construction, object as distinct from the self being false as a construction of avidyā. Since the object is the self (or reality) itself under the limitation of avidyā it is mithyā (though till it is *actually* sublated like the appearance of the rope as snake, it is empirically real) and not tuccha but apart from the self, it is tuccha, being but a vikalpa. The object is to the eye of reason mithyā or anirvācya but to the eye of faith it is tuccha, or as it may be put, it is tuccha or mere vikalpa to the jīvan-mukta. Error in the last resort would be mere vikalpa: all difference in the object is but a verbal construction (vācārambhaṇa), though the vāk or speech here is cosmic and impersonal. To Yoga, however, error and vikalpa are utterly distinct as vṛttis. The world of experience, so far as it is a construction, is not false but phenomenally real. It is not reality with false limitation and therefore false in the last resort as it is conceived to be in Vedānta but reality with constructed limitation and therefore still real, for the construct though unreal does not falsify but only limits the manifestation of reality.

74. Viparyaya or error is to Yoga a vṛtti that has not the form of the object that it purports to refer to.[b] It is

[a] YV.I.9
[b] a-tadrūpa-pratiṣṭhām—YS.I.8.

then possible to refer to an object without a presentation having its form. To Vaiśeṣika, cognition—true or false—refers to its object without presentation and, therefore, there is no special difficulty about false cognition. To Yoga cognition is through presentation and the difficulty about false cognition is how the presentation implied by it refers to the object without taking its form. Has the vṛtti called viparyaya a form at all? The form of object only but not that of vṛtti can be an apparent form: it cannot be said that the presented form of the vṛtti is cancelled, by correction or bādha. The form of the object that is cancelled then never even appeared in the vṛtti. That is why the content of error known as such (through correction) cannot be intelligibly stated; it can be verbally expressed only as a contradiction (like 'this rope as snake'). There is no vṛtti for the consciousness of a contradiction. The vṛtti for a cognition is known in reflection on it, the reflection being an anuvyavasāya in other cases and in the case of false cognition the correction or badha itself. The vṛtti for a false cognition as indirectly revealed by the corrective reflection is known as not having had the form of the content that is now cancelled. It cannot be said—as it would be presumably said by the Vedāntist—that the vṛtti is known neither as having nor as not having the form of the cancelled content, or, in other words, that the content was neither presented nor unpresented, for some content was certainly presented which is also definitely known in the bādha as not the content cancelled. This definite knowledge of the vrtti as without the form of the object that it yet referred to is knowledge of a contradiction that implies no vṛtti. The knowing or mistaking of the rope as snake is a fact but there is no knowledge or consciousness reflected in a standing vrtti of the rope being a snake: a contradiction is committed but is not known, being a content that is unpresentable or unknowable as known.

75. That a contradiction is committed but not presented is just what is implied by the theory of anyathā-khyāti—advocated both by Yoga and Vaiśeṣika. The latter does not admit vṛtti or presentation in any knowing and hence the taking of the rope as a snake (previously known in some other time-space position)—or the commission of a contradiction—without its presentation implies no special difficulty, though the

contradiction is no object at all. Yoga, however, admits presentation though in this case it is not presentation of the form of snake or of the contradictory 'rope as snake' but some indefinite unnameable presentation and understands the committed contradiction to be the taking as this (rope) not an actual snake known elsewhere (as in Vaiśesika) but the unreal content of the present vṛtti or what is presented as unpresented.[a] In Vedānta, the contradiction is itself presented as a content that neither is nor is not (prātibhāsika-sṛṣṭi, anirvācya) while in Sāṁkhya it is presented as a content that *both* is and is not.[b] The presentation here to Vedānta would apparently be a vṛtti not of buddhi but of raw avidyā—such as suṣupti is sometimes taken in this system—while to Sāṁkhya it would be a buddhi-vṛtti. In Yoga, there is presentation not of the contradiction but of *some* content as unpresented, the contradiction itself being utterly unpresented and only committed. The contradiction is the *function* of avidyā, while to Vedānta it is a presentation of avidyā and to Sāṁkhya an indeterminate presentation of buddhi.

76. To understand empirical error, both Yoga and Vedānta have to refer to raw avidyā, to avidyā beyond asmitā (as it would be expressed in Yoga) or the transcendental principle of error, which is conceived in Yoga as a function and in Vedānta as a presentation conformably to the different views on the nature of knowing in the two systems. There is no knowing function or activity in Vedānta: what appears as such is the quiescent being of knowledge with the willing function of buddhi as its upādhi. In Yoga, buddhi is as much a knowing function as a willing function, the latter being the actualisation of the former (and amounting to its supersession in asamprajñāta). The self is indeed knowledge (consciousness) itself as in Vedānta and Sāṁkhya but it knows the object only as identified with the knowing buddhi or buddhi-vrtti and not the willing buddhi which is no vṛtti, that being why it knows no content at all in asamprajñāta. Error is a knowing function intermediate between the bare willing function in asamprajñāta and the

[a] YV.I.8.
[b] sadasat-khyātir bādhābhāvat SS.V.56.

knowing—willing function involving the vṛttis other than viparyaya which differs from them in being formless. Error cannot be merely an exercise of free will, nor is it a mere presentation with conflicting determinations but an utterly indeterminate presentation explicitly embodying an exercise of free will. This free will is just avidyā which is constructive of vṛtti—the viparyaya-vṛtti—in the first instance and destructive of vṛtti—of the viveka-vṛtti ultimately—in asamprajñāta.

77. Empirical error unlike other vṛttis referring to the object explicitly embodies avidyā, the transcendental principle of error. Yoga mentions five transcendental errors—avidyā. asmitā. rāga., dveṣa and abhiniveśa of which avidyā is taken as at once starting and pervading the others.[a] Each is the nimitta of the next and is loosely regarded as its source. Avidyā leads to and does not become asmitā, though it continues with asmitā. Asmitā too leads to avidyā, and may co-exist with it though it need not. Asmitā and rāga, rāga and dveṣa, dveṣa and abhiniveṣa are apparently related similarly. Each lower may also cease in the presence of the higher, the cessation being gradual. The continuously manifest stage (udāra) as embodied (labdha-vrttika) in a presentation may pass to the intermittent (vicchinna) stage, that again to the tenuous, half-manifest or sub-conscious (tanu) stage and then again to the un-manifest or unconscious (supta) stage. From each later stage, a kleśa may hark back to the former stage, but there is a fifth stage, viz., dagdha-vīja-bhāva whence there is no return. When avidyā, the primordial kleśa which may co-exist with the other kleśas and also function in their absence (as in asamprajñāta), reaches dagdha-bījatā and ceases altogether, buddhi itself ceases or lapses into prakṛti.[b]

78. These principles are 'transcendental' in the sense of being 'subjective' functions, functions indeed of the mind but necessarily referred to the self, being unconscious as mental and conscious only as subjective and empirically conscious as embodied in objective presentations. They may as well be regarded as grades of spiritual error or kleśas as they are called, understood more as willing function than as knowing function. Yet

[a] YS. II. 4.
[b] YB. II. 10.

they are errors and not merely wrong willing—errors, because the primordial and pervading kleśa viz., avidyā is the conative actualisation of false knowing. Willing is a more essential function of buddhi than knowing, but it is necessarily understood through knowing as its actualisation.

79. Avidyā is explained in YS. II. 5 as the taking of the non-eternal as eternal, of the unclean as clean, of the painful as pleasurable, of the not-self as the self. Essentially it is the wrong viewing of the object as the self and derivatively in cognitive, moral and hedonistic reference to the object of experience, the viewing of it as though it were as real, as clean or sacred, as dear or enjoyable as one's own self. The nature of avidyā is best understood by contrast with empirical illusion on the one hand and with asmitā on the other. The content of all error is known in the correction of it as a contradiction or an unintelligibility, and it is in this sense that it has been said to be verbally inexpressible. In the case of an empirical illusion, however,—e.g., in the taking of a rope as a snake, one is aware in the correction that the unintelligible appeared as intelligible, that the contradictory 'this (rope-) snake' was explicitly known as 'this snake'. In the correction of the illusion of taking my body as myself—a form of avidyā, I am not similarly aware of my body having been *explicitly known* as myself. I am aware only of having acted or felt in a way that has to be interpreted as *implying* the cognition of my body as my self. The cognition is here implicit not in the sense that its content is undistinguished in an explicitly known content but in the sense that it is not and does not involve explicit cognition at all, that it is only inferred (or imagined) to be a cognition from the manner of willing or feeling, and not from any explicit cognition as the datum. Such implicit cognition of the self is not cognition of a presented content and is in this sense a transcendental function. If it is still taken as viparyaya-vṛtti, it is because the false knowing is remembered, showing that there *must* have been some unspecifiable presentation though it can not be asserted that there *was*.

80. Asmitā is also a transcendental error and is explained in YS. I. 6. as the consciousness of the apparent identity of the self and buddhi. It is the consciousness of the identity either as the self only or as buddhi only, not as their relation.

Avidyā would be consciousness of their identity as a relation or rather the function of relating them in the way of identity. Viveka which is knowledge of their distinction still implies the self knowing as identified with buddhi, the identification here being the avidyā-function of relating explicit distincts as identical. In asmitā, there is no consciousness of their distinction : it is consciousness of the product of the avidyā-function, viz., the undifferenced appearance of their unity either as the self or as buddhi,[a] as for example when one says 'I enjoy' or 'my enjoyment' ('I knowing' or 'knowing me'). Avid'yā is the implicit identifying of explicit distincts, while asmitā is the explicit consciousness of the unity of implicit distincts. The explicit unity is the result of the implicit identifying, the terms of the unity losing their distinction in the result.

81. Avidyā and asmitā are conceived as functions of false *knowing*, but the other three kleśas or transcendental errors are conceived as affective functions only implying or presupposing false *knowing*. They, too, are primarily functions and become consciousness only when embodied in presentation. Rāga is the craving for pleasure or object of pleasure implying memory of pleasure or of the object of pleasure. It is an error in the sense that the memory or perception (or the anticipation that it implies) is not detached knowledge such as the jīvanmukta may be conceived to have but a craving for one's exclusive self, thus involving asmitā; and it is yet distinct from asmitā in so far as the consciousness here is explicitly of pleasure as object and only implicitly of the enjoying self (*me*). Similar considerations apply to dveṣa or antipathy for pain and object of pain. As an affective function, however, it necessarily presupposes rāga and is accordingly less self-conscious, implying asmitā more remotely than rāga. Both rāga and dveṣa admit of different grades and specifications in reference to different classes of objects. The last viparyaya, viz., abhiniveśa is positively a clinging to life and negatively the fear of death. The positive moment is less (self-) conscious than the negative moment which thus directly involves dveṣa. Abhiniveśa is conscious even in its positive aspect and is called ātmāśīḥ—an instinctive desire about

[a] YV.II.6.

oneself of the form 'let me not cease to be' 'let me be' (māna bhūvam, bhūyāsam). It is not due to the saṁskāra of any experience in this life but is due to the vāsanā of the experience of death in a previous life and is the most obvious datum for the inference of a previous birth.[a] As a conscious desire, it is reckoned as a vṛtti.

82. Error as avidyā which is implied in every other error is implied even in pramāṇa or true knowing. Viveka which is the highest form of true knowing still involves avidyā which demands to be corrected through asamprajñāta or the activity of getting rid of all knowledge. Knowledge means knowledge of content which is possible only through the erroneous identification of the self with buddhi. If the self is taken to be jñāna, it is not jñāna of any content, being contentless consciousness understood merely as a being and not as a knowing function. The erroneous identification or avidyā and, therefore, also its retraction or purely conative correction which is the function of the same avidyā thus run out beyond pramāṇa, viparyaya being in this sense a more fundamental vṛtti of buddhi than pramāṇa. Within explicit knowledge, error indeed presupposes true knowledge, but knowledge itself presupposes conative error which is implicitly cognitive also. While pramāṇa may be said to be nearer than error to pure consciousness, error as avidyā is closer to prakṛti, being as vṛtti the immediate evolute of prakṛti and as function continuous with it. In the retractive movement towards mokṣa, the self regains its character of functionless consciousness immediately in knowledge (viveka) but through pure willing.

83. Pramāṇa or true knowledge is of three kinds—pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama. Of these, pratyakṣa is understood to be a vṛtti having the form of a real object and referring more to its particularity than to its sāmānya or universal, as distinct from anumāna which refers more to its sāmānya than to its viśeṣa, the object being taken in both as having both sāmānya and viśeṣa. Āgama in referring to an object beyond pratyakṣa refers through its sāmānya but yields knowledge of its viśeṣa. An object is known as individual i.e., with its viśeṣa either through pratyakṣa or through āgama, not through anumāna. The viśeṣa

[a] YB. II. 9; IV. 10.

of an object as thus known is, however, known as apparently one with or co-implicated (saṁkīrṇa) with the remembered meanings of words that express it—i.e., with verbal universals which are, in fact, vikalpas. It is known in its purity in samādhi or samāpatti of a type to be considered later, which amounts to perfect perception (param pratyakṣam). Absolutely true knowledge through āgama and anumāna can only be reached through such pure perception of viśeṣa. One must have such perception for oneself as the basis of the knowledge of the supersensible through anumāna and āgama.[a]

84. Pramāṇa is a direct or indirect knowing of the real individual as having a real or verbal universal, an absence and even an unreality undistinguished in it. The pure individual is sought to be intuited, known in the way of para-pratyakṣa or sākṣātkāra by the elimination of the undistinguished excrescences through the practice of yoga. Pramāṇa is in itself a demand for its purification and actualisation in samādhi. As knowledge of the real individual, it is not direct except in perception, and even as perception it is mixed up with the other pramāṇas and, therefore, is indirect knowledge in some aspect also. It is further mixed up with vṛttis other than pramāṇa and thus refers to contents other than the real along with the real. Normally then what is taken as truly known is known neither with absolute directness nor in isolation. Not that, therefore, it is not known : it is known but with an indefinite background which partly obscures its definiteness and threatens its certitude without, however, actually challenging its known-ness. Reflection on such knowledge shows its unrealised character without negating it as an actual presentation and without falsifying its content. The unrealisedness is, in fact, a transcendental or spiritual character but is not, therfore, without any bearing on the psychology and logic of the knowledge in question. The known content is felt to require further definition. Logical definition may be sought to be reached inductively but that is only a preparation for a new insight into the nature of the content to be defined. To have the insight is to have the presentation of the content or the vṛtti steadied and clarified. The islolating fixation of the knowing vṛtti for the definition of the known content is just the yoga process of realisation.

[a] YB. I. 42

CHAPTER VI

THE FIVE LEVELS OF BUDDHI

85. The distinctive function of buddhi is niścaya or certitude which is (or is implied in) the consciousness of a content as to the self, as making a difference to or (illusorily) modifying the self. The nature of certitude cannot be understood except in such reference to the self. Consciousness or the self is indeed associated with the mind not simply as buddhi but also in its lower stages, but the mind does not refer to the self as content or to a content *as to* the self except in the stage of buddhi. Certitude as such implies asmitā or the consciousness of 'I am'. The consciousness may be implicit or explicit but in any case certitude without this consciousness is unintelligible. Certitude may be directly about the self or about the object, in which latter case it is indirectly about the self and may be either implicit or explicit. Direct and explicit certainly about the self may again lead to a stage of buddhi where the consciousness of 'I am' lapses into the mere being of *I*, where the distinction between *I* as content and the consciousness of it ceases to be conscious.

86. Yoga-Bhāṣya* mentions five citta-bhūmis or levels of buddhi—viz., kṣipta, mūḍha, vikṣipta, ekāgra and niruddha. Of these the first three levels appear to be characterised by indirect and implicit asmitā and the fourth by explicit asmitā which is indirect in its earlier stages and direct in the latest stage. The fifth represents the stage where direct and explicit consciousness of *I* lapses into the mere being of *I*. The sub-stages of the fourth stage together with the fifth stage are sometimes specifically called citta-bhūmis, being the levels of buddhi as concentrated in yoga or samādhi. Samādhi is ordinarily understood to mean the concentrated state of buddhi but sometimes it is used in a wider sense to mean its general character of standing, of being self-identical or flowing as self-identical which is its character at all levels (sārvabhaūma-dharma), being just

* I. 1-2

what is meant by its manifestness. Buddhi is the manifest as such, manifesting or reflecting the eternal changeless self directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly. Buddhi is nothing without samādhi in the wide sense and the five levels of buddhi are distinguished by different measures and qualities of this samādhi.

87. Buddhi like every other objective tattva is a unity of the three guṇas. The sattva-element is dominant while rajas and tamas are more or less recessive and may be altogether suppressed or reduced to mere saṁskāra; and sometimes in the fifth or niruddha level the sattva element also may be reduced to saṁskāra and buddhi stands manifest as bare being with all differences suppressed in it. The guṇas in reference to conscious buddhi have the characters of prakhyā, pravṛtti and sthiti. Prakhyā would be the expressive character (prakāśa) in reference to the content of buddhi which is the self either directly or indirectly, being thus the function of revealing the self or self-conscious knowing. Pravṛtti would be activity (calatva) in reference to the self, the apparent activity of the self to become finite or self-conscious willing; and sthiti or persistence in reference to the self would be apparently self-conscious feeling. When pravṛtti and sthiti of buddhi are actual or emergent functions, they modify the dominant character prakhyā; and where they are abhibhūta or reduced to mere saṁskāra, they do not modify. In the kṣipta stage, both pravṛtti and sthiti are actual, the former being more explicit than the latter. In the mūḍha stage, pravṛtti is suppressed and sthiti is explicit while in the vikṣipta stage, sthiti is suppressed and pravṛtti is actual. In the ekāgra stage, both are suppressed and prakhyā alone is actual, and lastly in the niruddha stage prakhyā also is suppressed or rather retracted.

88. All these stages are stages of buddhi as manifesting the self. Buddhi manifests the self not necessarily in the sense of conditioning the consciousness of the self—there being no consciousness of the self in asamprajñāta—but in the sense of taking the changeless form of the self, while changing. Buddhi is indeed the same even in a flow of vṛttis, but the sameness here is inferred and is not evident to introspection.

Each vṛtti, however, is a flow in which there is a sameness that is introspectively evident. Buddhi without vṛtti—as in asamprajñāta—is also a flow with the form of self-identity, as is evident to the memory of it in vyutthāna. Flow with the explicit form of self-identity is samādhi and is evident to introspection or memory about at least some seetion of the flow that constitutes the being of buddhi. A tattva lower than buddhi is a flow in which the form of self-identity is not explicit at all.

89. The first three levels—kṣipta, mūḍha and vikṣipta—are, as has been pointed out, characterised by indirect and implicit asmitā. The mind is here directly occupied with objects *as to* the self. The indirect reference to the self is further implicit in the sense that it here appears as a value of the object felt or willed and not as a knowing presentation *detached* from the object presented, as it appears in the ekāgra stage. We may begin with the vikṣipta stage and work backwards and forwards to the other stages. Here the tamas element of buddhi is suppressed or reduced to mere saṁskāra so that it does not affect its prakhyā or self-consciousness. As this self-consciousness is indirect i.e., is primarily object-consciousness, its non-limitation by tamas means that buddhi here reveals the objective universe. Yet the revelation is of the possibility rather than of the actuality of the universe: there is consciousness in this stage of an indefinitely extendable series of objects beyond the attained definite object. This objective beyond is not actually experienced because it is the content of cognition as conatively qualified, prakhyā being here still restricted by pravṛtti or rajas, though not by tamas. The sthiti of buddhi or its self-conscious persistence (feeling) affects its prakhyā by limiting its field of vision, by making it stick to the object actually attained and shutting out the beyond from its view. The pravṛtti of buddhi or its self-conscious activity (willing) affects its prakhyā by making the beyond appear indefinitely as what is to be or can be experienced. The objective beyond is thus presented to consciousness as a possibility. In the kṣipta and mūḍha stages this consciousness of possibility is absent; and in the ekāgra stage, there is consciousness of the beyond as an actuality.

90. In the vikṣipta state, the mind is said to reveal all

objects[a] and in the e k ā g r a state, to reveal the true nature of its object or reveal its object as luminous or self-evident.[b] The former refers to the indefinite extent of knowledge and the latter to the depth of knowledge or insight into the essence. As v i k ṣ i p t a precedes y o g a, it cannot be said to yield knowledge of the actual infinite and hence it can only be understood to reveal the possible infinite. The objects that *can* be known in a stage of knowledge are only thought as an *all* in that stage and can be *known* as an actual or accomplished universe in the form of a more essential object in a deeper grade of knowledge. The possible universe is only thought in connection with actual objects that are known and thus knowledge in the v i k ṣ i p t a state may be said to be of actual objects in a possible universe. The thought of the universe is the knowledge of relation within the objects of actual knowledge as continued in the thought of relation between them and the possible objects beyond them. Thus knowledge in the v i k ṣ i p t a state may be taken as our ordinary thinking or discursive knowledge.

91. Knowledge in the m ū ḍ h a or k ṣ i p t a stage is to be conceived as lacking this consciousness of the universe. the thought of internal and external relation of the known object. In the m ū ḍ h a stage, the mind is fixed on a particular object and is aware that it cannot move on to other objects. In the e k ā g r a stage also, the mind is fixed on a particular object but is aware that it freely does not move out of it. The m ū ḍ h a state presupposes the k ṣ i p t a state, since to be aware that it cannot move, it must have had experience of moving (without the consciousness of relating as in the v i k ṣ i p t a state). To be aware of passing from one object to another without relating them is to know on the k ṣ i p t a level. The mind here is aware of moving out from the object on which it was fixed, and getting fixed on another, moving out of it again and so on. There is an alternation of moving and standing, p r a v ṛ t t i and s t h i t i within knowing while in the m ū ḍ h a state, there is no p r a v ṛ t t i, but only s t h i t i, there being only a helplessly

[a] s a r v a t a ḥ p r a d y o t a m ā n a m.
[b] s a d - b h ū t a m a r t h a m p r a d y o t a y a t i—where 's a d - b h ū t a m' is explained as p a r a m ā r t h a - b h ū t a m or as ś o b h a n a m n i t ā n t ā - v i r b h ū t a m s a t t v a m.

fixed or standing cognition. In the vikṣipta state the mind moves only and does not stand though in moving it relates, relating being a free standing or consciously keeping self-identical inspite of movement. In the ekāgra stage, the mind does not move from object to object but freely stands or fixes itself on an object and enjoys its self-identity in the activity of standing.

92. What is this freedom of knowing? The mind as prakhyā or self-conscious knowing is free, is aware of keeping self-identical, of actively maintaining itself in samādhi. It is aware of itself not as the persisting object that it is but as the persisting subject, as the self willing to stand (not eternally standing), or, in other words, as consciously achieving its duration. The sthiti of the mind that is due to tamas is an objective or helplessly given duration, which is not consciously realised as its self-identity. Knowing in the different levels of buddhi differs not in respect of this sthiti but in respect of sthiti as samādhi or praśānta-vāhitā[b] or self-achieved subjective duration. There is progressive increase of such knowing duration as one passes from kṣipta to ekāgra, not of the duration of the vṛtti involved in knowing. The subjective duration, however, is undistinguished from the objective duration in the stages before ekāgra and hence the duration of a cognitive vṛtti appears to increase gradually in passing from kṣipta to vikṣipta. It is greatest in vikṣipta not in respect of the knowledge of the substantive object but in respect of the knowledge of the relations within the object, while in ekāgra, duration is felt mystically to lapse into eternity.

93. The difference among the first four levels of buddhi has been considered so far in reference to knowing. But it is[a] really a spiritual difference of which the cognitive aspect is only one aspect which is specially stressed because it is through it that the other aspects can be precisely characterised. In contrast with vikṣipta, ekāgra is said not only to be a new quality of knowing which reveals its object as luminous or self-evident but also to attenuate the kleśas or spiritual errors, to loosen the bonds of karma and to make for freedom from the knowing or objective attitude altogether. Vikṣipta does

[a] YB. I. 13

not thus work—at least directly—against spiritual error, does not seek to reverse the downward current of karma and positively maintains the objective attitude. The vikṣipta mind is said to work for dharma, jñāna, vairāgya and aiśvarya, and the mūḍha mind to work for their opposites—adharma, ajñāna etc.—both attaining 'subjective' good or evil—while the kṣipta mind directly wills and enjoys viṣaya or object. These spiritual characters of the mind—good and evil—are rooted in the kleṣas or spiritual errors. The mind in the first three levels works within spiritual error in which saṁsāra or natural life is rooted. The spiritual problem of cutting the root of natural life and of turning the will backwards towards the attainment of mukti as strong un-ruffled self-possession does not arise in these mental levels. The mind here has only natural characters which receive their spiritual complexion from the memory of its spirituality in the higher levels—ekāgra and niruddha, memory of samādhi in the restricted sense of the term.

94. As immediately antecedent to explicit spritual mentality, vikṣipta mentality is implicitly spiritual, seeking to attain but not consciously enjoying the attainment of dharma, jñāna, vairāgya and aiśvarya as the forms of 'subjective' good. Explicit spirituality is more than the enjoying attainment of 'subjective' good which as such is good for the striving self, self that is identified with buddhi as with the moral pravṛtti for the good. But it is only as this moral pravṛtti is satisfied that the good is enjoyed as good in itself or spiritually good: striving for the subjectively good is consummated in the enjoyment of the spiritually good. Spirituality is more than even this spiritual enjoyment: it is implicitly a detachment or withdrawal from the enjoyment which is actualised in a transcendental or superconscious state of buddhi called asamprajñāta. This detachment from spiritual enjoyment in the enjoyment itself comes spontaneously according to other systems, but in Yoga philosophy it is taken to be effected through a specific withdrawing activity of the mind—viz., the practice of yoga. Vikṣipta is thus the pre-spiritual mentality, conscious as pre-spiritual, as a striving mentality that makes for but is not the enjoying attainment of spirituality and much less the detachment from the enjoyment.

95. The mūḍha mentality as just preceding the vikṣipta, the opposite of the moral striving towards the subjective good in which vikṣipta consists, being thus what makes for the subjective evil in the form of adharma, ajñāna etc. As there is no pravṛtti in the mūḍha state, the making for evil is not a striving but is still self-conscious. In mūḍha and vikṣipta, the evil or the good is felt as of the finite self, as subjective, but in kṣipta, it is not so felt. There is no consciousness of evil in kṣipta where the attitude is non-moral striving towards and enjoyment of the object or viṣaya felt as good but not known as such, as good for the self. That, however, the object is still felt as good shows that the mentality is implicitly self-conscious and belongs to buddhi. The consciousness of evil comes first in the mūḍha state as the result of the baffled striving for natural good in the kṣipta state. It is indeed the consciousness of natural evil but as baffled striving rouses the consciousness of the self also, the natural evil is felt as an evil for the self. Such subjective evil is implicitly a moral evil which is recognised as such in the vikṣipta state. What is felt as a natural good is implicitly a subjective evil: and what is felt explicitly as a subjective evil is implicitly a moral evil. What is explicitly felt as morally good is an implicit spiritual evil recognised as such in the explicit spiritual consciousness; explicit spirituality recognises itself as an absolute evil to be superseded.

96. The mūḍha state represents the tendency towards subjective evil and it comes midway between the kṣipta and the vikṣipta representing the tendencies towards natural good and moral good respectively. There is no helpless movement of the mind or distraction in the mūḍha stage. Its immobility is felt in the state as a subjective disability but not as a moral evil: it is, in fact, implicitly enjoyed, being suicidally sought to be continued by blind resistance to distraction (implicit pravṛtti). It is moral indolence which is recognised in vikṣipta as the fundamental moral evil, as the parent of adharma, ajñāna etc. The vikṣepas are the causes that keep the mind in the vikṣipta or morally striving state and prevent it from passing into the spiritual activity of yoga. Nine such vikṣepas are mentioned and five derivatives from them (vikṣepa-sahabhuvaḥ), the former being apparently what directly prevent

yoga and the latter what are only incompatible with yoga.[a] The nine vikṣepas are disease, mental dullness, doubt, unconscious omission or lapse of will, bodily dullness, greed, error, hesitancy in rising to a higher spiritual level and unsteadiness on the present level. Of these, mental dullness and greed appear to be the persistence of the mūḍha state itself within the vikṣipta and are opposed not to yoga-practice (spirituality) only, but to moral striving also, being thus specifically moral evils. Disease, unconscious lapse and bodily dullness are felt as evil even in the pre-moral or mūḍha stage. Doubt, error and the last two vikṣepas are specifically spiritual evils.

97. The mind passes from object to object in the kṣipta state not freely but because it is at the mercy of the objects which attract it successively. The operation of tamas is here implicit and the operation of rajas as expressed in the passing or transition is explicit, though the former really determines the latter. The former becomes explicit in the mūḍha state where rajas ceases to operate though, as sattva or prakhyā is the ground of all this variation, there is a consciousness of the absence of movement or transition. In the vikṣipta state tamas lapses and the movement from object to object is free in a sense and not conditioned by the attraction of the object as in the kṣipta state. The movement, however, is judged from the standpoint of yoga or the spiritual consciousness as an inability to stand, as unfree, as due to an internal necessity—the intrinsic instability of a vṛtti—though not to an external necessity, viz., the attraction of the object. The kṣipta mind is at best aware of moving towards an object but not of moving out of an object. The vikṣipta mind is aware of moving out of an object freely and does not realise that this freedom is only apparent and that it really cannot stand due to its inherent instability. It is only in spiritual consciousness, the yoga-level of mentality that the inherent cause of its movement is understood as a vikṣepa opposed to freedom. Freedom is conceived as the conscious power of the mind not to move from vṛtti to vṛtti, such power being lacking in the mūḍha state where the mind only helplessly stands and is unable to move. The yoga-level of the mind implies the conscious ability to move and the actual

[a] YS. I 30-31.

exercise of this ability not in moving from object to object (vṛtti to vṛtti) but in the mind or a mental vṛtti flowing as self-identical—which is in fact the conscious arrest of mental change or ruling out of vikṣepa.

98. Vikṣepa is thus distraction not merely of attention but of the free flowing being of buddhi. Buddhi as prakhyā is not merely knowing but the will to realise knowing, which is more than the will to attend. The will to attend may be variously motived and when the motive is explicitly to secure the free being of the mind, freedom from the inner tendency to change, from its own instability or unfreedom, the will to attend is the will to realise the mind. It is in the first instance a realising of freedom in a vṛtti that has itself come through change but ultimately it means a realising of freedom from vṛtti altogether. Vikṣepa is understood in this will to realise freedom as a mode of unfreedom of the self-conscious mind, as a tendency of the spirit to be in a vṛtti and as a necessary consequence to pass on to a new vṛtti. There is no vṛtti with vikṣepa[a] actual or potential. In the vikṣipta state, the vikṣepa is actual, while in the yoga state (short of the final asamprajñāta) it is potential, waiting to be actual as vyutthāna. Vikṣepa is not itself a vṛtti but the conscious passing to a vṛtti or the mental cause of the passing, which may be conscious or unconscious.

99. The fact that vṛtti necessarily implies vikṣepa is taken in Yoga-Bhāṣya I.33. to disprove the Buddhist view of the mind being but a series of momentary cognitions (pratyaya). If each pratyaya or vṛtti stood by itself in the series that mind is taken to be, each would be an ekāgra mentality and there would be no vikṣipta mentality at all—which is not the fact. Since then the difference between vikṣipta and ekāgra is an undeniable fact, the mind must be one with many vṛttis, either similar or dissimilar.

100. The continuity of one vṛtti with the next is conscious in both the levels: to be aware of a vṛtti is to be aware of passing beyond it. In the vikṣipta mind, the conscious passing to a dissimilar vṛtti is specifically called vikṣepa. In the ekāgra mind, the passing is conscious self-reproduction of a

[a] YB.I.30

vṛtti, its conscious achievement of duration and is itself vṛtti though not another vṛtti, while in vikṣipta the passing is conscious function of the starting vṛtti and not itself vṛtti. As the self-reproduction of an ekāgra-vṛtti is itself the vṛtti, vikṣepa is here not all potential as in asamprajñāta but both potential and actual, potential in respect of the subsequent vyutthāna-vṛtti and actual in respect of the insight into the essence of the object of the starting vṛtti. The insight here implies not a subsequent (anāgata) vṛtti but a present vṛtti involved in the starting vṛtti. The relation of the ekāgra-vṛtti to the involved vṛtti of insight is not a passing or vikṣepa in the sense of a conscious self-losing of the initial vṛtti but in the sense of its conscious self-realising. It is still the conscious passing of a vṛtti and is as such a subtle vikṣepa which is, however, absent in the fifth or niruddha level. Vṛtti as necessarily implying vikṣepa is an evil and the consciousness of this evil is what impels the mind to pass from vikṣipta to ekāgra and from ekāgra to niruddha.

CHAPTER VII

THE NATURE OF YOGA

101. In Yoga philosophy, 'yoga' is understood as spiritual activity or the result achieved by spiritual activity. Activity is conceived in this system as willing, knowing and even feeling as a process being taken as implicit willing. The process or activity of knowing or feeling is not necessarily understood in other systems as willing; and willing itself may be regarded as a mode of knowing or feeling. Spiritual activity, however, if admitted at all, is taken in all systems as a specific conscious function, the function of achieving freedom from evil as such. Non-spiritual activity may be a freeing from evil but it need not be freeing from evil explicitly understood as evil. Again, spiritual activity is activity explicitly for achieving freedom. Activity in the merely moral stage is a freeing from evil as such but is not explicitly *for* freedom being either for some good form of being (objective or subjective) or in pure obedience to the law, while spiritual activity is for freedom as the good but not as a good form of being. By 'good form of being' is meant here what is desired; and in desire the agent necessarily conceives his desiring being to continue unaltered at the time of fulfilment. Freedom which is the end of spiritual activity is not desired in this sense, being conceived in the activity not as what will satisfy the self retaining its present mentality at the time of satisfaction but as freedom from this mentality itself. Spiritual activity, in other words, is for the good in itself conceived indeed by the agent but not as good for the agent with his present mentality, conceived by him as an impersonal satisfaction, whether or not he remains a person at the time of satisfaction. Lastly, unlike other conscious activities, spiritual activity not only makes for the end and is anticipatively conscious of it but is explicitly aware of being the activity of the end. It is not only avowedly for freedom but is itself self-consciously free from evil, being in this sense the self-deepening of a satisfaction already attained. The activity of the impersonal end is more readily intelligible—though only figuratively—in spiritual knowing and feeling than in willing. Yoga philosophy may claim the merit of making it literally intelligible

in the conception of y o g a as the essential or spiritual form of willing.

102. Freedom and evil are connected notions: evil is intelligible only as implying a limitation or privation of freedom while freedom is known in the first instance as freedom from evil though it may not mean it. One is conscious of being unfree in the consciousness of freedom: un-freedom is realised as such in consciously not knowing, feeling or willing what ought to be known, felt or willed. The concept of 'ought' is understood literally in reference to willing and has only a figurative meaning in reference to knowing and feeling. What ought to be known or felt is what is good to know or feel, something that is already known or felt but necessarily wished to be realised, known better by introspective clarification of the presentation of it and felt more intimately by imaginative inwardisation of its significance for the self. Realisation here is no willing except to Y o g a and although it is a process or activity terminating in a result, the result is felt to come of itself and not to be achievedaby right. There may be a preparatory willing to remove the obstacle to its spontaneous emergence but the emerging process itself and not merely its result is felt to be a miraculous fulfilment of a wish involving the conscious dropping of the willing attitude. Yet it appears as though the fulfilment was achieved by willing; and there are figurative imperatives like 'know the self' or 'love your neighbour' (representing as it were, the will of an Oversoul). To systems other than Y o g a, not willing but the symbolism of willing is necessary to the spiritual realisation of knowing and feeling; and even the realisation of willing may not be literal willing but only a symbolic willing, a wishing that the realised will may come. To Y o g a all realisation is willing though it is not willing outward but inward and is will to n i v ṛ t t i and not to p r a v ṛ t t i. The will to n i v ṛ t t i, will not to will, will to retract willing is the one spiritual activity. The self-retracting will may rest in the first instance in realised knowledge or feeling but ultimately it shoots beyond them. Spirituality is essentially the will to retract the forward will, and though it may yield the capacity of energising the forward will also, the exercise of this capacity except in the retractive interest would mean a fall from spirituality.

103. Spiritual activity is essentially for n i v ṛ t t i or arrest of the will towards b h o g a. It may be an overt striving towards

an object but the motive of the striving is a good other than b h o g a. Starting from the conative tendency towards b h o g a as natural, spirituality may be taken to consist in viewing it, so far as it is self-conscious as evil, as the un-freedom of the self. The natural tendency may not in itself be an evil, but to be explicitly aware of it as an activity of the self is to be aware of it as evil. One is thus aware of it when pleasure is viewed as to be appropriated or enjoyed as a possession and not as an expansion of the self, as the self being better. Pleasure may not be viewed as for the self, and even when so viewed may be taken—as on the merely moral level—as a presented mental fact that does not affect the being of the self. It is viewed on the spiritual level as affecting the being of the self, as either expanding it—yielding the sense of freedom, or contracting it—yielding the sense of possession and as evil in the latter case. It is only when the self seeks pleasure to appropriate it that the will to b h o g a is taken as evil willing. Spiritual activity is the activity to arrest evil willing, to be freed from willing viewed explicitly as evil, activity for the avowed end of freedom from unfree willing. Such freedom may or may not be a desirable form of the being of the self, but in any case it is not sought to be realised *as such*. The activity is spiritual as a realising of freedom only from unfree willing; and it is spiritual in the further sense that it is itself free which it would not be if freedom were sought to be realised as a good *being* of the self.

104. The free realising of freedom is regarded in S ā ṁ k h y a and V e d ā n t a as a knowing process and in b h a k t i - systems as a feeling process. In Y o g a it is taken as literal willing, willing not necessarily to the exclusion of knowing or feeling, nor merely along with them but willing as their essential implication and as capable of outgrowing them. In Kant also it is taken as willing, willing to be freed however not from the evil will to b h o g a as in Y o g a, but from natural inclination (and also it may be from the evil being or the intelligible character of the self); and it is willing to realise freedom not as the good nor as potentially outgrowing knowing and feeling as in Y o g a but as the practically known and respected law of holiness. Spiritual activity is in Y o g a willing to free oneself from the will to b h o g a regarded as evil. All willing is in this system self-conscious, the function of b u d d h i called a s m i t ā. Spiritual

willing is willing behind willing, willing in reference to objective willing, higher asmitā controlling lower asmitā essentially in the negative or inhibitive way but capable of positively starting or energising it also either in the interest of freedom or as an expression of an unconscious evil in one's being deeper than the will to bhoga. Willing to control willing in the negative or the positive way is just what is meant by yoga in the system. All spiritual activity is yoga.

105. In other systems spiritual activity is not necessarily yoga in the sense of spiritual willing and yoga may be a spiritual condition other than activity. Although yoga either as an activity or as a passive condition is admitted as a fact in most Indian systems, it is only in Yoga philosophy that yoga is identified with spiritual willing and understood to be the essential form of spirituality. Spiritual willing is complete at every stage, neither complacent nor impatient but strong in its detachment and masterful in its activity. At every stage it is dual, willing not to be finite as against willing to be finite, ever succeeding beyond success, ever retaining and achieving its free infinitude. As free willing not to will, it is at the same time a possible willing to will, the possibility being here unlike the possibility on the moral level which is real to willing but not to knowing, an actuality that is known to be really annulled within the annulling willing. It is not preventing a desire from passing into willing but making it pass into willing to be killed by or subordinated to the spiritual willing. A jīvanmukta is said to create a body (nirmāṇākāya) to work off his karma, this being the terminal factual form of a willing annulling other actual willing within itself.

106. Willing as explicitly free both in the act and in the end, these being identical, is yoga. It is the merit of Yoga philosophy to have reduced the apparently mystical consciousness of spiritual activity to an intelligible practical psychology of willing. Psychology is ordinarily conceived to be a science based on reflection of the grade to which the mental states are only presented facts without any bearing on the consciousness of freedom and evil. Even the psychology that is based on moral reflection, if it refers to freedom at all, refers to it as extra-psychological or transcendental which mental states presuppose but do not determine or specificate. Hence it is that in the spiritual consciousness one feels an instinctive antagonism to the

reduction of it to psychology. Such reduction, in fact, is generally a denial of the unique value, obligatoriness or sacredness of distinctively spiritual activity; and where it is not a denial, it stands confessed as inadequate psychology presenting the husk and not the kernel of spirituality; for the value here constitutes the fact. Spiritual value or freedom, however, is not other than mental fact though the latter is distinguishable from the former. Freedom is mental fact as constituting, not as constituted by, mental state while mental state is fact as constituted by freedom. Freedom or value is not the pure self, for it has a necessary reference to mental being, nor is it the mental being which presupposes it. Freedom is a mental fact constituting mental state or being which is distinct from it. There may thus be a psychology dealing with freedom as the mental function of making and unmaking mental being; and the reduction of spirituality to this mental function neither denies its value nor presents an inadequate analysis.

107. Freedom as constituting mental state is psychologically intelligible only as freedom of the will. The purely logical or formal relation of 'constitutiveness' has indeed no necessary reference to willing: A is said to constitute B when B is distinct from A, but apart from A is nothing knowable. If B stands for knowable being in general, either there is no A to constitute it or A stands for a knowable real non-being which is just what is meant by freedom. Now mental state may be taken as representing knowable being in general, for if there be knowable non-mental being, freedom cannot be said to constitute it without constituting a mental state--viz.. knowledge of the being. If freedom, as shown, is still a mental fact, it can be said to constitute mental state or knowable being in general if it can be real as non-being even without constituting being. This can only be understood about freedom of the will. Free knowing or feeling, unless taken as an aspect of free willing, is fact only to the mystical consciousness. Free willing as a psychologically intelligible spiritual fact is y o g a.

108. Spirituality is reduced to a procedure of practical psychology in Y o g a philosophy, to a methodical willing to unmake or withdraw from mental state or knowable being in the first instance and then to make or freely put forth mental state, if and when necessary. The religion of y o g a has accordingly

been called a psychological religion. In one sense any religion that emphasises the inner or subjective spiritual attitude in contrast with objective spiritual life, social and ceremonial, is a psychological religion. The religion of Yoga is called psychological in a specially disparaging sense on the assumption that it is merely a system of psychic gymnastics and does not imply like the subjectivistic religions of jñāna and bhakti the realisation of sacred truths and values. The assumption is wrong, yoga being—as has been shown—exercise of explicitly spiritual and not of merely psychic willing. Such willing is also realisation of truths and values though it seeks to go beyond them. But it may be contended that as seeking to achieve freedom by right or might, yoga leaves no room for the consciousness of the sacred which is essential to religion. The charge requires to be examined.

109. Knowledge or feeling of the sacred content as such is as realisation of it itself sacred. The realisation is not a production or causation of the sacred and may accordingly be understood as the activity of the content itself. It is difficult to understand the conative realisation or *my* willing as the activity of the content or end willed without dropping the conative attitude altogether. The primary willing of freedom as end may be knowingly or feelingly realised as the activity of the end; but is it realised in the conative way? if the realising will were a surrender to a categorical imperative, to freedom as the sacred law (as in Kant) and not as an end, its sacredness might be intelligible as the activity or motivation of the law. But in the Yoga system, yoga as the realising will has freedom as the end or good though it does not exclude a surrender to freedom as the law, to Iśvara as holy will. As the end or good is supposed to be achieved by right and not to come to the agent through its free grace, how can the achieving be sacred? It has to be admitted then that so far as yoga is the will to realise freedom of the will as an end and not as an imperative, it is the will to transcend the sacred and to supersede religion. At the same time the activity of realising it is at the start a sacred or religious willing that is known or felt to come. Even the will to overcome this religious willing (in asamprajñāta) may come (though it need not) through the religious will to surrender to God as the eternally realised law, the will to

Īśvara-praṇidhāna (as understood in YS.I.23 and not in YS.II.1,32). The freedom that comes through such religious willing, however, is conceived as super-religious, as the freedom of asamprajñāta. The striving after it and the praying for it (as Īśvara-praṇidhāna may be called) are alternative activities which both bring in super-religious freedom. The discipline of Yoga may then be taken as alternatively religious and super-religious activity for super-religious freedom as the end.

110. The procedure for attaining super-religious freedom (as in asamprajñāta) is either religious or super-religious. The religious procedure in the last resort would be Īśvara-praṇidhāna in response to which Īśvara in his grace is said to help the passage into asamprajñāta. The super-religious procedure would be the spiritual effort of yoga, the intensification of śraddhā, vīryya etc.[a] This effort is not religious willing: there is no religious willing, for to reach an end through one's might and not through grace is not an activity that is felt as sacred. Nor is it the ordinary egoistic will, for it is the effort to get rid of the ego or the finitising ahaṁkāra. It is a willing negatively to avoid willing on any interest including the religious interest and positively to will itself or the freedom of self-possession or active self-identity. As willing, it is activity for an end or good, but the good here is conceived as itself and nothing else. If to act for a good is to act in an interest, the interest here is in the freedom from all interest. Yoga is an absolutely dis-interested willing (not the surrender of willing like certain forms of religion including Īśvara-praṇidhāna), being even in the asamprajñāta stage a super-religious spiritual activity. In other systems also there is the conception of super-religious spiritual activity, though the activity may not be conceived as willing. All activity for mokṣa (as distinct from svarga)—activity as opposed to self-surrender—where the good is conceived as absolute and not as co-ordinate with evil, not, in other words, as satisfying an interest is super-religious. Self-knowledge, for example, is a super-religious good in Vedānta; so is bhakti in Vaiṣṇava systems.

[a] YS.I.20-21

111. Yoga as spiritual willing is not for jñāna but is started by jñāna. In the case of samprajñāta it leads to jñāna also, though not as an intended result. Again yoga, unlike jñāna, is said to make for the cessation of prārabdha bhoga or experiences in this life due to the karma of a previous life.[a] Jñāna leads to vairāgya and this to the attenuation of karma, but such attenuation does not at least normally work against prārabdha and tends only to destroy or 'burn the seed' of sañcita-karma. The jīvanmukta waits for the prārabdha to work itself out and is not supposed to be competent to arrest its operation. In Yoga philosophy, jñāna is supposed (through vairāgya) to start the specific kind of willing called yoga which works against all karma and tends to arrest the operation of even prārabdha. Yoga is not only like the other spiritual functions generally reversive of the current of life, the downward course of causality towards bhoga, but is specifically directed against the causal course within the present life, being thus the will not to will, the self-conscious will to nirodha. Nirodha is not merely the anticipative prevention of a possible causality but the present conquest of a causality that has actually begun to function. Yoga in this sense is interference with natural causality, nature being understood as a system of experiences (bhoga) that has already started into being and includes a determinate future. It is thus tantamount to the willing of miracle or magic.

112. There is general scepticism at the present day not only about any mental activity actually yielding the capacity of producing magical effects in nature but even about the possibility of willing in the mistaken faith in such magic, scepticism not only about the yoga-vibhūtis but about the psychological possibility of yoga itself. Even if such scepticism be waived there is the dispute already noticed as to whether yoga is a necessary stage of spiritual discipline; and there is besides the doubt whether magic has any place in spiritual life at all. Whoever admits free willing, however, in any sense admits magic in some form or other. Even if free willing is admitted in the sense simply of willing as determined by the knowledge of the end to be achieved, the causality of the knowledge, though not implying

[a] YV. I. 1

that *I* could have caused a natural effect other than what I actually cause, implies that nature *could* be and not merely *might* be otherwise, could suspend its causal operation or, in other words, that nature is free. If freedom of willing is admitted in the further sense of the real possibility of willing what I do not will, it would mean an indetermination not only in external nature but even in mental nature, the external indetermination being conditioned by the internal. If further there is freedom of willing not to will, the willing that is said to be abstained from, has to be understood not merely as a real possibility but as an actuality that is annulled or 'reduced to ideality' in the abstaining will. There is not only indetermination in the mind, but the indetermination is a determinate moment in the spiritual willing, or, in other words, magic not only *can* be willed but *is* willed—at once put forth and retracted—in the freedom of yoga. If freedom is admitted at all, it is admitted as the causality or self-energising of knowledge (of the end willed). Freedom is not a hypothesis unless willing as causality is a hypothesis. The only causality that we are directly aware of is willing whence we derive the conception of causality in nature on the one hand and of spiritual causality on the other as the starting and retraction of willing itself as the effect. If knowledge has causality, the knowledge of knowledge also has its causality which would be just the magic efficiency of yoga. Free will in the different senses is, in fact, the same activity in different stages of realisation and implies the possibility of magic at every stage. To doubt yoga-vibhūti *is to doubt* yoga *itself* and to doubt yoga *is to doubt the freedom of the will.*

113. The fundamental doubt is about willing as the causality of knowing. Knowledge that starts willing is knowledge of a content to be brought into experienceable existence or to be prevented from emerging in it. Is the experience of attaining or avoiding literally *caused* by such knowledge? Is such known-ness of the content the cause of its emergence or non-emergence into existence? Is it of itself materialised into positively or negatively experienceable actuality? To deny the causality of knowledge in respect of the actuality of its content is to hold that knowledge is but a by-product of nature, that object that exists of itself causes its own known-ness. This would be materialism in which one inexplicability is only substituted for another. If the causa-

lity of knowledge be magic, the emergence of knowledge or known-ness as effect is also magic. Knowledge whether as cause or as effect of the experienceable actuality of its content implies an inexplicability. We start with the belief in our willing as a real causation. The belief may be held to and inwardised into the theory of y o g a as a system of magic willing. Or it may be sought to be rejected, but the rejection also requires a specific discipline to realise it—realise the emergence of known-ness as a continuous change of the object—which would be y o g a again though of another type. Materialism to be asserted as a theory demands to be realised. Realisation is y o g a and one can only choose between different types of y o g a. There is no escape from magic.

114. So much as to the general possibility of y o g a and y o g a - v i b h ū t i. The possibility of specific v i b h ū t i s will be discussed later.

CHAPTER VIII

THE KINDS OF YOGA

115. Two grades of yoga are mentioned by Patañjali —viz., samprajñāta and asamprajñāta. Samprajñāta is said to present four sub-grades as having for its object the content of vitarka, vicāra, ānanda and asmitā. The first two are each sub-divided into two stages, the first into savitarka and nirvitarka and the second into savicāra and nirvicāra. Again, three kinds of yoga are distinguished according as its object—the content concentrated on—is grāhya, grahaṇa or grahītṛ. These stages and kinds of yoga require to be explained.

116. Samprajñāta implies concentration on a vṛtti corresponding to an object. The object is in the first instance sthūla or perceptual which has sūkṣma aspects apprehensible by the mind without the mediation of the senses. Concentration on the presented sthūla aspect leads to its clarification, to the explication of all its implicit sthūla particularity, to the mind being 'completely filled' by it (ābhoga) or intuiting it in its fulness. The presentation of an object prior to the concentration implies the consciousness of a gap between the mind and the object : the mind does not completely reflect the object and the object is not completely unfolded, these being different sides of the same fact. The given-ness of the object in ordinary perception is not an ultimate inexplicability as it is to Kant but implies the consciousness that I have to know it better and the object has to reveal itself more frankly. It is an implicitly conscious gap—an absolute entity at once subjective and objective—between the mind and the object, the explicit fulfilment of which is yoga as concentration, this too being an absolute entity. Ābhoga or the mind being 'filled' by the object or intuition is the general character of the samādhi reached through concentration. When the intuition is of the sthūla object as sthūla, it is called vitarka.[a]

117. The concentrative intuition called vitarka explicates only the sthūla particularity of the sthūla object. The comple-

[a] YB. I. 17

tion of the process furnishes the occasion for the next stage of concentration called vicāra which yields intuition of the sūkṣma aspect of the sthūla object. 'Sūkṣma' means both what is imperceptible to sense and what is the constitutive cause of the sthula object and is understood here as the metaphysical reality immanent in the sensible object that is concentrated on. Vitarka leads to the intuition of the implied sensible aspects of the sensible object of concentration. The supersensible essence of the sensible object is not implied in it in the sense its sensible particularity is implied : the implicitness or immanence of the constitutive essence in the sensible object is of another grade. To intuit the object in its full sensible particularity is to be aware of the problem of intuiting its metaphysical essence. The sensible object is a construct of the vikāra-tattvas or viśeṣas—bhūta and indriya, these being accordingly themselves taken as sthūla, although neither is by itself perceptible to sense.[a] The sūkṣma essence of the sensible object is a gradation of objective essences from tanmātra upwards to prakṛti. Vicāra is concentration on these essences, on the eight prakṛtis mentioned in sāṁkhya.

118. The completion of vicāra in respect of any of these essences raises the problem of ānandānugata yoga. The meaning of 'ānanda' here is disputed. Vācaspati takes it to mean the pleasure that consists in the mind being 'filled' by indriya, sense-pleasure self-consciously understood as the intuition of the senses themselves as object, as the mind freely one with indriya. Vijñāna-bhikṣu holds that 'ānanda' has here no reference to sense, sense-pleasure as self-conscious being to him only a form of vitarka: ānanda is the pure joy that emerges after the realisation of the essence or heart of the object. To Vācaspati as to some others, while vitarka and vicāra are concentrated on the grāhya or apprehended object, ānanda is concentration on grahaṇa or the act of apprehension—which would be denied by Bhikṣu. The point will be discussed presently but Bhikṣu appears to be right at least so far as he implies that ānandānugata represents a higher grade of yoga than vicārānugata. Asmi-

[a] Bhūta is sthūla-sūkṣma and indriya is also such, the former representing the substantive being and the latter the sense-perceptibility or manifestness of the bhautika object.

tānugata is a still higher grade: ānanda, whatever else it implies, is not presentation of an object like vitarka and vicāra but is a mental state that is itself presented as an implicitly 'subjective' content while asmitā is presented as the subject itself, explicit either as the mind with the form of the self or as the self with the form of the mind. Concentration on implicit subjectivity (ānanda) prepares the way for concentration on the explicit subject (asmitā).

119. In YS.I.41 which will come up for later discussion, there is reference to the content of samprajñāta-samādhi or samāpatti as either grāhya (apprehended object), grahaṇa (apprehending act) or grahītṛ (apprehending subject). There is dispute as to whether the content of each of the four stages of yoga has these aspects or whether yoga as vitarka and vicāra has grāhya only as content, while ānanda and asmitā have grahaṇa and grahītṛ respectively. The first view is apparently held by Vijñāna-bhikṣu and the second by Vācaspati and others. It may be suggested, however, that although the content of vitarka and vicāra has the triple aspect, the grāhya aspect is alone explicit, the grahaṇa and the grahītṛ aspect being explicit in ānanda and asmitā respectively. In each of the four stages, the content has a triple aspect, for yoga is concentration not of cognitive attention only but of the whole being of the mind. In the first two stages the attitude is mainly cognitive or cognitively objecttive, while in the last two it is mainly subjective, being the feeling attitude in the third stage which is subjective but not opposed to the objective attitude and in the fourth stage either the pure conative attitude which is subjective and opposed to the objective or the attitude of knowing the self and not the object as in vitarka. and vicāra.

120. The important point appears to be that the subjective attitude of mind presupposes the objective attitude and that it is only when the object of experience is known as constituted by objective metaphysical essences that the feeling and willing aspects of the object are explicitly detached from the object as free subjective function and subject. The correction of the objective attitude of the mind is effected through the pure or metaphysical knowledge of the object. With all this accords the interpretation of the different stages of samprajñāta given in Bhoja-vṛtti I, 17.

The content of samādhi is the grāhya in vitarka and vicāra. The content of ānanda-samādhi is buddhi itself with the self implicit in it, buddhi as subjective function, not pure buddhi but with a touch of rajas and tamas in it and hence not freed altogether from the objective attitude, such content being ānanda or joy, the self-conscious 'absolute' being of subjective function or grahaṇa. The objective attitude of the first two samādhis implies the conceit of a body—gross and subtle—in which the mind is finitised. In ānanda-samādhi, this conceit of a body drops, such samādhi being said to be enjoyed without self-knowledge by the videha-devatās. Next comes asmitā-samādhi of which the content is pure buddhi freed from the objective attitude altogether and itself object in the sense of the bare existent or manifest self-identity, identified with the pure self and reflecting no viṣaya at all. This samādhi has two forms according as the identity of the self and buddhi is taken as buddhi only or as the self only. The former would be the samādhi said to be enjoyed by the devatās called 'prakṛti-layas and the latter would be viveka-khyāti as the consummation of samprajñāta.

121. The conception of videha and prakṛti-laya requires to be interpreted. Both are understood to be free from ahaṁkāra or the conceit of the body. Freedom from ahaṁkāra does not by itself mean knowledge or realisation of the self (or Īśvara). It is in the first instance a merging or forgetting of the self in a tattva higher than ahaṁkara, a free identification of the self with infinite buddhi—either in the form of feeling or in the form of willing. Free identification means identification in the explicit subjective attitude as distinct from unconscious or erroneous identification which implies the objective attitude and the conceit of the body. It means consciousness of infinite buddhi as one self, such consciousness being feeling the self as content, or willing as the self. The self is not the content of consciousness nor does the self will and hence the self as apparently content or apparently active is really buddhi undistinguished from the self or the self undistinguished from buddhi. The identity of buddhi with the self—as the content of consciousness—is the subjective object, feeling itself being the object felt; and the identity of the self with buddhi—the activity of consciousness—is the subject as willing towards

buddhi. Videha apparently represents the former and prakṛti-laya the latter. The videha may be taken as actively feeling out towards feeling as absolute object or tanmātra and as in this activity feeling infinite buddhi as the self. The prakṛti-laya in willing towards infinite buddhi feels infinite prakṛti as the self. Both are devatās, for to feel an infinite tattva as the self without being unrestricted to a body is to be a devatā or an absolute feeling. One feels an infinite object as the self, in being active towards something lower which is the finite absolute or tanmātra (lower than buddhi) in the case of videha and the infinite absolute or buddhi (lower than prakṛti) in the case of prakṛti-laya, 'absolute' meaning here manifest identity of subject and object. The former is in sānanda-samādhi and the latter is sāsmitā-samādhi, neither knowing the self (or God) as a tattva beyond the object, neither achieving freedom from the object. As unfree, though without the conceit of body, they are reborn but reborn as in samādhi which has not got to be achieved, the former apparently in the highest samprajñāta, or viveka-khyāti and the latter in samprajñāta; each being re-born in a samādhi higher than its present samādhi.

122. The videha, the prakṛti-laya and the vivekin appear to represent the affective, conative and cognitive types of spirituality or realised consciousness of the self. In terms of samādhi, the first stands for sānanda and the last two for two stages of sāsmitā, sānanda and sāsmitā having grahaṇa and grahītṛ or subjective function and subject as their respective contents. Realised feeling as of the videha is the objective absolute, the identity of subject and object appearing as impersonal. Realised willing as of the prakṛti-laya is the subjective absolute or the identity appearing as personal. Realised knowing or viveka would be detached from these two absolutes and as such would be the over-personal self as correcting or dissolving the self-conscious or free identity of subject and object. This correcting is still a buddhi-function with which the self is identified and is not accordingly explicitly aware of being over-personal. The subjective absolute or absolute will like the objective absolute or absolute feeling is identified with the substantive buddhi and not merely buddhi-function, but

unlike it is identified with the implicit or unmanifest form of buddhi which is just prakṛti.

123. The videha and the prakṛti-laya are conceived to be freely merged into or identified with the object and not knowing the self (or God) as beyond the object. The freely feeling self is aware of the self but not as distinct from buddhi and the freely willing self is aware of the self as distinct but not as known. The prakṛti-laya as absolute will may be further taken in Yoga as implicitly aware of God working in him (or in prakṛti with which he is identified)—that is why he is supposed to be reborn as janyeśvara—but not therefore as known. The vivekin is conceived in Yoga as knowing not only the self but also, it may be, God.

124. Is asmitā-samādhi necessarily dual as absolute knowing and absolute willing, viveka and prakṛti-līnatva as apparently conceived in Bhoja-vṛtti? It does not appear that one in the sānanda stage has to pass through the prakṛti-līna form of asmitā in order to attain the viveka stage. It was pointed out before that intensive effort and the contemplation of Īśvara are only alternative ways of reaching asamprajñāta. May not the two forms of asmitā be similarly alternative processes? Viveka or absolute self-knowledge need not be reached through the realisation of absolute will: sānanda or absolute feeling seems to pass directly either into absolute willing or into absolute knowing. Two courses appear to be open at every stage of the free willing of freedom. Freedom is understood both in the act and in the end of willing: the end remaining the same, a higher freedom or grade of efficiency in the act may be developed or the form of the act may be the same while a higher quality of freedom as the end may be achieved. Apparently the end of the videha and of the prakṛti-laya is the same—viz., to freely merge into the object; but the act of the latter is freer as willing towards buddhi itself than the act of the former which would be actively feeling out towards tanmātra. Again, the act or subjective function of the vivekin and the videha is the knowing of the mind, not willing towards it which is the act of the prakṛti-laya; but while the latter seeks to merge in it, the former seeks to be detached from it. Similarly the passage beyond vicāra also is in two directions—towards the knowledge of

ānanda and towards ānanda itself. But ānanda as free samādhi is at once both, unlike asmitā which is alternatively knowing and willing. The knowing of ānanda as subjective function and the feeling of it are indistinguishable.

125. So far as to the samādhis in the subjective attitude (i.e., with grahaṇa and grahītṛ as content)--viz., ānanda and asmitā. As to the objective samādhis—vicāra and vitarka (with grāhya as content), each presents two forms which are distinct and co-ordinate (not alternative). The two forms of vitarka are savitarka and nirvitarka, 'vitarka' in these terms meaning wrong vitarka.[a] Similarly about the two forms of vicāra—savicāra and nirvicāra. In both savitarka and savicāra, the content is presented with an adventitious distinction which drops out in nirvitarka and nirvicāra. In savitarka this distinction is a vikalpa generated by verbal knowledge,[b] while in savicāra, it is the specific spatio-temporal or causal position[c] of the content concentrated on, this being also a vikalpa in the wider sense. This adventitious distinction in the content is a buddhi-construct which is sought to be eliminated in the next higher samādhis—nirvitarka and nirvicāra.

126. In vitarka the object concentrated on is a perceptible whole of perceptible parts. In savitarka, it appears with the fictitious unity of the name, meaning and thought[d] called vikalpa. Not that the object as thus known is false, for the adventitious character is a mental construct and not the content of error. But it is known inadequately, known as indefinitely confused with presentation owing to the mind-created limitation. To be known adequately within perceptual limits—in para-pratyakṣa[e] is to be known in nirvitarka. Here the factitious character of the vṛtti drops off, the elimination being called smṛti-pariśuddhi[f] or the removal of the memory or thought of the verbal meaning. The object in savitarka

[a] YV.I.17.
[b] YS.I.42.
[c] YB.I.44.
[d] YS.I.42; III.17.
[e] YB.I.42.
[f] YS.I.43.

appears within the vṛtti and yet as distinct from it because of the verbal reference. In nirvitarka, as the verbal reference lapses, this distinction of vṛtti and its object also lapses so that the vṛtti appears to lose itself (svarūpa-śūnyeva) and shines as the object only (arthamātra-nirbhāsā). This object is still a whole of parts, an avayavin the unity of which is real and not a vikalpa.

127. The object of vicāra is sūkṣma in the sense of being the imperceptible cause or cause of cause etc. of the sthūla or perceptible object. Savicāra is the intuition of the sūkṣma object as present with the limitations of deśa, kāla and nimitta.[a] The intuition is of the sūkṣma as manifest in the sthūla and having the objective time-position of the sthūla, which is position in the causal series of spatio-temporal phenomena. (Such sūkṣma corresponds to what Kant calls substance or cause in *phenomenon*). This objective time-position is presumably a vikalpa, as implying krama which is taken in Yoga-bhāṣya[b] to be a vikalpa,[c] though apparently not in the sense of a verbally generated construct. As this time-position necessarily involves deśa and nimitta, they too are vikalpas; and the incidental implication is that there is no real causality in the succession of phenomena. In nirvicāra this time-position of the sūkṣma object is eliminated, the noumenon being known as integral and unrestricted to any specific immanent pariṇāma.[d] As in nirvitarka, the vṛtti appears to lose itself and shines as the artha only.

128. Nirvicāra yields intuition of the supersensible causes of the sensible world, beginning with the tanmātras and ending with prakṛti, a gradation of objective essences as standing by themselves without being manifest in this world. An object of normal perception under savitarka-concentration is isolated from all its external relations but is still known as an avayavin[e] unfolding its internal perceptible characters such as were implicit in the presentation of it. Under vicāra-concentration, this isolated object reveals a gradation of imperceptible constitutive

[a] YB.I.44.
[b] II.52.
[c] Vastu-śūnyo buddhi-nirmāṇaḥ śabdajñānānupātī
[d] YB.I.44.
[e] YB.I.43.

causes terminating in the a-liṅga, object that is unmanifest and manifests nothing, object as unrelated to the self in this sense. The viewing of the sensible object as thus resolved into prakṛti, as unrelated to the self, as unknowable leads to the lapse of the objective attitude altogether and to the emergence of the subjective attitude. The objective attitude implies attention to the grāhya (apprehended or known object) which ultimately reduces it to a known unknowable (a-liṅga), grāhya-a-grāhya as it may be called. The subjective attitude emerges when the object thus turns out to be a puzzle, if not a contradiction. The consciousness of the subjective not only presupposes the consciousness of the objective but the reduction of objectivity itself to an apparent or real contradiction. Attention is thus turned from the grāhya or apprehended object to grahaṇa or apprehending act or subjectivity whence again, as has been explained, it is turned to the grahītṛ or apprehending agent or the subject.

129. All these are stages of asamprajñāta-yoga. The general character of samprajñāta is best understood in reference to its result which is technically called samāpatti. Samāpatti is the fixation of the mind on a content (the mind being tatastha, 'in it') and its assumption of the form of the content (it being tadañjana—'taking its smear or complexion'). In all knowledge, the mind may be said to be fixed on the content and to take its form, but this has to be understood in a special sense about the super-normal intuition that samāpatti is taken to be. The mind here self-consciously fixes itself on the content and self-consciously identifies itself with it. Self-conscious fixation is not only the awareness of the mind as fixed on the content but also the awareness of willing to withdraw the mind from other contents, not provisionally—as in ordinary reflective knowing—in order to know more about the object fixed on but to know it better, willing to conquer vikṣepa as a spiritual evil, evil conceived to be a limitation of freedom (of self-possessed contemplation). As the result of such disinterested fixation, the mind overcomes the gap between knowing and its object or their dualism, gets 'filled' by the object and thus rises above the subjectivism that ordinary reflection involves. The mind takes the form of the object, is tadañjana in the sense that the dualism of knowing and known lapses. The lapse may take two forms:

either the mind or the mental vṛtti that is fixated finds the object within itself, the object being still distinct within, though not from, the mind as mirror, or the mind may freely merge itself into the contemplated object, give up its self as it were, (svarūpa-śūnyeva) so that the object alone shines out (artha-mātra-nirbhāsā). Even in the latter case, the object that shines is the mind or vṛtti appearing as the object by freely retracting its subjectivity. These two forms are distinguishably continuous in vitarka and vicāra where there is samāpatti in respect of the grāhya object. In ānanda and asmitā—where the samāpatti is in respect of grahaṇa and grahītṛ as content, the two forms either coincide or are exclusive alternatives.

130. Samāpatti is attained by the mind that is kṣīṇa-vṛtti, abstracted from all vṛttis other than that concentrated on and with the functions of rajas and tamas that make for vikṣepa attenuated by abhyāsa and vairāgya or disinterested spiritual practice. The abstraction or the arrest of vikṣepa—the retractive spiritual will—is the essential activity of yoga which in samprajñāta terminates or rests in a particular vṛtti. In attention in the vikṣipta stage, concentration appears to be the activity, abstraction being only its passive concomitant and result. In yoga, abstraction is the explicit activity of which concentration is the result which, too, is not passive but a restful activity, the activity of keeping self-identical in a vṛtti. Abstraction is negative or retractive willing which is real only through the spiritual interest, interest in the freedom from interest. The willing, however, rests in the vṛtti from which as ālambana it starts. There is no vṛtti, however, that does not imply an actual or potential vikṣepa,[a] and even in ekāgra, there is potential vikṣepa in the form of a persisting reference to the objects of bhoga or experience, reference that is, however, only a saṁskāra. Hence samādhi in samprajñāta is said to be savīja—with the seed or potentiality of suffering in it. At the same time this seed or saṁskāra is gradually devitalised by the saṁskāra left by the samādhi itself—prajñā-kṛta-saṁskāra as it is called—which as the saṁskāra or as conditioned by the saṁskāra

[a] YB.I.30.

of the retracting activity tends to arrest the tendency to relapse into the vikṣipta level.

131. Prajñā that shines out in samādhi is spiritual wisdom implying not only intuition of the viśeṣa or particularity of metaphysical objects, which āgama and anumāna only postulate and do not establish, but also a purity or transparency (vaiśāradya) of the buddhi-self in which one views suffering souls as from a height.[a] It need not mean the wisdom that is reached in nirvicāra-samādhi alone (in which prajñā is first mentioned in YB.): it includes viveka (param prasaṁkhyānam—YB.I.2.) which also is called prajñā in YS.II.27. Prajñā in this wide sense leaves its saṁskāra which militates against the saṁskāra of vikṣipta mind that persists in ekāgra. The saṁskāra of vikṣipta does not persist in asamprajñāta which is accordingly called nirvīja-samādhi. This samādhi arrests vṛtti altogether, arrests even the terminal vṛtti, the prajñā called viveka and militates against the saṁskāra left by the prajñā. Nirvīja-samādhi or niruddha also leaves its saṁskāra, as may be inferred from the facilitation and increased duration of later niruddha. This saṁskāra works against the saṁskāra of savīja-samādhi.

132. The prajñā that emerges in the final samprajñāta —viveka as it is called—is the perception of itself as buddhi-vṛtti distinct from the self and as accordingly savīja, tending through its implied avidyā towards bhoga or potentially evil. The perception is spiritual as implying para-vairāgya or final detachment of the self from the object, detachment not only from the object of the mind but also from the mind itself as object, from the mind even in its final actual state viz., viveka. Vairāgya is not mere desirelessness but a free conquest (vaśīkāra) of desire—whether for natural (dṛṣṭa) or for spiritual (ānuśravika) good through the perception of the evil implied in desire. Vairāgya is the condition of all yoga, the one motive of the will to nivṛtti. The perception of the evil even in viveka-samādhi in so far as it is a vṛtti leads to para-vairāgya which is no longer the conquest of desire —for viveka already means a cessation of desire—but the free

[a]Bhūmisthāniva śailasthāḥ—YB.I.47.

annulment of unfreedom that viveka itself as vṛtti is perceived in viveka to imply. Freedom is the positive end—the freedom of the mind to stand like the self. Negatively it is freedom from desire—and therefore is not said to be desired—and even from knowledge which as viveka knows itself to be but vṛtti, as dependent on the object and as, therefore, the initial form of unfreedom. There is no knowledge except through vṛtti and freedom though achieved through knowledge is freedom from knowledge itself, freedom as the super-conscious activity of the mind to stand like the self, to be and not to know.

133. This super-conscious activity or freedom beyond knowledge is asamprajñāta-samādhi. It is still the activity of buddhi, not of the self which is pure consciousness and no activity. In all lower stages the activity of buddhi is bound up with a vṛtti though even there as the will to nivṛtti, it also transcends the vṛtti. Here it is the will to withdraw from all vṛtti and is, therefore, no function of vṛtti, being the function of buddhi without vṛtti, i.e., with vṛtti reduced to saṁskāra within it. It does not mean a lapse of buddhi into prakṛti, as the retraction of all vṛtti would imply in Sāṁkhya. This saṁskāra-śeṣa-buddhi lapses into prakṛti only in the final asamprajñāta which of itself passes into mukti or kaivalya. Otherwise there is relapse from asamprajñāta to samprajñāta—waking or vyutthāna means this relapse here—to viveka-prajñā whence through the saṁskāra left by asamprajñāta there is easier elevation to the super-conscious stage. The alternation goes on till viveka reaches its full maturation in the four-fold knowledge of evil (heya), cause of evil (heya-hetu), freedom from evil (hāna) and means to freedom (hānopāya; and then comes the final asamprajñāta with its three stages—para-vairāgya, citta-laya (in prakṛti) and kaivalya (cessation of the possibility of re-emergence of citta) spontaneously succeeding one another without the necessity of fresh sādhana. The four stages prior to final asamprajñāta make up what is called kārya-vimukti (interpreted by Bhikṣu as kartavya-samāpatti or cessation of duty) and the last three citta-vimukti which is freedom from the mind.[a]

[a] YB. II. 27.

CHAPTER IX

THE PROCEDURE OF YOGA

134. *Yoga* or the free willing of freedom is a super-religious spiritual activity. It may presuppose a moral and religious discipline, and religious activity in the form of *Īśvara-praṇidhāna* may be an alternative procedure co-ordinate with the *yoga* procedure for the attainment of *yoga* or the freedom of *samādhi* as the end, but freedom whether in the *yoga* act or as its end is conceived to be super-religious. The absolute will that *yoga* implies is as much 'beyond good and evil' as the absolute knowledge of the *Vedāntist* or the absolute *bhakti* of the *Vaiṣṇava*. These latter may still be described as religious so far as they imply a surrender to the sacred but *yoga* as absolute will is explicitly a transcendence of the sacred. At the same time it is spiritual, unlike the absolute will in Nietzsche's cult of the superman, being essentially the will to *nivṛtti* and not to *pravṛtti*, the will to *mukti*, to freedom as the power to stand as distinct from the power to create objective values indefinitely. Not that the *mukti* of *Yoga* is incompatible with a patricipation in the life of God for all time in His work of liberation of souls, but anyway such participation would not be to *Yoga* the self's own life as individual, the self being as in *Sāṁkhya* eternally individual and without any activity. The freedom of negative willing indeed implies the freedom of forward willing but as has been pointed out, such forward willing conceived in *Yoga* to be actualised and annulled at the same time.

135. The practical procedure for the attainment of *samādhi* includes many steps, some of which are only preparatory to absolute willing (*bahiraṅga* or external means) and others that are constitutive of it (*antaraṅga* or internal parts); and the lower forms of *samādhi* are themselves preparatory in rereference to the highest. Some of these are consecutive steps of which each higher is to be attempted only after the lower step has been efficiently practised; and some are only alternative steps. As to the consecutive steps, it is not necessary that one should

begin with the lowest; one may be competent to function on a higher level.[a] In fact, one should begin on the highest level and then gradually discover by trial the level that suits him i.e., on which he can function efficiently.[b]

136. The spiritual procedure of yoga consists in the last resort in abhyāsa or vairāgya, positive exercise of freedom and negative annulment of unfreedom. Two grades of vairāgya—para and apara—have been mentioned, of which the latter is desirelessness understood as the active conquest of desire and the former is the free withdrawal of the self from the mind itself. Both are forms of negative or retractive mental activity conditioned by the knowledge of the evil (doṣa-darśana) in the objective attitude of the mind and both may be regarded as the prasāda or realisation of the knowledge. The knowledge itself implies a residual objective attitude, the evil of which is manifest only in para-vairāgya which is accordingly a withdrawal from knowledge itself and may be described as such realisation (prasāda) of knowledge as amounts to the transcendence of it. Abhyāsa or practice is the free willing to stand,[c] the self-conscious effort of the mind to persist unchangingly as an isolated buddhi-vṛtti or as vṛtti-less buddhi, such willing being confirmed by constant repetition in the right spirit.[d] The right spirit is but vairāgya, the motive to the positive effort and not merely to its repetition, so that abhyāsa and vairāgya appear to be different aspects of the same activity, the difference lapsing altogether in the passage to asamprajñāta, where the positive activity is negative and the negative activity positive, freedom in the act and freedom in the end being coincident. The positive activity in all yoga is a prayatna or willing of which śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi and prajñā are specific aspects.[e] 'Śraddhā' means here the active wish or aspiration for yoga, vīryā' the will to dhāraṇā, 'smṛti the effort of dhyāna, 'samādhi' the effortless activity to be and 'prajñā' the knowledge that shines out in samādhi: knowledge which

[a] YB.III.6.
[b] YV.III.6.
[c] YS.I.13.
[d] YS.I.14.
[e] YS.I.20.

being practised in vairāgya for its object leads to the freedom of asamprajñāta.

137. All these are stages of abhyāsa which is here direct willing and not willing through means, prescribed in the first pāda of Yoga-sūtra for the uttama-adhikārin, the fittest aspirant who starts with śraddhā in the above sense and is already in a sense on the ekāgra level. This direct willing leads him on even to asamprajñāta, though here an alternative to willing—viz., Īśvara-praṇidhāna which implies surrender of the willing attitude—is prescribed which also is attained directly without means. The aspirant who can directly attain yoga and is on the way to it may, however, experience vikṣepa and certain auxiliary practices are prescribed for its avoidance which are not really means but serve only to strengthen and chasten the aspiration (and are accordingly called 'parikarma'). These include cultivation of a serene moral attitude towards other persons, breath-control, experimental production of certain magical experiences ('pravṛtti' as they are called) through the control of attention and so forth. The moral attitude mentioned is interesting. The aspirant is enjoined to cultivate maitrī, karuṇā, muditā and upekṣā for the happy, unhappy, the virtuous and the vicious person respectively.[a] He should avoid envy for the happy man, have good wishes for him, feel his happiness as though it were his own, these being implied in maitrī or friendliness through which he gets freed from rāga or the lure of pleasure. Karuṇā or compassion implies avoidance of indifference (tāṭasthyam) towards others' suffering, of the conceit of being superior to them (darpa) and of the wish to inflict suffering on the enemy (dveṣa): the feeling of others' suffering as one's own frees one from dveṣa or fear of pain. Muditā or joy (of approval) at others' puṇya (merit or virtue achieved) excludes asūyā or the carping tendency and leads one towards puṇya and the avoidance of the pain of a bad conscience (paścāt-tāpa). For the sinner one should have upekṣā or forgiveness (indifference or audāsīnya in the sense of seeking to forget his sin) and not amarṣa—anger or hatred. Unlike the first three, upekṣā is only negative and has no positive counterpart unless it be

[a] YS.I.33.

karuṇā, which, however, is for the relief of the suffering due to sin rather than for the conversion of the sinner (though it may not exclude what is called in Gītā 'loka-saṁgraha' or the compassionate teaching of others). That upekṣā is only negative comes out in Yoga-bhāṣya.[a] where it is pointed out that while the other three can be intensified by thought (bhāvanā) leading to realisation (samādhi) and spiritual strength (bala), upekṣā does not admit of realising thought and hence does not lead to positive strength.

138. No *means* to the attainment of yoga are apparently prescribed in the first section of the Yoga-sūtras which describes only the actual procedure of the uttamādhikārin, the aspirant who is already posted in the ekāgra level. The discipline for the madhyamādhikārin, the next best aspirant who has already the spiritual impulse and cannot yet spiritually will, is stated[b] as comprising tapas (asceticism), svādhyāya (study of sacred śāstra or meditation—japa— of sacred mantras) and Īśvara-praṇidhāna (contemplation of God), these making up what is called kriyā-yoga (inner religious activity which is external relatively to super-religious spiritual activity viz., the free willing of freedom). These attenuate the spiritual evil (kleśa) in our nature that prevents rise to samādhi.[c] They are prescribed for one already in the religious stage with aspiration for freedom or mokṣa. There are, again, others who have not yet risen to this stage, for whom a discipline of our relatively outward nature—moral and even physical—is necessary. The discipline for all who are on the vikṣipta level—for the vyutthita-citta (with a waking or discursive consciousness as distinct from the ecstatic sleep of samādhi)—is summed up in the eight stages—yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi, samādhi being the end to which the others are consecutive means (and which is itself means to higher samādhi to one already on the ekāgra level).

139. Are these eight members of the yoga-procedure (yogāṅga) consecutive stages, each leading on to the next? In connection with Yoga-sūtra III.6, Vyāsa states in re-

[a] III.23.
[b] YS.II.1.
[c] YS.II.2.

ference to saṁyama comprising dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi that one has to rise here consecutively from the lowest grade upwards unless one is already competent to function in a higher grade. Vijñāna-bhikṣu extends this rule to these eight stages in interpretation of the word 'yathākramam' in the Bhāṣya.[a] The rule, however, is taken by others to hold good about the last six stages, the first two—yama and niyama—being understood as only removing the obstacles to the attainment of samādhi.[b] Of the six stages the first three are taken to be preparatory steps (bahiraṅga) and the last three constitutive steps (antaraṅga), samprajñāta-samādhi itself being antaraṅga to asamprajñāta.

140. Yama and niyama constitute the ethical and religious setting of the specific yoga-activity. Five yamas are prescribed—ahiṁsā, satya, asteya, brahmacarya and aparigraha—all ethical in the sense of being negative or prohibitive in form and in reference to outward action. The niyamas are also five—śauca, santosa, tapas, svādhyāya and Īśvara-praṇidhāna, these being religious as implying the cultivation of certain positive inner virtues. The yamas as negative (or forms of nivṛtti), are prescribed for all irrespective of caste (jāti), place (deśa), time (kāla) and convention (samaya—restrictive condition, reservation in respect of purpose etc.), or in other words, they are universal and categorical rules of action. The niyamas as positive (or forms of pravṛtti) have reference to activity at a particular time and are not, therefore, universal (sārvabhauma) rules of action. Nor are they categorically prescribed i.e., for their own sake, for virtue is positive willing though in the inner spirit and as such demands to be retracted (nivṛtti). Not that it is implied that yama is more obligatory than niyama. Morality as abstinence, though from outward action, is continuous with vairāgya (or upekṣā for evil) and is directly willed for its own sake; while religious practice, though more inward than morality, is willed only as a means (kriyā-yoga) to the free activity of yoga (to abhyāsa, morality as an embodiment of vairāgya being co-ordinate with abhyāsa). Hence appa-

[a] YV. II. 23.
[b] BV. II. 29.

rently there is one morality but many religions. Morality is universal as the negative externality of spirituality, religious practice is its positive particularity and internality, while super-religious yoga is its transcendent individual reality.

141. The five yamas are forms of the will to nivṛtti or abstinence from violence, lying, stealing, sexual indulgence and acquisition of property—these forms of evil willing being understood not merely literally but as both generalised and inwardised. Hiṁsā or violence is taken to be the basal form of evil willing, the other four involving it or leading to it in spirit, if not in actual fact; and even the niyamas are taken to be intimately related to ahiṁsā which is thus taken to be central to all morality and religion.[a] Ahiṁsā and in fact, all the yamas are primarily the avoidance or arrest of hiṁsā etc. in thought i.e., as vitarka through the contemplation of their pratipakṣa, of their evil consequences. Hiṁsā etc. may be committed, abetted or approved; they may proceed from lobha (greed), krodha (anger) or moha (illusion that they are right or good, perverted conscience—dharmo me bhaviṣyati iti)[b] and may be directed towards an infinite variety of objects.

142. Of the five niyamas, the last three—tapas, svādhyāya and Īśvara-praṇidhāna—are specific religious practices (what are called kriyā-yoga in YS. II.1); and the first two—śauca and santoṣa—are religious attitudes in the sense of being not merely negative like the yamas and of forming the spiritual setting for the last three. Śauca is cleanliness, not natural but spiritual, cleanliness of the body as well as of the mind. The spiritual side of bodily cleanliness implies feeling of the association with the body itself (of oneself or of others) as unclean (aṅga-jugupsā)[c] which explains the inwardness of ceremonial or symbolic purification of the body (saṁskāra) by holy water etc. Mental cleanliness would imply freeing oneself from moral dirt (citta-mala) through the attitudes of maitrī, karuṇā etc. Santoṣa is contentment with what one has[d] or—as sometimes explained— with what is barely necessary for life. Tapas is asceticism (without prejudice to

[a] YB. II. 30.
[b] YB. II. 34.
[c] YS. II. 40.
[d] YB. 32.

mental serenity)[a] for the attenuation of the specific spiritual evils (karma-kleśa-vāsanā), consisting in deliberately bearing —accustoming oneself to—a pair of contrary experiences (dvandva) like heat and cold. It includes all self-chastening and expiatory religious practices and, according to Bhikṣu, even joyous religious practices like worship etc. Svādhyāya includes sacred meditation and study. Īśvara-praṇidhāna or meditation on God—understood here as an emotional activity rather than an impersonal or pure cognitive activity (as in YS. I.23) is the crown and consummation of niyama or religious discipline. Perfection in this meditative practice is said to lead directly to samādhi[b] which, as Yoga-vārtika exlpains, does not imply that the other items of the yoga-procedure are useless. It implies that it is only in the attitude of surrender to God that the later steps of yoga have to be performed for the sure attainment of samādhi.

143. The next three steps of yoga—viz., āsana, prāṇāyāma and pratyāhāra—constitute the process of direct energising of the body as an organ of the spirit in anticipation of the purely spiritual or bodiless willing that consists in dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi. The moral and religious disciplines represented by yama and niyama are subjectivistic in attitude implying a flight from the merely natural bodily and mental life. The passage of subjectivism to concrete spirituality is effected by the conquest of the conscious body and not by flight from it, by spiritualising the body or attuning it with the infinite. The association with the body is due not to subjective error which implies ahaṁkāra but to transcendental error which originates ahaṁkāra itself, and which though attenuated by the subjective discipline of yama and niyama can only be conquered by the direct idealisation of the body. The willing implied in morality and religion is still bodily willing: normally there is no willing except in the body, the so-called religious willing being but a wishing or aspiration that tips bodily willing. Freedom from the body may come through grace in response to religious aspiration, but in the yoga-form of spirituality, this freedom has to be achieved by the will. Hence the necessity of reversing the direc-

[a] YB. II. 1.
[b] YS. II. 45.

tion of bodily willing: the natural movement of bodily willing which is pravṛtti towards finitising bhoga has to be turned into nivṛtti-movement in the body towards the infinitude of the spirit (buddhi). Outgoing or assertive bodily willing has to be replaced by ingoing or retractive bodily willing in the form of the achievement of a tranquil posture, equable vital flow and the reversal of sense-activity.

144. The attitude of surrender to God makes directly for an effortless serene or sacred poise of the body called āsana. The poise is the consciously achieved expression of effortless strength, involving free relaxation of the will (prayatna-śaithilya) on the one hand and free identification on the other with the poise of our planet[a] or with the infinity of ākāśa.[b] The merely bodily posture may be induced by positive natural willing, the unconscious willing that holds the body together (vidhāraka-prayatna), but the spiritual poise of the body that āsana means is induced by the will not to exercise this prayatna which is in fact antagonistic to it[c] implying such strength as consists in the non-exertion of strength and in spiritual rapport with the infinite (devatā). Āsana spontaneously leads to prāṇāyāma which may be taken as control (negative—gati-viccheda, gatyabhāva etc.) of the life-function. Like vidhāraka-prayatna, prāṇa or vital activity is also an unconscious natural willing, and prāṇāyāma is the will not to exert i.e., to hold or arrest this willing. This vital willing is called vāyu and is taken in Sāṁkhya-kārikā as the function common to the karaṇas—buddhi, ahaṁkāra and indriya. Its manifest form is breathing—life felt or sensed as though it moved outwards and inwards and stood within the body; and prāṇāyāma means free breath-control. Here also, as in the case of āsana, the control though exercised in the body is spiritual willing, willing in tune with the universe, willing in the realisation of bodily life as the cosmic rhythm. This con-

[a] ananta-samāpatti or realised thought of being one with Ananta, the god holding the earth steady.

[b] 'ānantya-samāpatti'—an alternative reading, meaning ākāśādigatānantye cetasah..... avyavadhānena tādātmyam— Bhoja-vṛtti II.48.

[c] cp. TV. II. 47.

[d] YS. II. 48.

trol of life spontaneously makes for control over the mind (d h ā r a ṇ ā - y o g y a t ā),[a] which in the first instance is manifest as p r a t y ā h ā r a which means the retraction of the senses into the mind. The retraction is explained as the free act, objects being unpresented to the senses, absorbing the senses into the mental v ṛ t t i that is concentrated on so that they appear to take the same form as the mind.[b] It is the mind that takes the form of the sensible, but in p r a t y ā h ā r a the senses appear to take the form of the v ṛ t t i: the free image of the object contemplated becomes sense-percept. P r a t y ā h ā r a is not mere i n d r i y a - j a y a understood as the withdrawal of the senses from the objects presented to them, from evil objects or from all objects. The withdrawal, according to some, implies non-apprehension of the presented object and, according to others, the free apprehension of them.[c] Such withdrawal would in fact come under y a m a but p r a t y ā h ā r a is a specific spiritual activity in the body like ā s a n a and p r ā ṇ ā y ā m a, not merely negative control of the senses but positive conquest and absorption of them by b u d d h i which supersedes the necessity of moral control.

145. P r a t y ā h ā r a is the consummation of spiritual willing in the body. The next three stages—the a n t a r a ṅ g a s or constitutive members of y o g a—viz., d h ā r a ṇ ā, d h y ā n a and s a m ā d h i imply bodi-less willing or willing in the pure spirit. These three apparently correspond to ā s a n a, p r ā ṇ ā y ā m a and p r a t y ā h ā r a, the forms of spiritual willing in the body: willing is willing of a static attitude, of an outgoing action or of a retractive action, whether of the body or of the mind. D h ā r a ṇ ā is the fixation of the mind on a real space-position.[d] As a merely psychic process, it is interesting as a form of actual doing and not an imagined doing, the actual placing of an imagined object or image in the space-position attended to. The imagined object is the proposed content of d h y ā n a which in d h ā r a ṇ ā is voluntarily visualised as *there*, referred to an actual position in the real world (including one's body). Ordinarily in imagining an object, if we visualise it at all with a background, the background or the spatial context is taken to be as unreal as

[a] YS. II. 43
[b] YS. II. 54
[c] YB. II. 55
[d] YS. III. 1.

the object itself. Here in dhāraṇā, however, the spatial context is real and the willing to visualise the imagined object in a position in it is just as real as the willing to see or looking for an actual object there. A presentation actually emerges in both cases as the result of and in response to the willing, the production of a desired effect being willing, whether the effect be a physical fact or a 'mere' appearance. Dhāranā is not mere imagining nor willing (attending) to know but willing to imagine in a known context, to visualise it there—it is added—for a certain desired duration. It is actually placing the imagined object there, the mind being fixed on it by its vṛtti.[a] The mind or the senses are taken in Sāmkhya[b] to be or to have their vṛtti where they function i.e., in the place where their object is referred to, not within the brain, their kriyā being not motion *in* space but the apprehending act which has space within it as its content. Dhāraṇā is, however, not a mere psychic process: like āsana, it is a spiritual process in tune with the infinite, implying a slackening of the natural effort of attention and an identification with the sacred—devatā or self or Īśvara, the visualising attitude here being a mode of negative *willing*, for otherwise real deśa or space-position would not be presented. Again, the deśa is not any arbitrary position but a position in the body or relatively to it that is prescribed as significant of the sacred content (devatā etc.) to be realised in samādhi, the significance being accepted in faith. Dhāraṇā is only a help to samādhi, to be practised in the earlier stages of yoga and may be dispensed with later.

146. Dhyāna is the continuous contemplation of the object on which the mind is thus fixed. The contemplation consists in the thinking or imagining of the object over and over again till the operation loses its intermittent character and is felt as a single process of willing and imagining, of the effort of the mind and the self-revelation of the object. Still there is a consciousness of subjective effort in fulfilment and supersession of which comes effortless samādhi where the conscious subjectivity lapses and the object alone shines out, the mind being expressed as the standing shine of the object. This samādhi is like

[a] YB. III. 1
[b] SS. V. 106

dhāraṇā and dhyāna only a member of the yoga-procedure and is distinguished from samprajñāta-samādhi or aikāgrya in which as the result of the continued practice of the three antaraṅga-yogas in successive levels of the mind, there emerges prajñāloka or the light of intuition in which all the implicit viśeṣa or particularity of the object concentrated on becomes self-evident. The antaraṅga triad—called saṁyama—is again preparatory or bahiraṅga to nirvīja or asamprajñāta-samādhi.

147. The eight-fold procedure of yoga is the spiritual discipline of willing in three stages—the subjectivistic-spiritual (or ethico-religious) stage comprising yama and niyama, the bodily-spiritual stage including āsana, prāṇāyāma and pratyāhāra, and the concrete pure spiritual stage divisible into dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi. Each stage is bahiraṅga to the next stage as antaraṅga, this holding good also of the sub-stages within each stage. The whole procedure is bahiraṅga to asamprajñāta-yoga which thus is implicitly operative as the form of negative willing in all the stages and is more and more explicit and inwardised as one proceeds in the series.

148. Yoga is concentration on a variety of objects and in many grades. Each form of yoga is believed to yield a special siddhi or vibhūti—super-normal knowledge or magical control over objects. The general possibility of magical efficiency through spiritual willing has already been discussed. That a particular form of efficiency is acquired through a form of yoga is necessarily, to one who has not experienced it, a matter of faith. Yet as in the case of specific bhoga of a karma in a later birth, in some cases at least one can detect an imaginative affinity between the inward form of a particular spiritual willing and the specific vibhūti said to be acquired by it. Since yoga is a spiritual activity and not mere psychic gymnastics, the efficacy of it cannot be entirely unanticipable in imagination: the spiritual is the self-revealing. Incidentally it is pointed out that some preliminary experience of this magical efficiency of yoga is necessary for an aspirant in order to have a motive for the practice of yoga proper. In connexion with YS.I.35, Vyāsa says that faith alone in the super-natural helped by inference etc., is not sufficient to induce spiritual willing: there must be personal ex-

perience of at least some element of the super-natural content (including m u k t i) the realisation of which is prescribed. Without some experience of y o g a - magic, spiritual activity is apt to be a matter of idealistic sentiment only.

149. The attitude prescribed for the y o g i n towards the magic s i d d h i s or v i b h ū t i s of y o g a is of spiritual interest. Y o g a - s ū t r a III. 51 states about the y o g i n at a certain stage that the d e v a t ā of the level of b u d d h i conquered by him invites him to enjoy the paradise earned by him when he is expected to pass on unconcerned without desire and without conceit (s a ṅ g a - s m a y a). The magical powers come to be acquired but are not meant to be used for the gratification of desire. Nor should the sense of power induce the self-complacent feeling of being superior to the gods or an arrogant ascetic disdain for the paradise offered by them, which in fact is the name for a quality of spiritual satisfaction. If the y o g i n passes on, it is because he is genuinely afraid of slipping down and feels the urge to use the freedom already acquired to win final freedom.

CHAPTER X

THE NOTION OF ĪŚVARA

150. There is reference to Īśvara-praṇidhāna or the contemplation of God both in the first pāda and the second pāda of the Yoga-sūtras. YS. I.23 takes this praṇidhāna as an alternative procedure for the attainment of asamprajñāta. Sūtras II.1. 32,45 understand it as coming under krīyā-yoga or niyama and leading to the attainment of samādhi (II.45) which apparently is samprajñāta and only through it to the attainment of asamprajñāta. Praṇidhāna in II.1 is explained by Vyāsa as the dedication of one's willing and of the merit thereof to God, this being an emotional meditation enjoined as a karma-śesa, as an accessory to specific religious practice; while in I.23 it appears to mean pure intellectual meditation—though it is still called bhakti-viśeṣa, a special quality of bhakti. It is so called because it is still a surrender to God, surrender not merely of particular acts of willing but of the entire attitude of willing, of the willing behind knowledge itself for the sake of asamprajñāta. In other forms of bhakti there is surrender only of ahaṁkāra, not of buddhi as here. God is understood everywhere as the implicate or postulate of bhakti; but while bhakti as a kriyā-yoga implies meditation on an accepted God, God taken to be caught in buddhi, bhakti for asamprajñāta—as the surrender of buddhi itself—is meditation on a God that is manifest only through the meditative surrender or, to put it paradoxically, that is known, not by knowing, by the renunciation of the conceit of knowledge. All the Sāṁkhya tattvas are known in buddhi, Īśvara as a new tattva being not included in them, because God as the object of religious bhakti would be either a feeling-construct and no tattva at all or only a self among selves with no qualitatively new character. Yoga admits God as a tattva, as a self qualitatively and not merely numerically distinct from the other tattvas. God only appears to be such in religious bhakti, and to super-religious bhakti, God is a tattva unknowable in buddhi.

151. Vijñāna-bhikṣu in his Sāṁkhya-bhāṣya makes the ingenious suggestion that the Sāṁkhya denial of Īśvara is only vyāvahārika intended in the interest of viveka to induce vairāgya for god-like power (aiśvarya); and as a matter of fact, Īśvara understood as the eternal God —not as janyeśvara, the existence of which is admitted—is taken to be only unproved[a] and not as non-existent. Any way the contemplation of God is not necessary to the distinctive spiritual discipline of Sāṁkhya and is even repugnant to it. To Yoga, the contemplation is necessary as a niyama in the lower stages of spirituality and has at least the status of an alternative sādhana for the highest stage—viz., asamprajñāta. To it but not to Sāṁkhya, God is a postulate of the activity of spiritual realisation. The exact meaning of 'postulate' here has to be determined in reference to the Kantian view of God as a moral postulate.

152. What is called the moral argument for the existence of God resolves into the position that since there is a higher and higher, there must be the highest. The question is whether it represents only an emotional or moral certitude or a logical inference. To Kant it is but a moral certitude about a content that is necessarily thought but not known. The content is not indeed an imaginative ideal like beauty or teleology, not a mere heuristic concept of rational imagination but is logically connected with the moral *ought* which, however, is only practically and not theoretically known. Not that it is therefore practically known; nor is there any moral obligation to entertain belief in it, the belief being there but apparently without any practical bearing on spiritual activity. To others, like the Mīmāṁsaka, there is an obligation to entertain the belief: the contemplation of Īśvara or of Brahman is prescribed as auxiliary to the performance of religious duty like worship or sacrifice, although the content is not regarded as a knowable truth or an absolute reality. To the Vedāntist, Brahman—not Īśvara—is the absolute truth and the knowledge of it is eternal, being contingent only in its manifestation to the individual mind and is no end the attainment of which is practically prescribed; nor is Brahman a mere symbol for a contemplation that is prescribed for its own

[a] SS.I.92-5

sake. Between the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta positions, an intermediate position is conceivable viz., that Īśvara is an absolute reality, the certitude about which and the contemplation of which emerge as one integral spiritual fact : Īśvara is not known first and then contemplated, nor does contemplation come first and then generate belief in Īśvara. Yoga apparently represents this position; and the Vedāntic position on Īśvara as distinct from Brahman is conceivably similar with the difference that Īśvara is here the eternal truth or Brahman itself with the sole vikalpa of being contemplated, or—what is the same thing—of revealing itself as absolute contemplation. To Vedānta there is knowledge of the eternal truth without the mediation of buddhi-vṛtti but not to Yoga to which the certitude about God that involves no buddhi-vṛtti is no knowledge of truth but a conviction about reality as in Kant.

153. Some proof of God is indeed attempted in Yoga-bhāṣya on the lines of the moral argument. God is mainly conceived as omniscient, as the infinite of knowledge, knowledge being the basis of spirituality, of power and goodness. Now this infinite of knowledge is inferrible on the ground that knowledge necessarily admits of increase i.e., knowledge of a content necessarily implies knowledge of a greater content that includes it, just as a magnitude is perceived necessarily as part of a greater magnitude. Whatever necessarily implies a greater implies a greatest or an infinite. This infinite of knowledge is the omniscient or sarvajña. The inference is, however, that there *must* be a sarvajña : that this sarvajña is God has to be accepted in faith. The infinite is an individual and assertorial certitude about the inferred (or necessary) existence of an individual that is unperceivable can only be yielded by the testimony of śāstra—or what is its nearest equivalent—by the testimony of our spiritual consciousness.

154. What is important in the present connection is that assertorial certitude about the infinite spirit is not yielded by inference or by any logical pramāṇa; and the implication is that the infinite spirit is not known in a buddhi-vṛtti. Faith is before and beyond knowledge though it may be quickened by it: it is through faith that spiritual knowledge (prajñā) reaches assertorial certitude. Where the knowledge is of a metaphysical content that is intuitable, the intuition is reached through yoga

started in faith. *Apparently* Īśvara *in* Yoga *is unintuitable and there is no mention of the intuition of* Īśvara in any form of samādhi. If He could be known at all, He would be known in some samādhi higher than samprajñāta but in asamprajñāta there is no knowledge at all. So about Īśvara, even if we know that He must exist, we can never know that he does exist. Like para-vairāgya, the śraddhā leading to the Īśvara-praṇidhāna that induces asamprajñāta is the samprasāda of viveka reached in samprajñāta, knowledge being realised negatively by the will to be free from it (para-vairāgya) and positively by the wish for such freedom (śraddhā). The motive to the will to yoga is vairāgya and the aspiration for yoga is śraddha or faith. The asaṁvega or inner intensity of the will to yoga is or is determined by the depth of vairāgya. Asamprajñāta is said to be attained either directly by tīvra-saṁvega willing or indirectly by Īśvara-praṇidhāna, the former being determined by vairāgya and the latter by śraddhā. Viveka may be taken as realised by negative vairāgya into the positive will to yoga and by positive śraddhā into negative surrender of willing which is Īśvara-praṇidhāna, where Īśvara (who is nowhere mentioned as known in viveka) can only be the mystery of asbolute freedom bound up with the will-surrendering faith.

155. Faith or śraddhā has apparently two aspects—āstikya-buddhi or belief that there is a higher being than one-self and samprasāda or aspiration for a higher state of oneself. The concrete conception of the higher in either sense may be presented by śāstra but śāstra is recognised as śāstra because it is felt to interpret the faith in a higher that is already there. The concept of the higher is intrinsically bound up with the attitude of faith. The faith that emerges after viveka or self-knowledge reached in samprajñāta is faith in the existence of a higher self than the self-knowing self and in the attainability of a higher state of the self than self-knowledge, faith in Īśvara and aspiration for asamprajñāta. The aspiration is not merely subjective, for there is no place for subjectivism after samprajñāta but a self-fulfilling activity. Nor is Īśvara merely objective in the sense of being other than

the self but is higher in the sense of being capable of working in and annulling the self-consciousness (a buddhi-vṛtti) of the self and inducing in it the state of samprajñāta. The aspiration for asamprajñāta then fulfils itself through the inward working (antaryāmitva) of Īśvara, which in this connection is his grace. The aspiration thus matures into praṇidhāna or bhakti in Īśvara, which is at once a self-surrendering activity and the feeling of its fulfilment in His grace. Through this feeling of grace, self-knowledge as in viveka becomes the realisation of the self as like God. Thus God is primarily conceived through self-knowledge as higher than the self and absorbing its self-knowledge and then the realised feeling of God's grace transfigures the self with the reflection of divinity.

156. The conception of Īśvara that emerges in the faith after viveka which leads to praṇidhāna or bhakti requires to be elaborated. God is taken as a puruṣa-viśeṣa or a self qualitatively different from other selves. Other selves—as isolated from buddhi—are absolute self-repetitions: they differ only in the mode of buddhi that is their upādhi. The divine self may also be said to have a perfect buddhi (prakṛṣṭa-sattva) as its upādhi, but the difference is not only that the upādhi is perfect buddhi but also that God freely assumes the upādhi. Other selves are associated through beginningless avidyā with buddhi that is shot with this avidyā and although they can free themselves from it, they start as unfree while God is eternally free, free both to associate with and to dissociate from buddhi. Freedom means both mukti and free activity—positive and negative. God is free both in being and in activity and His free activity whether in the assumption or renunciation of buddhi—waking or sleep—does not prejudice His eternal freedom of being. In one sense, indeed, a jīvātman is eternally free, for he is only illusorily identified with buddhi as he finds out in viveka. But the illusion itself is a fact to him according to yoga and not illusory as to Vedānta, for even the jīvanmukta who recognises the illusion as such is conceived in Yoga not as passively watching the illusion that still binds him to his buddhi disappear of itself, i.e., turning out to be itself illusory but as actively seeking to free himself from it, from at least the potentiality of a body (sañcita-kar-

ma) by the creation of nirmāṇa-kāyas, such activity implying awareness of the illusion as a fact. There is apparently to Yoga no conscious realisation in life of freedom from buddhi. Yoga-bhāṣya II.27 points out that there is conscious realisation at best of freedom from the urge of the will, from the felt demand of something to be effected by buddhi but not from buddhi itself, freedom from buddhi—citta-vimukti as it is called—being an unconscious, unwilled process. The consciousness of the self in fact as eternally free is but a faith that is said to be realised through Īśvara-praṇidhāna.[a]

157. God is eternally free both in His being and in his will. The jīva's freedom of will does not belong to him as the self, being an intrinsic function of buddhi with which his self is illusorily and helplessly identified. But God's freedom in his will to assume or renounce buddhi as his upādhi belongs to him as a self : his identification with buddhi is free and does not involve an illusion. That is why his excellence (utkarṣa) and absolute reason (śāstra or logos) are said to justify each other, being in eternal mutual implication in his nature (prakṛṣṭa-sattva): his knowledge (revelation, śāstra) and his will (freedom, utkarṣa) are the same. But then it implies that his freedom to assume buddhi, to know or to reveal śāstra is his intrinsic attribute as a self. This involves a conception of the self as inactive (niṣkriya). Īśvara's freedom to assume a buddhi-body is an actual willing and hence the self generally may have to be conceived as having the capacity (yogyatā) for action which is actualised in the Divine self and is never actualised, except illusorily, in the other selves. In the case of God, there is real willing though as being absolutely free it is as much actual as unactual, his freedom of action being indistinguishable from his freedom of being or mukti. The freedom of being of other selves, even when actualised in their 'abiding in their essential nature' (svārūpāvasthāna), is not a willing to abide but only the capacity for such willing, so that there is no incompatibility with the Vaiṣṇava conception of their participation in the Divine work of the liberation of souls, though such participation would be to Yoga a mystery which is

[a] YB. 1.29.

beyond philosophy. Hence, too, there is no knowledge of Iśvara in buddhi and if all knowledge of content is taken to be mediated by buddhi, there is no knowledge of Iśvara but only a faith in his reality conditioning praṇidhāna or upāsanā or bhakti. There is even no knowledge of the self as eternal and absolute (nitya-pūrṇa) but only a contemplative certitude bound up with the contemplation of God,[a] for such self-knowledge as we have is a buddhi-pratyaya.[b]

158. The buddhi with which God is said to freely identify himself is perfect or pure buddhi (prakṛṣṭa or śuddha-sattva), buddhi that is free from kleśa (transcendental error), karma (merit and demerit), vipāka (its maturation into bhoga) and āśaya (dispositions generated by bhoga). His mind represents the eternal limit (kāṣṭhā) of aiśvarya —the infinite of knowledge and will, knowledge of all that is real and resistless power having neither an equal nor a greater (sāmyātiśaya-vinirmuktaṃ). Will (and wish) is but efficient or self-realising knowledge and what proves the existence of infinite knowledge proves the existence of the infinite mind. The existence of infinite knowledge is proved by the necessarily felt finitude of our actual knowledge though as what is inferred is only the necessity of existence, assertorial certitude about the existence of infinite knowledge can only be yielded by śāstra. The mutual dependence of the truth of śāstra and the reality of the infinite mind has already been referred to, the implication of which apparently is that the faith in the infinite mind or in the validity of śāstra is immediate. The fact of śraddhā (after viveka) is justification at once of the reality of perfect buddhi and of the truth of śāstra.

159. This justification—called 'nimitta' in Yoga-bhāṣya I.24 (interpreted as 'pramāṇa')—is cause rather than the logical ground of our belief in truth and reality, or more accurately is neither cause nor ground but something prior to both. Subjective reason or pramāṇa itself derives its prāmāṇya or validity from śraddhā or faith and that is why the inferred infinite requires to derive assertorial certitude from śāstra, requires to be given by objective reason, demands to be presented

[a] YB.I.29.
[b] YS.II.20.

to subjective reason independently of it. The faith in objective reason justifies subjective reason or logic in the sense of giving it assertorial certitude; and the faith in objective reason is itself *justified by the infinite mind that is the content of objective reason, justified in the sense that truth is truth as emanating from* or breathed forth by absolute reality. Reality emanates truth which reveals reality. That truth or objective reason or śāstra reveals reality or the infinite free self or Īśvara is because otherwise it would not be truth. Reality, too, would not be reality were it to emanate untruth, though it need not emanate either truth or untruth. The last clause implies that reality is the mystery of absolute freedom: there cannot be an unveracious God, but God may be silent as he is said to be in pralaya when he freely abstains from revealing himself. His self-revelation or assumption of buddhi-body or breathing out of śāstra as well as his self-concealment is absolutely free.

160. The infinite mind with which God is said to freely identify himself is conceived to be essentially the knowing mind. Knowledge is, however, regarded not only as receptive but as actively communicative or revelatory. God as with this mind is both sarvajña or omniscient and the eternal teacher, timeless teacher of all past teachers.[a] He is said to teach not for his own good but to save others, compassion or grace being the motive of his absolute free activity of revelation.[b] The work of this grace is conceived in different stages: he breathes forth śāstra, he quickens the reason of others from within (as antaryāmin) and he helps in their attainment of asamprajñāta. God's relation to other selves is that of the saviour to the saved, the saving work consisting in enabling others to work out their freedom, either by communicating to them knowledge in the shape of śāstra or by inducing in them inner intuitions or by directly devitalising the evil tendencies in their minds—the antarāyas or obstacles to yoga—that stand in the way of their realisation of freedom. The last is the specific work of grace responsive to Īśvara-praṇidhāna that facilitates the passage to asamprajñāta. The viveka in either presses towards absolute freedom in vairagya from viveka itself or

[a] YS.I.26.
[b] YB.I.25.

finds absolute freedom coming to him as the correlate of his bhakti.

161. For this bhakti or praṇidhāna, Īśvara is already revealed in sound as the mystic syllable 'Om' which may be regarded as at once his eternal expression and his perennial grace. The significance of language is eternal (sthita) and the restriction of particular words to particular meanings is beginningless convention which may be taken as God's will to particluarise the significance,[a] the will being free but not arbitrary, freely revealing or bodying forth the truth. The eternal significance of 'Om' which may be taken to symbolise language in general or the concept in general or truth is the absolute reality or Īśvara and the expression of reality in 'Om' would then symbolise Īśvara's permanent will to reveal or grace. Īśvara is eternally revealed in a symbol for contemplation and the contemplation is consummated not in knowledge or intuition but in a spontaneous liberation from the conceit of knowledge which is just the freedom of asamprajñāta. It is God who makes worship (praṇidhāna) possible and it is God who frees the worshipper from his own thinking mind—which is freeing him from worship itself and enabling him to work out his liberation. While then in lower stages God speaks to and vitalises man's reason, in the highest stage He frees him from his reason and from his feeling of dependence on Him which is conditioned by reason. There is no suggestion in Yoga of God raising man either into identity or into perpetual communion with Himself, though apparently Yoga would not oppose either suggestion. The precondition of such identity or communion is freedom—achieved or vouchsafed—from religious dependence and philosophy to Yoga apparently goes no further than this freedom.

162. There is no direct reference in Yoga to God's power to create or retract the universe. As in Sāṁkhya, so in Yoga, sṛṣṭi and pralaya are the functions of prakṛti or the object which is regarded as svatantra or free, uninfluenced by anything foreign to it whether in its downward path of causal pariṇāma or in its upward or anti-causal retraction of causa-

[a] YB. I. 27.

lity. Yet the movement of prakṛti is for the bhoga or mukti of embodied souls and may be regarded as in its essence the function of avidyā or aviveka that is illusorily referred to the self. Avidyā, however, is really the function of the object and its causal and anti-causal movement is nothing but this avidyā-function. Now if Īśvara operates in reference to the object, he operates primarily in the buddhi of other selves, buddhi with which they are unfreely and he is freely identified. He, in fact, operates as a nimitta primary for the actualisation or retraction of their buddhi and through it for the creation or dissolution of the world of experience, nimitta being understood as a negative condition, the removal of pratibandha to the causal and anti-causal operation of nature. To operate as a nimitta is still his free willing: even in mahāpralaya or His sleep. He is said to freely will not to will.[a]

[a] YV.I.24.

THE JAINA THEORY OF ANEKĀNTA

(1) Jaina Realism not only asserts a plurality of determinate truths but takes each truth to be an indetermination of alternative truths. (2) Sometimes an ultimate plurality of truths has been taken as one truth in the sense that there is one cognition of the plurality. The objectivistic equivalent of this unity of cognition is the bare togetherness of the facts known. (3) This category of 'togetherness' is the fundamental category of realism but it is only a name for quite different aspects of truth which do not make a unity in any sense. (4-5) Taking the distinction between 'subjective' knowing and 'objective' knowing what precisely is the counterpart of the knowledge of this distinction? Now, since togetherness or bare distinction is the form of objectivity, the counterpart in question must be 'distinction from distinction'. (6) This distinction from distinction has been taken as a kind of identity and the problem arises as to the relation between this identity and distinction in the objective. The Hegelian subordinates distinction to identity; Nyāya assigns priority to distinction. But the Jaina theory admits identity as indeterminate non-distinction and takes the two relations to be co-ordinate.

(7-8) The Hegelian subordinates distinction to identity in the sense that the dialectical movement ends in an absolute identity and not in an absolute distinction. But then this identity comprises all differences and is thus in the relation of identity with the differences. Identity would thus be at once a relation and a term. (9-10) To the Hegelian, identity as relation is nothing but mutual implication. But then the Identity of the Absolute, synthesis with the retained being of the distinction within it is not identity as mutual implication. Apparently then the Hegelian has to admit two utterly different kinds of identity which cannot be reduced to further identity. This, however, is a contradiction. (11-14) There is a similar contradiction in the Nyāya view. We have synthetic identity of positives in this system in the form of samavāya. But this relation is a distinct existent only by self-identity. As a fact, it is only unrelated and cannot be even said to be definitely different from its terms. Relation, then, as an unrelated term is not even determinate and it is a contradiction to

speak of it as self-related or unrelated and yet as determinate. (15-17) In the case of identity-in-difference then, the subordination of either relation to the other seems to lead to a contradiction. The relations of identity and difference may, however, be taken to be co-ordinate. But this would be no solution, for, on analysis it would be found that on this view, the identity of a determinate thing disappears and gives place to a dualism of the abstraction—thinghood and particularity.

(18) The only way of escape lies in taking the determinate thing to be 'simply given' i.e., to be existing as a distinct apart from distinguishing. This may be justified by the circumstance that the distinction between the subjective and the objective is itself a known object. But then distinction from the objective, taken as itself objective, implies that knowing is known as distinct from the known i.e., as *unknown*. This brings up the conception of the objective indefinite or the 'definite indefinite'. (19-22) What now is the relation indicated by the phrase 'definite indefinite'? According to the realistic postulate, the 'definite indefinite' is a fact with two elements incompatible in thought. The factual equivalent of this incompatibility would be no-relation. Here then we have togetherness of unrelated or undifferenced elements. In the case of the given definite, likewise, we have the definite definite or differenced togetherness. We have thus two modes of togetherness—differenced and undifferenced—which the Jaina calls kramārpaṇa and sahārpaṇa respectively.

(23-24) The different basal categories of objectivity corresponding to different forms of realism answer to the different aspects of the act of knowing. These categories are three in number, viz., distinction, distinction from distinction as other than distinction and the indetermination of the two. Ordinary realism is based on the first category. There are forms of realism that admit some kind of identity as distinct from distinction; and finally Jaina realism admits both in the form of indetermination. (25-30) The development of the Jaina conception of indetermination into seven alternative modes of truth analysed and assessed.

THE JAINA THEORY OF ANEKĀNTA

1. The Jaina theory of anekānta or the manifoldness of truth is a form of realism which not only asserts a plurality of determinate truths but also takes each truth to be an indetermination of alternative truths. It is interesting as suggesting a criticism of present-day realism and indicating a direction in which its logic might be developed. It is proposed in the present paper to discuss the conception of a plurality of determinate truths to which ordinary realism appears to be committed and to show the necessity of an indeterministic extension such as is presented by the Jaina theory.

2. The truth that we actually know is a plurality of truths and philosophy, rightly or wrongly, sets itself the problem of finding the *one* truth which either denies or in some sense comprises the plurality. Whatever differences there have been as to the actual conception of the truth, the rejection of the faith that there is *one* truth has generally been taken to argue a scepticism about the many truths that we claim to know. Sometimes, however, an ultimate plurality of truths has itself been taken as the *one* truth and the apparent contradiction has been sought to be avoided by taking it to mean only that there is one *cognition* of the plurality. Elsewhere the cognition of a fact is a further fact but here the addition of cognition as a fact to plurality as a fact yields us nothing but the plurality. The realistic or objectivistic equivalent of the unity of a cognitive act is the bare togetherness of the facts known; and the togetherness of cognition as a fact with the fact cognised is the exemplar of this relation.

3. The difficulty is about the objectivity of this bare togetherness. When two objects other than knowing are known together, they are ordinarily taken to be in some kind of whole, specific relation or unity. This cannot be said of object and its cognition as together. Objects also may, however, be barely together: the relation of a whole to its elements, of a relation to its terms or of a unity to its factors is nothing more specific than togetherness. This then is the fundamental category of realism; and whole, relation or unity would be understood as particular cases of it. We propose to show on the lines of the Jaina theory that this category is itself manifold, being only a name for

fundamentally different aspects of truth which cannot be subsumed under a universal and do not make a unity in any sense. Togetherness, as ordinarily understood by the realist, means distinction of determinate positive truths. The J a i n a category might be formulated as distinction from distinction which, as will be shown, has a definite range of alternative values, only one of which answers to the distinction or togetherness of the modern realist.

4. Prima facie there is a difference between the relation of a composite fact with its components and the relation of the components themselves. We may overlook for the present the different forms of the composite—whole, relation or unity—which imply varying relations to the components and provisionally admit composite truth as a single entity Now there is no difference between the togetherness of any one component with the rest and that of any other with the rest: the components in their various combinations are together in exactly the same sense. Taking, however, the composite on the one hand with the components on the other, we find that the two sides can be only thought alternately: while one side is thought by itself, the other can be thought only in reference to it; if the components are taken to be given, the composite can be understood as only *their* plurality; and if the composite is given as one, the components are known as only *its* analysis. Each side can be given by itself as objective and so it is not a cause of mere correlative *thoughts*. Neither side need be thought in reference to the other; but while one is thought as distinct by itself, the other has to be thought as only together with or distinct from it. We have in fact a correlation here between 'distinct in itself' and 'distinct from the other', between given position and what is sometimes called the negation of negation.

5. Is the necessity of thinking something *as other than its other* merely subjective? It would appear to be objective in the same sense and on the same grounds as the togetherness or bare distinction of positives admitted by the realist. Realism objectifies the subjective because it is *known* and is not simply transcendental. The question may be asked, is the distinction of subject and object, of knowing and the known, both taken to be facts—'enjoyed' and 'contemplated' respectively, to use Professor Alexander's phrase—a fact of the former or of the latter category

subjective or objective? Now just as knowing is known, the absolute difference of the two forms of knowing—enjoying and contemplating is also known; and if the unity of the knowing act be taken to correspond to objective togetherness, this absolute difference must also be taken to have its objective counterpart. Togetherness or bare distinction is the form of objectivity in general. The counterpart then of the difference of 'subjective' knowing or 'enjoying' from objective knowing or 'contemplating' would be distinction from objectivity i.e., from distinction. Thus both distinction and distinction from distinction should be taken by the realist as objective. These two, however, are not ordinarily distinguished: both are called by the same name—togetherness.

6. If however, as shown, these two forms of togetherness are fundamentally different, what is their further relation? Now distinction from distinction has sometimes been taken as a determinate relation, as identity or some unique relation, like 'characterising' or adjectivity, which also for our present purpose we may call a peculiar form of identity. The problem is accordingly about the relation of identity and distinction in the objective. We may consider two forms of identity as presented by the Hegelian and the Nyāya systems respectively. The Nyāya is avowedly a realistic system and the Hegelian theory may also in some sense be taken to be realistic. Realism proper, as we conceive it, has no place for the relation of identity in the objective except in a factitious sense, although it should—what it ordinarily does not—admit distinction from distinction as a specific category. The above two theories, however, admit both identity and distinction though they do not stress them in the same way. The Hegelian subordinates distinction to identity while the Nyāya assigns priority to distinction. The Jaina theory admits identity only in the sense of indeterminate non-distinction; and it takes the two relations to be co-ordinate without subordinating any one to the other.

7. In what sense does the Hegelian subordinate distinction to identity? No doubt he emphasises distinction to distinguish his concrete identity from abstract or formal identity but he does not admit—what a realist would admit—that an object can be distinct in itself and need not be in a comprising identity. The dialectic movement ends in an absolute identity, not in an absolute distinction. The thesis and antithesis at any stage are said to be re-

duced to 'ideality' in the synthesis, to be not only contained but also transformed by it. The identity progresses in concreteness in the sense that it dissolves in itself a deeper and deeper difference; but the absolute in the last resort is taken as the identity of the deepest differences, not as incommensurable bifurcations of an identity.

8. What, however, is this relation of *subordination* of distinction to identity? Distinction is in some sense negated by the identity; it is said to be dissolved or reduced to 'ideality' in the identity. Not that it is negated in the sense an illusory percept is said to be negated by a true percept: difference or the rich variety of the universe is not an illusion. If then difference still retains some kind of being, what is the name of the relation between this being and the being of the identity? Should it be called identity again, as apparently the Hegelian would call it? Identity then would occupy two positions: the synthesis or the composite, as we may call it, is the identity *of* the different factors and is also identical *with* them, being thus at once a relation and a term.

9. The Hegelian ordinarily understands identity as mutual implication or correlation. If A and B imply one another, each being wholly intelligible by the other, they are said to be identical. In this sense a synthesis would be taken as the identity of its factors. Is the identity of the synthesis *with* the retained being of the distinction within it also to be understood in the sense of mutual implication? The two implications that make up mutual implication must be envisaged as substantially different truths and must not be a purposeless repetition of each other in different verbal order only. If a synthesis and its factors be mutually implicatory, the synthesis implying the factors must mean some thing concretely different from the factors implying the synthesis. It cannot mean simply that the factors are *presupposed* by the unity; for that means substantially the same thing as that the factors presuppose the unity. The two sides are but the verbal explications of the same fact viz., the thought of identity-in-difference or synthesis. Synthesis implying the factors should mean then that the unity must break out *actually* into difference. In the last resort it will amount to saying that the Absolute should be *experienced*, not merely *thought*, as necessarily reproducing itself in actuality. But is the actual universe *experienced* as necessary? It is only thought to be necessary; and accordingly the implication

by the Absolute of actual differences—the necessity of its self-reproduction—is not distinct as a substantial truth from the mere *presupposition* of the Absolute by the universe.

10. The identity then of a synthesis with the retained being of the distinction within it is not an identity in the sense of mutual implication. If the relation be still called identity, it must be taken as simply intuited, as all identity is taken to be in the Nyāya. Apparently then the Hegelian, while subordinating distinction to identity, has to admit two utterly different kinds of identity, corresponding to the difference of thought and intuition, which cannot be reduced to further identity. This, however, is a contradiction.

11. A similar contradiction may be brought out in the Nyāya view. Here, however, we start with the priority of distinction to identity and we have to end, as will appear presently, by admitting an identity that is not distinct from anything at all. Confining ourselves to positives, we have synthetic identity of positives in this system in the form of Samavāya or the relation of inherence. Without going into the subtle technicalities of the Nyāya in this connection, we may indicate that Samavāya is understood by it as the relation of attribute to its substratum and of a whole to its part. It is a relation of distinct objects and is regarded as what is presupposed by every other relation of existents. It is not a mere formal relation of identity: the distinction of the terms of this relation is taken to be real and to be in no sense superseded by it. Hence it is not *called* identity in this theory but it is pointed out that one term of the relation (attribute or whole) exists inseparably from the other (substratum or part), the inseparability being eternal although no term may be infinite or permanent. This eternal inseparability may accordingly be regarded as a form of concrete identity.

12. Now this identity is taken as knowable by perception, unlike the implicational identity of Hegel which is supposed to be known only by necessary thought. As a percept it is a distinct among distincts, not as in the Hegelian theory comprehensive of the distincts. Ultimately there are objects like the simple atoms distinct in themselves and not inhering in anything beyond them. Other objects like attributes and wholes exist as distinct but inseparable from their substrata. Finally, the relation samavāya or this concrete identity is also a distinct object. Thus

priority is assigned, as has been pointed out, in this system to distinction.

13. The relation of S a m a v ā y a implies three grades of distincts—objects that must be in some substratum, the substrata. and the relation itself. The question may be asked if relation is a distinct being in the sense in which the objects of the other two grades are distinct. These objects are distinct as the terms of the relation: objects which do not inhere in anything are still determinate as having attributes and wholes inhering in them. Not that the knowledge of a substance presupposes the knowledge of what inheres in it: it is known as distinct prior to the analysis. But in point of being, every object except relation must either have something inhering in it or itself inhere in something else or be in both these situations. Relation is not itself related to anything beyond, for then there would be a regressus add infinitum. It is a distinct existent only by self-identity or s v a - s a m a v ā y a.

14. Self-identity, however, is not a relation of distincts at all. Granting—what is not admitted by all—that S a m a v ā y a is known by perception, this self-identity or S v a - s a m a v ā y a is not a perceptible fact but is only an artificial thought-content. 'Self-related' means unrelated in the objective. S a m a v ā y a is certainly known along with its terms but as a fact it is only unrelated and cannot be even said to be definitely different from its terms. Can it then be determinate in itself? It may indeed be conceded that the determinateness of a related term does not in point of being depend on its relations: the relation of a term *presupposes* an intrinsic determination in the term. But that need not mean that the term is itself unrelated and has relation only added to it. In point of being the relation of S a m a v ā y a is eternal and so the related term is never unrelated, though as a term it is distinguishable from the relation. Relation then as an unrelated term is not even determinate and it is a contradiction to speak of it as self-related or unrelated and yet as determinate.

15. In the two conceptions of identity-in-difference above considered, the subordination of either relation to the other appears to lead to a contradiction. Shall we then take the relations to be merely co-ordinate? We may take one type of such a view as presented by W. E. Johnson (Logic, Vol. I. Chapter vii).

In the last two views, a term A can be both identical with and other than B. The present view denies it and keeps to the common-sense principle that distincts cannot be also non-distinct. Yet identity as a relation is admitted: a term X, viewed in connexion with the distincts A and B, would be said to be identical as against the distinction of A and B. Identity of X here practically means its self-identity: it is not merely the thing X but a relation in reference to the distinction. Identity of X thus implies a distinction outside X, viz., between A and B, not any distinction or plurality within itself.

16. The so-called mutual implication of the identity and distinction of two terms M and N means, according to this view, their identity *in one respect a* and their distinction in another *b*: the two relations are presented together, each being known independently. It amounts to saying that M and N are in the two relations the *same* two terms only in a factitious sense. They are two pairs of terms—M*a*, N*a* and M*b*, N*b*—presented together; and the identity of M*a*, N*a*. means that they are only different symbols of P.

17. But what does 'symbol of P' mean, it may be asked. Can we simply say that M*a*, N*a*, are P as in connexion with i.e., as distinct from and together with M*b*, N*b*, respectively? Apparently P *has* to be thought in two positions. The difference of symbols is not accidentally together with the identity P: it cannot be got rid of and cannot in the last resort be taken to be merely outside the identity, like the difference of M*b*, N*b*. In other words, a new relation—other than the mere co-ordinateness of distincts has to be admitted between P and its ultimate symbols or thought-positions. So far as the identity of P can be distinguished from this relation, it is only P-*ness* and not P; and the relation itself is but the particularity of P. The identity of a determinate thing then disappears and gives place to a dualism of the abstractions—thinghood and the particularity.

18. Ordinary realism starts with the determinate thing and would resist this analysis as artificial. But the alternative would appear to be to take the determinate thing as simply given, as implying no identity and to reject self-identity as only a meaningless phrase. What precisely is meant by 'simply given'? It can only mean 'independent of all particularising or symbolising thought'. It is to assume that the distinct exists apart from

distinguishing. If this is justified simply by the circumstance that the distinction between the subjective and the objective is itself a known object, we come back to the old difficulty about distinction within the objective and distinction from the objective. Distinction from the objective, taken as itself objective, implies that knowing is known as distinct from the known i.e., *as unknown*. If this is not a contradiction, knowing can only be understood as the *indefinite* that is known (i.e., is definite or objective) *as* the indefinite. The realistic equivalent of the relation of object and subject then is the relation of the definite and indefinite.

19. The objective indefinite has been admitted by some logicians with a realistic tendency, e.g., by Hobhouse in his Theory of Knowledge. The content of simple apprehension which to him is the standard fact is at once definite and indefinite. What is apprehended is a definite with an indefinite background. The indefinite as apprehended is so far definite but it is definite *as* indefinite, not as superseding the indefinite. Yet to Hobhouse there is knowledge only so far as the content is defined by abstraction. The knowledge of the indefinite as such is not regarded as necessitating any modification of the forms of definite knowledge. The difference of the definite and the indefinite is not understood as other than the difference between two definites. There is the other obscure relation approximating to adjectivity or identity indicated by the phrase 'definite indefinite'. But this relation, if not denied, is not considered by him at all. The Jaina recognises both these relations explicitly and obtains from their contrast certain other forms of truth, simpler and more complex.

20. The obscure relation in the content 'definite indefinite' requires elucidation. If the indefinite is definite *as such*, is this definiteness an objective character? To the realist, thought only discovers but does not constitute the object. Bare position corresponding to the simple positing act of thinking must then be objective. The indefinite is thought as *indefinite* and by the same logic the indefiniteness is also objective. The 'definite indefinite' is thus a fact but the two elements of it are incompatible in thought. The factual equivalent of this incompatibilty would be disconnexion or *no-relation*. The two elements cannot be said to be related objectively even in the way of distinction. Yet

as the elements have to be thought together, their togetherness is to be admitted as objective in the same abstract sense. Here then we have *togetherness of unrelated or undifferenced elements*. We cannot deny a plurality nor can we affirm a definite distinction: the relation is a magical alternation. This would be the Jaina equivalent of the relation of identity. We may call it non-difference, distinction from distinction or indeterminate distinction.

21. If the given indefinite is definite *as* indefinite, the given definite is definite *as* definite. The given definite thus turns out to be a manifold, in contrast with the given indefinite. If the adjective 'definite' in 'definite indefinite' be objective, it is also objective in 'definite definite' and distinguishable from the substantive 'definite'. We use the terms adjective and substantive only in a provisional way. The adjectival definite is objective thought-position and the substantive definite as contrasted with it is objective given-ness or existence in general. As they are both distinct, their relation is definite distinction or differenced togetherness. Thus we have two modes of togetherness—differenced and undifferenced. The Jaina calls them kramārpaṇa and sahārpaṇa respectively—consecutive presentation and co-presentation, as they might be translated. To him the indeterminism or manifoldness of truth (anekānta) presents itself primarily in these two forms of difference and non-difference.

22. The two definites in the phrase 'definite definite' mean thought-position and given-ness. They answer precisely to the elements of the determinate existent—viz., particularity and thinghood—which we obtained from the co-ordinateness of identity and distinction. In order to avoid the apparently artificial analysis, the realist takes the determinate existent as merely given. It is indeed given but so is the indefinite also given and the contrast of the two brings out the circumstance that the determinate existent is manifold—the very analysis that was sought to be avoided. The determinate existent then implies the distinct elements and is at the same time distinct from them.

23. Such is the logical predicament that is presented everywhere in the Jaina theory. It may be generalised as a principle: the distinction from distinction is other than mere distinction and yet asserts the distinction. It is just the realistic equivalent of the simple statement that the subject is distinct from

the object and *knows* this distinction, or as it may be put more explicitly, that the knowing of knowing is the knowing of knowing *as referring to the object*. As we have already suggested, the different basal categories of objectivity with which the different forms of realism are bound up answer to the different aspects of the act of knowing. If knowing is a unity, the known is a plurality, the objective category being distinction or togetherness, If knowing is itself a duality of 'contemplating' and 'enjoying', the known or the contemplated is a duality of distinction and distinction from distinction. If finally knowledge is *of* the object, *refers to* the known, the known must present an equivalent of this *of-relation* or *reference*.

24. What is this *of-relation*? It is the relation of knowing and its content, the knowing or assertive function which is sometimes identified with the function of meaning. It is a relation, not of two contents, but of content and no-content; of being and no-being — something that is neither the one nor the other and is intelligible only by the concept of *freedom that can neither be said to be nor not to be*. This freedom, stripped of its subjective associations, is but the category of indetermination. Distinction and identity in fact—or as we call them, differenced togetherness and undifferenced togetherness (of particularity and thinghood)—are themselves related in the way of indetermination or alternation : particularity and thinghood are in *each* relation without being in the other relation *at the same time*. Identity is distinct from distinction and yet implies it, i.e., is in alternation with it. There are thus three basal categories—viz., distinction, distinction from distinction as other than distinction, and the indetermination of the two. Ordinary realism is based on the first category; there are forms of realism that admit some kind of definite identity as distinct from distinction; and finally, Jaina realism admits both in the form of indetermination, the identity being interpreted as indefinite.

25. The Jaina develops this category of indetermination into seven alternative modes of truth. The indetermination is ultimately of the definite and indefinite. Now this yields two relations—definite distinction between them and indefinite distinction. But indefinite distinction between them is to our knowledge nothing other than the indefinite as a term of it : we do not know more of the indefinite than that it is indefinite. The

most complex mode of truth then that we know is the definite distinction between the definite and the indefinite, or as we put it more explicitly, between the definite-definite and the definite-indefinite. Every other aspect of truth, as we shall see presently, is implied by it as distinct from and alternative with it.

26. Now the definiteness of the given indefinite, as has been shown already, though objective, sits lightly on the indefinite and is a detachable adjective. The conception of detachable definiteness being thus obtained, the given definite turns out to be a manifold, to be a togetherness or distinction of two definites—the detachable definite, on the one hand, or particular position which has no reference to existence or non-existence, and given-ness or existence in general, on the other, which as contrasted with the particular i.e., as characterless may be called its negation. No other negation is admitted by the J a i n a to be objective: what is called absolute negation—one form of which is the contradictory—the negation of what it is not possible to affirm at all is to be rejected as not objective, as no truth at all. The definite-definite or the determinate existent may then be said both to be and not to be: particularity or pure position is its being and existence in general is its negation. There is no contradiction if we bear in mind that the being of pure position is not given existence but only what must be thought, what is objective in this sense. The same logic is sometimes expressed by saying that a determinate existent A *is* in one respect and *is not* in another respect. This does not simply mean that A is A and is not B: it means that existent A, as existence universal, is distinct from its particularity.

27. The determinate existent is, in the sense explained, being and negation as distinguishably together, together by what the J a i n a calls k r a m ā r p a ṇ a. The given indefinite—the 'unspeakable' or a v a k t a v y a as it has been called—as distinct from the definite existent, presents something other than this 'consecutive togetherness': it implies s a h ā r p a ṇ a or co-presentation which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negation in the above sense. It is objective as given: it cannot be said to be *not* a particular position nor to be *non*-existent. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence; it represents a category by itself. The common-sense principle implied in its recognition is

that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is not expressible by a single positive concept. A truth has to be admitted if it cannot be got rid of even if it is not understood.

28. So far then we have obtained four modes of truth—being, negation, their distinction and their non-distinction—all implied by the distinction between the definite given and the indefinite given. Now this distinction is itself a mode of truth: and as the definite given is taken to be being and negation or particularity and existence together, the indefinite may be considered as together with or distinct from each of these elements taken singly. It may be taken *to be* a particular i.e., to be together with position, and it may be taken to be many undistinguishable negotions, to be the universal—existence—as itself a confusion of the negations of many particulars, as not-A, not-B, not-C.... indefinitely together. Thus we have altogether seven modes of truth—b h a ṅ g a s as they have been called—viz., particular position or being, its negation or the universal—existence, position and negation as distinguishably together or the determinate existent, these as indistinguishably together or the indefinite, this indefinite as itself a being or particular position, as many negations together, and finally as distinct from the determinate existent. If there be an eighth mode, it would be non-distinction of the definite and indefinite, which however is but the indefinite, nothing more specific than the fourth mode.

29. The value of these modes of truth for logic cannot be fully discussed within the limits of this paper. We may conclude by pointing out that these modes of truth are not merely *many* truths but *alternative* truths. The last mode may be regarded as implying the other modes but is not therefore in any sense a comprising unity. What is implied by a mode is a different mode. The implying relation in objective terms is but indetermination. The implying mode and the implied mode are at once distinct and indefinitely non-distinct. Truth as an indetermination or alternation of truths is but manifold possibility. Each mode of truth as alternative with the others is a *possible* though it has to be taken as objective.

30. There is the conception of indeterministic will to which there are many possibles, any of which can be really chosen by it. Here we have already the notion of manifold possibility as objective to the will. But the logic of this notion has not been

sufficiently investigated, though the relations of objective possibles cannot be adequately expressed by the categories of ordinary logic. The Jaina theory elaborates a logic of indetermination not in reference to the will—but in reference to the knowing, though it is a pragmatist theory in some sense. As a realist, the Jaina holds that truth is not constituted by willing, though he admits that the knowledge of truth has a necessary reference to willing. His theory of indeterministic truth is not a form of scepticism. It represents, not doubt, but toleration of many modes of truth. The faith in one truth or even in a plurality of truths, each simply given as determinate, would be rejected by it as a species of intolerance. What is presented and cannot be got rid of has to be accepted as truth even though it is not definitely thinkable or is thinkable in *alternative* definite modes.

THE CONCEPT OF RASA

Artistic enjoyment (1-19).—(1-2) 'Rasa' in Indian Aesthetics signifies the essence of feeling and is to be taken either as an eternal feeling or as an eternal value that is felt. It is not, however, 'essence' in any intellectual sense and is to be understood purely in terms of feeling. It is the feeling par excellence and stands on a new level compared to other feelings. (3-6) In a direct feeling like enjoying an object, the contrast between the subject and the object becomes blurred; the object appears to have an enjoyable expression and the subject feels weighed down or attracted into the object. In sympathetic joy, on the other hand, where the direct object is another's joy, the sympathising subject does not lose the sense of distinction between his feeling and the feeling that is sympathised with. In the original feeling, again, the expression—joyous or otherwise—is presented as adjectival to the object of the feeling: in sympathy, the expression is presented as detached from the object and as floating on it and the freedom of the sympathetic feeling is reflected in the object of the original feeling as this detachment of expression. It is because of these features that sympathy may be taken to belong to a higher level than the feeling sympathised with.

(7-9) Beauty, again, is not presented as a quality of the object. It is presented as an eternal or self-subsisting value very much like the expression of the original object in 'sympathy with sympathy'. (10-11) Aesthetic enjoyment thus stands on a level higher than ordinary sympathy and is on a par with duplicated sympathy. In some cases, the artistic sentiment may be literally taken as sympathy with sympathy. My aesthetic enjoyment may be the feeling for an *actual* person feeling for an actual third person. In other cases, one or both of these persons may be imaginary. (12) Every feeling that is depicted in art is contemplated in aesthetic enjoyment as sympathised with by the Heart-Universal and the person who contemplates the feeling merges his private heart in this ubiquity. (13-14) We have thus three levels of feeling—contemplative, sympathetic and primary. This scheme of three levels can be kept up in the case of the enjoyment of natural beauty

quite as much as in that of the enjoyment of a work of art. The beauty of an object implies three features distinguishing it from the object—expression, detachment and eternity. These three characters can be understood in the object as the projections of primary feeling, sympathetic feeling and contemplative feeling. (15) Artistic enjoyment is free. It is conceived not merely as free from the entanglement of fact but as the realisation of an eternal value, as the identification with the aesthetic essence without loss of freedom. (16-19) The nature of this realisation elucidated.

The beautiful and the ugly (20-29).—(20-21) The feeling for the ugly as an objective expression is quite as much aesthetic as the feeling for the beautiful. And in both cases the objective aesthetic quality cannot be discovered except through the aesthetic feeling. (22-23) Identity with the object is felt in all the grades of feeling. But distinction from this object is not felt or not felt uniformly in all the levels. In primary feeling, the distinction is not felt explicitly. In sympathy, it is felt explicitly while the feeling of identity is implicit. In the stage of contemplative feeling, both the feelings of identity and difference are explicit. (24) The feeling of identity is one of enjoyment and the feeling of difference is one of pain. The two feelings cannot simply stand side by side: one is subordinated to the other. The feeling of beauty emerges when pain is subordinated to the enjoyment, but where the enjoyment is subordinated to pain there emerges the feeling of ugliness. (25-26). The enjoyment of the tragic analysed. (27-29) The contemplative-aesthetic enjoyment of the ugly analysed and identified with the bībhatsa-rasa of Indian aesthetics.

THE CONCEPT OF RASA

I

ARTISTIC ENJOYMENT

1. Indian aesthetics presents the characteristic concept of rasa for which it is difficult to find an English equivalent. Literally 'rasa' means two things among others—it means essence and it means what is tasted or felt. The aesthetic conception of rasa combines the two senses and signifies the essence of a feeling, which is indifferently taken either as an eternal feeling or as the object of it, an eternal value that is felt. 'Essence', however, is an intellectual concept and the phrase 'essence of feeling' requires explanation. 'Essence' here is not taken in the sense of a logical universal. There is no suggestion in the Indian theory of art, as in certain other theories, that the same universal that is known as the essence of things is apprehended in feeling in a confused way as rasa. The logical universal has sometimes been identified with the ideal for life and the aesthetic essence has been conceived as the ideal that is felt or the feeling of the ideal. Rasa in the Indian conception is not identified with the Idea or universal truth, or with the ideal to be realised or as realised. It is understood purely through feeling and in terms of feeling; and if it is to be called essence or ideal, it can only be by way of metaphor. There is danger, however, of making too much of the metaphors both in the general theory of art and in the actual criticism of particular works of art. (Aesthetics—to start with at any rate—should not assume any speculative or religious postulates). What appears valuable to artistic feeling need not so appear—at least to the same degree—to the intellect or to the will, and feeling here should have the final say.

2. 'Rasa' means either aesthetic enjoyment or that which is aesthetically enjoyed. The significance of the concept is best interpreted by the orientation of aesthetic enjoyment in reference to other feelings. As will be explained presently, the artistic sentiment is not merely a feeling among feelings but the feeling par excellence, standing as it does on a new grade or level altogether as compared with other feelings. The place of a feeling is sometimes assigned in reference to the truth or known content with which

it is bound up or to the order of its emergence in mental evolution. It, however, does not help us far to find the significance or distinctive value of the feeling. This is best understood by the determination of the level or mental plane to which the feeling belongs.

3. We may begin by distinguishing between the direct feeling of an object and sympathy with such feeling. We speak of enjoying an object. What is the implication of the transitive use of the verb 'to enjoy'? It does not mean—at least to the enjoyer—that the object is only a means to the enjoyment: he feels no distinction between his enjoyment and the object. In this sense the clear-cut contrast of subject and object becomes obscured for feeling. The subject of the enjoyment unconsciously affects and is affected by the object. The object does not appear to him as a mere fact but as having a value, an enjoyable look or expression. The subject, too, does not feel his detachment from the object: he feels attracted into or weighed down by the object.

4. Consider next a feeling of which the direct object is another feeling, say, in a separate mind. This feeling of a feeling is to be distinguished from the mere understanding of it as a fact, which may leave one cold. Neither should it be confused with merely having a like feeling on the occasion of another's feeling. To sympathise with a person is to feel *him* feeling: only in this sense is his feeling the direct object of my feeling. We refer specially to sympathy, as it is the most familiar form of the feeling of feeling.

5. In sympathising with a child enjoying his toy, I am not interested like the child in the toy itself but in his enjoyment. Sympathy with joy is also joy but it is freer than the primary joy. I do not unconsciously project the joyous look or expression on the toy. I do not *see* it there like the child: I at best feel like *imagining it*. Nor do I like him feel fascinated by the toy, feel attracted into or glued down as it were to the toy. Not that I am altogether free in my sympathy, for I am still affected by the child's joy as a fact though not by the object of it, attracted by the particular feeling of the individual child as a compelling subjective fact. Even here, however, I do not lose the sense the child between my feeling and the child's feeling in the sense the child loses it between his feeling and the object of it.

6. By reason of this freedom then, feeling of feeling—of which we take sympathy as the type—may be taken as constituting a

higher level than the feeling of an object. We have next to consider if artistic enjoyment does not belong to a higher level still. That it has at least something of the freedom of sympathy can hardly be disputed. But it may be said that we seem to directly enjoy the beauty of an object and the beauty appears to be just as much *seen there* in the object as the terrible look of an object to one who feels terror. Where, it may be asked, is the distinction between such enjoyment and an ordinary object-feeling like terror? How does the former stand on a higher level—the level at least of sympathy? How sympathy with a feeling affects the object of the feeling requires first to be considered. Every feeling affects its object by lending a look or value to it. Sympathy does not indeed affect the object of the feeling sympathised with. To a person afraid of an object, the object has a terrible look but not one who sympathises with his fear. But the sympathiser, although he does not *see* the expression there, tends consciously to project something similar, to imagine seeing it there. The look or aspect that is consciously imagined differs from that which appears to be seen. The latter is presented as one with the given fact, as adjectival to it; whereas the former is presented as detached from the fact—as floating on it or as shining beyond it. The freedom of the sympathetic feeling, in fact, is reflected in the object as this detachment of expression from given fact, as expression 'in the air' without a substratum.

7. Now the beauty of an object, though not consciously projected on it by artistic feeling, does not appear to such feeling, as a quality or adjective of the object in the way the terrible aspect of an object does to one in fear. It is presented as a floating or transcendent expression like that which is consciously projected by sympathy on the object of the feeling sympathised with. The circumstance that beauty is not consciously projected but appears to be seen does indeed make a difference, to be explained presently. But that beauty is not presented as an adjective or quality of the object distinguishes it from the reflex of an object-feeling. That is why aesthetic enjoyment is taken to belong to a higher level than object-feeling. The question remains if it belongs to a level higher than sympathy.

8. We have pointed out that sympathy though unaffected by the object of feeling sympathised with, is still affected by and limited to the particular feeling and the individual subject to it.

In sympathy, the detachment is felt from objective fact but not from subjective fact, though the distinction from the subject sympathised with is not observed. But there may be such a feeling as sympathy with sympathy. One may sympathise, for example, with a mother feeling for her child suffering. Just as my sympathy with a person's feeling of an object is unaffected by the object, so my sympathy with a person's sympathy for a third person's feeling is unaffected by the feeling. It is thus on the level of this duplicated sympathy that a feeling can be emotionally contemplated in a detached way, felt as dissociated from its character as a given subjective fact, realised as self-subsisting value. To simple sympathy with a feeling, the object of the feeling has already a detached expression which, however, lacks reality by reason of the detachment. To this duplicated sympathy, the expression of the object is not only detached but self-subsisting, having a felt independent reality of which the given object is only a kind of symbol. Since it is altogether detached from the particularity of fact, it is a kind of eternal reality, a real eternal value.

9. Beauty, we hold, is just such an eternal value and aesthetic enjoyment accordingly belongs to the level of duplicated sympathy—sympathy with sympathy. That the beauty of an object appears to be seen rather than imagined shows that to feeling it has a reality not inferior to that of the object as a given fact. That it is not seen as a quality or adjective of the object and is yet not presented as another object side by side with it implies that it is reality to which the *object* is somehow adjective or subordinate. As, however, there would be no sense in saying that the object is a quality of the beauty, the adjectivity of the object here has to be recognised as a peculiar relation—the relation of the symbol to the symbolised, an analogue in the sphere of feeling of the logical relation between a word and its meaning.

10. Aesthetic enjoyment thus stands on a level higher than ordinary sympathy which again constitutes a level higher than primary object-feeling. The artistic sentiment may in some cases be literally taken as sympathy with sympathy. I may, for example, enjoy contemplating an old man affectionately watching his grandchild playing with a toy. Contrast here the child's joy in the toy with the grand-father's sympathetic joy and this again with my contemplative joy. Although the old man is not immersed like

the child in the enjoyment of the toy, his feeling is not yet of the artistic character: it is still a personal selective interest in the particular child and his feeling. My contemplative joy has no such personal complexion. I am interested in the child's feeling reflected in the grand-father's heart as an eternal emotion or value. I enjoy the essence of the emotion, get immersed in it even like the child in the toy, without, however, being affected by it and thus losing my freedom. I no longer feel the distinction between my feeling and the child's feeling, as the old man does between his feeling and the child's feeling. My personality is, as it were, dissolved and yet I am not caught in the object like the child. I freely become impersonal.

11. In the above example, my aesthetic enjoyment is feeling for another actual person feeling for a third actual person. But one or both of these persons sympathised with may be imaginary. Consider a case where the second person is imaginary. I may aesthetically contemplate a poor waif in the street. The waif is beautiful to me not as a dirty child but as it may be somebody's darling. I contemplate what the child would be to its mother, had she been living. The mother is here an imaginary person. A case in which the third person is imaginary would be where I contemplate a mother treasuring up the toys of her child who is no more. She sees the same value in the toys as though the child were living and playing with them. The child is here the imaginary person but the mother's emotion is still actual or personal and it is to me alone who contemplate the emotion a beautiful theme of art. Again both the persons are imaginary when, for example, I comtemplate a character in a drama. The character is here the imaginary third person or primary subject; but who, it may be asked, is the sympathising second person?

12. There is a difference between imagining an object as actual and imagining it as imaginary. In the former, the object is imagined as presented to an actual feeling of the person imagining as, for example, a savoury dish imagined by a hungry person. In the latter, the feeling bodying forth the image is itself imaginary: the object is imagined as what would be imagined by another person having the actual feeling. Now the character in the drama is not imagined by me as an actual person: I imagine some one imagining the character as an actual person and I sympathise with this imaginary 'some one' as the second person.

The imaginary second person is not one particular person but *some one* or *any one* person. He has the value of a concept of a person in general: only here we have in the concept an efflux of feeling and not of the intellect. This person is felt—not thought—by me who am aesthetically contemplating. The felt-person-in-general may be semi-mythologically called the Heart Universal. Every feeling that is depicted in art is contemplated as reflected in or sympathised with by this Heart Universal and the person who contemplates the feeling merges his personal or private heart in this ubiquity. Artistic enjoyment is not a feeling of the enjoyer on his own account; it involves a dropping of self-consciousness, while the feeling that is enjoyed—the feeling of the third person—is freed from its reference to an individual subject and eternalised in the Heart Universal.

13. Can we keep up the scheme of three persons or three grades of feeling—contemplative, sympathetic and primary—in the case of the enjoyment of the beauty of a natural object? Here also we may take the second and the third persons as imaginary and implicitly intervening between the contemplator and the object. Only here the third person is evanescent—some person rather than a particular imaginary person like the character in the drama spoken of. When I appreciate the beauty of a natural object, I imagine in the first place a particular primary feeling—say, joy or sorrow or fear—according as the object has a joyous or melancholy or fearful expression. This feeling is imagined as the feeling of 'some one', of an indefinite third person. The indefiniteness here, like the conceptual character of the second person referred to, is felt and not thought. It implies that the third person is indifferent to me: I am interested less in him than in his feeling. This feeling is next idealised by being contemplated as felt by or reflected in the second person—the Heart Universal. Lastly, I, the first person, feel this idealised feeling as my direct object.

14. Is this an artificial analysis? We have indicated that the beauty of an object does not appear as a mere fact—a quality of the object like its colour but as an expression or value. The expression, however, unlike the reflex of a primary feeling, is not seen as one with the object or adjectival to it but as floating on it or as irradiating beyond it. At the same time it is not presented like the reflex of a sympathetic feeling as an expression 'in the

air' : it is to aesthetic feeling a real eternal value. The beauty of an object, thus, implies three characters distinguishing it from mere fact—expression, detachment from the object and eternity. These three can only be understood in the object as the respective projections of primary feeling, sympathetic feeling, and contemplative feeling. The feelings have to be understood as the feelings of three persons who may, however, all be in one person, viz., the aesthetic enjoyer in three different emotional levels at the same time. Since the last grade of feeling comprehends the other two, we have taken aesthetic enjoyment as not merely a feeling among feelings but as the feeling *par excellence*.

15. The conception of r a s a or aesthetic essence may thus be interpreted entirely in terms of feeling, without any reference to the intellectual Idea or the spiritual ideal. We have indicated the place and significance of aesthetic joy by determining the level or grade of feeling to which it belongs. A further elaboration is necessary to bring out the distinctive flavour of the Indian concept. Artistic enjoyment is conceived not merely as *free* from the entanglement of fact but as the *realisation* of an eternal value, as an identification with the aesthetic essence without loss of freedom. What is the precise sense in which this realisation or identification is understood ? To answer the queston, we have to consider first certain features of primary feeling and sympathy.

16. We have pointed out that in a primary feeling—say, sensuous enjoyment of an object, the distinction of feeling and the object is obscured: the object gets an expression and the feeling loses its subjective detachment. Yet the confused unity of the object-immersed feeling has two alternative directions, the objective and the subjective. In the objective direction the self-feeling lapses: the object alone is perceived as with the expression adjectival to it. But the subject need not be in the perceiving or objective attitude; it may retain the feeling-attitude, while the object perceived gets indefinite and melts away, much as to a drowsy person the fixed world appears to swim and shimmer away into nought. This would be the subjective direction. Instead of the subject forgetting itself in the object, we have the object here getting dissolved in the subjective feeling. To understand it, we have to remember how in respect of an object in one's clasp, there is a difference between trying to enjoy it and actually enjoying it. When one is only trying to enjoy, the

feeling has indeed begun; but there is a constant sense of not being able to enjoy, of the object refusing to be enjoyed, to melt into the feeling. This tantalizing experience constitutes the unreal character that attaches to the incipient feeling. To successfully enjoy, to have the object dissolved in one's feeling, is to get rid of the felt unreality. The feeling here becomes subjectively real: it stands by consuming the object.

17. Two forms of sympathy may be distinguished corresponding to these two directions of object-feeling. Although in sympathy, the distinction between the sympathiser and the person sympathised with is never lost, the two subjects do not simply stand side by side. The sympathiser either feels through the other person's heart or feels the other person within his own heart. In the former case I feel *out* towards the other person, feel my detachment from him to be an evil, seek to forget myself, to feel as though I were the other person feeling and to become the other person in this sense. In the latter case, I feel my sympathy with him to be unreal so long as the other person is foreign and his feeling a mere fact which I cannot feel as mine. In the former I resent my detachment, in the latter his foreignness. In both I strive to feel freedom; in the former by expanding, by projecting myself outwards and in the latter by assimilating or drawing in, feeling his feeling as mine. We may accordingly call these the projective and the assimilative types of sympathy.

18. Similarly the identification with the object in the aesthetic enjoyment has two alternative directions—the projective or creative direction and the assimilative or abstractive direction. What is enjoyed in the object is its beauty which we have taken as an eternal self-subsisting value to which the object is related as a symbol. The symbolising function in the aesthetic sphere is of two kinds. The object that is the symbol may retain its definite character of fact and express a value as its transcendent significate, or its fact-character may get evanescent while the value symbolised gets defined out as a subtile spirit-form, as a dream floating in the ether of the heart and nowhere in space and time. Either way the enjoyer identifies himself with the eternal value. But whereas in the former he enters into the object freely, overcomes its opacity and sees himself as the soul of it, the heart of its reality; in the latter, he dissociates himself from the object as mere fact which accordingly tends to dissolve, to have its hard

outlines softened away, and feels rather than sees the soul of it freeing itself and merging in his enjoyment. In the former, the feeling becomes objective but does not get entangled in the given fact: it transfigures the fact into a value. In the latter, the detachment of the subject does not imply a feeling of unreality: the value or soul of the object is drawn out as it were and reposefully enjoyed. In the former, there is freedom in spite of enjoying contact: and in the latter, enjoyment or reality in spite of detaching freedom.

19. Indian art is prevailingly abstractive or contemplative in character and not dynamically creative: and in the Indian theory of art, the aesthetic essence is conceived as a subjective absolute or r a s a rather than as an objective absolute or beauty.

II

THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE UGLY

20. In the previous part, I did not distinguish between the feeling for the beautiful and the feeling for the ugly. I was concerned there mainly with the general level or grade to which both these feelings belong. In the present part, I have endeavoured to bring out the specific nature of the feeling for the ugly and the varying aesthetic values of ugliness as an objective expression.

21. As in the previous part, so here I rule out the question as to what there is in the object that makes it appear beautiful or ugly. Formal characters like symmetry or unity in variety, such as are ordinarily spoken of as constituting beauty, are not only inadequate for a definition but appear to presuppose the aesthetic feeling from which they derive their specific meaning. For one thing, an important element of beauty is subjective association: the objective formal element is not all. Besides, what does symmetry or unity in variety mean? Any geometrical symmetry is not beautiful: what particular symmetrical form is beautiful depends on the intuition of the artist and thus presupposes the artistic feeling. Similarly as to unity in variety: it all depends on what the artist *feels* to be the satisfying unity. The formal characters in their generality, apart from the particularising feel-

ing of the artist, mean almost nothing. Certain forms in certain contexts may indeed appear beautiful in many cases, though not in all cases. This, however, is a matter of technique which is but a summary of particular artistic experiences. A general theoretic discussion of the objective characters of beauty and ugliness appears to me, therefore, to be unprofitable. Not that I deny that there is something in the object that determines the aesthetic feeling. I believe, in fact, that the aesthetic attitude does not create but only discovers beauty or ugliness, and that while an object that appears indifferent to others has an aesthetic value to one already in the attitude, there are objects which perforce induce the attitude in many souls, if not in all. At the same time I hold that the objective aesthetic quality cannot be discovered except through the aesthetic feeling, that it is only by this feeling and not by any merely intellectual investigation that we can analyse beauty or ugliness in the object, and that the analysis can only be of a piecemeal character in the form of particular intuitions and can never be exhausted by any objective formula. So, as in the previous part, I confine myself here to an analysis of the mental attitude.

22. All feeling implies an identification of subject and object. Contrast the thought of an object with the feeling of it. The former implies a detachment from the object, the latter an intimacy with it. To thought, the intimacy appears to be a confusion, while to feeling the detachment means inanity or unreality of the subject. The subject feels itself real when it is filled with the object, when it feels the object united or identified with itself. What to thought is but a confusion is to feeling a real identity.

23. Identity with the object is felt in all feeling. Is distinction from the object also felt? Not in the grade of primary feeling. In some sense, indeed, all feeling of pain is a feeling of distinction between subject and object, but in the grade of primary feeling, the distinction is not explicitly felt as such. In the grade of sympathetic feeling, the distinction from the object of the feeling sympathized with is explicitly felt while the identity continues to be felt with the primary feeling. The two attitudes, however, do not enter into any relation in this stage: the feeling of identity here is only implicit and is completely merged in the explicit feeling of difference. In the contemplative feeling, both

the feelings of identity and difference are explicit. The subject freely merges into the object and the object tends to get dissolved in the subject. That is the identity. The object gets idealised into a standing expression, into a sort of objective mind and the subject feels real in joy by consuming the object. At the same time the feeling of identity is a process. There survive aspects of the object which stand out un-idealised as full fact and there is a persistent sense of not being able to enjoy along with the joy that has begun. The feeling (as un-idealised fact) of the inability to enjoy is the feeling of distinction between subject and object. It is still a feeling on the aesthetic plane because it would not arise but for the idealisation or enjoyment, the identity that is already felt.

24. If the feeling of identity be called enjoyment, the feeling of difference may be taken as a pain, both the feelings being on the artistic or contemplative level. Now enjoyment and pain cannot simply stand together side by side: one is subordinated to the other, subordination being a unique relation in the sphere of feeling. When the pain is subordinate to the enjoyment, we have the feeling of beauty. Where the enjoyment is subordinate to pain, there emerges the feeling of ugliness and its congeners.

25. To explain. Take the artistic contemplation of sorrow. A well-told tale of sorrow moves one to tears, who yet gets exquisite enjoyment out of it. The pain is here subordinate to the enjoyment. The pain is still explicitly felt and felt in fact more exclusively, though not, it may be, more intensely than by the primary subject of the sorrow. Sorrow to the primary subject has its distraction and has, more often than not, an admixture of other and sometimes quite incompatible feelings such as the subject may be ashamed to confess. But the contemplative subject is absorbed in the sorrow in its purity, stripped of all its accidents. That does not mean that he contemplates the mere feeling of sorrow and has no interest in its objective setting: that would be only logical abstraction. He contemplates the setting also—such circumstances as bring out the feeling and are suffused with the feeling-value, though there is a difference still between the centre of interest and the setting like that between a flame and its halo or irradiated light. But the primary subject of sorrow has not only the sorrow and its aesthetically relevant setting presented to him but also other feelings and objective cir-

cumstances along with them which have no affinity of tone with the sorrow. These are what I call 'accidents'. The aesthetic enjoyer contemplates the painful feeling of sorrow stripped of such accidents. To aesthetically realise or contemplate a person's sorrow is to *feel* the *sorrow*, not to think it, though it is to feel it as a pure eternal value such as the person himself is not privileged to feel. I say 'privileged', because though the sorrow is a more exquisite or penetrating (though not more intense) pain to the contemplator than to the primary subject, the former does not in the feeling lose his freedom like the latter, but feels himself more real as a spirit through the pain than if he did not experience it. So even where the pain is not itself artistically enjoyed, it is no mere evil to be avoided: its purity and depth are in themselves a spiritual value.

26. But the artistic contemplation of sorrow is an enjoyment. The sorrow is felt as an exquisite pain but it is still the object of the enjoyment and in this sense subordinate to it. As a felt object it is one with the enjoyment, turned into it, transfigured. As an object of contemplative feeling, it is still distinct, the sorrow continuing to be felt in its purity within the enjoyment. This relation of 'within' or subordination has only to be accepted as a matter of experience; it can only be explicated, not disputed. So any kind of primary feeling in its purity may be the object of enjoyment and subordinated to it; when the primary feeling is itself an enjoyment, it is completely merged in the contemplative feeling, merging being the limit of subordination.

27. But while any feeling may be subordinated to aesthetic joy, it *need* not be. That depends, so far as the subject is concerned, on the depth of his artistic realisation. Potentially, I believe the artistic spirit can swallow and assimilate every kind of feeling, subordinate the most refractory of feelings to itself, transmute all painful feelings into enjoyment. As a matter of fact, however, it cannot or does not in many cases transmute the presented feeling : it lacks either the energy or the transparency of the soul requisite for it, this being entirely a matter of inborn gift or previous discipline. Artistic feeling represents a new depth of the spirit: contemplative level is deeper than the level of primary feeling or sympathy. But there are varying depths within the contemplative level and a primary feeling which stands out untransmuted in one grade of aesthetic feeling

may be transmuted into joy in a deeper grade. Where a primary feeling presented to the aesthetic attitude is not assimilated, the joy of the attitude is present but gets subordinated to the presented feeling. The presented feeling is here a pain, a feeling that emerges in the joyous aesthetic attitude as distinct from it. So in the artistic contemplation of sorrow just considered, the sorrow is presented as distinct, as a pain to start with. But the pain is there the object of the joy while in the present case the joy is the object of the pain. The joy of the aesthetic attitude is here itself a torture which lends a new value to pain. But for the joy, in fact, the pain would not take the form of disgust. That is the sense in which I understand the subordination of enjoyment to pain. When the aesthetic feeling, unable to assimilate a presented primary feeling, gets thus subordinated to it, it turns into the feeling of ugliness. The implications of this account of ugliness have to be brought out. The primary feeling is here present to the aesthetic feeling. That means it is raised to the contemplative grade, stripped of accidents, isolated in its purity. A fact viewed in the scientific or practical attitude is neither beautiful nor ugly. It is only when it is aesthetically contemplated that it appears beautiful or ugly. When so contemplated, the fact as such retires into the back-ground and its expression or value as due to a primary feeling comes into prominence, this being viewed through the double medium of sympathy, as indicated in the previous part. The primary feeling as presented to the aesthetic attitude is thus itself turned into a contemplative feeling.

28. Next this contemplative feeling enters into a relation with the aesthetic feeling to which it is presented. The aesthetic attitude is in itself a joy, not merely an expectation of joy: it is joyous expectancy waiting to turn by its alchemy any new experience into joy. But the alchemy may not be potent enough. The new experience may be refractory and then the joyous expectancy is turned into bitterness or disgust so that the refractory experience gets an extra painful value, viz., the repulsive or disgusting value. The experience itself as a contemplative presentation is not repulsive: it is so only because of there being baffled expectation of joy.

29. When repulsion is thus felt on the contemplative level, there are many alternative ways in which the spirit saves itself.

The contemplative attitude may be withdrawn altogether and there may be a simple relapse to the normal practical attitude. Or it may happen that the spirit keeps on the contemplative level and the artistically refractory experience is side-tracked into contemplative channels other than the artistic. Received first in the artistic attitude as an un-welcome kill-joy, the experience may be presently draped off for philosophic or religious contemplation. The aesthetic expectancy is retracted but the spirit may be overborne by the hideousness of the world. The ordinary spirit is not artistic enough to stand ugliness for any length of time, to maintain the joy of the aesthetic attitude while either shaking off the repulsive experience or transmuting it into joy with the patience and faith of a courageous love. Yet there are spirits where joy is too deep to be killed by a repulsive experience and whose artistry is potent enough to evolve a beauty rich and strange out of presented ugliness. The aesthetic attitude survives the feeling of ugliness in two ways. It may, in the first place, turn into the feeling of the ludicrous which is just the joy of detaching oneself from or shaking off the repulsive experience. The feeling of ugliness is itself a contemplative feeling but the artistic spirit may retire to a deeper level and rejoicingly contemplate the ugly in an attitude of superior detachment. It rejoices either in having eluded its touch and in being able to watch it from a secure distance or in the sense of power to blow it away and turn it into thought—I mean the explosive power of laughter, these being the two directions of the feeling of the ludicrous. The other aesthetic attitude in which ugliness can be negotiated is what I have characterised as the patient faith of courageous love. The faith that the ugly can be transmuted into beauty is familiar enough in the artistic sphere. It is in fact what makes aesthetic education possible. No one will condemn more than the artist the conceit—which is unfortunately common to-day—that refuses to admit the need of educating the taste and the possibilities of realising what immediately appears ugly as beautiful through such education. It is this faith then that sustains what we may call aesthetic effort—the effort to deepen the feeling of ugliness into an enjoyment, to perceive the immediately ugly in its infinite setting and thus to realise it as beautiful. During the effort, the ugly remains ugly but becomes tremulous with the shimmer of expectant delight; the faith becomes objective as the suggestion

of a beauty that is not yet manifest. And then as the aesthetic faith turns into vision and attainment, there emerges a Beauty Triumphant in which ugliness is itself realised in its quintessence as an object of enjoyment. This enjoyed quintessence of ugliness is just what Indian aesthetic daringly recognises as a *rasa* viz., the *bībhatsa-rasa*. Such recognition does credit to the virility of Indian art and to the Indian theory of art.

ERRATA

Page	line	For	Read
34	7	in	is
36	15	full-bloom	full-blown
43	27	ā k ā ś a: as substance	ā k ā ś a as substance
45	19	indentified	identified
50	35	ś v a l ā t s y ā m a m	ś a v a l ā t ś y ā m a m
53	28	Were it not	[Were it not
53	32	is not he	is not the
63	30	the (last three)	(the last three)
64	33	This empirical world	This (empirical world)
64	36	It was	It saw
73	28	all consciousness in	all consciousness is
79	29	it alto-	is alto-
86	39	ā k ā ṁ ṣ ā	ā k ā ṁ k ṣ ā
144	22	if	of
151	34	being	been
160	6	body.	body).
169	21	p a r i ṇ m a	p a r i ṇ ā m a
171	33	to the	to be
171	36	a cyclic	cyclic
177	38	made	mode
178	4	as spatial	is spatial
187	32	take it is	take it as
191	13	b u d d t i	b u d d h i
193	27	atc	act
203	22	p a r o p a k ā r a k a	p a r o p a k ā r a k a).
204	6	someone	some one
208	19	p r a k ś a	p r a k ā ś a
209	17	feeling which in	feeling in
209	27	imagintd	imagined
224	10	as l i ṅ g a-m ā t r a)	(as l i ṅ g a-m ā t r a).
227	3	willng	willing
230	32	reffective	reflective
246	9	Where	Here
248	3	circumstances	circumstånce
258	29	ia v ṛ t t i	a v ṛ t t i

Page	line	For	Read
262	32	P a t a ñ a l i	P a t a ñ j a l i
263	7	B h ā r a are indted	B.h ā ṣ y a are indeed
263	37	as unreal	as real
264	31	cocentrated	concentrated
265	18	b a d h a	b ā d h a
272	2	s a ṁ k i r ṇ a	s a ṁ k ī r ṇ a
275	6	seetion	section
279	2	the opposite	is the opposite
284	18	achieved a by	achieved by
301	22	t a t a s t h a	t a t s t h a
305	18	patricipation	participation
305	23	willing con-	willing is con-
306	6	or	and
308	19	reliigious	religious
320	15	a s ṁ v e g a	s a ṁ v e g a
326	9	primary	primarily
336	15	add infini-	ad infini-
342	12	nego-	nega-
352	27	adjective	adjectival